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THE PAPACY AND THE CRUSADERS IN  
THE EAST, 1100-1160

by

John Gordon Rowe

Volume II

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FORT TWO

Pope, Creek and Crusader



Section One:

THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE AND THE CRUSADERS

1. The Western Policy of John II Comnenus<sup>1</sup>.

Upon the death of Alexius, the Byzantine throne passed to his son John. Although determined to follow in the political policies vis à vis East and West laid down by his father, John's attention at the outset of his reign was devoted primarily to wars against the Turk to the East and the barbarian tribes to the north. Hence, his active interest in Europe was slight. Fortunately for the Empire, the Normans in south Italy were engrossed in internal difficulties.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps also because of these disorders among the Normans, the new Emperor was able to regard the Venetians with a less benevolent eye. Venice had assisted the Empire in her two struggles against Norman aggression. Now that the Norman menace seemed to have abated, the Empire need no longer be so concerned with the maintenance of good relations with her commercial rival on the Adriatic.

Despite the occasional flash of hostility, as in the case of the Venetian expedition in 1100 to the East, Alexius and Venice had been on friendly terms. It had been Alexius who had raised Venice, in recognition of her invaluable services against Bohemund and Guiscard, to a position of supreme importance in the commercial life of the Empire. The privileges accorded to Pisa in 1111 had been of such an inconsiderable nature as not to threaten the monopoly which the Venetians had on commerce with the Latins within the Oecumene. It may be that John, feeling more secure from the





Normans than his father, resented the great commercial position which the Venetians held within his realm. Perhaps he also resented the growing power and independence of Venice. In 1115 Venice, admittedly with some assistance from Constantinople, had waged successfully a war against Hungary and the Dalmatian counts, seeking to recover territories granted to her by Alexius by the chrysobull of 1084 after the Guiscard war<sup>3</sup>. Her growing position of power in the Latin States of the East further reminded John that one day Venice might become too powerful<sup>4</sup>. Perhaps he could also see the ruinous effects for Byzantine merchants of Venetian pre-eminence in the commercial life of his realm, and the loss in revenue for the State due to the exemptions which Alexius' chrysobulls had granted to Venice.

For these reasons, the Emperor, upon his accession to the throne of his father, failed to renew the elaborate commercial privileges which his father had granted to Venice. Reprisals were in store.

When, as we shall see, at papal request, the Venetians dispatched a fleet to the East, equipped with a papal banner indicating the papal blessing on the expedition, the Venetians attacked unsuccessfully Corfu, and upon their return from the siege of Tyre they pillaged other Greek possessions, notably Rhodes and Samos. Before this display of hostility, John gave way at once. The privileges granted by Alexius were restored to Venice.<sup>5</sup> All in all, the Empire lost considerable prestige. Venice became a hostile force within the Oecumene which would have to be placated henceforth with favourable treaties in order to avoid trouble. The speedy defeat of the Empire by Venice must have illustrated Greek weakness to those in the West who both despised and feared the Greeks or who dreamed of the conquest of the Empire.



A further result of this quarrel with the Venetians may well be the re-opening of discussion between Emperor and Pope concerning the reunion of the churches. Perhaps the Emperor resented the fact that the marauding fleet had sailed under a papal banner. Perhaps Calixtus II was disturbed that the quarrel, which seemed to have a semblance of papal backing, should alienate the Greeks still further. However, we do know that the Pope took the initiative and broached the subject of church reunion. John at this time seemed encouraging to the idea of reunion and professed himself grateful for the papal initiative. However, any further discussion was broken by the death of Calixtus and the outbreak of a new war between Byzantium and the Turks.<sup>6</sup>

Although we have no evidence to support the contention, the chances are that the Greek intention here was the same as it had been during the reign of Alexius and Paschal: the defence of the realm from Latin attacks, such as those of Bohemund and now of Venice; the unification of the imperial crowns of East and West; the separation of the Papacy from the Normans of south Italy. In all likelihood, the third aim was the most powerful one in the mind of the Greek government. The Normans remained always a menace which had to be dealt with unless they themselves were rendered inert by internal discord. By this time, also, the Emperor had seen that the Empire could not remain merely on the defensive in the face of Western power in the Mediterranean. Greek diplomacy thus takes on the character of a more offensive movement, aiming at ever-expanding power in the West and the East. It may be therefore that John, in addition to a line of policy which would split the Norman from the Papacy also attempted to develop another line of diplomacy which had also as its aim the



reduction of the Norman power. There is evidence which would lead us to believe that the Emperor began to sound out the Normans with regard to a marriage which would unite the houses of the Comneni with that of Guiscard.<sup>7</sup> The evidence has been challenged, but I incline to believe that such a marriage was in the air at this time.<sup>8</sup>

This more aggressive diplomacy was to receive a check from the Emperor himself. It is possible that John became uneasy, feeling that as yet the Empire could not become embroiled in the endless ramifications of papal-Norman politics. In 1125, the ambassadors of Honorius II arrived in Constantinople to take up the matter of church reunion where Calixtus had left it. Unfortunately, the text of the papal letter does not survive to us. The imperial reply does, and it gives us at least some indication of the line of approach taken by the Pope. At the beginning of the letter, John makes a reference to the "two swords", whose union, the Emperor agrees, is the highest goal. From this we may conclude that the Pope pointed out to the Greek ruler that if the churches of East and West were united, that it would be possible for the Papacy and the Eastern Emperor to find basis for an alliance which would bring together once and for all the two swords, the spiritual and temporal powers, by which the entire world was, in the providence of God, to be governed. This is only a suggestion, but as such it does open up to us the most tantalising possibilities as to the aims and the purposes of papal policy at this time. The striking thing is that John, with the possible union of the imperial crown of East and West held out before him by the Pope, refused to continue the negotiations. In a friendly manner which rebuffs the papal overtures in the most gentle fashion, the Emperor declared himself adverse to the organic union between the



two churches. Perhaps, as we suggested, the uncertainty of the papal-Norman alliance frightened John away. Perhaps also the Greek hierarchy had indicated to the Emperor that it would not acknowledge the Roman supremacy. Perhaps too the Emperor himself had not cared for the papal understanding of the famous and venerable "two swords" theory which, if adopted, would have split, as we have suggested, the unity of the Oecumene, a unity which was at the very heart of Byzantine society. For whatever reason, the negotiations came to nothing. The Papacy was not likely to forget that it had been rebuffed in this matter.

It was just as well for John that he remained out of the shifting sands of the Papacy's relationship to its frightening Norman vassals in south Italy. If the pontificate of Honorius II was a peaceful one with regard to Germany, France, England and Spain, it was most unsettled with regard to the Normans.<sup>10</sup> In 1127, William of Apulia died, leaving no direct heir. His cousin, Roger of Sicily, took advantage of the unsettled conditions to enforce his claims on south Italy. Honorius, on the other hand, as suzerain of Apulia threw his lot in with the disaffected baronage who resisted Roger's claims. Despite the fierce language which Honorius used to proclaim a veritable crusade against Roger<sup>11</sup>, the papal forces were defeated in 1128 and Roger was invested with William's duchy.

The vitality and ambition of the new Sicilian ruler were thus made manifest to Western Europe. His vision of power covered the entire East. Even when under the regency of Adelaide, he had begun a series of expeditions against the Saracens of North Africa. These were to continue throughout his reign.<sup>12</sup> Further proof of his ambition is found when we recall the terms of the treaty made when





his mother contracted the fraudulent marriage with Baldwin of Jerusalem. If the couple were to die childless, Roger was to inherit the crown. Only the opposition of Arnulf and the baronage nullified this arrangement. Roger neither forgot nor forgave the *Latins* of Jerusalem for their insult to his pride and honour.<sup>13</sup>

It is probable that the Greek government knew of these pretensions. Further, the Greeks could see the dangerous possibilities of Roger's expeditions to North Africa. Perhaps one day the Norman would control the central passages of the Mediterranean, thus dominating the commercial routes of the Empire and the Italian Maritimus. Further, when in February, 1130, Bohemund II, Prince of Antioch, was killed in battle, Roger had put himself forward as his heir. The difficulties of Roger with his Italian vassals and the struggle, soon to begin, connected with the schism in the Papacy, had made it impossible for the Norman to intervene decisively within Antioch.<sup>14</sup> Was it not clear then to the Greeks that the Sicilian monarch was attempting a vast encirclement of the Empire? Certainly such ideas were encouraged by those refugee Norman barons from Southern Italy who took refuge in John's court at Constantinople. It was to their advantage to encourage John's dreams of the destruction of Roger of Sicily.<sup>15</sup> Some campaign of attack would have to be initiated and a Western ally found to combat Roger. Here the course of Western politics played into John's hands. In 1130, the schism between Anacletus and Innocent II broke out in Rome, Thanks to St. Bernard, Germany, France, England and Spain declared for Innocent. Anacletus was supported primarily by Roger who in the year of the schism took advantage of the situation to effect his own coronation and have it ratified by the anti-pope. This was a clear defiance of the rights



and claims, not only of John Comnenus, but also of Lothair of Germany. While the first expedition of Lothair in 1133 returned Innocent to Rome long enough to effect Lothair's coronation, the battle was still undecided in 1135, between Anacletus and Roger on one side and Innocent and Lothair on the other.<sup>16</sup>

Into this struggle came John. There had been some diplomatic contact between the two empires in the early years of his reign.<sup>17</sup> However, nothing positive had developed from these. Now, the Emperor decided to proceed against Roger of Sicily and to further this plan he sent an embassy to Lothair in the early summer of 1135. When the ambassadors of Constantinople passed through Venice, they were joined by representatives of Venice who had also complaints against Roger and who feared his power. At Merseberg in August, 1135, the ambassadors of the two powers complained to Lothair against Roger for his "attacks" on their possessions. As for his usurpation of the royal title, they pointed out that Roger had thus taken southern Italy and Sicily away from the Western Empire. By such argument the Greeks hoped to enlist Lothair's assistance in their plans to destroy the Norman power in south Italy and Sicily. Actually, their aim was to pay Lothair to undertake an expedition against Roger whom they described as traitor and rebel against Lothair's imperial crown. Not only this, there was another purpose for their East-West alliance, beyond the destruction of Roger II. As we shall show, at this time, John was beginning to think of an expedition against Antioch. For this, it would be necessary to protect the Western flank of the Empire against Roger who might take advantage of imperial involvement in the East to invade the western territories of Byzantium. Their arguments were



enhanced by costly gifts presented to Lothair. They asked for a treaty by which Lothair would agree to punish Roger, and the Greeks and Venetians would agree to furnish not only men but also any quantity of money which was necessary.

To all this Lothair responded well, and he sent out Anselm, Bishop of Havelburg, to conclude the treaty in Constantinople.<sup>18</sup>

We do not know the details of the legation. However, it is clear that the veteran negotiator, Anselm of Havelburg, returned in the spring of 1136 with a treaty concluded.<sup>19</sup> It would seem also that while during his stay at Constantinople he had many theological discussions with the Greeks, including the learned Nicetas, Archbishop of Nicomedia. We are fortunate in that Anselm in later years attempted to reconstruct his formal debate with the Archbishop.<sup>20</sup> Suffice it to say for the present that the entire work had as its aim the reconciliation between the Latin and Greek churches and particularly the diminution of Latin prejudice against the Greeks.<sup>21</sup>

John was pleased with the results of his mission to Lothair. He sent off a new one which had as its object an alliance with Piss who for several years had been the enemy of Roger II.<sup>22</sup>

When Anselm returned from the East in the spring of 1136, he found Lothair making preparations for his descent on Italy. In this he was encouraged principally by Innocent II who had no effective defence against the power of the king of Sicily.

Lothair crossed the Alps in 1137. At first his campaign was successful. Little credit for this was due to the Greeks. They failed to fulfill their promises of aid for the expedition. All



they had to offer ~~was~~ fair words of encouragement to Lothair encamped at Lake Pesoli.<sup>23</sup>

Lothair's quick expulsion of Roger from Italy proved to be an illusory success. The climate, disease and mutiny forced him to abandon his military plans. He died in December, 1137, on his way back to Germany.

There was from this invasion of Italy by Lothair in 1137, one ominous result. We can assume that the Papacy knew of the part played by John in encouraging Lothair to undertake the punishment of Roger. What its reactions to this Greek interference in the affairs of Italy ~~was~~ we can only conjecture. However, during the visit of the Greek ambassadors to Lothair in south Italy in 1137, there was a most deplorable incident.

A certain Greek, described by our chronicles as a learned man, was among the legation to Lothair. Without any apparent provocation, the Greek attacked Latin Christianity and more especially the Roman Church, accusing them of serious crimes. The Western Church had departed from the decrees of the council of Nicaea; she had introduced the "Filioque" clause into the Creed. For this reason the Greek did not hesitate to describe the Western Church as excommunicate. As for the Papacy, the Greek ambassador attacked its worldliness and ambition. The Pope was a warmonger, a militarist, as we would say. Having ended his accusations, the Greek then proceeded to defend not merely the claim of the Emperor of Constantinople and the Empire but also the faith and practice of the Greek church.<sup>24</sup>





We have seen that the Emperor John had repulsed the attempts of the Papacy at reunion. We see now an unequivocal expression of hatred for Rome on the part of a Greek. We are uncertain as to the status of this spokesman. However, since he was a member of the Greek legation to Lothair, his remarks must have been judged to carry some degree of official sanction. Not all Greeks felt this way. Nicetas of Nicomedia, with whom Anselm of Havelburg had an amicable theological debate, had been friendly and understanding. Yet Anselm records the compliment paid by Nicetas to himself during the course of discussion. Anselm was, - at long last, - a Latin who was a true Catholic, i.e. he did not behave with contempt for Greek faith and practice.<sup>25</sup> From this we may conclude that many Greeks felt the Latins had been led astray by an all-consuming pride. We can also conclude, therefore, that the irate Greek spokesman was voicing an opinion not unshared by members of Byzantine society at this time. The language and the concepts of this attack are very similar to those of Anna Comnena, whose contempt and hatred for Rome and certain aspects of Latin Christianity we have already described.

Thus the steady process of deterioration in relations between the two churches had reached a crisis. The Papacy had been rejected by John; now she was openly attacked. There was also the Greek intervention in the affairs of Italy. Innocent was aware of this and was too acute not to perceive possibilities dangerous to the Roman church. Perhaps one day the East-West alliance would destroy the Normans. Perhaps then only the Greeks would be left as possible papal protectors. How could this succeed without recognition of the Roman primacy by the Greek church,



and John had rejected organic union? More, how could this succeed if the Emperor of New Rome refused to accord the Roman See the liberty which was hers by right. Having emancipated herself and the Western Church from the control of Emperor and Layman, she might find herself helpless before Byzantine Caesaro-papism. Or again, with Greek intervention continuing in Italy, the Papacy might find itself either driven from Italy and Rome by the natural disorders attendant upon war or torn between the contending powers of German, Greek and Norman. These fears are to be added to the probable papal reaction to the attack on Rome and Latin Christianity by the Greek ambassador. Together they are to be set in the context of the estrangement between the Churches arising from conflicting ideologies and diverse political aims, from the Crusade and the ambitions of Bohemund of Antioch. Of this estrangement we have spoken before. Decisive developments were but a short time away.

## 2. The Byzantine Advance against Antioch

The Empire had never abandoned its claim to Antioch, established once and for all by the defeat of Bohemund in 1108. However, trouble with Hungary, the Slavs, Patzineks and the Turks, kept the soldier-Emperor John from exercising any power over the Norman principality. Yet with the increasing strength of the Empire during his reign, the occasion soon appeared when John might intervene decisively in Antioch. It is during his reign that the ambition of the Byzantine Emperors to become the benevolent suzerains of the Latin States becomes clearly marked.<sup>27</sup>

In Antioch, the power, after the death of Bohemund II, had fallen first of all to the Princess Alice who acted as Regent



for the heiress, Constance. That her principality was in difficulties was plain. After the death in battle of Bohemund II, the Armenians had expanded into Cilicia, ejecting the Byzantine garrisons and at the same time becoming dangerous to the Norman

principality.<sup>28</sup> There was the power of the emir Zengi. Hence in 1135 Alice offered the hand of Constance to Manuel, John's younger son. This was explicit recognition of the Byzantine claim to Antioch. The imperial suzerainty of Antioch seemed to be assured.<sup>29</sup>

However, as we shall describe later on, in another connection, the diplomatic gesture of Alice was resented by the Norman barons, the Patriarch of Antioch and the King of Jerusalem. Although the Emperor John agreed to Alice's proposal, the agreement was rendered null and void when the baronage of Antioch, with Fulk of Jerusalem's advice, summoned Raymond of Poitou to the East to marry Constance and take up his duties as prince. The young French noble arrived in 1136.<sup>30</sup>

John thus might well feel slighted. His son Manuel had been rejected. His suzerainty had been flouted by the actions of the Latins who had not consulted him in regard to Raymond. He determined to humble the Normans. Further, there were the raids of the Sultan of Iconium to check and the Armenians to punish for their insolent advance into Cilicia. Perhaps also he was encouraged by the war which had broken out between the Armenians and Raymond, shortly after the arrival of the latter in the East.<sup>31</sup> To the West, the imperial flank had been secured by the alliance of the two empires against Roger of Sicily. John could feel that he was free to advance his power in the East.



Leaving his capitol, with his great army he advanced quickly through Asia Minor. The Byzantine military power and brilliance, so magnificently recorded by William of Tyre, swept all before it. The Armenian holdings crumbled: Tarsus, Mamistra and other fortresses were no match for Byzantine ~~se~~gecraft. Finally on 29 August, 1137, John appeared before the walls of Antioch. The hour of revenge was at hand when the problem of Antioch was to be resolved once and for all.<sup>32</sup>

The Latins were caught by surprise. Effective resistance was impossible. The infidel general Zengi, hearing rumours of the Greek advance, had decided to turn this to his profit by attacking the fortress of Montferrand. Thus, when John arrived at Antioch, the bulk of the Latin forces were engaged in the relief of the fortress. Raymond was helpless. Zengi's attack destroyed all hope of reinforcements from the South. It was plain that the city could not hold out indefinitely against the imperial ~~si~~ge machines. At first he offered to surrender the city provided he could remain in possession as Imperial Vicar. John refused, perceiving clearly the emptiness of such promises. Raymond consulted Fulk. The King, hoping perhaps that John might advance the Latin cause, acknowledged that the Greek claim to Antioch was legitimate and further that if Raymond submitted John might be induced to render them aid against the infidel, Raymond capitulated and swore homage to John. In this recognition, it is likely that Edessa was also involved. The Byzantine claims to Northern Syria were thus strikingly vindicated.

His suzerainty established, John was disposed to be generous.





The treaty guaranteed to John complete access to the city and to the citadel. Raymond became the vassal of John, swearing fealty and allegiance. Moreover, if John could capture Shayzar, Hama, Hims and Aleppo, Raymond would receive these in perpetual fief while the Greek empire would have Antioch all to itself. Thus John succeeded in gaining recognition for the Byzantine claim to Antioch, and the imperial standard now floated from the citadel. The imperial intention was perhaps to reconstitute the ancient Byzantine duchy of Antioch. Manuel, John's son, would be placed to rule the new duchy and his capitol would be protected by a circle of Latin vassals.<sup>33</sup>

To his own cost, John decided to winter at Tarsus and therefore withdrew from Antioch, leaving Raymond to re-occupy the citadel. When spring came, Shayzar was placed under ~~seige~~ <sup>seige</sup>, April, 1138, the capture of which was the first objective in the new campaign. John was accompanied by the prince of Antioch and Joscelin the Younger, count of Edessa. As if by pre-arranged plan, the Latin princes distinguished themselves by their buffoonery and ineptitude. No friend to the Greek nation, Tyre draws a contrast between the noble heroism of John and the frivolous behaviour of the two Latin princes.<sup>34</sup> The city was, due to its location and its fortifications, all but impregnable. The army of Zengi was an ever-present menace. Furious with the conduct of the Latin princes, John concluded a truce with the emir of Shayzar, raised the ~~seige~~ <sup>seige</sup> and returned to Antioch.<sup>35</sup>

The antics of the two Latin princes seem incredible. How did they dare to make sport of John and the great Byzantine army?



It could be suggested ~~that~~ they had learned of the serious step taken by Innocent II. The news of John's descent on Antioch, the swearing of homage by Raymond, the unfurling of the imperial standard over the citadel, had reached Rome. Mindful of Greek hostility, suspicious of the Greek design in the West, Innocent took action to save Antioch for the Latins.

On 28 March, 1138, he wrote to all the Latin faithful who were serving in the army of the King of Constantinople, or living in his territory. Reminding his readers that those who consent to evil will be punished, Innocent recalled the labours which Catholic men from Italy and beyond the mountains had expended for the liberation of the Eastern Church and for the cleansing of the Holy Places. Innocent has learned that the eastern emperor, who has cut himself off from the unity of the church and from Blessed Peter, has dared to occupy certain cities and the metropolis of Antioch, itself. Therefore, all those who hear faithfully the voice of the mother church are to withdraw from his service and give him no aid whatsoever. If they do so, they forfeit remission of their sins. Thus to participate in the expeditions we have described would be regarded, in the Papacy's eyes, as equivalent to working one's own damnation.<sup>36</sup>

This letter was the most explicitly hostile attack yet made by the Papacy upon the Byzantine Empire. We have described in another place the preparations for such an attack. If we suggested that the Papacy was uneasy about the intervention of the Greeks in the affairs of Italy, there is no doubt that the Papacy was anxious to keep the Greeks out of Antioch. Although



two bishops as representatives of the Pope had witnessed the signing of the treaty of 1108, wherein Bohemund acknowledged the Byzantine suzerainty over Antioch, the Pope seems to have disregarded this agreement altogether. The reason for his motivation is clear: the preservation of Antioch for the Latin princes and the Latin church. The basis for his action was that John was excommunicate, a ruler who had withdrawn himself from the communion of the Church and of the see of Peter. It is not difficult to hear in this an echo of John's refusal to continue negotiations with Honorius II and the fierce attack launched by the Greek in 1137 against the Latin church and the Papacy.

We cannot be certain if the papal letter had reached the East in time to influence the frivolous behaviour of Raymond and Joscelin. That they wished to impede the activities of John is clear, thus attempting to break his hold upon Antioch. If actual resistance were impossible, buffoonery and an assumed frivolity might serve. They thought, perhaps, that if called upon to answer to the Emperor for their behaviour that they could produce the papal letter forbidding all Catholics to assist John in his military undertakings. However, once again, we cannot be sure that they had seen the letter prior to these events.

John returned to Antioch. He entered the city in procession, Raymond and Joscelin walking before him as his marshalls. The Patriarch Ralph, whose difficulties with Raymond of Antioch shall be discussed in the next section, was with his clergy to greet John. Accompanied by the Latin clergy, chanting the Te Deum,



and to the applause of the inhabitants, John was led in state to the cathedral to make his devotions and thence to the palace.

What followed there, as related by Tyre, has something of the character of a comic opera. The Emperor established himself in the palace of Antioch and proceeded for several days to enjoy the baths and also to demonstrate to the citizens of the city his liberality. Finally, these diversions exhausted, he summoned Raymond into his presence. He declared that the military operations that he had planned to execute had been revealed to be of a more difficult nature than he had expected. Therefore, he demanded the possession of the citadel which he would use as an arsenal for his military operations. Tyre himself acknowledges the fact that the request was reasonable. On the other hand, to Raymond and his advisers, it seemed that Antioch, which had been so dearly purchased with Frankish blood was about to pass, once and for all, into the hands of the "effeminate Greeks". Nonetheless, they had no choice but to accept the conditions of the Eastern Emperor. This done, the Count of Edesse and Raymond set out to eject the monarch from the city by trickery.

According to William of Tyre, who relates the story with great relish, the Prince and the Count incited the populace of Antioch to riot. The mobs gathered, thanks to the invention of sinister rumours by Joscelin who had it put about that John intended to occupy the city and evacuate it of its inhabitants. These brought the desired effect. A mob collected, shouting defiance of John and killing any member of the imperial household they happened upon.





To the native Christians, John's presence was alarming in that it augured the return of the repressions of official Greek Christianity. To the Greek heresy was always close to treason. The native Christians saw in John a threat to the spiritual freedom of their respective religious communities. For the Latins, it was an insult to racial pride, a betrayal of the heritage of Bohemund. To the Latin clergy of Antioch, it meant removal from their place of power and authority. John had not required of Raymond that a Greek patriarch be introduced into Antioch.<sup>37</sup> However, this was the fear of the Latin clergy. Further, by this time, they had probably heard of Innocent's action against John. We can be sure they did all they could to bring about the expulsion of the Emperor. For all and sundry, the presence of John spelled the return of oppressive Greek taxation. For the Italian maritimes in particular, it was a threat to their commercial monopolies in the Latin East.

The ruse was successful. John left the city for fear of continued outbreaks and demonstrations.<sup>38</sup> A reconciliation followed. The representatives of Raymond saw that John was too powerful to be disregarded. They excused Raymond from complicity in the riot and alleged that he as prince would surrender the city and citadel if required to do so. John seemed to accept these excuses. He declared that reasons of state compelled his departure to Constantinople. He would return soon to fulfill his promises. Nevertheless, the fact remained that aside from recognition of his theoretical suzerainty over the city, John had only the conquest of Cilicia, some captive Armenian



princes and the cross of Romanus Diogenes to show for his so-journ in the lands of the Normans.<sup>39</sup>

However, the campaign was a success in that it re-asserted Byzantine influence in the Latin States. Further, the Byzantine claim to Antioch had been conclusively established. The Empire could perhaps look forward to the establishment of its power on the Euphrates and the recognition of its suzerainty over the Latin States.<sup>40</sup> Perhaps the dream of Alexius, i.e. the erection of a line of vassal states on the frontiers of the Empire, might come to pass. It was to the Greek advantage to have a series of vassal states which would heed the general wishes of the Emperor in Constantinople, and yet have to bear the brunt of the attacks of barbarian and infidel. These considerations must have consoled John on his march home after the humiliation he had received from Raymond and Joscelin.

### 3. The Second Campaign of John Comnenus

The position of the Latins in the next few years remained precarious. Fulk was defeated in 1141 at Ascalon. Zengi's power in the north knew no limitations. Raymond and Joscelin were estranged. Raymond thus was in need. There was only the Byzantine Emperor to turn to. The practical results of Innocent's letter do not seem to have amounted to much beyond encouraging perhaps Raymond, Joscelin and certain factions in Antioch to force John's withdrawal. However, the principality grew weaker. It was either John or Zengi. The Prince and the Count chose the former and sent off a message to John requesting that he fulfill his promises made in the treaty of 1137.



John realized the Latin predicament. This time, however, he would not have his army used for Latin protection and then he repaid with insult and betrayal. This time, Antioch would be reduced to a vassal duchy, annexed to the Empire in theory and in fact. Giving out the report for public consumption that he was setting out to punish the Armenians for their continued defiance and that he might also wish to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, John set out for Antioch. No embassy was sent to Antioch, John hoped to take them by surprise.<sup>41</sup>

The Byzantine army advanced swiftly. Turning aside from the road leading to Antioch from the Cilician Gates, John overran the county of Edessa. Having secured himself to the east, by taking a hostage from Joscelin, he turned back to Antioch.<sup>42</sup> When he reached the borders of the principality, John sent an ultimatum to the prince, demanding possession of the city and the citadel. He intended to use Antioch as a base of operations against the infidel. He promised also that he would interpret with liberality the terms of the agreement which he had made in 1138.<sup>43</sup>

Raymond was now in a most difficult position. He had summoned John in order to protect himself against Zengi. However, he was not supported in this by his advisers. They pointed out that if Antioch were surrendered, the city would fall into the hands of the infidel. The Latins, in their fierce pride assumed, with some justice it should be said, that the Greeks could not effectively defend the city. By way of an excuse which would give Raymond an opportunity to save his



face with John and not alienate him completely, they offered this: Raymond could not dispose of his wife's patrimony - without the acquiescence of the citizens and lords of Antioch. Thus Raymond might be able to argue his way out of his promise made in 1138 that he would surrender the city to John.

Accordingly an embassy of barons and clerics was despatched to John. In the name of Blessed Peter, the Patriarch and citizens of Antioch, John was forbidden to enter the city. They declared Raymond's agreements to be null and void. They indicated that they would never consent to the transfer of the patrimony of Constance into Greek hands.<sup>44</sup>

A more significant theme was expounded by Hugh, Bishop of Jabala. Addressing the emperor bluntly to his face, and claiming to speak on behalf of the Roman pope and the Western emperor, the Bishop demanded that he desist in his attempt to occupy the city.<sup>45</sup> As we have remarked before, the advent of John raised before the eyes of the Latin clergy of Antioch the spectre of a Greek patriarch restored to Peter's patriarchal see. Then too, as we shall recount in the next section, Antioch had been visited in November - December, 1140, by the papal legate, Alberic, Cardinal bishop of Ostia. While evidence is lacking, the legate may well have ordered the Church of Antioch to contest all Greek encroachments. The papal letter of 1138 would make this a likely supposition. This may well have been for the basis of the defiance of John by this suffragan of the Patriarch of Antioch who claimed to speak on behalf of the Pope. The account in Otto of Freising and Tyre indicates just how deeply the Papacy and the





Latin Church were involved in this attempt to save Antioch from the Greeks.

These words angered John. Strangely, he decided to withdraw to spend the winter in Cilicia. Before doing so, he decided to try another tack with the Latins. He wrote to Fulc of Jerusalem indicating his desire to pay his devotions at the holy shrines. He also promised to lend military assistance to Fulc if such were necessary and useful. To this generous if devious request, Fulc replied. The emperor's offer was refused although he was permitted to bring a small force with him to Jerusalem. The realm would not support his entire army. Thus Fulc professed himself ready to receive John as "the great lord of the world" only if he came as a pilgrim but not as a conqueror<sup>46</sup>. This was as far as the Latins dared to go. The Latin fear is easy to understand. If they had accepted John's offer of military assistance, they would be acknowledging in fact, if not in theory, the imperial suzerainty over the realm of Jerusalem.

It was plain to John that he was not wanted. Rebuffed by all the princes of the Latin Orient, John returned to his winter quarters in Cilicia. While there, he was mortally injured during a hunting party and died on 8 April, 1143. His dreams for the capture of Antioch and for the domination of Syria were at an end. Although the historian William of Tyre has nothing but praise for his character, it is plain that the relationship between Emperor and crusader had not improved during the reign of John Comnenus. However, the imperial ambition had been displayed and had achieved some success over the Latins. It was



destined to receive fulfillment, brilliant, if transitory, during the reign of Manuel.<sup>47</sup>

The question remains: why did John withdraw from Antioch? He had been angered by the rebuff of the Latins. Indeed Tyre called their action "far from laudable".<sup>48</sup> It was true that Antioch, a masterpiece of Byzantine fortification, would have presented many problems if John had decided to storm the city. Secondly, the season was far too advanced for a prolonged siege. The principality was in a weakened condition, however, and it is likely that John could have effected its capture. If he had obtained possession of the city, he would have been able to have forced the Latins to acknowledge him as their protector and suzerain in the East.

While John certainly wished this role, there were factors which he saw would prevent its achievement. In the first place, he wished to rule Antioch as a duchy, a vassal state, available to the Empire as a base of military operations. To do this, he would have to have the willing support of the citizens of Antioch. This was not forthcoming, and John probably realized that even if he captured the city, this would not bring him the desired goal. Besides, such an event might turn the rest of the Latin Orient against him. Of course, there is the further consideration that John did not feel sufficiently strong to attack Antioch and then to hold it by himself against both Turk and Latin. He knew that if the city were lost while in Greek hands, the reputation of his Empire with the Latins in East and West would be ruined irrevocably.



There were other considerations. From the lips of the bishop of Jabala had issued the voice of the Latin church at Antioch, ever fearful of the return of the Greek church, and the voice of Rome. The prelate had spoken on behalf of the Papacy. John undoubtedly knew of the hostile letter of Innocent. Perhaps therefore he feared further reprisals from the Papacy. The occupation of Antioch might become a bone of contention which would render useless any attempts at church re-union which he might consider politically expedient in the future. Rome had damned him as excommunicated. That could be repaired. But could it be repaired if the imperial standard floated over Antioch?

It is significant that the Bishop of Jabala claimed also to speak on behalf of the Western emperor. We have seen the establishment of the Byzantine-German alliance against Roger of Sicily. When Lothair died in 1137, the German princes elected Conrad III as his successor. Like his predecessor, he hated the insolent Roger of Sicily for his disregard for the imperial crown. Roger fanned <sup>the German's</sup> ~~Conrad's~~ hatred by constantly fomenting rebellion against Conrad.<sup>49</sup> On the other hand, it was to the court of Conrad that many deprived Norman counts came seeking redress against the "tyranny" of Roger.<sup>50</sup>

As for Roger himself, although the anti-pope Anacletus had died in January, 1138, he had scored a great triumph over the Papacy. Innocent, having launched an excommunication against him at the Lateran council of 1139,<sup>51</sup> undertook to punish Roger in person. However, Roger defeated the papal army at Garigliano in July 1139<sup>52</sup> and forced Innocent to recognize his royal title



and confirm his possessions by papal investiture.<sup>53</sup> This recognition was not pleasing to Conrad, nor was there any encouragement to imperial ambition to be found in the overwhelming triumph of Roger who had restored on his own terms the Norman-papal alliance.

When therefore John sent an ambassador to Conrad early in 1140 to renew the alliance between the two empires against Roger, Conrad was pleased to favour this plan. Further, he showed himself agreeable to John's proposal that his son Manuel be united in marriage to a German princess. For a suitable bride, Conrad suggested his sister-in-law Bertha of Sulzbach. To continue the negotiations, he sent back Albert, his chaplain, and Alexander, count of Gravina, a Norman baron in exile from the realm of Roger II. They were to continue the negotiations leading to an alliance against Roger and to offer the hand of Bertha to Manuel. Conrad also asked John to render justice to some German merchants who had been attacked by the Ruthenians in his realm.<sup>54</sup>

In 1141, Innocent had broken with his vassal Roger over the question of royal control of episcopal elections.<sup>55</sup> So great was the estrangement that Innocent II now seems to have opened up the matter of German intervention in Italy to Conrad.<sup>56</sup> Embrico, Bishop of Wurzburg, had been sent by Conrad to discuss the matter with Innocent. The growing entente between Conrad and Innocent against Roger was strengthened by the support of Venice.<sup>57</sup>

A new embassy arrived in January of 1142.<sup>58</sup> The letter of John is lost, but we possess a full copy of Conrad's answer in





Otto's Gesta.<sup>59</sup> Despite a slightly condescending tone, e.g. references to the empire of New Rome as the daughter of Old Rome and the reference ~~to~~ "daily legations" from all parts of Europe suing for Conrad's favour, the alliance against Roger and the betrothal of Bertha to Manuel were accepted as accomplished diplomatic facts. The letter also referred to the papal desire for Conrad's intervention in Italy, due to the papal troubles with the Romans. Conrad again asked for Greek justice against the Ruthenians on behalf of the German merchants and also for imperial permission that would enable the Germans living in Constantinople to have a church of their own. The letter was carried to Constantinople by Albert and Robert of Capua. To this John replied expressing gratitude and appreciation to Conrad and praising the excellent work of the dogs of Venice. Through his ambassadors he offered Conrad advice on the situation in south Italy.<sup>60</sup>

Roger was not unaware of these developments. Indeed, he sought to meet the danger by opening up negotiations with John which would lead to a marriage between one of his sons and a Greek princess. However, the negotiations came to nothing because of John's death in Asia Minor.<sup>61</sup>

We have made this digression in order to summarize the relations existing between the two empires. By the time of John's departure for Antioch in 1142, he could see great possibilities for the future relations between the Empires of East and West. A coalition might develop which would encircle the power of Roger of Sicily. That Roger was a threat to the Empire



was plain. The past history of the house of the Comneni's relations with the Normans of south Italy, the ambition of Roger to extend his power to north Africa and even to the Latin East, these made Roger the principal enemy of the Byzantine Empire. Admittedly, we can only deduce the following suggestion by inference, but it seems likely that one of the factors in John's withdrawal from Antioch was his desire to do nothing which would disrupt the harmonious growth of a papal-German-Byzantine coalition against Roger.

He realized that at best his alliance with the Germans was insecure. The condescending tone of Conrad's letter hid an antagonism which was to become plain during the reign of Manuel. Its basis, in brief, was the claim on the part of each to be the true and only successor to the glory and power of Rome. To Conrad, even at this period, as the letters preserved in Otto's Gesta will show, John was, at the most, emperor of Constantinople while he, Conrad, was emperor of the Romans. In turn, for John, Conrad was only "rex".<sup>62</sup>

The Bishop of Jabala had spoken on behalf of the German emperor and the Pope. With the prospect of an alliance with these two leaders of the West before him, and mindful of the consequences if he captured Antioch, John hesitated to storm the Latin stronghold on the Orontes. It is suggested here that his withdrawal was due in some measure to his desire to pursue Byzantine goals in the West, especially the humiliation of Roger of Sicily. Perhaps for the sake of that goal, he was willing to sacrifice ambition of his house to recover that city whose possession



the cunning of Bohemund, historical circumstance and the ill-feeling generated by the Crusade had denied to the Byzantine Empire. However, there was the promise of the future. In 1142 John was waited upon by ambassadors from Genoa. Their exact purpose is unknown to us, but it was a sign of the advancing Greek prestige in the Mediterranean.<sup>63</sup>



FOOTNOTES:

1. We repeat once again the standard works for this period: F.Chalandon, Histoire de la Domination Normande en Italie et en Sicile (two volumes, Paris, 1907) and Les Comnènes, Etudes sur l'Empire Byzantin aux XI<sup>e</sup> et XII<sup>e</sup> siècles. II. Jean II Comnène (1118-1143) et Manuel Ier Comnène, (Paris, 1912), the companion volume to the work on Alexius I; E.Caspar, Roger II (1101-1154) and die Gründung der Normannisch-Sicilischen Monarchie, (Innsbruck, 1904). Indispensable are the volumes of W.Bernhardi, Lothar von Supplinburg, (Leipzig, 1879) and Konrad III, (Leipzig, 1883), these being part of the series Jahrbücher der Deutschen Geschichte. We cite again the trio of works concerning the crusade, S.Runciman, A History of the Crusades, (three volumes, Cambridge, 1952-1954); R.Grousset, Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume Franc de Jérusalem, (three volumes, Paris, 1934-1936); R.Rohricht, Geschichte des Königreiches Jerusalem, (Innsbruck, 1898); W.Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, (Berlin, 1903) and L.Bréhier, L'Eglise et l'Orient au Moyen Age. Les Croisades, (Paris, 1921); W.Heyd, Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen Age, (translated from the German by F.Renaud, two volumes, Leipzig, 1936, second impression); A.Kretschmayr, Geschichte von Venedig, (two volumes, Leipzig, 1965-1920); A.Fliche, R.Foreville, J. Rousset, Du premier Concile du Latran a l'Avenement d'Innocent III, (being volume nine, of A.Fliche, V.Martin, Histoire de l'Eglise depuis les Origines jusqu'a nos jours, part one, Paris, 1948). This work will be referred to as Fliche, Histoire IX-I.
2. For the Norman kingdom at this time, see Chalandon, Domination Normande, I, pp. 320-326, 355-404; E.Caspar, op.cit., pp. 25-88.
3. See the Historia Ducum Veneticorum, MGSS, XIV, p. 73; Dandolo, Chronicon, RIS (new), XII, I, pp. 217, 229-230; Annales Venetici Breves, MGSS, XIV, p. 71.
4. Although his hate and scorn are clear, Kinnamos had a vivid appreciation of Venice's rapid rise to power. See VI, 10, CSHB, pp. 280-281.
5. These Venetian attacks are recorded in the Annales Venetici Breves, MGSS, XIV, p. 71, the Historia Ducum Veneticorum, MGSS, XIV, pp. 73-74; Dandolo, Chronicon, RIS (new), XII, I, pp. 233-236; Fulcher, III, 61, RHCocc., III, pp. 470-471, Hag.Fulcher, pp. 758-761. Fulcher here shows his great impartiality between Latins and Greeks. The Venetian action is heavily criticised. For the treaty which gave them a third of Tyre, see Fulcher, III, 36, RHCocc., III, p. 467, Hag.Fulcher, pp. 745-746. See also Dandolo, p.234, Kinnamos, VI, 10, CSHB, p. 281. The privileges were restored to Venice by John in August, 1126. See Dölger, II, No. 1304. See Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, pp. 157-158. The chrysobull is printed in Tafel-Thomas, I, pp. 95-98, 115-123 and in JGR, III, pp. 434-439, 519-523. See Heyd, op.cit., I, p. 196 and Kretschmayr, op.cit., I, pp. 229, 458, A.3. At the same time new privileges were given to Venice in Cyprus and Crete, Dölger, II, No. 1305.





6. Dölger, II, No. 1302, dated June, 1124. The texts may be found in J.Ch.Amadutius, ed.B.Stephanopoulos, Epistulae tres Graecolatinae (Rome, 1781), pp. 378-384 and A.Theiner and F.Miklosich, Monumenta Spectantia ad Unionem Ecclesiarum Graecae et Romanae, (Vindobonae, 1872), pp. 1-4. See also Norden, op.cit., p. 91.
7. Liber Pontificalis, II, p. 322-323.
8. Chalandon, Domination Normande, I, pp. 321-322, challenged the account in the Liber Pontificalis. It presents difficulties in that it says that Duke William of Apulia went to Constantinople to arrange for the marriage. This is all but impossible. No other source lends any weight to this. However, the report is probably a record of rumours concerning a possible Norman-Greek marriage.
9. Dölger, II, No. 1303, dated April, 1126. Text printed in Amadutius, op.cit., p. 369 and Theiner and Miklosich, op.cit., pp. 4-6.
10. The text which follows is derived from the accounts of Fliche, Histoire, IX-I, pp. 42-70, Chalandon, Domination Normande, I, pp. 380-404, II, pp. 1-80; Caspar, op.cit., pp. 61-197.
11. See Falco of Benevento, who reports the pontifical harangue on 30 December, 1127, at Capua, PL, 173, cc. 1197-1199.
12. Chalandon, Domination Normande, I, pp. 367-379, II, pp. 157-166.
13. Tyre, XI, 29, Krey-Babcock, I, p. 514, RHCOcc., I, p. 506.
14. Tyre, XIV, 9, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 59-60, RHCOcc., I, p. 619. Roger's influence was so great that Raymond of Poitou was forced to go to the East in disguise in order to elude the agents of Roger. Tyre XIV, 20, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 77-78, RHCOcc., I, pp. 635-636.
15. Kinnamos, II, 4, CSHB, p. 37, refers to one of these disaffected nobles. See Chalandon, Domination Normande, II, p. 29.
16. At the council at Pisa, in 1135, Innocent promised to all those engaged in the struggle with Roger and Anacletus the same indulgence that Urban had placed on the crusaders at the council of Clermont, see JL, I, p. 865, canon 11. See also P.Kehr, Italia Pontificia, VIII, pp. 39 ff.



17. Ekkehard, Chronicon Universale, MGSS, VI, p. 256, c. 1121. reports the death of Burkhard, Bishop of Münster while on an imperial mission to Constantinople.
18. This mission to Lothair is Dölger II, No. 1309. The above is based upon the accounts in the Annalista Saxo, MGSS, VI, p. 769; the Annales Erphesfurdenses, MGSS, VI, p. 540; Annales S. Petri Erphesfurdenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 18; Annales Magdeburgenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 185; Canonici Wissegradensis Cont. Cosmae, MGSS, IX, p. 141; Translatio Godehardi Episcopi Hildesheimensis, MGSS, XII, p. 649. For secondary works, see Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, pp. 164-168; Domination Normande, II, pp. 55-56, Caspar, op.cit., pp. 167-188, Bernhardt, op.cit., pp. 575-576. For a study of Anselm's legations to the East, see J. Dräseke, "Bischof Anselm von Havelburg und seine Gesandtschaftsreisen nach Byzanz", (Zeitschrift für der Kirchengeschichte, XXI, 1900), pp. 160-175.
19. The Annalista Saxo, MGSS, VI, p. 770 says he was home at Easter-tide.
20. The Dialogi of Anselm may be found in FL, 188, cc. 1139 ff. While the treatise was written for Eugene III, it is difficult to date it although 1149-1150 is probably the best guess. Anselm, in the prologue, c. 1139, harks back to a discussion he had had with Eugene on the differences in faith and practise of the Greek and Latin churches. The bishop described the conversation as taking place "quoniam ego aliquando Magni Lothari Romanorum imperatoris augusti legatus fui in Constantinopolim". The papal register makes 1149-1150 the most likely date to fit this description, JL, II, pp. 61-69. Further as we shall argue at a later point, in 1149-1150, Anselm was desperately concerned to help his master Conrad III who was allied with the Greeks against the vast diplomatic alliance created by Roger II after the Second Crusade.
21. Anselm's argument was to show the essential agreement of the Greeks and Latins in matters of faith and to plead for a charitable understanding of diversity in Christian practise. He further attempted to reduce Latin prejudice by pointing out that many saints and popes had been Greeks. If so, how could they have been in error in matters of faith? See IL, 188, c. 1161.
22. Dölger, II, No. 1310, No. 1312. See the Annales Pisani, RIS (new), VI, II, p. 10. The texts are in Müller, pp. 45, 54; Miklosich-Müller, III, pp. 9-15. See Heyd, op.cit., I, p. 197. For the activities of the Pisans against Roger, see Romuald's brief summary, RIS (new), VII, I, pp. 220 ff.



23. Dölger, II, No. 1313. See the Chronica Mon. Casinenses, MGSS, VII, p. 833; Annales Hildesheimenses Cont. Paderbornensis, MGSS, III, p. 116.
  
24. The account is in Peter the Deacon, MGSS, VII, p. 833.
  
25. PL, 188, c. 1204: "Videor mihi invenisse hominem Latinum vere catholicum; utinam tales Latini istis temporibus ad nos venirent nam si aliqui venirent, ambularent in magnis et mirabilibus super se, et nequaquam talia, nec tam catholica, ne tam humilia, sed superba et intolerabilia nobis loquantur".
  
26. It seems safe to assume, since the event is recorded by a member of the Abbey at Cassino, that the Pope received a full report of the Greek's charges.
  
27. This benevolent attitude is shown by John's intervention on behalf of the Latins held captive by the infidel, Dölger, II, No. 1298, date uncertain. For the difficulties encountered by John in his reign in Anatolia see Nicetas, De Iohanne Comneno, V-VI, IX, CSHB, pp. 27-29, 45, Kinnamos, I, 6, CSHB, pp. 14-15 and Michael the Syrian, III, pp. 223-224, 227, 237-239. Chalandon's account of his difficulties with the Turks is based principally on these sources, Jean et Manuel, pp. 35-48, 77-91. In my judgment, the best survey of the relations between John and Antioch is to be found in C.Cahen, La Syrie du Nord à l'Époque des Croisades, (Paris, 1940), pp. 347-368.
  
28. Michael the Syrian, III, pp. 230-233 and Gregory the Priest, RHCarmen, I, p. 152. For the activities of Leo of Armenia at this time, see Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, pp. 107 ff.
  
29. John's claim to Antioch was based upon the treaty of 1108, not upon the oath of 1098 as Bréhier, L'Eglise, p. 101, incorrectly says.
  
30. For the above, see Kinnamos, I, 7, CSHB, pp. 16-17. For a more detailed account of the fortunes of Antioch in this period see Runciman, op.cit., II, p. 200-202.
  
31. Michael the Syrian, III, pp. 244-245. Michael says the primary reason for John's invasion was to chastise the Armenians.
  
32. Kinnamos, I, 7, CSHB, pp. 16-17; Tyre, XIV, 24, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 83-85, RHCOcc., I, pp. 641-642. See also H.A.R.Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle, pp. 240-241.



33. Tyre, XIV, 26-30, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 87-93; RHCOcc., I, pp. 645-653; Kinnamos, I, 1, CSHB, pp. 18-20; Michael the Syrian reports the treaty, III, p. 245; Nicetas, De Iohanne Comneno, VII, CSHB, pp. 36-37; Orderic Vitalis, XIII, 34, V, pp. 98-102, his account being designed to exalt the heroism of Raymond in the face of Greek power. See also Dolger, II, No. 1314; Norden, op.cit., pp. 74-75; Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, pp. 126-127; Runciman, op.cit., II, p. 309; Rohricht Geschichte, p. 211.  
  
As for John's desire to create a duchy for Manuel, see Kinnamos, I, 10, CSHB, p. 23.
34. Tyre, XV, 1, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 94-96, RHCOcc., I, pp. 655-657; Dölger, II, No. 1317.
35. Tyre, XV, 2, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 96-97, RHCOcc., I, pp. 657-658; Kinnamos, I, 8, CSHB, pp. 19-20; Nicetas, De Iohanne Comneno, VII-VIII, CSHB, pp. 37-41; Michael the Syrian III, p. 245. See Dölger, II, No. 1318. Dandolo's account of the behaviour of Raymond and Joscelin supports Tyre. See p. 236, RISS (new), XII, I. Other sources for the siege of Shayzar, H.A.R.Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle, pp. 248-252; Bar Hebraeus, p. 264; Usamah, pp. 26-28, 143-144.
36. JL, 7883, PL, 179, cc. 354-355. See Norden, op.cit., pp. 75-76. La Monte is incorrect when he suggests that Innocent acted to defend Antioch as a papal state which he feared would be lost to Greek control. See his article "To What Extent was the Byzantine Empire the Suzerain of the Latin Crusading States?" (Byzantion, VII, 1932), pp. 253-264, reference here, p. 255.
37. On the other hand, Ibn al-Qalanisi thought so. See H.A.R.Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle, pp. 245-246. I would think this unlikely since Byzantine statescraft was nothing if not realistic. Perhaps the chronicler is reading the demands of Manuel, twenty years later, back into the reign of John. However, in other captured cities which John annexed directly to his realm, he did restore the Greek episcopate. See Odo of Deuil, Berry edition, p. 68. However, here there was no question of outright conquest and annexation.
38. Tyre, XV, 3-4, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 97-101, RHCOcc., I, pp. 658-663.
39. Tyre, XV, 5, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 99-102, RHCOcc., I, pp. 663-665; Michael the Syrian, III, p. 245. The cross of Romanus taken at Manzikert, was given to John by the emir of Shayzar. As for the Armenians, see Dölger, II, no. 1316.





40. It is during the reign of John that the dream of a restored empire in Asia and Egypt begins to take form and substance. See Kinnamos, VI, 9, CSHB, p. 278 and Nicetas, De Iohanne Comneno, VII, XI, XII, CSHB, pp. 36, 52, 56.
41. For this, see Kinnamos, I, 10, CSHB, pp. 22-23 and Nicetas, De Iohanne Comneno, XI, CSHB, p. 52. Tyre confirms Raymond's invitations, XV, 19, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 123-124, RHCOcc., I, pp. 688-689.
42. The movement against Edessa shows that John was determined to rely on military power this time, not empty oaths of suzerainty, for the control of Antioch.
43. Tyre, XV, 19, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 123-124, RHCOcc., I, pp. 688-689. For the second descent on Antioch see also Gregory the Priest, RHCarmen, I, p. 157 ff.
44. For a Greek version of John's rebuff at Antioch see Nicetas, De Iohanne Comneno, XI, CSHB, pp. 52-53. More reliable, however, is Tyre, XV, 20, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 124-125, RHCOcc., I, pp. 690-691. See Dolger, II, No. 1323; Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, pp. 187-190.
45. Otto of Freising records the actions of this bishop in his Chronicon, VII, 28, MGSS, p. 263.
46. Tyre, XV, 21, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 126-127, RHCOcc., I, pp. 691-693. Kinnamos, I, 10, CSHB, p. 25 represents his desire to visit Jerusalem as inspired by piety alone. Nicetas confirms this, in part, XI-XII, CSHB, pp. 52, 56. See Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, pp. 188-191.
47. Tyre, XV, 22-23, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 127-129, RHCOcc., I, pp. 693-696. Tyre fully supports the reverence and affection in which John's subjects held their imperial master. Complete reports of his death and his appointment of Manuel as his successor may be found in Kinnamos, I, 10, CSHB, pp. 24-28 and Nicetas, De Iohanne Comneno, XI-XII, CSHB, pp. 53-64. Western accounts record his death, the Caffaro Annales, FSI, I, p. 31; the Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, p. 452. His death is reported briefly, without comment, by Michael the Syrian, III, p. 254.
48. Tyre, XV, 20, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 125, RHCOcc., I, p. 690.
49. See Godfrey of Viterbo, Pantheon, MGSS, XXII, pp. 260-261; Historia Welforum Weingartensis, MGSS, XXI, p. 468 and the Annales Hermannii Altahenses, MGSS, XVII, p. 391.



50. Godfrey of Viterbo, Pantheon, MGSS, XXII, pp. 260-261; Otto of Freising, Chronicon, VII, 23, MGSS, XX, p. 261.
51. Falco of Benevento, Chronicon, PL, 173, c. 1249.
52. Falco of Benevento, Chronicon, PL, 173, cc. 1249-1253; Romuald, RISS (new), VII, I, p. 225; Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XII, p. ; Annales Caccanenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 285; Annales Tarfenses, XI, p. 589; Otto of Freising, Chronicon, VII, 24, MGSS, p. 261; Orderic Vitalis, I, 24, I, p. 191 and Godfrey of Viterbo, Pantheon, MGSS, XXII, p. 260.
53. For the papal bull, JL, 8043, PL, 179, cc. 478-479; see also Falco of Benevento, Chronicon, PL, 173, cc. 1251-1253; Annales Herbispolenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 2; Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 309.
54. The basic account here is the Gesta Friderici of Otto of Freising. The account is most difficult to handle with regard to a chronological presentation of these negotiations. For this first stage see, Otto, Chronicon, VII, 28, MGSS, XX, p. 263. Gesta, I, 23, MGSS, XX, p. 363 and I, 24, MGSS, XX, p. 365. The mention of the Ruthenians enables us to distinguish this legation from the ones which followed. This mission is Dölger, II, No. 1320. See Bernhardt's Conrad III, pp. 266-267; Caspar op.cit., pp. 360-361.
55. For this rupture, see Chalandon, Domination Normande, II, pp. 108-112.
56. Otto, Gesta, I, 25, MGSS, XX, p. 364. This information is cited in the letter discussed below.
57. Otto, Gesta, I, 24, MGSS, XX, p. 364. The doge of Venice is mentioned in John's last letter to Conrad discussed below.
58. Dölger, II, No. 1321.
59. The letter is in Otto, Gesta, I, 23, MGSS, XX, pp. 363-364.
60. Dölger, II, No. 1322, dated in the late spring of 1142, printed in Gesta, I, 24, MGSS, XX, p. 364.
61. This abortive negotiation recorded by Kinnamos, III, 2, CSHB, p. 91.



62. It would be instructive to quote the incipits of the two letters preserved in Otto, Gesta, I, 23-24, MGSS, XI, pp. 363-364: "Conradus Dei gratia Romanorum imperator Augustus Iohanni eadem gratia Constantinopolitano imperatori -----  
Ut parentes nostri, videlicet Romanorum imperatores antecessores nostri, ad antecessores vestros, scilicet et regnum et populum graecorum, constituerunt -----". "Iohannes in Christo Deo fidelis rex Porphyrogenitus, sublimis, fortis, augustus, Comes et imperator Romanorum, ad nobilissimum fratrem et amicum imperii mei, nobilissime et delecte amico imperii mei, rex, -----". The letter ends: "Vale, nobilissime amice imperii mei, rex".
63. Caffaro, Annales, FSI, I, p. 31.



Section Two:

THE LATIN CHURCHES IN THE EAST

1. The Patriarch Gormond of Jerusalem.

Baldwin and his Patriarch died in the year 1118. However, the alliance between throne and patriarchal chair remained unchanged. The Patriarch's last triumph was to secure the election of Baldwin of Edessa as King of Jerusalem as over the claims of Eustace of Boulogne, brother of Godfrey and Baldwin I.<sup>1</sup> Arnulf lived to see Baldwin given the insignia of royalty,<sup>2</sup> dying but a few days after this event. His successor was Gormond, a native of Picquigny in Picardy, in the diocese of Amiens. William of Tyre, who despised Arnulf, speaks of his successor as a straightforward man who feared God.<sup>3</sup> Tyre declares that under him the patriarchate was administered with renewed vigor and honour.<sup>4</sup> By the first week of May, 1118, Gormond was in possession of the see of Jerusalem. His conduct of office was vigorous, and the history of his pontificate can well be said to coincide with the history of the reign of Baldwin II, so great was the close union of policy between them.

At this time, the fortunes of war were not with the Latins. Repeated earthquakes, a series of crop failures and their own inner divisions combined with the attacks of the heathen to render the Latin position a difficult one in the East. This was particularly true to the north in the principality of Antioch where in 1119 the main strength of the army of Antioch had perished with Roger at the "Field of Blood".<sup>5</sup> What is significant in this for us is that Baldwin II became the effective overlord of the entire Latin states in the East.<sup>6</sup>





In all these difficulties it was clear to the pious that all was not well with the Christian cause in the eyes of God. It was plain that He was punishing them for their sins. Hence there was need for moral reform which would propitiate the Deity. In the year 1120, the patriarch undertook the reform of the morals of the crusaders. Meeting at Neapolis in Samaria, in January of 1120, Gormond, joined by the king, summoned the crusaders to repentance and reparation. A series of twenty-five canons were passed in council. The canons, preserved in Mansi, concern the payment of tithes to the church of Jerusalem, evidently a source of friction, and the application of the most severe penalties to the extirpation of adultery and sexual perversion.<sup>7</sup> What is important to us is that the Latins determined at this council to send appeals for aid to the West, especially to the Pope and the Venetians. The result of these appeals was the Venetian expedition to the siege of Tyre which we described in the previous section.

The Papacy does not re-enter the scene until 1121. The occasion was the confirmation of the election of Gormond and the settlement of disputes which had disturbed the life of the canons of the church of the Holy Sepulchre. In this we see the difficulty of fostering and guiding a church which was far from Rome and with whom communications were so haphazard and uncertain.

In regard to the confirmation of Gormond, the initiative had been taken by Ebremer of Caesarea and the other bishops of the church. On 6 July, 1121, Calixtus II recognized Gormond's election and entrusted to the papal legate, the Bishop of Porto, the pall which the legate would deliver to Gormond personally.<sup>8</sup> The letter, which ends with the usual command that the Latins of Jerusalem obey



their rightful metropolitan, begins with Calixtus' declaration that the crusaders owed reverence and obedience to the Roman church as their mother. Perhaps the delay in requesting the necessary papal confirmation of the election had suggested the Pope that the church of Jerusalem did not have the proper respect for the Roman church. The crusaders were reminded that the Roman church had liberated the Church in the East through the expenditure of blood and further that to that very day the Pope laboured daily on their behalf in Italy and beyond the mountains.<sup>9</sup>

To the legate the Pope also gave letters which dealt with the regular canons of the Holy Sepulchre. One letter, to Gerard, the prior, confirmed the rule and the possessions of the canons.<sup>10</sup> Another, directed to Gormond, declared that the cantor and sub-precentor could not live outside of their cloister. The officials of the Order had taken to living in places outside of the cathedral close, thus violating the spirit and letter of their rule. Not only this, they had hired others to perform their duties for them. This also is forbidden by papal command. The erring monastics were to stay in the cloister and perform their duties faithfully.<sup>11</sup>

However aside from these problems, the life of the Church in Jerusalem continued to <sup>develop</sup> ~~live~~ in peace. Gormond was a capable Patriarch whose relationship with the king was so close and whose prestige was so great that when Baldwin II suffered imprisonment by the Saracens, it was the Patriarch who took the decisive steps to defend the kingdom.<sup>12</sup>

## 2. The See of Tyre.

We have already described the quarrel which had broken out between the churches of Antioch and Jerusalem. Jerusalem had extended



its conquests to churches which traditionally belonged to the patriarchate of Antioch. Paschal had sanctioned this development although protests from Antioch had forced him to attempt to limit his concession to Jerusalem by a closer definition. However, the solution was to prove unsatisfactory. The capture of Tyre seemed likely at this time. There was no question but that Tyre had been the premier metropolitocal suffragan under the patriarchate of Antioch. Yet Jerusalem was in the ascendancy among the Latin States. As I have said above, the disasters to Antioch in 1119 had rendered Baldwin II the effective suzerain of the Latin establishment in the East. It was Jerusalem which effected the capture of Tyre. Thus the second stage in the quarrel between the two patriarchs was about to open.

We have seen how Antioch had protested her loss of her rights to Paschal. The issue there was that the county of Tripoli under Bertrand was in vassalage to the kingdom of Jerusalem and yet the cities of the county fell well within the orbit of the ancient patriarchate of Antioch. As we shall see, farther along in this section, the bishops of the ecclesiastical province of Tyre, i.e. Tripoli, Tortosa and Jebail, were loyal to Antioch. Probably they were aided in their defiance of Jerusalem in that the vassal relationship between the Count of Tripoli and the King of Jerusalem fluctuated in strength. As we know in 1111, Bertrand of Tripoli had given an acknowledgment of the Emperor's suzerainty to the ambassadors of Alexius Comnenus. If Bertrand's son Pontis threw over the Byzantine alliance, he made friends with Tancred, marrying his widow in 1115.<sup>13</sup> The count of Tripoli's relationship to Antioch remained a close one. Indeed he was restive under the oath of vassalage to



Jerusalem by which Bertrand had bound his county as a fief to Baldwin I. In 1122, he tried to throw this off, but was unsuccessful.<sup>14</sup> We must remember that strictly speaking Tripoli was not part of the realm of Jerusalem,<sup>15</sup> and this and Pons' connection with Antioch probably permitted the Patriarch of Antioch to continue to hold the cities of the county of Tripoli in subjection to himself.

On the other hand, Jerusalem was clearly in control of Beirut, Sidon and Acre. Yet these cities were once part of the ancient patriarchate of Antioch. However, no evidence survives to indicate that they were rebellious against the Patriarch of Jerusalem. Despite Paschal's re-definition of this concession to Baldwin, the cities probably remained under the supervision of Jerusalem. Clear evidence for this is lacking. There could be no doubt that they had once belonged to the Antioch patriarchate because they were suffragans of Tyre, suffragan archbishopric within the patriarchate of Antioch.

Thus by the year 1122, the two churches, Antioch and Jerusalem, had all but divided the archdiocese of Tyre between them.<sup>16</sup> However, Antioch was weak, under the regency of Baldwin II who ruled on behalf of Bohemund II.<sup>17</sup> Tripoli had been humbled. The Patriarch of Jerusalem thus thought that little opposition from Antioch would be forthcoming. Since it was plain that Baldwin would effect the conquest of Tyre, he decided to steal a march on Antioch and consecrate an archbishop for Tyre. He could always argue that such was fitting since the major portions of the archdiocese had been reconquered from the infidel. Thus, whether for reasons of politics or pastoral zeal, he consecrated a certain Odo as archbishop prior to the capture of the city.<sup>18</sup> The city itself was taken after a long siege on 7 July, 1124,<sup>19</sup> but just prior to its capture, Odo died.<sup>20</sup>





Gormond's motives become more obscure at this point. For four years after the capture of Tyre, no archbishop was provided for the city. Although Tyre had always been subject in the ancient church to the jurisdiction of Antioch, Antioch did not take the initiative. Finally, in 1128, Gormond consecrated William, the aged prior of the church of the Holy Sepulchre.<sup>21</sup> An Englishman of exemplary life, he was given the church of Tyre which by now was in a state of disorder due to the fact that it had had not proper ecclesiastical supervision.

Tyre was a metropolitical see. Accordingly, William decided to go to Rome to obtain his pall. If we are to believe Tyre, Gormond tried to prevent his going. However, in this he did not succeed and William left for Rome.<sup>22</sup> It is possible that Gormond feared that the Papacy might give Tyre to Antioch. By the first decree of Paschal, Tyre belonged to Jerusalem, since Jerusalem had led the victorious expedition against Tyre. However, Tyre clearly belonged to the patriarchate of Antioch by ancient church law. Thus if the Papacy wished to stand by its later interpretation of the decree of Paschal, an interpretation which gave Jerusalem only those churches which they had captured from the infidel and whose place in diocesan and patriarchal boundaries was in doubt, then Tyre would return to Antioch. If this were decided, then Tyre might take Beirut, Sidon and Acre away from Jerusalem. Another factor which might influence the Papacy in this direction was that the northern suffragan sees of Tyre, in the county of Tripoli, were already in the hands of bishops who acknowledged Antioch. One could never tell what the Papacy might decide to do. Paschal had vacillated. Perhaps Calixtus would do so. The Popes in their ignorance of ecclesiastical



boundaries of the Holy Land were especially vulnerable to appeals from interested parties who could plead their case effectively. Perhaps Jerusalem would lose out if the Patriarch of Antioch and the Prince of Antioch made representations to Rome.

While he had perhaps intended to steal a march on Antioch, through the early consecration of Cdo, perhaps Gormond reflected further on what the future might hold with regard to Antioch. At first he decided to keep Tyre vacant. It seemed safer this way since the problem of Tyre's place in the patriarchal organization of the East might never come up. If so, he could rule Tyre without an archbishop, and continue to rule directly those suffragan sees, Beirut, Sidon, and Acre, without losing control of them through providing them with a metropolitan.

However, he again changed his mind, perhaps frightened by the thought that Antioch might provide an archbishop for Tyre. Then he would lose Tyre and perhaps even Beirut, Sidon and Acre, which belonged of old to Tyre, and therefore to Antioch. Hence he decided to consecrate a second archbishop for Tyre. Yet mindful of the possible developments at Rome, mentioned above, he would keep William from receiving his pall. This would prevent the issue from arising at Rome.

It soon became apparent that William could not be prevented from going to Rome. Accordingly other arrangements would have to be made. The obvious one would be to have the Papacy confirm, this time without definition or qualification, the rights of the crown and the church of Jerusalem to rule the lands they had taken from the infidel. This would secure Tyre, Beirut, Sidon and Acre against the claims of Antioch.



Thus in 1128, the Archbishop of Tyre arrived in Rome to ask for his pall. He was accompanied by Roger, the bishop of Lamlah who was in Rome on behalf of the king of Jerusalem. Honorius settled Roger's business first of all. On 29 May, 1128,<sup>23</sup> he signed a letter which noted with pleasure the glowing reports which had been given to him by the emissaries from the East as to the character and ability of Baldwin. Honorius expressed himself happy that such a lover of righteousness and religion was King of Jerusalem. Honorius then proceeded to concede the kingdom of Jerusalem to Baldwin and to the Jerusalem church, following the example of his predecessor, Paschal. The honour due to the King and the church of Jerusalem must be preserved in its integrity.

The letter continued on to commend Fulc of Anjou. The prelates and lay lords of the realm had prevailed upon Baldwin to invite the Western prince to come to the East to marry the royal daughter, Melisende. Pathetically short of leadership in the Latin Orient, Fulc would bring added strength to the waning power of the crusaders. Honorius thus gave his blessing to the summoning of the count of Anjou, a man who, as the Pope said, was strong and true and who had left behind his barons, people and possessions to offer himself to the service of God and Baldwin. The commendation of Fulc ends the letter to Baldwin.<sup>24</sup>

If one were to read this letter out of context, it might be possible to conclude from the text that at this moment the king of Jerusalem became the vassal of the Apostolic See.<sup>25</sup> However, there is nothing in the letter beyond the words "concede the kingdom of Jerusalem" which will support this interpretation. There is no reference to Baldwin as the Pope's man, no mention of tribute,



the usual sign of vassalage. Further, in this letter, Honorius is determined to do only what Paschal had done for Baldwin I, i.e. preserve to the crown and to the church of Jerusalem those lands conquered by Jerusalem from the infidel. Hence Honorius concedes the realm of Jerusalem to Baldwin and the Jerusalem church with the intention of preserving the integrity of the crown and the church of Jerusalem.<sup>26</sup>

Thus Roger succeeded in having Honorius renew the decree of Paschal. We must remember that the issue here was Tyre. The anxiety of King and Patriarch are clearly indicated, an anxiety centered around the ecclesiastical alliance of Tyre, a spiritual matter which would have the most profound temporal consequences. By this decree, Tyre was implicitly placed within the orbit of Jerusalem. Nothing was said by the Pope by way of modification. It no longer mattered that Tyre's ecclesiastical status was not in doubt since she was by ancient law subject to Antioch. Rome implicitly in this decree set all this aside, thus continuing her policy which aimed at the protection and exaltation of Jerusalem. I think therefore that it would be incorrect to see in this decree an attempt by the Papacy to establish a suzerainty over Jerusalem. On the other hand, the letter is clear evidence of the eminent position occupied by the Papacy in regard to the Latin establishments in the East. By using this great authority, the Papacy was determined to keep peace in the East. Perhaps Honorius saw that Paschal's hesitations had produced nothing but disorder, therefore, the problem had best be settled once and for all. Honorius thought that by giving these territories and cities that he could avoid the tensions and disorders which would arise if a city, say Tyre, belonged





spiritually to Antioch and temporally to Jerusalem. That there were other aims and objectives in the papal action is probable. However, one clear aim was the desire for peace in the churches of the Latin Orient.

Honorius had acted quickly in regard to the mission of Roger of Ramleh. He delayed a few months before he took the necessary action in regard to the archbishop of Tyre. After his letter to Baldwin, there was no need to hurry. In July, 1128, at Bari he issued three letters. Following the order in Jaffé, the first was directed to Gormond of Jerusalem.<sup>27</sup> Honorius in this acknowledged receipt of letters from the patriarch. He had also received William as archbishop of Tyre. He informed Gormond that William had received the pall and the suffragans of Tyre were commanded to obey William as their metropolitan. A second letter ordered the suffragans of Tyre, the clergy and people to render obedience to their metropolitan. The third was addressed to Bernard of Antioch. He was commanded to restore to Tyre the suffragan churches which he had illegally taken to himself. Antioch's claim to Tyre was thus denied in every respect. Tyre belonged within the orbit of the church of Jerusalem, and the precedent set down by Paschal in the decree of 1112 was upheld by his successor without qualification or limitation.

Jerusalem had taken Tyre and to Jerusalem the city belonged. It is interesting that the Papacy confided this last letter to the legate, Giles of Tusculum. Tyre also knew that the legate himself wrote letters to the people of Antioch. These letters still existed in William of Tyre's day but unfortunately he did not see fit to quote them. It may be supposed that these letters from the legate dealt with the same material as did the letter which the pope dispatched to the patriarch of Antioch.<sup>28</sup>



Our historians for the Kingdom of Jerusalem, Fulcher of Chartres and William of Tyre, devoted considerable attention to this problem.<sup>29</sup> William lists Tyre as the chief suffragan archbishopric under the patriarchate of Antioch. As we shall see, certain suffragan churches of the see of Tyre, refused to enter the jurisdiction of the Jerusalem patriarch, thus defying Rome. William, himself Archbishop of Tyre, thus felt embittered towards Rome whose action had split his archiepiscopal see into two camps.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, Fulcher, as we know, cited the decree of Clermont and its reiteration by Adhemar at Antioch in 1098 dealing with the possession of lands recovered from the heathen by the crusaders. This Paschal, and now Honorius, confirmed. We feel that Fulcher agreed with those who upheld the Roman pontiff's decision to set aside the ancient patriarchal boundaries in favour of this new arrangement.<sup>31</sup>

However, the storm was just beginning to rise. The Papacy had acted decisively by letter. Could its commands be put into effect?

Gormond, victorious over the claims of Antioch, died in 1128.<sup>32</sup> The clergy and laity of Jerusalem chose as his successor Stephen, of La Ferté, former abbot of the monastery of St. John in the Valley, near Chartres. Stephen, present in the Holy Land for a pilgrimage, was at his prayers in Jerusalem when he was elected to the throne of the patriarch. His election was inspired by the fact that the church was short of skilled leaders in the East and also that he was kinsman to Baldwin of Jerusalem.<sup>33</sup> However, if it had been Baldwin's intention to place on the throne a man bound to him by ties of blood and therefore one who would work closely with him, he was quickly disillusioned. The election seems to have increased



Stephen's appetite for power. He soon resurrected the dreams of Daimbert, demanding the control of the city of Jaffa, claiming that if Ascalon were captured that the Holy City should pass under his direct control. It is no wonder that enmity developed between the King and the Patriarch. While Tyre pays tribute to his lofty spirit and zeal for the preservation of his patriarchal "rights", the early death of Stephen was a fortunate event for the kingdom. Because he agreed with Stephen's aims, Tyre reports his death after two years in office as due to royal poison.<sup>34</sup>

His successor was William, prior of the church of the Holy Sepulchre. A handsome Fleming from Salines, he was popular with all because of his evident sincerity. Not a learned man, he could see that the plans of Stephen had been ruinous. They were forgotten. William reigned ever popular through many vicissitudes, some of which we shall consider in their proper order.<sup>35</sup>

### 3. The See of Antioch.

We have already spoken of the position which the Patriarch of Antioch exercised in the life of that principality. If the disasters of 1119 had revealed the great importance of the Patriarch Bernard in the life of Antioch,<sup>36</sup> the patriarchate had suffered a severe check in its ambition at the hands of Rome. When William of Tyre had received his pall, the Pope had commanded Bernard to surrender the suffragan sees of Tyre which he held within his patriarchal jurisdiction.

However, there were ways and means which would make for resistance against Rome if such were desired. Bernard was Patriarch of the city where men were first called Christians and whose first bishop had been Peter. The polyglot population of Antioch per-



mitted Bernard to rule peacefully through a policy which depended on the mutual antagonisms existing between Greek and Syrian and Latin Christian. There was this additional advantage in that Antioch stood contested between Greek Emperor and Latin Prince. Pope, Emperor and Norman prince could be opposed to one another by the patriarch of Antioch if he so desired. These were the possible weapons of defence by which Bernard could defend his patriarchate against loss of prestige and power.

Unfortunately, the principality continued to suffer defeat in the temporal realm. Joscelin of Edessa proved to be an enemy, ravaging the countryside. The bright hopes raised by the arrival of the heir of Bohemund and Tancred, Bohemund II, were dispelled with his early death in battle.<sup>37</sup> Then the capture of Tyre by Jerusalem and its subsequent loss to the church of Jerusalem must have rubbed salt in the wounds of the disordered and weakened principality. However, Bernard refused to heed the command of Rome. He remained in control of the northern suffragan sees in the archdiocese of Tyre. Besides, he was to have assistance in his defiance of Rome from the bishops of the church of Tyre themselves.<sup>38</sup>

In the winter of 1134-1135, William, Archbishop of Tyre, died. His successor was Fulcher, a native of Aquitaine, abbot of the canons of Celles. Fulcher had suffered for his support of Innocent II during the schism of 1130, at the hands of the papal legate Gerard of Angoulême who had favoured Anacletus. He came to the Holy Land and professed the life of the regular canons of the Holy Sepulchre. He was called to rule the church of Tyre and received his consecration at the hands of William, Patriarch of Jerusalem.<sup>39</sup>

As an archbishop of Tyre, Fulcher found himself master of a weakened church. William had not been able to repair the damage





done to the church of Tyre during the four years interregnum when the church of Tyre was without an archbishop. Further, the suffragan sees were still divided between Antioch and Jerusalem. The suffragans who showed their allegiance to the Patriarch of Antioch were Tripoli, holding also the sees of Botron, Arka and Aréthasia, Tortosa, holding Arados and Maraclea, and Jabail. Those owing allegiance to Jerusalem were Beirut, Sidon, holding also the see of Serepta, Banyas (Caesarea Philippi), not yet recaptured from the heathen, and Acre (Ptolemais). As we have said, each patriarch had filled the sees which came into his power, hoping that Tyre would one day be restored to its own metropolitical dignity within the jurisdiction of his own patriarchate.<sup>40</sup> We know that Jerusalem had gained papal recognition for its control of Tyre and indeed Honorius had ordered Bernard of Antioch to relinquish his control of the Northern suffragan sees of the archdiocese of Tyre. Nothing had been accomplished. Even during the weakness of Antioch after 1131 until the coming of Raymond,<sup>41</sup> the Northern sees remained loyal to Antioch. In this connection, it may be pertinent to recall that Pons of Tripoli, within whose county these recalcitrant bishops had their sees, was still restive in his relationship to the king of Jerusalem as overlord. In 1131-1132, he tried once again to throw off the tie and once again he was defeated.<sup>42</sup> No doubt his continued resistance assisted both the bishops of Jabail, Tortosa and Tripoli in their determination to remain loyal to Bernard of Antioch and also Bernard of Antioch in his determination to preserve the integrity of his patriarchate.

Fulcher thus was faced with serious difficulties. What was he to do? He could accept the decision of Rome and accept the loss of those suffragan bishoprics who were loyal to Antioch. They would



not support him in his submission to Jerusalem. On the other hand, he could ignore Rome and Jerusalem and try to re-unite his divided suffragans by throwing in his lot with Antioch. If he could restore unity among his suffragans, the church of Tyre would be restored to health and power. Besides, perhaps the papacy could be induced to change its mind and return Tyre to Antioch. Fulcher and his suffragans seem to have chosen this second alternative. They attempted to withdraw from the jurisdiction of William of Jerusalem.

Hence in the year 1137, we can see the beginnings of Fulcher's activities. He seems to have approached those bishops within the Jerusalem patriarchate. He and the sees of Sidon, Beirut and Acre began to ignore William of Jerusalem who at once complained to Rome. On July 13, 1137, Innocent II wrote to Fulcher and these suffragans, Bernard of Sidon, Baldwin of Beirut, Joan of Acre, ordering them to obey William of Jerusalem as their rightful superior.<sup>43</sup> Even with this clear command, they refused to do so. Submission to Jerusalem meant to them the destruction of the integrity of the church of Tyre. William continued his complaints. On 6 March, 1138, the Pope reiterated his command.

This time the papacy tried a new tack, addressing itself to the bishops of the county of Tripoli, Raymond of Tortosa, Gerard of Tripoli and Hugh of Jebail and also the three bishops of Sidon, Acre and Beirut.<sup>44</sup>

The letter was threatening in tone. Through their continued disobedience, the bishops of the church of Tyre run the risk of closing on themselves the door to heaven. Give William the respect which is due any primate. Fulcher is commanded to behave in the same respectful fashion as his predecessor, William, had done.



The letter closes with a threat of deposition and suspension from office. It would appear that Fulcher had achieved some unity among his suffragans, and that William of Jerusalem was faced with the loss of all the bishoprics of the church of Tyre.

The Archbishop and his suffragans were not rendered silent by this curt papal command. They represented to the papacy that submission to Jerusalem meant deprivation and loss to the honour to the church of Tyre. Innocent tried to soothe their feelings by writing to the Patriarch of Jerusalem. On 17 July, 1138, he wrote to William, administering a mild rebuke for William's apparent lack of consideration for the tender feelings of Fulcher and his bishops. The Pope reminds William that in his day the church of Jerusalem had grown ever more powerful. He should therefore be careful to be all the more humane to his brethren and to honour those who owe him obedience with mutual charity. Fulcher had been commanded to obey him as his superior. Therefore the Patriarch is admonished to be kind to Fulcher, to do nothing derogatory to the church of Tyre. The Patriarch is reminded of the fact that it would be unworthy of him if he did not accord to Tyre the same prominence which Tyre had received under the jurisdiction of the Antioch patriarchate. This means that Tyre would hold the first place of suffragan archbishoprics in the ecclesiastical province of Jerusalem.<sup>45</sup> Fulcher and his suffragans perhaps had found a basis for their complaints in that William was not anxious to accord Tyre the great prestige which she had held in the Antioch patriarchate. As we have suggested above, William would have been happy to rule the churches of the archdiocese of Tyre, directly and not indirectly through an Archbishop with metropolitan authority.



Fulcher refused to bow to Rome. On 28 July, 1132, the Pope wrote again to Fulcher of Tyre. Enunciating the Petrine doctrine of papal supremacy, the Pope declares that he has the right to make shifts and alterations in matters of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Following his predecessors, he has decided that the church of Tyre which once owed obedience to Antioch should now owe obedience to the church of Jerusalem. Fulcher is therefore once again commanded to obey William of Jerusalem. Not only this, anticipating possible action on the part of Antioch, Innocent directs that the Antioch patriarch is forbidden to excommunicate Fulcher for his obedience to the see of Jerusalem. If he dares to do this, Fulcher is to consider the sentence as null and void.<sup>46</sup>

During those years, the patriarchate of Antioch must have been a source of considerable anxiety to the Roman see. In the first place, there was a new patriarch. Bernard of Antioch died in the summer of 1135.<sup>47</sup> After his funeral, the bishops and clergy assembled to choose his successor. They were prevented from doing so. By skilfully demagoguery, the Archbishop of Mamistra, Ralph of Domfront, aroused the Antioch mob who by violence and intimidation, forced the assembled clergy to choose Ralph as patriarch.

Ralph was a man of whose great vitality was equalled only by his cruelty and his ambition. Popular with the lower classes and the knights, he was more warrior than priest. Supported by mob action, this energetic and warlike cleric seized the pall which reposed on the high altar of the cathedral of St. Peter.<sup>48</sup> This was clear defiance of Rome which alone had the canonical right to award this symbol of metropolitan jurisdiction. However, Rome was far away. Her power had been defied by Bernard, by the church of Tyre





and even by the patriarche of Jerusalem. At the outset of his reign Ralph seemed determined to be an independent patriarch. He was in a position of great potential strength. He could play upon the feelings of those who hated Rome for her humiliation of the rights of Antioch. On the other hand, he could, if desirable, invoke Roman protection if it were necessary to defend his see against the Greek Empire and its claims to the principality and patriarchate of Antioch.<sup>49</sup> Such would hardly be necessary. The native Syrian Christians hated the church of the Empire. The action of Ralph therefore should be seen in part as Antioch's reply to Rome's favouritism of Jerusalem. Not only this, fear of Ralph may well have prevented the Northern suffragan sees of Tyre from changing their allegiance from Antioch to Jerusalem. This, in its turn, probably influenced Fulcher to adopt the course of action described above.

The coup of Ralph was successful. Nonetheless the circumstances of his election had made him many enemies. Some clergy refused to do him obedience and Ralph retaliated with oppression and cruelty. He also sought power in the temporal realm. Fulk of Jerusalem was engrossed in the south with rebellion within and the infidel without. Ralph was also aware of the delicate circumstances in which Antioch was placed. There had been no prince since the death of Bohemund II, the principality <sup>being</sup> administered by Bernard and the Princess Alice on behalf of her daughter, Constance. Ralph seems to have effected some kind of alliance with Alice. This, however, proved to be of short duration.

We have already seen how in 1135, Alice, aware of the power of Zengi and wishing to turn her back on Fulk of Jerusalem had offered Constance to Manuel, son of the Emperor John Comnenus. Fearful of Greek power, Ralph, the baronage of Antioch and Fulk of



Jerusalem, in their turn, had opened negotiations which culminated in the arrival of Raymond of Poitiers in 1136 to take up his duties as Prince of Antioch.<sup>50</sup>

Ralph's position at this time was none too strong. His alliance with her had collapsed the moment Alice had made her proposals to Constantinople for a royal marriage. Further, his relation to his clergy had deteriorated quickly. His greed and ambition had made him pose as Prince-Patriarch of Antioch. All opposition he attacked ruthlessly. Distinguished laity were tortured. He vented his spleen on the canons of the cathedral of St. Peter's. He remained indifferent to Rome.

Accordingly he considered what use he could make of Raymond. As the young prince drew near, he therefore began a skilful bit of trickery. He convinced Alice that the young Raymond was coming east to marry her, not Constance. This decoit was designed to secure Alice's support against his clergy.<sup>51</sup> As for Raymond himself, Ralph opened direct negotiations. Making the most of Raymond's precarious position, he demanded and eventually received from Raymond an oath of fealty which gave the patriarch a spiritual suzerainty over the city and principality of Antioch. However his plans went awry. Once married to Constance and in possession of his principality, Raymond began to lend an ear to the many persons who had suffered in times past at the hands of Ralph. He also was irritated by the continued arrogance of the Patriarch and became increasingly restive under the oath which the Patriarch had exacted from him. Within a short time, persecution of the Patriarch began to be apparent.<sup>52</sup> However for the present, Ralph was able to bear this burden successfully. Events played for a time into his hands.



Innocent in Rome must have been disturbed by reports of Ralph's defiance of the Roman primacy, of his methods in governing the church of Antioch and of his quarrels with Raymond. However, these reports of the troubles of the church of Antioch were soon to be eclipsed by the report which reached Innocent probably in the fall of 1137 that the Greek emperor had appeared with full military strength before the walls of Antioch, sweeping all before him. The Pope was also informed, in all likelihood, that John intended to undertake military operations against the infidel in the vicinity of the Latin principality.

This event had a soothing effect upon the relation of the Patriarch to the Prince of Antioch. Raymond knew well that one day, if not at this time, the Greek ruler would demand the introduction of a Greek patriarch into the city.<sup>55</sup> Thus when John appeared at Antioch towards the end of August, 1137, all things pointed to the necessity of an outward reconciliation, at the least between Ralph and the prince of Antioch. The reconciliation was to last only as long as it proved necessary to continue the pretense.

However, the news of these developments brought a strong reaction in Rome. We have seen already in the previous section that Innocent had had a glimpse of the hatred and detestation in which many Greeks held the papacy. He also remembered that John had refused to discuss the matter of church reunion with Honorius II. Now it would appear that Antioch was threatened. Not only this, reports of the submission of Raymond and of the agreement for a combined expedition in the spring of 1138 had reached Rome. The Papacy was determined to defend its own and hence the violent letter of 28 March, 1138 wherein, Innocent referred to John as excommunicated, and threatened with excommunication any Latin who



aided and abetted him in his military operations. We have tried to gauge the precise effect this letter had upon the principality of Antioch and upon the behaviour of Raymond and Joscelin. We suggested that perhaps it served the Latins to resort to guile and trickery in the ejection of their unwanted suzerain.

If peace was not achieved in the north at this time, with the entire Latin control of Antioch now rendered doubtful, there was no certain peace within the churches to the south. We remember that on 17 July, 1138, Innocent had written to William of Jerusalem, counselling moderation and respect in his treatment of the church of Tyre. Tyre was to have in the patriarchate of Jerusalem the same place of honour that she had held in the patriarchate of Antioch. Further we recall the letter of 23 July, 1138, when the Pope once again ordered Fulcher of Tyre to obey his superior, William of Jerusalem, and to ignore any sentence of deposition which might be passed against him by the Patriarch of Antioch. As we suggested, it may be that Innocent was anticipating such an action by Ralph against Fulcher. Rome knew that Ralph of Antioch was completely indifferent to Roman authority. One can sympathize with the feelings of frustration which must have made Innocent and his curia feel uneasy at times. There was Ralph and Antioch, its future within the Latin church in doubt. To the south, the see of Tyre was not yet united. There was Fulcher and his reluctance to accept Jerusalem's authority, and there was William whose behaviour towards the see of Tyre had not been moderate and conciliatory. William had been rebuked in this regard, but the Papacy was to receive proof of just how ineffective this rebuke had been. The Papacy had tried to regulate the boundaries between Antioch and Jerusalem for the sake of peace, and disorder had been its reward.





Sometime before the seventeenth of January, 1139, the new Archbishop of Tyre, Fulcher, appeared in Rome, requesting that he be given the pall which was his by right as a metropolitan. The request was granted at once. This done, Fulcher unfolded for the papal ear a tale of persecution which had been visited upon him by his superior, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, who had attempted to prevent his coming to Rome to obtain his pall. The pall granted, Fulcher returned home where new indignities were heaped upon him. Evidently they were of such a nature that there was no recourse but an appeal for protection to the see of Rome. While the letter which Fulcher wrote to the pontiff is lost, the facts recited above are reflected in the letter which Pope wrote to William of Jerusalem on January 17, 1139 from the Lateran.

In the prologue to the letter, Innocent remarks that by heavenly dispensation the entire magisterium of the Church has been put into the hands of Blessed Peter and his successors. Not without reason therefore is Innocent amazed that the Patriarch of Jerusalem refuses to obey the Roman Church, all the more since that church has laboured so much for the liberation of the Eastern Church. In this cause many of her sons have shed their life's blood. Then the pontiff proceeds to recite the papal grievances against William. He hindered Fulcher in his attempts to come to Rome to receive his pall. Secondly he has treated him miserably upon his return with the pall to the Holy Land. He has denied to the church of Tyre her ancient rights and privileges, perhaps meaning that William had refused to acknowledge the metropolitanical rights conferred by the Papacy according to ancient tradition upon the Archbishop of Tyre. Further, William has refused to restore to Fulcher certain



properties pertaining to the church of Tyre at Haifa and elsewhere. At this point the pontiff declares that he had been ordered to do<sup>so</sup> within three months upon the receipt of a papal mandate to this effect. Perhaps the original mandate was given to Fulcher upon his departure from Rome for the east. No record survives of this letter but, assuming its existence, the letter in question constitutes what might be called a second warning. The pontiff then proceeds to repeat the burden of his advice which he had given in the mandate. It would be a disgrace if the church of Tyre lost under Jerusalem the honour which had been hers when she was under the obedience of the patriarchate of Antioch. William is now given forty days to render to Fulcher that which is his due. If he refuses he will have to face the possibility that the Pope will take the church of Tyre away from his patriarchal jurisdiction and place directly under papal protection.<sup>54</sup>

At the same time, the Pope directed his attention to the unity of the church of Tyre. It would seem that Fulcher changed his policy sometime in 1158. Perhaps he realized that he could not effectively withdraw from obedience to William of Jerusalem. Tyre was clearly within the realm. Furthermore, if he persisted in this action, he recognized that he would never receive his pall from the hands of the Pope. He might be deprived of his see altogether. Besides, Ralph was in Antioch, embroiled in a struggle for power with his clergy and with the prince, Raymond. Perhaps the sees of the county of Tripoli could be detached at long last from the Patriarch of Antioch and his see, adorned with metropolitan rank, unified within the church of Jerusalem.

Thus when he returned from Rome with his pall, Fulcher had much to contend with. In the first place there had been the



humiliations inflicted on him by William of Jerusalem, upon his departure and even upon his return from Rome. That William did not wish Tyre to achieve the status of a metropolitical see is clear. Secondly, there were the six suffragans. Tortosa, Tripoli and Jebail were prepared to remain loyal to Antioch. Beirut, Sidon and Acre now continued loyal to Antioch. Perhaps they hated William of Jerusalem. Perhaps they feared they might fall into his direct control. Perhaps they wanted independence and chose to obey the weaker patriarch. Fulcher even proceeded to declare Beirut, Sidon and Acre deposed if they would not obey him as metropolitan, but to no avail. Thus Fulcher had to complain to Rome not only against William but also against his own suffragans.

Accordingly, in addition to the letter to William of Jerusalem which Innocent issued on 17 January, the Pope also wrote to Ralph. The Patriarch was asked not to prevent the suffragans of Tyre from giving due obedience to Fulcher, their metropolitan.<sup>55</sup> To the bishops of Beirut, Sidon and Acre, he wrote, threatening to uphold the sentence of the archbishop of Tyre of deposition and deprivation, a sentence passed against them by their metropolitan because they had refused to render him canonical obedience. No excuses were to be allowed, i.e. they could not plead loyalty to Antioch. Nor were they to be afraid of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, if they were to obey Fulcher of Tyre. In this last, we receive additional evidence that William himself preferred to rule those sees directly, not indirectly through the see of Tyre.<sup>56</sup> To other suffragans of Tyre, he wrote, informing them that their allegiance to Antioch was null and void. They were bound to obey Fulcher of Tyre.<sup>57</sup>



In regard to this last letter, two things are to be noted. Tripoli, Tortosa and Jebail had been under Antioch for some time. With Antioch's power declining they had been left to themselves. They probably preferred to remain independent of their metropolitan at Tyre and allege as an excuse their allegiance to Antioch. As for the influence of temporal politics in this matter, we have already commented on the relationship existing between Tripoli, Jerusalem and Antioch. We shall have occasion to comment on this again.

Secondly, and this is a suggestion made in connection with Paschal's original decrees in favour of Jerusalem, the Papacy could not help but be uneasy concerning the future status of the Antioch patriarchate within the orbit of the Roman church. By January, 1139, Innocent knew that his bull of excommunication had not destroyed the formal status of the Prince of Antioch as the vassal of John Comnenus. It may have lent encouragement to those who had arranged John's expulsion from Antioch in 1137, but the fact remained that Antioch seemed to be slipping deeper into the Greek net. Hence the papal concern to detach all possible sees from Antioch and join them to Jerusalem. However, once again, and as before, this is only speculation.

The Pope was too astute to suppose that the matter had ended there. Wherever the Papacy turned it could see only disorder in the churches of the East. We can appreciate the papal zeal to rectify this. Disorder in the realm of things spiritual was bound to produce disorder within the realm of things temporal. This imperiling the Christian cause in the Holy Land. Innocent saw a Jerusalem patriarch who refused to honour his metropolitan of Tyre, six suffragans of Tyre who refused to honour either their metropolitan





or their patriarch, and finally a patriarch in Antioch, defiant of Rome, suspected of serious crimes, hated by his prince and many of his clergy and laity, and who was willing to receive the allegiance of bishops who were canonically not his own. Further there was the uncertainty as to the status of Antioch vis à vis the Greek emperor. However, the career of the Patriarch Ralph was about to enter upon new developments.

When John left Antioch, Raymond felt that he could proceed against Ralph. No Greek patriarch was in sight and now was the time to settle old scores.

In this hostility, Raymond had many helpers. We have spoken of Ralph's cruelty. Two men in particular had felt his wrath, Arnulf, a knight from Calabria, and Lambert, Archdeacon of the church of Antioch.<sup>58</sup> These Raymond encouraged to present their complaints before the see of Rome. Not only this, he arranged with Arnulf to make further trouble for Ralph. Arnulf was by birth a Calabrian and indeed ended his days as the Archbishop of Cosenza.<sup>59</sup> Raymond urged Arnulf to accuse Ralph before Roger II of Sicily as the man responsible for the loss of the principality of Antioch from the hands of the house of Bohemund. The Norman house of southern Italy had once established the principality and an excellent case could be made that it was still theirs by hereditary right. With this scheme agreed upon, Lambert and Arnulf embarked for Rome.

They were soon followed by the patriarch. Perhaps the persecution which the prince visited on the prelate was responsible. More likely is the fact that the patriarch wished to defend himself against the charges which he knew would be brought against him in Rome by Arnulf and Lambert. No doubt, with the full cooperation



of the Prince of Antioch, Ralph also embarked on a journey to Rome. This occurred in early months of 1139.<sup>60</sup> Thus, there were two parties travelling towards Rome. When Arnulf and Lambert arrived in Sicily they did their work well. The mind of Roger II was poisoned against the Patriarch who was due shortly to arrive also in the Norman kingdom. Thus when Ralph stepped ashore at Brindisi, he was arrested on the spot and unceremoniously hailed before Roger II, there to be confronted with the accusation that as Patriarch of Antioch, Ralph had been instrumental in the exclusion of the house of Bohemund from the control of Antioch.<sup>61</sup> However, Ralph's splendid appearance and eloquence stood him in good stead. By clear speech and diplomatic behaviour, he brought Roger to reason, convincing him that he was not responsible for the flouting of Peter's claim to the principality. Probably he laid the onus of the charge on the occupant of the principality and his nobles. Be this as it may, Ralph was set free and allowed to continue his journey towards Rome.

At the Holy ~~See~~ <sup>See</sup> he found that Arnulf and Lambert had preceded him. Here once again, the course of victory at the first flowed against the Patriarch. He was poorly received at the Lateran.<sup>62</sup> Yet here also Ralph's great gifts of diplomacy and duplicity won the day. Cleverly he seems at first to have deliberately increased the seriousness of the charge against Arnulf and Lambert had brought against him by openly proclaiming that Antioch was the equal of Rome since both had been the see of Peter, and further that Antioch had a kind of pre-eminence since Peter had first occupied the see of Antioch. It may be that Ralph learned that Rome had been suspicious for some time of Antioch, since a rivalry could be established on this basis. Thus through bombast and deliberate provocation, Ralph was able to secure an audience with



the pontiff, forcing his accusers to present their charges against him publicly. It was plain from the reception of these on the part of the Pope and his advisors that the accusers were fully ill-prepared to substantiate their accusations. The Pope wished to have more information. Accordingly it was suggested that the Pope send a legate to investigate the charges against the patriarch. This Ralph probably wished to prevent. Accordingly he performed a sudden volte-face. Having presented himself as the equal, indeed superior, of Rome, Ralph now rejected this pose. Dramatically, he resigned his pall. In a spirit of repentance he renounced his claims for his own see, renounced his pall since it had been taken illegally in the first place, and made a plea for pontifical clemency. The gesture took all by surprise and made a great impression. It succeeded in distracting attention from the charges which had been presented to the papal court by Lambert and Arnulf of Antioch. Ralph now received a sympathy which surpassed expectations. Instead of waiting for the report of a legate, without delay Ralph was given a new pall. The papacy was relieved more by the disappearance of the Antiochene Petrine claims than by the clear refutation of the charges brought against him. Not only this, restored to communion with the Apostolic See, Ralph was allowed to proceed back to the Holy Land as the rightful possessor of the see of Antioch. Although the Pope intended to send out a legate to investigate the matter more fully, he could feel well pleased with the outcome of his political manoeuvring.<sup>63</sup>

The above reconstruction is based upon the report of Tyre who, as we know, was distinctly hostile to the papacy. It could thus perhaps seem as if the papacy had been skillfully deluded by



the Patriarch of Antioch. We must remember the distances involved, the lack of disinterested information. Further, the splendid gesture of renunciation appealed to many. Ralph had asked for forgiveness. While the charges of Arnulf and Lambert were serious, the Pope could have done nothing less as a priest than restore the pall to the repentant Patriarch. It may also be that Ralph, like another ambitious and thwarted patriarch before him, i.e. Daimbert, pleaded in his favour the manifest hostility of the Prince of Antioch who had "driven" him to Rome. Perhaps also he mentioned Alice's 1135 negotiation with John Comnenas and Raymond's oath of vassalage which had augured the loss of Antioch from the orbit of the Latin Church. Given his submission, it was clear to the papacy that Ralph should be restored, be it for spiritual or political reasons, - or both.

This Ralph left Rome fully recognized as Patriarch of Antioch. He paid Roger of Sicily a friendly visit. Tyre records that he and Roger had many a friendly discussion. Perhaps the wily prelate attempted to secure the friendship of the Norman monarch by holding out the possibility of the restoration of Antioch to the cause of Guiscard.<sup>64</sup>

Ralph returned to the East sometime in May of 1139. There, new difficulties awaited him. The news of his colloquies with Roger II and of his restoration by Innocent preceded him. When he arrived at the Port of St. Simeon, he found Raymond's hostility had not disappeared, despite papal recognition himself as patriarch of Antioch. The clergy of the principality sided with their Prince and therefore it was impossible for Ralph to take possession of his see. Raymond saw in Ralph an insult to his temporal sovereignty and, worse,





a traitor who had concluded a secret alliance with Roger II. Had not Ralph returned on galleys provided by Roger and displaying gifts received from Roger? Thus, faced by Raymond's hate and the aversion of his own clergy, Ralph withdrew from the city. He cast about for supporters. Thence he found in the county of Edessa where Raymond was not beloved by Joscelin and his barons. Invited to Edessa, Ralph was thus received with all due reverence as patriarch by the Edessan hierarchy, led by the miserly Hugh, the Archbishop and metropolitan of Edessa. Thus the patriarch found lodging, if for a time.<sup>65</sup>

However, his exile lasted only a short while. In the first place, Raymond saw that if Ralph were still hostile to his authority, and planning treason with the King of Sicily, that his presence at Edessa, surrounded by obedience and sympathy, did not auger well for his own control of Antioch. Perhaps this was merely an outward sign of a secret coalition which Joscelin, Ralph and others were forming against him.<sup>66</sup> In the second place, he had heard that the Papacy had sent a papal legate, travelling but a few days behind Ralph from Rome, to investigate the entire matter of Ralph and the conditions existing in the patriarchate of Antioch. If the legate arrived and found the patriarch in exile, it might seem to be a clear defiance of the authority of the Apostolic See. The legate would then become a supporter of Ralph and the prelate might be allowed to retain his see once and for all. Accordingly, a reconciliation was effected. Ralph returned to his cathedral. However, Raymond wished no time to be lost in the removal of Ralph and the reversal of Rome's re-instatement of Ralph to the status of patriarch of Antioch.



The papal legate who had been sent out was Peter, the Archbishop of Lyons. Following the usual custom of pilgrims, the legate first repaired to the sanctuaries of Jerusalem to say his prayers. He was not permitted to remain in his pious retreat for long. Arnulf and Lambert, no doubt encouraged from behind the scenes by Raymond of Antioch, summoned Peter to come to Antioch to initiate proceedings against the patriarch. On his way, Peter, a man who was advanced in years, and upon whom the voyage had taken a severe toll, died at Acre, 28 May, 1139.<sup>67</sup> Thus the enemies of the Patriarch seemed to be confounded and this time for good. However while Lambert, the Archdeacon, bowed to the will of Ralph of Antioch and was reconciled to him, Arnulf persisted in his course of action. Although exhausted from the strain of his former travels, so arduous physically and so expensive financially, Arnulf set out once again for Rome to demand another legate. The Pope complied to the request and a new legate was despatched. This was the French cardinal-bishop of Ostia, Alberic. He travelled to the East early in May, 1140.<sup>68</sup> Alberic found the Christians engaged in the siege of Banyas, a military operation which lasted from the twentieth of May to the twelfth of June, 1140 when the city passed into Christian control.<sup>69</sup> Joining the armies there, he found that the Patriarch of Jerusalem and the King of Jerusalem and the Prince of Antioch were also present. After the capture of the city, with the sanction of Fulcher, of Tyre, Adam, Archdeacon of Acre was created the Bishop of Banyas. Leaving the captured town, the princes and the prelates returned to Jerusalem for services of thanksgiving. During this time, Raymond promised the legate the fullest support, urging him to come to Antioch to undertake his investigation of Ralph. After Raymond's departure, the legate summoned the entire hierarchy of the Holy Land to a general synod to be held at Antioch on 29 November, 1140.<sup>70</sup>



When the synod opened in Antioch, an impressive array of ecclesiastics ~~was~~ present. William of Jerusalem, Guudentius of Caesarea, Anselm of Bethlehen, Fulcher of Tyre, accompanied by Baldwin of Beirut and Bernard of Sidon. The entire hierarchy of the province of Antioch was present also. The bishops and archbishops who had assembled for the trial of the patriarch were not of one mind. Some, such as Stephen, Archbishop of Tarsus, Gerard of Laodicea and Hugh of Jabala, all favoured the cause of the adversaries of Ralph. Others, Franco of Hierapolis, Gerard of Corice and Serlo of Apamea, favoured the patriarch. The rest were undecided.<sup>71</sup>

When the synod opened, the charges were presented by Arnulf and Lambert whose submission to Ralph had been more apparent than real. They declared that Ralph's installation as patriarch had been irregular, that Ralph was guilty of incontinence, and finally that he was guilty of simony. It was clear by this time to many of the synod that conditions were at work against the cause of the patriarch. Many more, therefore, began to support his accusers. Ralph was cited twice before the tribunal and twice he refused to come, fearing perhaps the power of the prince of Antioch. It is clear also that Raymond played a determining role in the council, if only from behind the scenes. He himself was at this time under the influence of a certain Peter Armion who was the custodian of the citadel of Antioch. Peter wanted the patriarchal throne for his nephew, Peter Aimery, a young man who had been favoured by Ralph and made by him a deacon in the church of Antioch. With all this, the charges, the atmosphere of the synod, the royal power, there could be but one result. What opposition there was, was crushed quickly. In defiance of the synod Serlo of Apamea declared himself in favour of Ralph as his rightful superior and lord. For this he was summarily degraded and



excommunicated, an over hasty action which suggests the importance of the royal power in determining the conclusion towards which the synod was rapidly moving. Upon a third citation and a third refusal by Ralph to appear, he was deposed and degraded.<sup>72</sup>

There can be little question that Ralph commanded a wide allegiance. His cruelty and arrogance had not cost him the support of the Antioch mob which had brought him to power in the first instance.<sup>73</sup> As we read the account in William of Tyre, we see that William had the gravest doubts as to the justice of the proceedings against Ralph. The character sketch which he gives of Ralph is one of a great and commanding personality which was probably flawed with vices attributed to him by his accusers. However, the historian clearly indicates that intimidation by Raymond of the legate and the hierarchy was the real cause of his deposition. In fact, he states clearly that the election of a new patriarch, Peter Aimery, who has been mentioned before, was accomplished through the bribery of the Prince. William considered the new Antioch patriarch, a native of the Limousin, to be an ignoble man.<sup>74</sup>

There is nothing to prevent our accepting William of Tyre's judgment that in this deposition the legate had been subservient to the will of the prince. We have remarked before on papal deference to the temporal power in the East, and we have seen other legates bow to the will of the prince in matters ecclesiastical. It should, however, be added that if the legate had supported Ralph, the consequences might have been disastrous. It could be suggested that faced by Roman support of Ralph, Raymond might well have admitted the Greek church into Antioch. The power and strength of the Empire, despite the intrigues of 1138, was an important factor. If Rome wished to keep Antioch safely within the Latin orbit, she





would have to make some concession to Raymond. Alberic thus may well have bowed to the will of Raymond, knowing the trial to be unjust although perhaps finding consolation in the fact that the charges levelled against Ralph were probably correct. This is, however, only a suggested interpretation. Nonetheless it is striking that Rome had reinstated Ralph when he made his submission but the legate in the Holy Land deposed him. Certainly the deposition was largely the work of Raymond. If so, then this is but another example of a papal legate's deference to the temporal power.

With Ralph deposed the patriarchate of Antioch passed to Aimery, the erstwhile protege of Ralph. Tyre reports that Raymond used his influence to secure his election.<sup>75</sup>

Leaving Antioch the legate returned to Jerusalem, the following Easter of 1141 found the legate in the city for the celebrations. There he dedicated the Temple of the Lord. He also held a council in the church of Mount Zion where he conferred with ecclesiastics on matters which were pertinent. Among these was the matter of the church union with the Armenians. Relations had been cordial with these particular native Christians although the latter were determined to keep to their national traditions. During the Synod, the Catholikos Gregor III was present, and discussion arose on the matter of Armenian faith and practise. Alberic urged re-union, based on submission to Rome and reform in Armenian faith and practise. The Catholikos countered by saying that there was no need to speak of re-union since the churches were not separated. The discussion settled little but the friendly exchange of opinion was valuable if only for the future relations between the two Christian groups. The synod concluded, Alberic went home.<sup>76</sup>



The visit of Alberic was not without achievement. These years see a decline in ecclesiastical controversy. Although the records do not reveal the legate's activity in regard to the church of Tyre, he probably effected the complete reconciliation of the archbishop of Tyre and the patriarch of Jerusalem. As for the refractory suffragans of Tyre we know nothing. The legate probably realized that much of the quarrels had arisen from tensions between the temporal powers. Fulc of Jerusalem did not occupy the same strong position which Baldwin II had done in regard to the northern baronage. We have already spoken of the tension between the crown of Jerusalem and its great feudatory, the count of Tripoli. Further there had been the intrigues of Joscelin of Edessa, Alice of Antioch and Tripoli, and although Raymond was on friendly terms with Fulc, who was partly responsible for his elevation to the principate, still the northern Latin establishment was not as closely linked to the crown of Jerusalem as it had been in the days of Baldwin II. Besides, the principality had formally acknowledged the suzerainty of John Comnenus. These temporal developments and the general internal rivalries among the princes, had their effect on the alignment of dioceses, and it is also probable that the legate perceived this.

The problem was really incapable of solution. The boundaries of the patriarchates were centuries old. With the close intertwining of spiritual and temporal power in the Holy Land, one could not combine tradition and the exigencies of the Latin establishments in the East. The papacy had sacrificed tradition for the sake of consolidating spiritual and temporal loyalties in the East. Once again, the papacy saw that, for example, Tyre could not belong to Antioch spiritually and to Jerusalem temporally. Further, there



was the Roman fear of the Greek church's claim to Antioch and the possible loss of the entire ecclesiastical province of Antioch. Other factors would include the desire of the Papacy to exalt Jerusalem and the desire of the Tyre suffragans to be as independent as possible of both patriarch and archbishop.

As we shall see, the controversy continued. When William of Tyre became archbishop, he could still write in his history that the two lords contended for control of the diocese. He accused the church of Rome who commanded that Tyre be subject to Jerusalem and yet did not protect her from the injury by the patriarch of Antioch. If only unity could be restored, he as archbishop would reverence either patriarch. That was unimportant compared to the unity of his diocese. William, however, does indicate that the Jerusalem patriarch's control ran through that part of the diocese which belonged to the kingdom of Jerusalem. In other words, Sidon, Acre and Beirut acknowledged Tyre and Jerusalem. The rest, belonging to the county of Tripoli, remained in the orbit of Antioch. William probably over-emphasizes the influence of Aimery, patriarch of Antioch. A better estimate would place more weight on the uneasy temporal relationship between Jerusalem, Tripoli, Antioch and Edessa. Further, it may also be pertinent to emphasize again that Tortosa, Tripoli and Jebail were left more and more to themselves as Antioch's power declined before the infidel on the one hand and the Greek emperor on the other. A taste for ecclesiastical freedom, once aroused, could not be put away easily.<sup>77</sup>

#### 4. The Fall of Edessa.

A measure of peace returned to the Latin church in the East. The Papacy of Lucius II re-issued, this time to William of Jerusalem,



its decree concerning the church of Jerusalem's rights over all territory conquered by the kings of Jerusalem. In this case, special reference was made to Baldwin III.<sup>78</sup> Lucius also confirmed Bethlehem as an episcopal see as over against the tradition which had made Bethlehem merely a parish in the diocese of Jerusalem.<sup>79</sup>

A difficult situation was avoided when the papacy was able to bring peace between William of Jerusalem and Gaudentius of Caesarea. The quarrel had existed since the days of Bernard of Jerusalem and Ebramar of Caesarea. Its exact cause eludes us; however it may be that William was attempting to be more than metropolitan and primate. We have seen in another connection how his ambition had led him to deny to his suffragans their rightful dignity and respect.<sup>80</sup>

But if things were quieter in the church, matters were not well in things temporal. Only the death of John had saved Antioch from Greek occupation. There was the death of Fulk of Anjou after a short reign. The brilliant monarch's life came to an end when he was thrown from his horse during an outing with his wife Melisande.<sup>81</sup> Then there was the increased animosity between Joscelin of Edessa and Raymond of Antioch, an animosity born of Joscelin's resentment for an upstart, a boogary knight, who had been imported from the West to take up the principality of Antioch and be overlord to Joscelin, a Latin whose life had been spent in the East. Joscelin thought Antioch was rightfully his.<sup>82</sup>

If, however, Jerusalem was secured through the talents of Melisande and her son Baldwin,<sup>83</sup> the north seemed unable to resist the ravages of Zengi. A year after the accession of Baldwin, the great emir besieged Edessa. Joscelin was not present, having taken





a dislike for his capitol. Secure in a castle on the Acropolis, he had left his docile and peaceful population poorly protected by a handful of inadequately trained and, most important, carelessly paid mercenaries. This, in addition to the estrangement existing between Antioch and Edessa, conspired to deliver Edessa into the hand of Zengi. In the blood bath that followed, Hugh, Archbishop of Edessa,<sup>84</sup> was struck down by Turkish horsemen while struggling with his flock in the streets of the dying Christian city.<sup>85</sup> Joscelin made an attempt in November, 1146, to recover his city but he lacked sufficient military strength to make this a permanent achievement. When the weather returned, the slaughter of the helpless population was even greater than before.<sup>86</sup> Soon messengers, pilgrims and travellers would be streaming to the West, recounting the capture of Edessa which the Latins often called Rohas, a latinization of the Arabic name of the city Al-Ruba. They would describe the death of the Archbishop, the profanation of holy relics,<sup>87</sup> the destruction of churches and the murder of helpless Christians. The fall of Edessa was to be the signal for the Second Crusade.

##### 5. The Papacy and the Religious Foundations.

During these years from the death of Paschal II to the election of Eugene III, the religious establishments of the Latin Orient continued to grow in wealth and possessions. A quick perusal of RR will show how great was the growth of two foundations in particular, the church of the Holy Sepulchre and the monastery dedicated to St. Mary in the valley of Jehosaphat.

In regard to the former, the prior and the canons found an able patron in the patriarch of Jerusalem to whose interest, financial and otherwise, it was that the church of the Holy Sepulchre



receive its due in offerings and donations from the faithful in East and West. The Papacy was thus often persuaded to confirm with its apostolic authority the possessions of the Holy Sepulchre.<sup>88</sup> These years see also not only gifts to the foundation<sup>89</sup> but also exemptions from tithes granted by the hierarchy.<sup>90</sup>

The possessions of St. Mary also grow to such an extent that the Papacy was called upon repeatedly to confirm its goods and privileges.<sup>91</sup> Thus the monastic orders flourished in the East.<sup>92</sup>

As for the Hospital of St. John, the donations are even greater. Princes took them under their protection,<sup>93</sup> bishops granted exemption from tithes,<sup>94</sup> the Papacy fostered them.<sup>95</sup> The popularity of the Hospital increased and her houses could be found throughout Europe. Much of this was due to the genius of Raymond of Puy, under whose guidance, as we have written, the Order assumed its military character. There can be little doubt that it was due to Raymond's untiring efforts that the Order became popular throughout Europe.<sup>96</sup> By the end of this period, the Hospital had completed its new re-orientation as a military order under the leadership of Raymond.<sup>97</sup>

Of the papal recognition of the Temple we shall speak in the next section. The first donation to the Temple which appears in RR is dated 1137-1138.<sup>98</sup> The Order's original growth was primarily in the west where, like the Hospital, she found the Papacy ever zealous to advance her welfare. The rapid growth in the power and prestige of the two military orders increased along with their growing independence of both spiritual and temporal authorities in the East.<sup>99</sup> With their own courts and claiming the traditional clerical immunities, these orders were to arouse the envy, suspicion



and hate of many of the Latins in the East.<sup>100</sup> However, at the first, all was well. When Hugh de Payens returned from the West in 1130, having been recognized by the Pope as master and having seen the rule of the Order confirmed, he brought with him enough new recruits for the Order of the Temple to enable Baldwin to undertake the siege of Damascus.<sup>101</sup>

The Temple had, of course, a powerful protagonist in the person of St. Bernard. Long interested in the crusade and pilgrimages to the East,<sup>102</sup> Bernard espoused the Order, made certain its recognition by the Papacy and continued to support it especially through letters directed to important personages in the Holy Land.<sup>103</sup>



FOOTNOTES:

1. Tyre, XII, 1-3, Krey-Babcock, I, pp. 517-521, RHCOcc., I, pp. 511-516; Fulcher, III, 1, RHCOcc., III, p. 441, Hag.Fulcher, pp. 615-617. At this time we recall to the reader's mind the three great histories of the crusades Grousset, Runciman and Röhricht. We have cited before the eighteenth century work of Michel Le Quien, Oriens Christianus, III, (Paris, 1740), and a modern attempt to compile the lists of bishops for the Latin Orient, Le Quien, "Syria Sacra", (Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-vereins X, 1887), pp. 1-43; then there are the two great cartularies for the Church of the Hospital and for the Hospital, edited by Rozière and Delaville Le Roulx, respectively. To this we now add E.Delaborde, Chartes de Terre Sainte provenant de l'Abbaye de Notre Dame de Josaphat, (Paris, 1880). Attention is drawn again to the two articles on the patriarchal lines in Antioch and Jerusalem by L. de Mas Latrie. For the constitutional history of the realm, we have mentioned already the standard works of Dodu and a Monte. Finally, we cite once again the great monograph of C.Cahen, La Syrie du Nord à l'Epoque des Croisades, (Paris, 1940).
2. Tyre, XII, 3, Krey-Babcock, I, p. 520, RHCOcc., I, p. 515; Albert, XII, 30, RHCOcc., IV, pp. 709-710. A close perusal of the documents reveals, however, that while Baldwin II was installed as monarch on Easter Day, 1118, he was not crowned in Bethlehem until Christmas, 1119. See Fulcher, III, 7, RHCOcc., III, p. 445, Hag.Fulcher, p. 635.
3. For Gormond, see Albert, XII, 30, RHCOcc., IV, p. 710; Röhricht, "Syria Sacra", p. 7 and L. de Mas Latrie, "Les Patriarches Latins de Jerusalem", p. 18.
4. Tyre, XII, 6, Krey-Babcock, I, p. 524, RHCOcc., I, p. 519.
5. For the disaster see Walter the Chancellor, II, 2-6, RHCOcc., V, I, pp. 101-111; Fulcher, III, 3, RHCOcc., III, p. 442, Hag.Fulcher, pp. 621-623; Tyre, XII, 9-10, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 528-531; RHCOcc., I, pp. 523-526; Michael the Syrian, III, p. 204; Matthew of Edessa, MCarmen, I, pp. 121-124.
6. Thus Baldwin was called in to defend Antioch after Roger's defeat and death. He left Bernard, the Patriarch, to administer the city in his name. See Walter, II, 16, RHCOcc., V, I, pp. 129-131 and Tyre, XII, 12, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 532-535, RHCOcc., I, pp. 530-531.





7. The records of this council may be found in Tyre, XII, 16, Krey-Babcock, I, pp. 535-536, RHCocc., I, pp. 531-532. See also Mansi, XXI, cc. 261-262 and RR, No. 89. Neapolis was an important event in the constitutional life of the kingdom. See La Monte, Feudal Monarchy, p. 9. For the appeal to the West, see the Translatio Mirifici Martyris Isidori, RHCocc., V, I, pp. 322-323.
8. JL, 6922, to Ebromar and all the kingdom of Jerusalem, clergy and laity. PL, 163, cc. 1216-1217. RR, No. 96 and Rozière, Cartulaire, pp. 14-15.
9. PL, 163, c. 1217: "Ad vos igitur scripta praesentis dirigentes, universitatem vestram -- monemus ut in matris vestrae monachae Ecclesiae unitati atque obedientia firmi et stabiles maneatis; ipsa enim per Dei gratiam multo filiorum suorum sanguine vestram Ecclesiam liberavit, et ipsa pro vobis quotidie in ultramontanis et citramontanis partibus elaborat".
10. JL 6921, PL, 163, cc. 1215-1216, RR, No. 95.
11. JL 6923, PL, 163, cc. 1217-1218, Rozière, Cartulaire, p. 72-73, RR, No. 94.
12. See C.Kohler, "Histoire Anonyme des Rois de Jerusalem", (ROL, V, 1897), p. 234. Tyre and Fulcher recount his summoning of a council to elect a regent. Fulcher, III, 16, RHCocc., III, p. 450, Hag.Fulcher, pp. 638-661; Tyre XII, 17, Krey-Babcock, I, p. 541, RHCocc., I, p. 538. Hence also Gormond's name heads the list of signatures on the treaty with the Venetians prior to the siege of Tyre. This, however, must not be interpreted as indicative of any predominant ecclesiastical influence in the Holy Land. The signatures may be found in Tyre, XII, 25, Krey-Babcock, I, p. 556, RHCocc., I, p. 553. This most important treaty is RR, No. 102. See Tafel-Thomas, pp. 79-89. See also Fulcher, III, 36, RHCocc., III, p. 467, Hag.Fulcher, pp. 745-746; Dandolo, RIS (new), XII, I, p. 234, Kinnamos, VI, 10, CSHB, p. 221. Baldwin confirmed this treaty upon his release, RR, No. 105. For an excellent picture of Gormond's activities, see Röhricht, Geschichte, pp. 163 ff; for the Venetian expedition, see Grousset, op.cit., I, pp. 601 ff.
13. Tyre, XI, 16, Krey-Babcock, I, p. 492, RHCocc., I, pp. 486-484; Albert, XII, 19, RHCocc., IV, p. 701 gives the date but it may be incorrect.
14. Tyre, XII, 17, Krey-Babcock, I, p. 539, RHCocc., I, pp. 536-537, Fulcher, III, 11, RHCocc., III, pp. 447-448, Hag.Fulcher, pp. 647-648.



15. Ernoul, p. 27; Tyre, XVI, 29, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 182, RHCOcc., I, pp. 754-755.
16. Tyre, XIII, 13, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 19-20, RHCOcc., I, pp. 573-575 and XIV, 14, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 69, RHCOcc., I, pp. 626-627.
17. Fulcher, III, 7, RHCOcc., III, pp. 444-445, Hag.Fulcher, pp. 633-635; Tyre, XII, 12-14, Krey-Babcock, I, pp. 532-537, RHCOcc., I, pp. 528-534.
18. Fulcher, III, 11, RHCOcc., III, p. 447, Hag.Fulcher, pp. 647-648; Tyre XIII, 23, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 36, RHCOcc., I, pp. 591-592; Le Quien, op.cit., c. 1311; Rohricht, "Syria Sacra", p. 17; Rohricht, Geschichte, pp. 153, 170. The exact date of his consecration is uncertain but 1122 is the most likely date.
19. Tyre's date, 29 June, is incorrect. See Tyre, XII, 1 f, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 1 ff., RHCOcc., I, pp. 555 ff; Fulcher, III, 27 f, RHCOcc., III, pp. 459 ff; Hag.Fulcher, pp. 693 ff.
20. Tyre, XIII, 13, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 20, RHCOcc., I, p. 592.
21. For information in regard to William, see Rohricht, "Syria Sacra", p. 17.
22. Tyre, XIII, 23, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 36, RHCOcc., I, pp. 592-593.
23. JL, 7314, PL, 166, cc. 1279-1280; Mozière, Cartulaire, pp. 17-18 and RR, No. 122, p. 30.
24. PL, 166, c. 1280: "Nos vero, qui in cathedra beati Petri sedemus, licet indigni, personam tuam vero in Domino charitate diligimus, et regnum Ierosolymitanum cum dignitate a praedecessore nostro felicis memoriae, papa Paschali, antecessori tuo, regi Balduino, atque Ierosolymitanae Ecclesiae justo discretionis moderamine tandem concessa apostolica tibi auctoritati concedimus. Praecipimus quatenus honor debitus Ierosolymitani regni et ecclesiae integer conservetur. Ad haec charissimum filium nostrum Fulconem, Andegavensem comitem, strenuum quidem et sapientem virum, qui, postposito baronum suorum et innumeri populi dominio atque relicta copiosa terrae propriae ubertate, Deo et tibi servire decrevit, prudentiae tuae attentius commendamus". On the summoning of Fulk of Anjou, see Tyre, XIII, 24, XIV, 2, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 38, 50-51, RHCOcc., I, pp. 593, 608. Also L.Halphen and R.Loupardin, Chroniques des comtes d'Anjou, (Paris, 1913), Gesta Ambaziensem Dominorum, p. 115; Gesta consulum Andegavorum, pp. 69-70. It is significant that Baldwin applied directly to Louis VI of France for help. The Pope only sanctioned a fait-accompl.



25. La Monte, Feudal Monarchy, pp. 203-205, No. 1 on p. 205.
26. An interesting comparison could be made with papal letters written to papal vassals, such as Alfonso of Portugal. There the phrases concerning homage and tribute are clearly marked. See JL, 8590, 8600.
27. JL, 7315, 7316, 7317, IL, 166, cc. 1280-1281; Tyre, XIII, 23, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 36-37, RHCOcc., I, pp. 592-593.
28. Tyre, XIII, 23, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 37, RHCOcc., I, p. 593.
29. Tyre, XIV, 12, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 64-65, RHCOcc., I, pp. 623-624; Fulcher, III, 34, RHCOcc., III, p. 466, Hag.Fulcher, pp. 738 ff.
30. Tyre, XIV, 14, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 62-70, RHCOcc., I, pp. 626-627.
31. We have cited Fulcher before in another connection. Nonetheless it is expedient that we repeat the evidence, III, 34, RHCOcc., III, p. 466-467, Hag.Fulcher, pp. 739-742;
 

"---- pacificet Deus Antiochenam ecclesiam cum Hierosolymitana, quae duae dissident de Tyria tertia. Illa dicit hanc sibi fuisse subditam sub Graecorum tempore; haec dicit se esse communiam privilegiis a Romano pontifice. Nam in concilio Alvernensi tam authentico et nominatissimo constitutum unanimi adsensu fuit, ut quaecumque civitas, mari magno transito, a paganorum posset excuti iugo, sine contradictione perenniter obtineretur. Hoc etiam in Antiocheno concilio, episcopo Podiensi magistrante, replicatum et concessum ab omnibus est. In Hierusaelm quoque dux Godefridus et dominus Boamundus acceperunt terram suam a patriarcha Daiberto propter amorem Dei. Identidem ruschalis papa privilegiis suis corroboravit et ea ecclesiae Hierosolymae transmisit, quibus ecclesia Romana sic auctorisante, iure perpetuo communiatur".
32. Tyre, XIII, 25, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 39, RHCOcc., I, p. 594. His chronology is confusing here. See RR, no. 129 where evidence is given which permits us to place his death in 1128. This agrees with Tyre's other statement that he reigned "for nearly ten years", loc. cit. See also L. de Mas Latrie, "Les Patriarches Latins de Jerusalem", p. 18.
33. Stephen was highly born. See Tyre, XIII, 25, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 39, RHCOcc., I, p. 594; Röhricht "Syria Sacra", p. 17; Dedu, op.cit., pp. 359-360.



34. Tyre, XIII, 25, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 39-40, RHCOcc., I, pp. 594-595.
35. Tyre, XIII, 26, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 43, RHCOcc., I, p. 598.  
See also, Röhricht, "Syria Sacra", pp. 7-8.
36. Walter, II, 10-15, RHCOcc., V, I, pp. 117-129; Tyre, XII, 11-12, Krey-Babcock, I, pp. 531-535, RHCOcc., I, pp. 527-531.
37. Tyre, XIII, 21-22, 27, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 32-35, 43-45, RHCOcc., I, pp. 588-591, 598-601.
38. Rome tried to win the trust of Bernard through the assignment of Jabala to Antioch. See JL, 7627, dated 27 May, 1133.
39. Tyre, XIV, II, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 62-63, RHCOcc., I, pp. 621-622.
40. Tyre, XIV, 14, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 68-69, RHCOcc., I, p. 626.
41. In 1131, Fulc of Jerusalem was forced to re-organize the principality after the death of Bohemund II. See Tyre, XIV, 4-5, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 53-55, RHCOcc., I, pp. 611-614.
42. Tyre, XIV, 5, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 54-55, RHCOcc., I, pp. 612-614.
43. JL, 7847, PL, 179, c. 329. RR, No. 171.
44. JL, 7875, PL, 179 c. 347, RR, No. 175.
45. JL, 7906, PL, 179, c. 370: "Indignum eat enim ut honor qui tibi, si ei obediret, ab Antiochia exhiberetur, a te vel tuis successoribus subtrahatur". RR, No. 176, Tyre, XIV, 12, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 65, RHCOcc., I, pp. 623-624.
46. JL, 7908, PL, 179, c. 372, RR, No. 178.
47. Le de Mas Latrie, "Les Patriarches Latins de Antioche", pp. 192-193, errs when he dates Bernard's death in 1132. See Tyre, XIV, 10, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 60, RHCOcc., I, pp. 619-620.





48. Tyre, XIV, 10, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 60-61, RHCocc., I, pp. 619-620.
49. Bohemund, we remember, had in his treaty of 1102 promised to introduce a Greek patriarch into Antioch.
50. Kinnamos, I, 7, CSNB, pp. 16-17; Tyre XIV, 9, 20, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 59-60, 77-79, RHCocc., I, pp. 618-619, 635-637.
51. Tyre, XIV, 20, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 78, RHCocc., I, pp. 636-637.
52. The date of Raymond's marriage is 1136. See Röhricht, Geschichte, p. 203. For the course of events between Raymond and Ralph, see Tyre, XIV, 20, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 78-79, RHCocc., I, pp. 636-637.
53. Ibn al-Qalanisi in the Damascus chronicle, edited by H.A.R. Gibb, pp. 245-246 suggests that during his first descent upon Antioch, John demanded the restoration of the Greek patriarch. Qalanisi makes this the reason for the hostility of Raymond to Ralph. I would set aside the report on the basis of Tyre's evidence for the origin of the quarrel between prince and patriarch. As said in the previous section, the Arabian chronicler had probably confused the demands of John with the demands of Manuel in 1159-1160.
54. JL, 7943; Tyre, XIV, 11, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 63-64; RHCocc., I, pp. 622-623; See RR, No. 187, PL, 179, cc. 400-401.
55. JL, 7941, PL, 179, cc. 339-340; RR, No. 185; Tyre, XIV, 13, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 67, RHCocc., I, p. 625; PL 179, cc. 399-400.
56. JL, 7942, PL, 179, cc. 400; RR, No. 186, Tyre, XIV, 13, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 67-68, RHCocc., I, p. 625.
57. JL, 7940; PL, 179 c. 399; RR, No. 184, Tyre, XIV, 13, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 66, RHCocc., I, pp. 624-625.
58. Tyre, XIV, 10, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 61, RHCocc., I, p. 620.
59. Tyre, XV, 12, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 113, RHCocc., I, p. 677.



60. Unfortunately, the chronology is difficult here. We are uncertain as to the date for this journey. Tyre tells us that Ralph was present to welcome John to Antioch at the end of May, 1138, when the emperor entered the city after the unsuccessful assault on Shayzar. See Tyre, XV, 3, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 97, RHCOcc., I, p. 679. This seems to be one reliable date. A second may be found in I. Kehr, Italia Pontificia, I, p. 169 which plainly asserts Ralph's presence in Rome for the Lateran Council of April, 1139. Upon these two dates, I have erected this reconstruction. Neither Runciman nor Röhricht have attempted to solve this chronological problem.
61. On Roger's claim to Antioch, see Tyre, XIV, 9, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 59-60, RHCOcc., I, pp. 618-619.
62. For the above, Tyre, XV, 12, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 113-114, RHCOcc., I, pp. 676-678.
63. Tyre, XV, 13, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 114-115, RHCOcc., I, pp. 678-679.
64. Tyre, XV, 13, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 115, RHCOcc., I, p. 679.
65. Tyre, XV, 14, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 116-117, RHCOcc., I, pp. 680-681. For Tyre's assessment of this prelate, see XVI, 5, Krey-Babcock, I, p. 143, RHCOcc., I, pp. 711-712. See also Röhricht, "Syria Sacra", p. 13.
66. For the uneasy relations between Antioch and Edessa, so important in connection with the loss of Edessa and the second crusade, see GRÖSSET, op.cit., II, pp. 174-175.
67. See Röhricht, Geschichte, p. 223.
68. Tyre, XV, 15, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 118, RHCOcc., I, pp. 681-682.
69. The siege of Banyas occurred in May-June 1140. Tyre, XV, 11, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 110-112, RHCOcc., I, pp. 674-676.
70. There are difficulties in dating here. The usual date given for the synod is 1139: Mansi, XXI, cc. 503-506, 577-580; Runciman, op.cit., II, pp. 220-222, Röhricht, Geschichte, p. 223; C. Cahen, op.cit., p. 503. Krey and Babcock accepted this date, II, p. 118, n. 19. This seems most unlikely. Peter had died on 28 May, 1139. The news would have reached Rome quickly,



and another legate could have been dispatched in time to open a council at the end of November, 1139. However, Tyre says that Arnulf "Roman profiscens, iterum opportune et importune pulsatus; tandemque precibus proterve insistens" until another legate was sent out. Tyre, XV, 15, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 118, RHCocce., I, p. 682. This indicates a considerable passage of time. Further Tyre explicitly says that Alberic, upon landing, joined the Christians at the May-June, 1140, siege of Banyas. There he was encouraged by Raymond to begin his investigations. There is therefore, on the basis of Tyre, every reason to date the synod as I have done. Tyre is quite explicit in his time sequence at this point. On the other hand, RR, No. 203, dated the synod 30 November, 1141. This is too late. The only way of ascertaining the date is consult the papal bulls for this period. Alberic's name appears steadily among the lists of signatures for 1139-1140, appearing last on 6 May, 1140, AL, 179, c. 514. His name reappears on 22 September, 1141, AL, 179, c. 551. This evidence has its limitations, but if correct, it vitiates the date of 1139 suggested by Mansi et al. since he was in Rome at that time. See PL, 179, cc. 487, 492 and also Rohricht's date since he returned to Rome by the fall of 1141.

71. Tyre, XV, 16, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 118-119, RHCocce., I, p. 683.
72. Tyre, XV, 17-18, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 118-122, RHCocce., I, pp. 685-688. William adds that Ralph escaped the imprisonment to which Raymond and the synod had condemned him. He went to Rome, obtaining some favour there. His death, from poison as Tyre suggests, would be dated 1141-1142. Michael the Syrian, III, p. 255, has some knowledge of the deposition of Ralph.
73. Tyre, XV, 17, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 121, RHCocce., I, pp. 685-686.
74. Tyre, XV, 18, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 122-123, RHCocce., I, pp. 687-688. See L. de Mas Latrie, "Les Patriarches Latins d'Antioche", pp. 193-194.
75. Tyre, XV, 18, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 122, RHCocce., I, pp. 687-688. See also L. de Mas Latrie, "Les Patriarches Latins d'Antioche", pp. 193-194, Rohricht, "Syria Sacra", p. 3.
76. The date for the synod is in dispute. Mansi XXI, pp. 505-508, dates it 1136; RR, No. 203, following, his dating for the Antioch synod, places it in 1142. However, the date for the synod, if we follow Tyre and the above argument for the date of the Antioch synod, would be 1140. For the Armenians, see M. Ormanian, The Church of Armenia, (London, 1912), p. 61 and Tyre, XV, 18, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 122-123, RHCocce., I, p. 687. For proof of the friendly attitude of the Latins towards the Armenian Christians in Jerusalem see RR, No. 409, a donation to the monastery of St. Sabas.



77. Tyre, XIV, 14, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 69-70, RHCOcc., I, pp. 626-627.
78. JL, 8690, 1144-1145, PL, 179, cc. 927-928, RR, No. 230.
79. JL, 8699, 1144-1145, RR, No. 231. This Innocent had also done, JL, 8285.
80. JL, 8700, dated 4 January, 1145; RR, No. 232, PL 179, c. 929; Rozière, Cartulaire, No. 21.
81. Fulc died on November 10, 1143. Tyre, XV, 27, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 134-135, RHCOcc., I, pp. 700-702. For the chronological difficulties, see n. 51, p. 135 of Krey and Babcock.
82. Tyre, XVI, 4, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 140-142, RHCOcc., I, pp. 709-710.
83. Tyre, XVI, 3, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 139-140, RHCOcc., I, p. 907.
84. Tyre, XVI, 5, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 143, RHCOcc., I, pp. 711-712, describes Hugh as a niggardly miser who refused to aid in the defence of the city.
85. For the capture of Edessa, Tyre, XVI, 5, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 143-144, RHCOcc., I, pp. 711-712. The fall of the city occurred on Christmas Day, 1144. See Rohricht, Geschichte, p. 234. For other accounts of the siege of Edessa, see Gregory the Priest, RHCArmen, I, pp. 157 f; Michael the Syrian, III, pp. 259-363, 270-272; Bar Hebraeus, pp. 68-270. For secondary accounts, see Runciman, *op.cit.*, II, pp. 235-240; C.Cohen, *op.cit.*, pp. 368-373.
86. Tyre, XVI, 14-16, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 157-161, RHCOcc., I, pp. 728-732.
87. Edessa was sacred to the memory of the Holy Apostles, Thaddeus and Thomas.
88. See RR, No. 124 (1128), No. 177 (1138), No. 189 (1139), No. 202 (1141), No. 220 (1144), No. 221 (1144), No. 225 (1144) for papal confirmation of their rights, privileges and possessions in the Orient, Europe and south Italy. These are JL, 7318, 7907, 8019,





- 8147, 8479, 8481, 8652 respectively. The documents may be found in Rozière, Cartulaire, No. 16, No. 17, No. 39, No. 18, No. 19, No. 20, No. 22. In 1135, Fulk of Anjou used his position in Antioch as "bagulus and tutor" of the principality to confirm their possessions in the city which they had traditionally held for centuries. RR, No. 157, Rozière, Cartulaire, No. 86, and PL, 155, cc. 1182-1183.
89. See RR, No. 121, No. 127, No. 128, No. 129, No. 209, No. 218 are examples. Rozière, Cartulaire, No. 44, No. 67, No. 77, No. 78, No. 83, No. 97, PL, 155, cc. 1133-1134, 1166-1167, 1175, 1176.
90. RR, No. 126 (1129) for an exemption by Ebremer of Caesarea. Rozière, Cartulaire, No. 70, PL, 155, cc. 1168-1169.
91. For these donations, see RR, No. 97 (1121), No. 101 (1123), No. 131 (1129), No. 133 (1130), No. 134 (1130), No. 135 (1130-1145), No. 190 (1138). The papal confirmations are No. 196 (1140) and No. 207 (1142). The documents may be found consecutively in Delaborde, No. 9, No. 12, No. 16, No. 17, No. 18, No. 19, No. 20, No. 21, No. 27. In the papal registers, these documents are JL 7725, 8095, 8096, 9099 (a repetition of the papal confirmation by Eugene III in 1147), 8223, 8748, (a repetition by Eugene III in 1145) and 9469, another confirmation in 1151.
92. New orders arrived. The Premonstratensians came to the East in 1131. See the "Sigeberti Cont. Præmonstratensis," MGSS, VI, p. 450. This also provides a most vivid picture of the flourishing religious orders in the East. Bernard requested Melisende to take this order under her protection, see PL, 182, cc. 557-558, Bernardi ep., No. 355.
93. As for example Roger of Antioch in 1118. See Delaville le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 45, RR, No. 86. Alfonso of Aragon and Navarre was generous to them, Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 78 (1126) and No. 86 (1129), as was Louis VI of France, No. 96. These are but a few examples taken from the cartulary of Delaville Le Roulx.
94. Bernard of Nazareth exempted them in 1125 from tithes in his diocese, RR, No. 106, Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 71. So also did Tripoli, RR, No. 106, and Beirut, in 1133, RR, No. 144 and Acre in 1135, RR, No. 155. See Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 79, No. 82, No. 100, No. 112.



95. The papal confirmations appear regularly: RR, No. 38 (June, 1119, Calixtus II), Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 48, JL, 6700. The Papacy attempted to assist the Order in its difficulties over the question of tithes in the county of Tripoli. See RR, No. 117 (December, 1125, Honorius II), Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 72. In 1135 Innocent reiterated the concessions of Paschal and Honorius (whose bull does not remain to us). He further exempted the Order from local diocesan authority by forbidding the proclamation by any bishop of an interdict upon their churches. They could celebrate the divine offices for themselves privately. Thus the only method of control which a bishop might have over the Order apart from an appeal to Rome was all but removed. See this most important decree in Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 113. A further step was taken by Innocent in 1137. JL, 7823, Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 122. The Order was taken under papal protections, their rights and privileges were confirmed. They were given license to build churches, establish cemeteries. They were given special privileges in regard to Christian burial, being forbidden to bury only those who had been placed by name under anathema. If any of their houses and churches were in areas under ecclesiastical interdict, they were permitted once a year to celebrate the divine office publicly. The order was to make much of their special rights in regard to ecclesiastical burial. See Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 123. Innocent was to issue another bull urging all prelates to champion the Order by encouraging the faithful to give to its support. Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 130, dated 1139-1143. The Order was enhanced when the Hospital of the Germans was placed under their jurisdiction, Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 153, 154, JL, 8742a, (JL, II, p. 758), by Celestine II in December, 1143.
96. During the reign of Calixtus, Raymond wrote to the hierarchy of the Church, thanking them for their generosity and requesting their continued support for the Hospital. The letter, Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 46, was confided to personal representatives of Raymond. These obtained a letter from Calixtus asking for the support of the Order, Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 47, JL, 7089.
97. In 1136, they erected and occupied the fortress of Gibelin, Tyre, XIV, 22, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 82, RHCOcc., I, p. 659.
98. RR, No. 173.
99. For example, the Templars in 1168 refused to support King Amaury of Jerusalem in his campaign against Egypt, Tyre, XX, 5, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 350-351, RHCOcc., I, p. 949.



100. See La Monte, Feudal Monarchy, pp. 217-225. For an example of this claim of clerical immunity, see Tyre, XX, 30, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 392-394, RH20cc., I, pp. 997-999. In view of the antagonism that soon developed between the local Jerusalem hierarchy and the Temple, it is not without irony to note that William of Tyre stresses the initiative of the Patriarch Stephen in securing the papal confirmation which will be described in the next section, XII, 7, Krey-Babcock, I, p. 525, RH20cc., I, pp. 520-521.
  
101. Tyre, XIII, 26, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 40, RH20cc., I, pp. 595-596.
  
102. See Bernardi Ep., No. 52, No. 55, No. 56, No. 57, No. 64, No. 82, No. 359, No. 399. FL, 132, cc. 159, 160-162, 166, 169, 202-204, 560-561, 612-613.
  
103. Bernardi Ep., No. 175, No. 206, No. 229, No. 354, No. 392, No. 393, FL, 132, cc. 336-337, 373, 494-496, 556-557, 593-600, 600-602, to the Patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem and Queen Melisende. St. Bernard also composed the De Laude novae militae, c. 1135, FL, 132, cc. 921-940.



Section Three:

THE PAPACY FROM THE DEATH OF PASCHAL II TO THE ELECTION OF  
EUGENE III.

1. The Pontificate of Gelasius II.

The death of Paschal II in 1118 brought to the Roman chair the chancellor of the Roman church, John of Gaeta.<sup>1</sup> A man of exemplary piety, a scholar and product of the monastery of Monte Cassino, a loyal servant of Urban II and of the ideals of Hildebrandine papacy, John assumed the name of Gelasius II. Continued troubles with the emperor of Germany and with the Roman populace forced John to take refuge in France. However, the brilliant prospects which his election kindled were soon extinguished. Weakened perhaps by the difficulties of his journey, John succumbed at Cluny in 1119. There is no evidence remaining to us to indicate the extent and scope of his labours on behalf of the crusaders in the East. However, it should be pointed out that he continued the long established papal policy of encouraging the Crusade in Spain. There the menace of the Almoravides had not yet abated.<sup>2</sup> Fighting had resumed with new fury in the vicinity of Saragossa. In June 1118 a council was held at Toulouse, bringing to the attention of the ecclesiastical leaders of the dioceses of south France the crisis in Spain.<sup>3</sup> Gelasius, hearing of the news of Saragossa, exercised his responsibility as spiritual leader of the crusading movement. He wrote to the armies besieging Saragossa a letter of encouragement and exhortation. His readers were assured once again that they would receive the plenary indulgence and remission of sins for their labours, their services and money given to the crusading cause. All those who died in the





expedition would receive a total absolution for their sins. The letter reveals that Gelasius did not deviate from the position taken by his predecessors in regard to the Crusade.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. The Pontificate of Calixtus II.

The cardinals at Cluny chose a new shepherd, Guido, the archbishop of Vienne. Having received ratification of his election from the clergy and people of Rome, Guido accepted consecration at the hands of Lambert, Cardinal-bishop of Ostia. He assumed the name of Calixtus II.<sup>5</sup> A man of the highest birth, a skilled diplomat and administrator of the Church, Calixtus' reign sees the first resting place in the struggle between the spiritual and the temporal powers: the Concordat of Worms.

Calixtus continued his predecessor's support of the war in Spain against the infidel. In the early years of his pontificate he wrote to the faithful of Europe urging them to hasten to the defence of their christian brethren in Spain and also to assist in the liberation of the churches. To those who did so he promised the same privileges which those who had gone to the defense of the Oriental Church had received. They too would receive the plenary indulgence. They also would wear the sign of the cross on their clothing. Those who did not fulfil their vows would be excommunicated. A papal legate was despatched to give the armies in Spain the papal blessing.<sup>6</sup> The parallels to the crusade in the East are plain.

The fact of papal interest in the crusade in Spain leads us naturally to enquire as to the papal policy towards the crusade in the East. However, before we turn to that problem, we should mention the war that had broken out between Pisa and Genoa in 1119.<sup>7</sup>



It bears on our investigation. The conflict had been inevitable. The trade with the Holy Land and the general economic hegemony of the Western Mediterranean were the prizes at stake. For Calixtus, the war was most serious for it involved the fortunes of the crusade in the Holy Land. In the year 1123, Calixtus wrote to the bishops of Corsica, bemoaning the damage which the war had brought. The sea power of the Latins weakened, the Italian peninsula had once again felt the lash of a Saracen raid. The papal sympathies seem to have been with Genoa. He promised his readers that he would attempt to end the struggle through disciplining the archbishop of Pisa. Accordingly he revoked the right of the Pisan archbishops to act as metropolitans of Corsica. The bishops were informed that from now on they owed their allegiance directly to Rome alone.<sup>8</sup> The letter is interesting to us in that it reveals that the Papacy realized that the Crusade involved the cooperation of all the forces of Christian Europe. Strife between those powers, especially among the Italian maritimes, would cripple the crusade movement.<sup>9</sup> Unfortunately the war continued in sporadic fashion for many years, becoming an important factor in the political struggles which were to break out between the Papacy and the Normans of south Italy.

While Pisa and Genoa were at one another's throats and causing the Papacy endless anxiety, Venice was busy extending her commercial power in the East. In 1117 she had received a handsome concession of rights and privileges from the count of Tripoli.<sup>10</sup> This had but whetted her appetite.

We remember that in 1119 the power of Antioch had been all but annihilated on the "Field of Blood". The news of this disaster was quickly known throughout Italy.<sup>11</sup> Further, the Latins in the



West knew of the continual raids by the Saracens from their bases at Tyre and Ascalon. The situation seemed to be a serious one. It is also likely that Peter of Iorio brought first-hand information to Calixtus II when he returned from his legation of 1121-1122.

Further information was attained from messengers sent by the crusaders themselves. The crusaders of Jerusalem were beginning preparations at this time for the assault on Tyre. For this a fleet would be required to render the Christian blockade of the city effective. Accordingly, at the council of Neapolis, the Latins decided to appeal by messengers to Calixtus and also the Venetians, whose doge at this time was the brilliant and astute Domenico Michael who had attained his high office in 1113.

When the letters arrived from the East, the Venetians saw their opportunity. In this they were encouraged by the approval of Calixtus who, by way of response to the Latin appeals for help, wrote to the Venetians urging them to assist the crusaders in their distress. As a sign of his approval and of the papal protection given to their expedition, Calixtus sent to the doge a banner of St. Peter. The doge and his followers did not delay. They took the cross and departed in August, 1122, arriving at Tyre the following spring.<sup>12</sup>

The news of the capture of Tyre and Venice's part in the siege must have gratified Calixtus.<sup>13</sup> However, we have already described the effect which the Venetian expedition had upon the relations between the Greek and Latin churches. We suggested in a previous section that it brought to Calixtus again the problem of church reunion. As we already know, the negotiations which were begun by Calixtus were interrupted by the pontiff's death.



We find no general exhortations from the Pope in favour of the Crusade to the East.<sup>14</sup> What papal encouragement there was is to be found in the records of councils. At the Rheims council of 1119, Calixtus made the Jerusalem pilgrimage the canonical expiation for the crime of breaking the Truce of God, an interesting development in the long association of the Crusade and the Truce of God in the mind of the Papacy.<sup>15</sup> At the Lateran council of 27 March, 1123, the usual plenary indulgence was offered again to those going to Jerusalem. As before, the faithful would have their goods protected by the church in their absence. Those going to Spain or Jerusalem were authorized to wear the cross as a sign of their profession. Those who delayed more than a year in the fulfilling of their vows would be excommunicated.<sup>16</sup>

It cannot be claimed that the Papacy was ignorant of the difficult military situation of the Latins in the East. Pilgrims, legates, the Venetians, letters from one individual to another,<sup>17</sup> brought the news from East to West. What can be suggested is that the Papacy felt that continued appeals to Europe for large-scale support might blunt the effectiveness of the preaching of the Crusade.

The sending of relics, the reports from overseas, the preaching of the hierarchy, all these could be counted upon to keep the Crusade before the attention of the faithful. The Lateran council had reiterated the crusade privileges, thus bringing before the hierarchy the necessity of continued support of the crusaders in the East. Further, the reign of Calixtus saw the visit of the representatives of Raymond du Puy to the West. His purpose was to raise support for the Order by way of recruitment, gifts and donations to the Hospital. As we know, the Papacy wrote a letter of





introduction and exhortation for Raymond's ambassador to all the faithful of Europe.<sup>18</sup> We have already mentioned this in the previous section. Suffice it to say that the Pope commended the Order for its charitable character and Raymond for his sincere devotion, testimonies of which had been brought back to the West by those returning from the Holy Land. We could not say that Calixtus had yet seen in the Hospital a partial answer to the continuing problem of recruitment for the crusading armies in the East. The Hospital had not yet become a military order although the transformation had probably begun by this time.

As for the rest, there is nothing to mention except to recall that the Papacy granted Gormond of Jerusalem his pall and by letter attempted to reform the life of the canons of the Holy Sepulchre. In this the Pope was merely exercising his prerogative as the vicar of Peter entrusted with "the care of all the churches".

### 3. Honorius II.

Upon the death of Calixtus the second, the choice of the cardinals fell on Lambert, the cardinal bishop of Ostia, who assumed the name of Honorius II.<sup>19</sup>

The registers of Honorius reveal little papal exhortation in regard to the preaching of the crusade. Nonetheless there is evidence remaining which sheds light on his continuation of the policies of his predecessors.

Since the days of Clermont, the Papacy had undertaken to protect the property of the pilgrim while he was away on the journey to the East. Hence in 1125, we find the papacy intervening to protect the abbot of Lerins and his monks. The pious religious had decided to make a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, the money for the journey



being raised by a village near by the foundation. As often happened, they were captured by the Saracens. The first papal concern, therefore, was to effect the collection of their ransom. Not only this, the bishops of the local dioceses had taken advantage of the distress of the abbot and proceeded to seize the churches upon which the monastery depended for support. Papal action thus aimed at the suspension of these unlawful activities on the part of the episcopate, thus preserving the lands of the monastery intact until the release of the captive religious.<sup>20</sup>

This, however, was little compared to the significance of papal activity in 1128. We have spoken of the origin of the Order of the Temple and its founders, Hugh of Payens and Godfrey of St. Omer. Designed as a kind of standing army which would protect the pilgrims on their travels in Syria-Palestine to and from the Holy Places, the Templars had grown in numbers and in power. It may well be that Baldwin II was the first to recognize the potential strength which the Templars might bring to his realm. Certainly it was an inspiration of the highest value which led him in the year 1126 to write to the already famous Bernard, Abbot of Clairveaux and asked that he undertake to compose a rule of life for the nascent religio-military Order. The bearers of the request were probably the first members of the Order to appear in Europe.<sup>21</sup>

The exact stages in the development at this point are unknown to us. It may be that Bernard in his turn approached the Papacy, asking for papal recognition. Perhaps also Baldwin convinced the Patriarch Stephen, despite the views which Stephen held on the supremacy of the Patriarch in Jerusalem over the royal power, that he should approach the Papacy, requesting papal recognition of the Order.



It is certain that the Patriarch sanctioned the papal action which was to follow. Be that as it may, in 1128, the papal legate, Matthew, cardinal bishop of Alba, held a council at Troyes. Present at the council was Hugh of Payens with many of his fellow Templars and also the celebrated Bernard under whose inspiration the rule of the Order had been drawn up. In addition to the papal legate, most of the hierarchy of France were present at the behest of the pontiff. The white habit was adopted in deference, no doubt, to its great Cistercian protector. The rule of the Order was confirmed by canon law passed in council.<sup>22</sup>

After the conclusion of the council at Troyes, the master and his companions went through Western Europe seeking financial support for their Order and also attempting to add recruits for their Order and indeed for the crusading movement in general. Baldwin had sent them to the West for this very purpose. In this they achieved not only papal recognition but also brought back to the East additional recruits for the unending struggle against the infidel.<sup>23</sup>

For the rest of the reign of Honorius II, we have no pertinent information. We have already described in detail the re-opening of the controversy over the see of Tyre between the patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem. Further, we have seen how the Papacy, uneasy over Antioch and its future status as a Latin principality, anxious to exalt the church at Jerusalem, and determined to bring peace to the Latin Orient, handed the see of Tyre over to the patriarchate of Jerusalem and confirmed the rights and possessions of the kingdom of Jerusalem. The claims of Antioch were denied without qualification. As for Spain, there was little activity on the part of Honorius on behalf of the crusade.



These years were uneasy ones for the Papacy also in regard to the Greek church. John, as we saw, politely but firmly rebuffed the papal attempts to open the problem of church reunion. The closing years of Honorius' reign saw the rise of the power of Roger II to the South, a development which was to produce the most serious consequences in the reign of Innocent II. Yet through all of this Honorius attempted to strengthen the crusaders in the East. Not the least of his achievements was the part he played in the sending of Fulk of Anjou to the Holy Land to marry Baldwin's daughter, Melisende, and thus become heir to the crown of Jerusalem. Considering the desperate shortage of manpower in the East and the lack of leadership among the crusaders themselves, this in itself was no small contribution to the vigour of the Latin establishments in the East.<sup>24</sup>

#### 4. Innocent II.

Around the first of February of 1130, Honorius II had fallen ill, and it was soon apparent to all that the illness would have a fatal termination. The days which preceded the death of the pontiff were marked by a feverish manoeuvring for a prominent position among the Roman factions, adding at the moment of death to the troubles and the difficulties which they had caused Honorius through most of his reign. The result of this unhappy factionalism was the double election of 14 February, 1130, which produced Innocent II and Anacletus in the role of pontiff and anti-pope respectively.<sup>25</sup> While the schism lasted for several years, and occupied most of Innocent's time and energy, we should not presume to say that he neglected his duties towards the crusading movement and to the Latin church of the East. In particular, Innocent had good reason to be





grateful to the Latin Christians of Jerusalem. At a time when the validity of his election was in doubt, and when it was even more doubtful as to whether or not he could sustain the righteousness of his cause,<sup>26</sup> Innocent had sought support on every side against his rival Anacletus. His call for obedience found a swift response from the King and Patriarch of Jerusalem who were among the first to give him an unqualified obedience.<sup>27</sup>

There is little new evidence to present here for the reign of Innocent II. As we have said, the Pope did not neglect to do his duty towards the Latins in the East. However, this duty was fulfilled in Innocent's attempts to unite the church of Tyre within the orbit of Jerusalem, in his dealings with the ambitious Ralph of Antioch and his attempt to defend Antioch against the power of John Comnenus. In the West, the Papacy continued to give its support to the Temple and the Hospital. As for the Temple, the Papacy, at the 1135 council of Pisa legislated for its financial support.<sup>28</sup> Further, at the Lateran council of 1139, Innocent urged the hierarchy of the church to exhort the faithful to the support of the Order.<sup>29</sup> Thus houses of the two Orders were appearing in all parts of Europe, establishments whose first task was to beg money for their military activities overseas.<sup>30</sup>

Finally, Innocent reiterated the ancient guarantees of the Church's protection to all those who were journeying on a pilgrimage.<sup>31</sup> As for Spain, the Papacy devoted itself in the main to purely ecclesiastical matters.<sup>32</sup>

## 5. Conclusion.

Innocent's successor on 26 September, 1143, was the cardinal priest, Guido of St. Mark's, who assumed the name of Celestine II.<sup>33</sup>



His reign was short in duration. We have already noted his confirmation of the rights and possessions of the church of the Holy Sepulchre. Like his predecessor, he also favoured the Templars, issuing a plea to the faithful that they support the Order.<sup>34</sup>

His successor was Lucius II.<sup>35</sup> We have already mentioned that he once again confirmed the rights and privileges of the Jerusalem church. Once again the Papacy conceded to the Patriarch that all cities and provinces which were conquered from the Saracen were to remain the heritage of the Jerusalem Church. Thus Lucius upheld the policy established by Urban and Paschal, a policy which had resulted in great tension and disorder in the East.

For the rest there is little. Of greater significance for us was the papal confirmation in 1144 of the Genoese possessions in Syria. This was granted by Lucius and the Genoese agreed to pay yearly tribute to the papacy for these privileges.<sup>36</sup> The importance of this lies in the gradual extension of papal power and influence through every aspect of life in the Latin Orient.

A short summary is in order. In regard to the Church in the East, the Papacy through these years attempted to maintain its general influence and control over the life and activities of the churches of Antioch and Jerusalem. In this, the Popes were not completely successful. They were hampered by distance, by conflicting information, by the ambition of Latin prelates in the Holy Land. In Jerusalem, the Papacy continued to treat the Patriarch as a primate endowed with metropolitical authority. Fortunately, for the Papacy and the Latin Orient, only Stephen raised the old notion of an independent prince-patriarchate. He received no support from Rome who remained content to let the spiritual and temporal



authorities flourish in their respective spheres so that together they might grow in prestige and power, thus advancing the glory of the Cross in the East.

Once again it is necessary to insist that the Papacy did not regard the Latin establishment in the East as a papal state. The kings of Jerusalem were not papal vassals. Hugh of Jabala had admonished the Emperor John Comnenus in the name of the Pope and the German emperor. Baldwin had gone directly to Louis of France to obtain Fulk of Anjou as a husband for Melisende. The general tenor of the evidence examined so far is that the crusaders were the representatives of all of Latin Christendom. If the papal influence in the life and activities of the Latin East was increasing with the repeated confirmations given by the Papacy to the kings and patriarchs of Jerusalem, to the great religious foundations of the Holy Land, to the military Orders, this was but a working out of the papal claim to be not only the spiritual arbiter of Christendom but also the fulfilment of her special responsibilities to the Crusade and the Latin establishments in the East. However, the relationship of lord and vassal had not been established. Further, it should be pointed out that the Papacy continued to defer to the wishes and needs of the temporal power in the East, provided the liberty of the Church was respected.

Thus the papal power was directly exercised primarily in the spiritual realm. When the occasion demanded, the Papacy acted as judge in ecclesiastical disputes as in the case of the canons of the Holy Sepulchre. In regard to the see of Tyre, the papal policy was not totally successful. During this period, all claims of the Patriarch of Antioch to Tyre were set aside. However, for more



than ten years, the papal will was ignored first by the archbishop of Tyre, then by the patriarchs of Jerusalem and Antioch and lastly, and successfully, by the bishops of the county of Tripoli. In this the power of clerical ambitions and temporal disputes between the great lords in the East played an important part.

We have noted before that the papacy gave most of her energy and direction to the support and benefit of the kingdom and the patriarchate of Jerusalem. The reasons for this are many and inseparably connected with each other. The first reason is that Jerusalem was the holiest shrine of Christendom, the object of the devotion of the Latin West, the goal of pilgrims and for whose liberation and defence the Christian faithful had expended both blood and treasure. The exaltation of Jerusalem, within the orbit of the Roman primacy, was one of the primary duties of the papacy. This is connected with the papal deference to the temporal power in Jerusalem and indeed elsewhere in the East. Upon that power, provided that the rights of the Church were acknowledged, the continued existence of the Latin power in the East depended. The greater favour shown by the Popes to Jerusalem as opposed to Antioch is partly explained in this way. In the second place, the papacy sought to keep the peace between the various powers in the Latin Orient by the sacrifice of tradition in favour of the new alignments of temporal power in the East. Since a territory or city could not have one allegiance in matters spiritual and another in matters temporal, a decision was reached which thrust aside the traditional boundaries of the patriarchates of Jerusalem and Antioch and handed large areas of the ancient patriarchate of Antioch into the orbit of the king and the patriarch of Jerusalem. If the papal attitude





towards Jerusalem was one of devotion to its sanctity and to the exaltation of both patriarch and king of Jerusalem, towards Antioch the papal attitude was complicated by other factors. We have suggested that the Papacy feared the Petrine associations of Antioch which could become the basis for resistance to the papal will. The Papacy suspected the fact, as we have shown in this thesis, that Antioch had gone its own way and had not preserved close relations with Rome since the Christian re-conquest. Further, the attitude here was coloured by the papal fear of the Greek claims to Antioch. The Papacy probably realized that conditions had often played in the hands of the Patriarch of Antioch, enabling him to achieve a greater independence than was desirable from the papal viewpoint. These fears and attitudes may well have been present in the papal mind in connection with the withdrawal of the archbishopric of Tyre from the obedience of Antioch. They received confirmation in the career of Ralph. If Bernard had defied Rome and kept the sees of the county of Tripoli in his control, Ralph went further. He aimed at the erection of a patriarchal state which would know no superior, not even the Pope in Rome. When he appeared before Innocent, the Patriarch had given specific utterance to the supremacy of Antioch over Rome: it had been Peter's first see. While Ralph was humbled before the papal legate due to the influence of the Prince and the hate of his own clergy, the fact remains, as Otto of Freising tells us, that Antioch only at this time began to come under the primacy of Rome.<sup>37</sup> We know that the Papacy did not succeed in completely subjecting Antioch to itself or in writing the church of Tyre within the patriarchate of Jerusalem. In addition to the continuing defiance of Aimery who was determined to control the sees of Tripoli,



we emphasized that the disputed sees had probably developed a taste for independence and had chosen to obey the weaker patriarch. We also emphasized the fact that the continuing alignment of the Tripoli bishops with Antioch was intimately connected with the relations between the temporal power in Antioch, Tripoli and Jerusalem.

Thus the Papacy attempted to rule and govern the Church in the East, preserving the Church in its integrity, at peace with herself and with the temporal power. She favoured with her protection the great religious foundations in the East. Not only did she assist in the growing power of these foundations, she aided directly in the increase of the powers of the religio-military Orders, powers and privileges which were to render them virtually independent of the temporal and spiritual authorities in the East. It could be argued that in this the Papacy was attempting to control indirectly the churches of the East, especially the patriarchate of Jerusalem. What is more likely, although the suggestion cannot be denied en toto, is that the taking of the Orders more and more into a direct dependence on the Papacy was designed to render the activities of the Orders more effective in their task of recruitment and stimulation of Western support for the crusade movement.

When the Latin establishment was threatened by an alien power, the Papacy acted in the defence of the sons of the Roman church. We have seen in the course of this thesis that the Papacy had attempted to re-open discussion in regard to church union with the Greeks. In this she was rebuffed. Not only this, she had received proof of a growing Greek animosity against all things Latin and in particular the Roman church. Further she saw the rise of a



more ambitious Greek policy which raised the spectre of a Greek empire, stretching from Italy to Antioch, into which the Hildebrandine interpretation of the Church, its character, its rights and its mission would disappear swallowed by Byzantine Caesaropapism and the new Byzantine OEcumene. The alliance between the two empires was sufficient proof of this and the increasing Greek interest in the politics of Italy was sufficient to underscore the danger to the Papacy. The hostility of the Greeks to the Germans despite the dangerous attitudes of Roger II, could only be seen as a possible threat to Papal independence. Hence, when John moved against Antioch, he was denounced as excommunicate, and Innocent attempted to protect Antioch from absorption into the Greek orbit. In this, the Papacy had some success although the exact measure of her influence cannot be gauged. Suffice it to say that the Byzantine suzerainty over Antioch was clearly established during these years. Further it should be pointed out that so far, the Papacy had not let her difficulties with either the Germans or the German influence her continued defence of her own claims and prerogatives. Antioch was Latin and papal. As such she would remain. Nowhere is there evidence which leads us to suppose that the Papacy thought that the Greeks might be a source of strength to the crusaders in the East. Perhaps here it could be suggested that the Papacy was blinded by her own sublime devotion to what she considered to be her divine vocation as the protector and sustainer on behalf of Christendom of the entire crusading movement in the East.

If this period sees no great crusade bulls issued, it does see unceasing papal activity in connection with the war against the infidel. Protection for pilgrims, re-iteration of indulgences, the



favour shown to Hospital and Temple, the attempts to settle the Pisa-Genoa war, the prosecution of the Crusade in Spain, all testify to continuing papal zeal. If a new fervour was to be revealed in response to the fall of Odessa, it is to the papacy that we should give a large measure of credit for the maintenance of Latin enthusiasm for the Crusade.





FOOTNOTES:

1. Basic material for his pontificate is found in the Liber Pontificalis, II, pp. 311-321, 347-349, 376. See also the Chronica Mon. Casinensis, MGSS, VII, p. 792. For the general history of the Papacy at this time, see A. Fliche, La Reforme Gregorienne et la Reconquete Chretienne, already cited as volume eight of the Histoire de l'Eglise, referred to as Fliche, Histoire VIII, and volume nine, part one, of the same series, Du Premier Concile du Latran a l'Avènement l'Innocent III, referred to as Fliche, Histoire IX-I.
2. For this see, A. Ballesteros y Beretta, Historia de España, (eight volumes, Barcelona, 1919-1936), II, pp. 406-407; Fliche, Histoire VIII, pp. 485-486.
3. See the Chronicon Malleacense, RMGF, XII, pp. 406-407. The king of France took part in these proceedings, RMGF, Ex Historiae Franciae Fragmento, XII, pp. 7, 8, 10.
4. JL, 6665, PL, 163, c. 508. The Bishop of Saragossa, Peter, found his church so destitute after the capture of the city that he placed the papal letter in general circulation with a bill of indulgences attached in order to raise money for his devastated diocese.
5. See the Liber Pontificalis, II, pp. 322-326, 376-379.
6. JL, 7116, dated c. 1121-1124, PL, 163, c. 1305. The papacy during this pontificate continued to play an important role in the life of the Spanish kingdom and church. See in particular, JL, 6828 (1120), 6920 (1121), 6926 (1121), 6931-6934 (1121), 7020 (1123), 7085 (1123), 7160 (1124), dealing with the disposition of the Spanish crown, the primacy, the activity of the papal legate and the shrine of Santiago de Compostella. For the Christian reconquest in Spain in these years, see Fliche, Histoire IX-I, pp. 188-189.
7. See the Annales Pisani, RISS (new), VI, II, pp. 8 ff. and the Caffaro Annales, FSI, I, pp. 16 ff.
8. Caffaro, Annales, FSI, I, pp. 18 ff.

See also Mansi, XXI, c. 270. The right of consecration was restored by Honorius II, Mansi, XXI, c. 334.



9. There is evidence that the Pisa-Genoa war did touch the Holy Land to a certain extent. See RR, No. 153, dated c. 1134.
10. See RR, No. 84; the document is printed in Tafel-Thomas, I, pp. 76-77.
11. Many chronicles mention it, the most interesting report being that preserved in Romuald, Chronicon, RIS (new), VII, I, p. 210.
12. See Dandolo, RIS (new), XII, I, pp. 232-235; Tafel-Thomas, I, p. 78; Historia Ducum Veneticorum, MGSS, XIV, pp. 73-74; Fulcher, III, 14, RHCoc., III, p. 449, Hag. Fulcher, pp. 655-657; Annales Venetici Breves, MGSS, XIV, p. 71; Translatio Mirifici Martyris Isidori, RHCoc., V, I, pp. 322-323, Orderic Vitalis, XI, 27, IV, p. 261.
13. Tyre was well-known to some of the mediaeval chronicles. See Anselm's continuation of Sigebert, MGSS, VI, p. 379.
14. While we possess no papal exhortations in favour of the crusade to the Holy Land, others seem to have taken upon themselves to provide for this deficiency. JL, 7111, dated c. 1120-1124, is a false bull which urges all Christian men to seize Spain and Jerusalem from the hands of the pagans. It would be interesting to know if this bull was forged by those who had an interest in the crusade, e.g. the princes of the Holy Land or of Spain, or perhaps merely the work of a pious individual who thought that enthusiasm for the crusade was on the wane.
15. Mansi, XXI, p. 237.
16. PL, 163, cc. 1363-1364; Mansi, XXI, cc. 302-303; Fliche, Histoire VIII, p. 394.
17. Some of these letters survive. Ebremer received a request for relics from the abbot of Saint Arnaud in 1121. Lambert of Arles also wrote to his old friend Ebremer introducing the Archdeacon of Terouanne who evidently was on a pilgrimage to the East. See consecutively E. Martène, Thesaurus Novus anecdotorum (five volumes, Paris, 1717), I, pp. 351-352 and PL, 162, cc. 677-678. Another exchange of relics is preserved in PL, 155, cc. 477-480 between Hugh of Edessa and Ralph, archbishop of Rheims. For this see also Tractatus de reliquiis S. Stephani, RHCoc., V, I, p. 317.
18. JL, 7089, Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 47.



19. The Liber Pontificalis, II, pp. 37-328, 379; Mansi, XXI, cc. 319-320 has another Vita.
20. JL, 7181, 5 January, 1125; see also JL, 7352; PL, 166, 1245; Pflugk-Harttung, Acta, I, pp. 136-137.
21. See RR, No. 116.
22. For the recognition of the Order, see Tyre, XII, 7, Krey-Babcock, I, pp. 524-527, RHCOcc., I, pp. 520-51; and, more important, the preface to the rule of the Temple printed by the Marquis de Curzon, La Règle du Temple, (Paris, 1886), pp. 11-20. For St. Bernard's relationship to the rule as it has come down to us, see Curzon's superb introduction, pp. i-xv. The canons of Troyes are to be found in Mansi, XI, cc. 357-372.
23. Tyre, XIII, 26, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 4, RHCOcc., I, pp. 595-596.
24. As for the Crusade in Spain, the surviving letters concern discipline, and purely ecclesiastical matters, JL, 7236 (1126), 7231 (1126) and 7383 (1129) are examples.
25. Liber Pontificalis, II, 379-385. Other useful Vitae are in PL, 179, cc. 21-36. See also Mansi, XXI, 389-391. For a life of Anacletus, see PL, 179, cc. 687-690.
26. For Innocent's version of his election, see JL 7404, and PL, 179, c. 38.
27. Anacletus tried to get support from the king of Jerusalem but failed to do so. See JL, 8393 and 8413. In the latter letter, Anacletus claimed support from the East. In this he deceived himself. On 2 February, 1132, Innocent at Cluny announced to Louis VI of France that he had received letters acknowledging his authority from the patriarch of Jerusalem and the chancellor of the realm, JL, 7531, PL, 179, c. 119. See Annales Reichen-spergenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 454, and RR, No. 140.
28. JL, I, p. 865, canon, No. 9. Bernard of Clairveaux was present at this council.
29. JL, I, p. 886 (top).
30. For the establishment of one of the houses during the pontificate of Innocent II, see Kehr, Italia Pontificia, III, pp. 448-449, a bull dated 2 December, 1138.



31. See canons 11 and 12 of the 1139 Lateran council as summarized on p. 885 of JL, I. For a concrete (?) example of this protection see JL 8030, 29 February, 1140, written to that veteran pilgrim Thierry of Flanders.
32. For a few examples, see JL, 7415-7419 (1130), 7610 (1133).
33. Liber Pontificalis, II, p. 385. Innocent died on 24 September, 1143.
34. JL, 8478.
35. Liber Pontificalis, II, pp. 385-386. Another useful Vita is Mansi, XXI, cc. 607-608.
36. Caffaro, Annales, P.I., I, pp. 32-33.
37. Otto, Chronicon, VII, 33, MGSS, XX, p. 266.





PART THREE

The Second Crusade



Section One:

MANUEL COMNENUS AND THE SECOND CRUSADE

1. The Opening of the Reign of Manuel Comnenus.

We have already written that John Comnenus on his deathbed in Cilicia designated his son Manuel to succeed him on the imperial throne. Garbed in the purple, Manuel's accession was acclaimed by the entire army and the high dignitaries of the Empire who had accompanied the Emperor John on his last expedition.

Manuel continued his father's foreign policies with unceasing vigour.<sup>1</sup> Throughout this period of Byzantine Empire, the house of the Comneni had seen the gradual transformation of the Mediterranean into a Latin lake. There was the Latin establishment in the East. Antioch, despite a formal acknowledgment of Byzantine suzerainty and a temporary occupation by the Emperor John Comnenus, had successfully eluded all Byzantine attempts at permanent acquisition. We suggested in this connection that among the many reasons for John's withdrawal from the walls of Antioch in 1142 could be found the fear of arousing additional hostility from the Papacy and also John's concern that no obstacle be placed in the way of what seemed to be the growing papal-German-Byzantine<sup>2</sup> entente against the power of Roger II of Sicily, whose very existence as King of Sicily under papal suzerainty had been an implied threat to the safety of the Greek empire. Controlling the trade routes of the Mediterranean, Roger had cast his net over North Africa and had even extended the scope of his ambition to Jerusalem and to Antioch. In this Norman aggression which knew no limits, the Greeks rightly found much to fear.



Yet there was little certainty in the entente to which we have alluded. Even though partly for its sake, John had withdrawn from Antioch, not wishing to place an obstacle in the way of his plans for the punishment of Roger through the efforts of the German Conrad III, there was little clear assurance of the safety of the Empire in these diplomatic developments. John died, excommunicate in the eyes of the Roman church. Further, we have already remarked on the Greek resentment of the existence of an imperial title in the West, and the Western reluctance to treat the Emperor of Constantinople as anything more than King of the Greeks. The Germans claimed that they were the true Romans and in this the Greeks found an insult to their imperial tradition and a possible menace, potentially only at this time, to the very life of the Empire itself.<sup>2</sup>

These were some of the grounds of Manuel's fear of the Latins. To meet it, this brilliant, if misguided, representative of the house of the Comneni continued with even greater power the dream of his father: the revival of the glories of Justinian. If John Comnenus had dimly perceived this dream, his son was to make it plain to the Latins in East and West through a dynamic combination of diplomacy and political power. Among the Latins of the Orient, he was to achieve a brilliant if transitory success. The imperial ambition here was to extend in theory and in fact the Byzantine suzerainty over all the Latin establishments in the East. To the West, the imperial ambition was even more grandiose. While the reign of Manuel extends beyond the limits of our investigation, there will be enough material to illustrate Manuel's desire to restore Byzantine power in Italy. The necessary preliminary to this would be the destruction of the kingdom of the Normans. This done, the emperor would proceed to



destroy the German pretensions to the imperial crown. Just as his grandfather Alexius had proposed to re-unite the crowns of East and West with the aid of Isacchal II, so now Manuel looked forward to the union of the crowns and the reunion of the churches by the absorption of the Roman see into the Oecumene as the chief ecclesiastical dignity of the newly enlarged Empire. While the working out of these plans is beyond the scope of this essay, occurring as they do in the reign of Alexander III, we shall at least see the beginning of these policies which were the Byzantine answer to Latin Christendom's aggressions, Norman, papal and German. Latin expansion was to be met by Greek expansion. In this conflict of wills and of power, the crusades are inextricably connected.

Significantly enough, from the outset of his reign, the new monarch displayed the greatest partiality for the Latins. This was borne of the imperial dream. If the Empire of Justinian were to be restored, the throne of Constantinople would have to surpass its narrowly Greek confines and embrace Greeks and Latins equally. The universal Empire would have to be truly universal. Before the throne, Latin and Greek, East and West, were to meet on equal footing.<sup>3</sup>

The great interest therefore which Manuel displayed in the West necessitates some rearrangement of material in this section of the thesis. Previously, whatever concerned the Greeks and the West has been placed in the first section of each part of the thesis. Now, however, in order to lay bare the full complexities of the Byzantine intervention in the life of Western Europe at this time, and the Papacy's actions in this situation, we shall limit as much as possible this section to the activities of Manuel in regard to the Second Crusade and the Latin States of the Orient.





The young Emperor proceeded to prove his worth in short order. After John's death and the Byzantine withdrawal from Cilicia, Raymond had invaded the area, expelling the small garrisons left behind by John. Not only this, the principality of Antioch had sent an embassy to Manuel which in the most insulting language attempted to reduce the Byzantine claim to Antioch to the barest terms. Angered by the insolence of the embassy and the aggression of Raymond, and mindful of the insults his father had suffered at the hands of Antioch, Manuel dispatched an expedition which by land and sea, threatened to overrun the entire principality. Raymond could not resist. The power of Zengi had been demonstrated by the capture of Edessa. According to Kinnamos, the Norman prince was forced to go to Constantinople to sue for peace. Rebuffed at first, Raymond was eventually forced to confess his faults before the tomb of John Comnenus. After this public humiliation, he swore homage to Manuel. The Latins of Antioch thus humiliated and his father's honour avenged, Manuel sent the prince back to Antioch, laden with gifts, and rich with promises of Byzantine aid and assistance against the infidel.<sup>4</sup>

In regard to the West, Manuel had already attempted decisive action. However, his first diplomatic gesture was in the direction of the King of Sicily. This was a curious development in policy. Although the alliance between the two Empires of East and West was an uneasy one due to the reasons mentioned above, there was at the outset of Manuel's reign no reason to abandon the alliance. Further, Manuel was officially betrothed to Bertha of Sulzbach. However, Roger had unsuccessfully attempted to arrange a marriage with a Byzantine princess. This at least had opened the door to future negotiations. Secondly, when Manuel reached Constantinople he had



had to crush a rebellion composed of Normans living in exile from their lands in South Italy. Led by Roger of Sorrento, they attempted to place Manuel's brother Isaac on the throne before Manuel could be crowned in Santa Sophia. Roger had been highly favoured by John Comnenus who had made him a Caesar and married him to one of his daughters. Beyond personal ambition we can not discern Roger's motives. Possibly, however, the revolt dramatized to Manuel the necessity of dealing with the Normans of south Italy.<sup>5</sup> Despite his marriage alliance with Germany, and the possibilities it opened up, Manuel decided to attempt to deal with Roger, himself. Perhaps results of a more concrete nature could be achieved, independent of Hohenstaufen and papacy.<sup>6</sup> Besides, the Germans were upstarts, claiming an imperial title which was not theirs and the papacy was the hated, - by many Greeks, if not all, - protector of the Normans.

In many ways, the time was ripe for a Byzantine-Norman rapproch<sup>É</sup>ments. If Manuel were going to adopt the policy of "Divide and rule" which the Byzantine emperors had perfected in their dealings with the Turks, then there was all the more reason. As we have mentioned previous to this, Roger had become estranged from the papacy due to his desire to control the episcopate of his realm. The hate of the Germans for Roger remained unabated. Therefore, Manuel sent off an embassy to the Norman monarch to negotiate a marriage between one of Roger's sons and a Byzantine princess. No marriage contract was attained by the Greeks, instead the most profound humiliation. The wily Norman, rich in the art of flattery, persuaded the Greek ambassador Basilius to recognize his royal title. Manuel disavowed his ambassador, and when the Norman ambassadors arrived in Constantinople to continue negotiations, he threw them into prison.<sup>7</sup> The dream of a re-conquest of south Italy was not to be surrendered. Roger would remain always a "tyrant" to the Greek mind.<sup>8</sup>



Thus the breach between Greek and Norman was not healed. Humiliated by Roger, Manuel turned back to the German alliance. The proposed marriage with Bertha would be carried out. However, Conrad was in a difficult mood. Judging by his letter to Manuel which Nicephoras, the Greek ambassador, and Embrico of Wurzburg and Robert of Capua, the representatives of Conrad, carried back to Manuel, Nicephoras was treated with insult and contempt upon his arrival at Conrad's court. A perusal of Conrad's letter suggests that Nicephoras did not use the imperial title when addressing Conrad. Perhaps he cast doubts on the suitability of Bertha as a wife for his master. However, his anger was appeased. The treaty of friendship was renewed between the two monarchs. Further, Conrad, mindful of the approaching marriage of Manuel to Bertha, condescended to give Manuel his blessing. This was another insult in that Bertha's lineage was not of the highest rank. The "king of the Greeks", an insulting phrase, was assured that his enemies were Conrad's enemies. The German ambassadors were directed to discuss, among other matters, the question of south Italy with an eye to the implementation of the mutual assistance pact concluded between them. Not only this, Manuel was to receive aid against the Turk.<sup>9</sup>

All things considered, Manuel had little choice but to swallow the insulting tone of the letter. The alliance was a necessary stage in the development of the imperial ambitions of the Emperor, which had as one of its first objectives, the defeat of Roger of Sicily. That monarch's hostility could be counted upon when Manuel had thrown his ambassadors into prison in reply to his master's insult to the Greek, Basilus. Greek spies had informed Manuel of the construction of new fleets in the shipyards of Sicily. In 1146,



the Admiral, George of Antioch, was to attack Tripoli. That the future would bring some kind of a direct assault on Byzantium was altogether certain. Therefore, the German alliance was quite necessary for the moment.

The mission of Nicephoras, which arrived in the West in the spring of 1145, returned to Constantinople sometime during the fall of the same year. With them they brought the imperial ambassadors of Conrad, the imperial letter, and the bride-elect, Bertha. The German ambassadors, the Bishop of Wurzburg and the Prince of Capua discussed matters pertaining to the alliance: the Greek plans for an attack on the Turk in Asia Minor and the dangers to both monarchs resulting from the arrogance of Roger of Sicily. The alliance of the two Empires was sealed with the marriage of Manuel and Bertha in January of 1146.<sup>10</sup>

It is possible, although unlikely, that Manuel had already heard of the crusade bull which Eugene III had issued on December 1, 1145. Probably he knew of the great unrest in Europe which had resulted from the arrival of the news of the fall of Edessa. At any rate, the presence of a German princess on the throne of Byzantium was to be of great value during the coming Crusade. She was visible proof of the sworn friendship of Conrad and Manuel and their alliance against Roger.<sup>11</sup>

## 2. Manuel and the Second Crusade.

In the year of his marriage, 1146, Manuel felt secure enough in the West, to turn his attention to the East. He opened a campaign against the Turk. Success attended him, but fear of Roger and the news of the rising crusade agitation in Europe probably prevented him from reaping the full benefits of his victories. He withdrew his army





and returned to Constantinople. A close perusal of the original sources reveals that both Turk and Greek felt menaced by the second Crusade.<sup>12</sup>

Manuel was naturally concerned over the Crusade and what it might bring to the Empire. There were the old fear of damage to the Empire accomplished by the crusaders while en route to the East and the fear that the Crusade was merely the cloak for a Latin desire for conquest.<sup>13</sup> Manuel had had a taste of Hohenstaufen arrogance. He feared also that Roger might use the Crusade for his own purposes. Therefore, he would have to take steps for the protection of his capital, hold to the imperial alliance and by clever diplomacy prevent Roger from all attempts to use the Crusade to further his own designs. Not only this, Manuel knew that the First Crusade had strengthened Moslem power by forcing union upon the disunited emirs and satraps. Would not the same occur this time? Equally important were his fears concerning Antioch. Raymond's humiliation and submission had just been accomplished. What would the presence of new forces of Latins in the East do but bring back his old resistance to the Byzantine claims for Antioch?

The walls of Constantinople were hastily repaired.<sup>14</sup> Provisions were assembled for the use of the crusaders in an attempt to limit their pillaging of the countryside.<sup>15</sup> The Byzantine army was rearranged to supervise the passage of the crusaders.<sup>16</sup> Like his grandfather, Alexius, Manuel was determined to prevent any concentration of forces in the vicinity of the capital.<sup>17</sup>

As for diplomatic manoeuvres, Manuel showed his determination to prevent Roger of Sicily from exploiting the crusade to his own advantage. As we shall see in section three, Roger failed to coax Louis VII into his scheme for an attack on the Greeks. Friendly



relations of a sort were established at the outset of the crusade between Manuel and Louis and the papacy. Suffice it to say for the present that Roger, checked in his diplomatic manoeuvres against Manuel, resorted to open war. In the year 1147, when the Empire was playing host, if unwillingly, to the Latin crusaders, Roger proceeded to take advantage of the Greeks by having his navy ravage the Peloponnesus. No resistance was offered since what military strength the Greeks had was concentrated for the task of supervising the passage of the crusaders and the protection of the capital. The great cities of Thebes and Corinth, with their silk factories, were mercilessly pillaged. Athens and Euboea felt the sting of the Norman lash. The booty amassed was of the highest value and the powerlessness of the Empire before the assault of the Admiral, George of Tripoli, was most gratifying to the Norman monarch. Cerigo, the Negropontis, were pillaged, and Corfu was not only captured but also fortified by the Normans.<sup>18</sup>

Despite the existence of the alliance between Conrad and Manuel, the agitation of the Greek emperor increased as the vast horde of "barbarians" from the West approached the imperial domain in the summer of 1147.<sup>19</sup> After the Germans had passed easily through the realm of the King of Hungary, Manuel began a series of diplomatic missions whose purpose it was to protect his empire from injury and humiliation. In Hungary, the ambassadors from Manuel asked Conrad and his barons for an oath of non-injury to the Empire. The Greeks knew that Conrad, who claimed to be king of the Romans, would have been completely alienated had anything more been demanded. To the haughty tone of the Greeks the Germans replied that they had come as guests of the Empire, that their destination was Palestine.



They meant no harm to the realm of Manuel.<sup>20</sup> The Emperor, reassured by their attitude provided boats for the crossing of the Danube and supplies were ordered to be sold to the travellers at a fair price.<sup>21</sup> However, the rate of exchange angered the Latins. This proved to be a source of resentment although the general behaviour of the Germans was excellent until they arrived in Dacia.<sup>22</sup> Relations with Greek officials who accompanied them were cordial despite occasional bickering.

However, the chorus of complaints increased. Further the discipline of the army was negligible despite the best efforts of the leaders. Violence became more common. The Emperor found it necessary to follow the example of his grandfather and sent out a force of men to check the excesses of the Latin by light skirmishing.<sup>23</sup> This only served to increase German resentment. At Adrianople the disorder reached a crisis. The Germans perpetrated a series of atrocities, rape, murder and the burning of a monastery to avenge the murder of a German noble at the hands of the Greek guerrilla forces which had been sent out to supervise the approach of the armies of Conrad.<sup>24</sup> Faced with their violence, Manuel's fear for the safety of Constantinople increased. He urged a speedy crossing of the Propontis, ordering his fleet to assemble at Abydos in order to transport Conrad across to Asia Minor. Thus, if the crusaders adopted this new route, it was not necessary for them to come any closer to the imperial city. A new embassy approached Conrad with this proposal.<sup>25</sup>

Conrad was not in a friendly mood. In vain did the Greeks remind him of his promise of friendship and respect for Manuel and the welfare of his realm. Conrad was probably influenced in his hostile attitude towards the Greeks by the tradition of Greek



treachery, which as we have shown had been current in Western Europe for more than forty years. Perhaps in Manuel's suggested re-routing was a plan to annihilate the German army. Further, he was disturbed by the flash flood outside Adrianople which had drowned thousands of his followers and reduced his supplies.<sup>26</sup> Hence he rejected Manuel's suggestion.<sup>27</sup> When another embassy from Manuel returned to offer him imperial condolences for the Adrianople disaster, they were brusquely rebuffed, and Manuel's request for an interview was refused.<sup>28</sup>

The Germans drew closer to the capital. Now the embassies from Manuel became more threatening in tone. Manuel hesitated to order a direct attack on the German army now at the outskirts of the city.<sup>29</sup> Instead he first withdrew the right of market, hoping this would bring the crusaders to a more peaceful state of mind. The Germans replied with wanton destruction of the parks which bordered the walls of the great city. Foraging in the suburbs, destroying what could not be eaten or carried away, the Germans seemed uncontrollable. Manuel finally ordered an attack which routed the crusaders.<sup>30</sup> Further he once again requested Conrad to enter the city for an interview, but the German, fearing treachery, refused. Threats, barely disguised by formal language, were exchanged.<sup>31</sup> It is probable that Conrad, for his part, knew he had no legal reason to attack the walls of the city. Further, he was not anxious to alienate a ruler who, after all, was his son-in-law.<sup>32</sup> Not only this he was uncertain of the reaction of the Franks to any attack on the royal city. Fortunately for Manuel, Conrad was none too friendly with Louis VII and refused to countenance the French monarch's appeal that Conrad wait for him on the eastern side of the Bosphorus.<sup>33</sup> Finally, Conrad knew his first task was





to fight the heathen. Without treaty or conference,<sup>34</sup> without waiting for Louis, Conrad and the bulk of his army crossed into Asia Minor. The patience of Manuel had had its reward, and the emperor promised his father-in-law guides and supplies for the perilous journey across Asia Minor.<sup>35</sup>

As we have mentioned, messengers from Louis had reached Conrad when he was before the walls of Constantinople, urging that he delay until Louis' arrival. This went unheeded. These then waited upon Manuel to ascertain his arrangements for the crossing of the Franks into Asia Minor and for the provisioning of the army on its journey.

We have already spoken of Roger's attempt to turn Louis against the Greeks. This had failed; however Manuel's suspicion was such that he took a much firmer stand with Louis than he had done with Conrad.

At Ratisbon, his ambassadors demanded that the Franks not take by force any city or stronghold in the realm. Further, whatever cities or stronghold they had captured from the Turk were to be given to the Emperor. Finally they asked that the Frankish nobles take an oath of loyalty to the Emperor and his realm. The similarity of these demands to the ones asked by Alexius of the first crusaders is marked. Then and now, the Franks thought the demands insulting. The more hostile said that they would seem to be fighting for the Emperor if they agreed to these requests. Two generations of prejudice engendered by the slanders of Bohemund and others had done their work. The more moderate were willing to concede some justice to the imperial demands. Mindful of Antioch, they asked Manuel to define the limits of his empire. However, Louis



ordered certain of his knights to take the oath of loyalty to the Emperor and his realm. The Greek ambassadors were satisfied. They promised sufficient markets, reasonable rates of exchange. When the embassy returned to the East, one member of the party remained to accompany the French army.<sup>36</sup>

The suspicion provoked by the demands of Manuel continued to grow as the Franks advanced into Greek territory. Many towns, despite the imperial decree concerning markets,<sup>37</sup> feared the crusaders, having suffered too much at the hands of the Germans who had passed on before. They refused to admit the Franks within their walls, letting food down over the walls in baskets, to be sold at ruinous prices. Frankish discontent reached the imperial ears. An embassy was despatched to make sure that the Greeks kept their side of the bargain.<sup>38</sup> Although Louis kept his head in the growing animosity, indicating that he wished to have an interview with Manuel in the palace,<sup>39</sup> mutual suspicion marked every turn of the negotiations between East and West. No amount of promises could convince the Empire that certain trust could be placed in the good will of the Franks. As for the Franks, there were rumours as to the hostile treatment which the Germans had received from the Greeks. Also the Franks knew of the treaty which Manuel had recently concluded with the sultan of Iconium. This too sounded like treachery.<sup>40</sup> Had not Manuel promised to join the crusaders in a war against Islam?<sup>41</sup> Thus animosity against the Greeks increased apace.

Anti-Greek feeling rose when this report of the truce with the Turks was circulated. Godfrey, Bishop of Langres, had long shown open animosity towards the Greeks, their civilization and their religion. He despised them, as did many another, for their meaching attitude towards royalty, for their elaborate court ritual



and for their "effeminacy".<sup>42</sup> Greek resentment against the Latins was also on the increase.<sup>43</sup>

Manuel could only continue his policy of an armed friendship. Roger was pillaging the Peloponnesus. The secret police reported to the Greek Emperor that some of the Franks were urging their king to ally himself with Roger and make a combined attack on Constantinople.<sup>44</sup> Without any possible eastern support against Roger, seeing that Conrad had passed to the East on crusade and that relations between them had almost been strained to the breaking point, it was fortunate for Manuel that Louis kept his head, holding to a moderate and humane judgment of the Greek Emperor and his policies. Correspondence continued between them.<sup>45</sup> When Louis wrote home to Suger from Constantinople, he merely reported that all was well and that he needed money.<sup>46</sup>

At Constantinople, Manuel at first seemed to be interested only in the speedy transportation of the Franks to the other side of the Bosphorus. He soon changed his mind. Perhaps it would be better to secure Louis' friendship by friendly hospitality and thus defeat Roger's attempt to win the Franks to his purposes. Accordingly, he opened the city to Louis and his suite and received the Frankish monarch into his palaces.<sup>47</sup>

Before the eyes of the bemused Franks there appeared the accumulated treasures of Byzantine glory. The account of Cdo remains a priceless testimonial to the splendour of the imperial city on the Golden Horn.<sup>48</sup> There was the magnificent palace of the Augusti, the beauties of the Philopation, where they were housed. Manuel seemed full of fair words, and to many the prospects of the expedition brightened considerably. Godfrey remained unconvinced.



No matter how delightful the Greek chanting on the feast day of St. Denis, a delicate imperial compliment to the Franks, no matter how kind the imperial face, no matter the luxury of the guest apartment, Langres saw in these only the blandishments of a proven traitor. He scanned the walls of the city and declared that they could be stormed, an ominous note. He never forgot that before him was the leader of those who set at nought the claims of Blessed Peter. They were heretical pests who grieved the Pope and who had caused trouble for the Christians of Antioch. What treason would Manuel do to them? Odo, who quotes Godfrey at length, thought that Godfrey's attitude was sound.<sup>49</sup> However the moderate counsels of Louis and his advisers prevailed.

The Greeks had two objectives: the removal of the Latins as quickly as possible and the obtaining of the oath of allegiance and security. The latter would prevent a Franco-Norman alliance. They resorted to treachery, the kind that the unsophisticated Franks could not resist. Rumours were manufactured, purporting to be reports from the imperial armies. Glowing accounts of German victories were passed on to Louis. Conrad had asked that someone be sent to hold the cities which he had taken, another clever ruse which would give the Franks the impression that they also should agree to return all cities to the emperor. Louis wished to wait for the armies of the Counts of Maurienne and Auvergne and the Marquis of Montferrat who were crossing by way of Brindisi and Durazzo. However his army became restive thanks to the propaganda of the Greeks. They feared that the Germans were taking the lion's share of the booty and gaining all the fame and credit of the expedition. Swearing eternal friendship and comradeship in war, Louis departed across the Bosphorus, c. 21 October, 1147.<sup>50</sup>





Between the malice of Odo and the silence of the Greeks, one is hard to put to it to assess accurately the methods used by Manuel to gain his objectives.<sup>51</sup> Disorders there were in the armies, and these received appropriate Greek retaliations. Manuel's aim was to prevent the French from joining Roger of Sicily who was attacking the Peloponnesus. Further, he would have all reconquered territory bound to his throne by an oath of vassalage. His demands irritated the Franks, especially men like Godfrey of Langres. Louis, however, kept his head. As we shall see, while he had serious complaints to make against Manuel, these were in no way comparable to the semi-hysterical hatred of the Greeks which animated the work of Odo de Deuil.<sup>52</sup>

The progress of the Second Crusade was wretched beyond description.<sup>53</sup> Despite Manuel's warnings, the imperial forces divided their strength, and the resulting catastrophe spared but a small remnant of the original army. As for the Franks, Odo reveals the incredible hardships, the mounting terror, the uncertainty as to direction, the uselessness and finally the defection of the guides. The end came at Adalia on the southern coast of Asia Minor where Louis and a small group of knights took ship for the Holy Land at ruinous prices, leaving behind innumerable dead and many others who disappeared into the ranks of the victorious Turks. As for Conrad, when Manuel heard the news of the disaster, he was disposed to be generous. Although Louis offered Conrad a place befitting his dignity in his own army, Conrad returned to Constantinople at the imperial invitation.<sup>54</sup>

This proved to be a masterstroke for Manuel. His spies had told him of the anti-Greek sentiment in the French army. He himself knew how close he and Conrad had come to outright war during



the stay of the Germans at Constantinople. Besides there was Roger to be dealt with and the aims of imperial policy to be furthered. Conrad and Frederick Barbarossa spent the winter at the capital. When Conrad's wounds needed treating, he received the medical attention of not only the royal physicians but even of Manuel himself.<sup>55</sup> In the spring of 1148, Conrad and his remaining forces were transported by the emperor to the East where the German had the pleasure of greeting Louis upon his arrival at Jerusalem. Yet even in the Holy Land although a certain consummation was found in the devotions paid by the crusaders at the tomb of the Saviour, the Crusade went on to a greater humiliation.<sup>56</sup> The attack on Damascus was a failure, and the forces of the Second Crusade soon melted away.<sup>57</sup>

When he returned from Palestine, Manuel and Conrad met for the last time at Thessalonica. Moving to Constantinople for the Christmas festivities of 1148, the Greek Emperor was determined now to reap the harvest of his benevolence. Conrad had been grateful for Manuel's kindness after the debacle of 1147.<sup>58</sup> The mutual assistance pact against Roger was re-affirmed, and this renewal of the alliance was sealed once again with the marriage of the princess Theodora to Henry of Austria. It may also be that Manuel proposed that Conrad assign south Italy to Manuel as Irene's dower.<sup>59</sup> Saving peril to their crowns and serious illness, the year 1149 would see a concerted attack against Roger. Conrad left the Greek capital on Candlemas, 1149, arriving at Aquileia c. 1 May. He was home by the end of the month.<sup>60</sup>

### 3. Manuel and the Normans.

If Manuel had been unable to resist the Norman depredations



in the Peloponnesus, he had made what preparations he could for a counter-attack when the crusade had ceased to be a thorn in his flesh. As we saw above, he salvaged brilliantly the Hohenstaufen alliance from the Crusade. Not only this, he had turned for help against Roger to Venice who, in time past, had watched the expansion of Roger's power with fear and alarm. In the summer of 1147, he had sent off an embassy to Venice to ask for aid against Roger. As usual, he offered additional commercial privileges to the Venetians, ever greedy to increase their commercial power.<sup>61</sup> In addition to this, he re-confirmed the treaties awarded to Venice by Alexius and John.<sup>62</sup> The Venetian doge proved to be agreeable to this new arrangement. Negotiations lasted for almost a year. We add in passing that certain Venetian factions objected to this new alliance with the schismatic Greeks. Of this more in another place.

Meanwhile Manuel pursued his preparations to attack Corfu.<sup>63</sup> Roger showed his arrogance by directing a new attack against North Africa which further established his power there from Tunis to Tripoli.<sup>64</sup> In the spring of 1148, Manuel sent his fleet to Corfu although the Empire was disturbed by a new advent of barbarians.<sup>65</sup> When Conrad re-affirmed the pact between the two emperors in the winter of 1148, the war of the Empire and the Greeks against Corfu was proceeding satisfactorily. Manuel was winning his struggle against the "dragon of the West", the now Amalek, i.e. the King of Sicily.<sup>66</sup>

However, trouble soon developed. Corfu was taken but not without difficulties with the Venetians.<sup>67</sup> Roger, faced with this loss, tried a diversion to the Greeks mainland. During the confusion of naval tactics, the Greeks captured a portion of the fleet



bearing Eleanor and Louis home from the crusade. Louis escaped but the Norman Admiral George of Antioch was required to free the Queen from her Greek captors. Many Frankish knights were freed only some time later.<sup>68</sup> This mistake was to become part of Roger's diplomatic strategy, as we shall show.

With Greek honour restored somewhat, the imperial policy could proceed. In the spring of 1149, there was a new mission to Pisa, undertaken with the approval and assistance of Conrad.<sup>69</sup> As for Conrad, he intended to fulfill the terms of the treaty. However, as we shall see in section three, upon his return to the West, he became involved in the skilful manipulations of Roger of Sicily who, either directly or indirectly, had Suger of France, Peter of Cluny, Bernard of Clairvaux, members of the papal curia, and the Welf faction in Germany as pieces on his vast diplomatic chess board. His purpose was to unite Latin anxiety over the Holy Land, general Latin hate of the Greeks, and papal anxiety as to the East-West alliance into a "crusade" which would be directed by Roger against the Greek Empire. We shall see how his plans were shattered by the political wisdom of Eugene, the lack of enthusiasm for a new expedition in France and Conrad's loyalty to Manuel.<sup>70</sup>

Suffice it to say that in 1149, Conrad was too busy at home, too weak in health, to invade Italy against Roger. Manuel therefore had to continue on his own. The victory at Corfu led to a general Greek control of the sea.<sup>70</sup> The news of the capture of Corfu spread quickly through Italy. It had its effect on Roger and upon the Pope. As we shall show in section three, Eugene feared a German-Greek intervention in Italy. He knew also, perhaps, that Conrad had recognized Manuel's claims to south Italy. This fear, we shall see, motivated in part Eugene's action against the





Doge of Venice in defence of the Patriarch of Venice who was opposed to an alliance with schismatics. Further, as we shall show, it sowed fear in the papal mind that the treaty between Manuel and Conrad was directed against the Roman church. Manuel, knowing this, may well have sent an ambassador to discuss church union with Eugene. This would separate the papacy from Roger and make it the tool of the East-West alliance against the Sicilian monarch. As we shall show, the Pope was not disposed to be the tool of either Roger or Manuel.

The winter of 1149-1150 saw the decisive step taken by the sending of John Ducas to Ancona. If Venice and Manuel had been estranged to some degree at the siege of Corfu, this was to prove too much for the Venetians who saw correctly in this development an attempt on the part of Manuel to re-establish the exarchate of Ravenna.<sup>71</sup> The Greek attempt proved abortive, thanks in part to Venice and to the war to which Roger of Sicily incited his Hungarian and Serbian allies at this time.<sup>72</sup> The ambition of Manuel was checked therefore for the time. A further defeat came when Frederick Barbarossa ascended the throne. As we shall show, the new German monarch agreed with Eugene III to expel the Greeks from Italy. If, however, Manuel found himself checked in the West, the final part of our investigation will show his gradual rise to great power in the East.



FOOTNOTES:

1. For the reign of Manuel Comnenus, the standard authority is Chalandon, Les Comnènes. II. Jean II Comnène et Manuel Comnène, (Paris, 1913). For Manuel's western foreign policy, H. von Kap-Herr, Die abendländische Politik Kaiser Manuels, (Strassbourg, 1881). Indispensable in this connection is W. von Bernhardt, Konrad III, (Leipzig, 1883). For the relations with the Normans, we have cited before the histories of F. Chalandon and E. Caspar which cover this period. As for the crusade histories, we have referred many times to the histories by Runciman and Grousset and to Röhricht's definitive history of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem.
2. For a clear statement as to the Greek attitude towards the German empire, see Kinnamos, V, 7, CSHB, pp. 218-220. Kinnamos could not understand how anyone who claimed to be an emperor could act as a papal equerry. As this passage shows, the Greeks hated the papacy for its role in creating the western title, a further indication that a society built upon a divided principle of authority, i.e. the Gelasian "two sword" theory, was beyond their understanding.
3. Nicetas understood Manuel's policies with great insight. See De Manuele Comneno, VII, 2, CSHB, pp. 259-268. Unless otherwise noted, all references in Nicetas are to that portion of his work devoted to the reign of Manuel Comnenus. As we have noted in the introduction, he was deeply critical of Manuel's aims and objectives as the passage cited reveals. cf. Kap-Herr, op.cit., pp. 109-116.
4. See Kinnamos, II, 1-3, CSHB, pp. 30-35; Nicetas, I, 1, CSHB, pp. 71-72; Michael the Syrian, III, p. 267. See Röhricht, Geschichte, p. 231.
5. Chalandon, Domination Normande, II, pp. 127-129, suggests without adequate reason that Conrad was behind this revolt and that therefore Manuel proposed to deal with Roger independently.
6. For this revolt, see Kinnamos, II, 4, CSHB, pp. 36-38.
7. I have conflated the accounts of Romuald, Chronicon, MSS (new), VII, I, Annales Romualdi, MGSS, p. 227, Kinnamos, III, 2, CSHB, p. 91 and in the Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, p. 453. This version is Dolger, II, No. 1531, dated April, 1143. See also the report of Nicetas, II, 8, CSHB, p. 130. The chronology here is rather confused, see Caspar, op.cit., pp. 363-364.



8. Kinnamos, II, 4, CSHB, 37, and JGR, III, p. 525.
9. The letter in question is found in Otto's Gesta, I, 23, MGSS, XIX, pp. 364-365. This is Dölger, II, No. 1338. See also Otto, Chronicon, VII, 28, MGSS, XIA, p. 263; Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 3.
10. Otto, Gesta, I, 23, MGSS, IX, p. 365. The Bishop of Würzburg died during the return journey to the east. Annales S. Disibodi, MGSS, XVII, p. 27.
11. Nicetas, I, 2, CSHB, pp. 72-73. Nicetas found her too German for his liking. See Kinnamos, II, 4, III, 5, V, 1, CSHB, pp. 36, 99, 202, who appreciated Irene's political usefulness.
12. Concerning this campaign, Chalandon, Journ. et Manuel, pp. 248-253. Although the chronology here cannot be clearly established, Michael the Syrian is probably correct when he attributes to the news of the Crusade the Emperor's withdrawal from central Asia Minor, III, p. 275. For the treaty concluded, see Kinnamos, II, 6, 8, CSHB, pp. 56-59. For the negotiations connected with this war with Sultan Masudi of Iconium, see Dölger, II, No. 1344, No. 1345, No. 1346, No. 1352, Kinnamos, II, 5, 6, 11, CSHB, pp. 39, 41, 46, 66.
13. See Kinnamos, II, 12, CSHB, p. 67 and Nicetas, I, 4, CSHB, p. 80 f for their opinions of the Crusade.
14. Nicetas, I, 4, CSHB, p. 82.
15. Nicetas, I, 4, CSHB, p. 81.
16. Kinnamos, III, 2, CSHB, p. 92; Nicetas, I, 4, CSHB, p. 81.
17. As in the First Crusade, the crusaders were to be channelled towards the Bosphorus. Nicetas, I, 4, CSHB, pp. 82-83.
18. For accounts of the Norman raid, see Kinnamos, II, 19, III, 1-2, CSHB, pp. 87, 89-92. Kinnamos saw clearly the effect the crusade had upon the weakening of the Greeks in face of Roger. Otto's report in the Gesta, I, 33, MGSS, XIX, p. 370, although brief, is magnificent in its exactness and comprehension. See also Nicetas, I, 4, II, 1, CSHB, pp. 82, 96-102; Annales Cavenses, MGSS, III, p. 192; Historia Lucum Veneticorum, MGSS, XIV, p. 75; Pandolfo, RIS (new), XII, I, pp. 242-243; Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIA, p. 310; Romuald, Chronicon, II (now), VII, I, p. 227; Annales Salidenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 83; Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, p. 453, although this account makes Manuel the aggressor.



19. A.K.Demetracopoulos, Bibliotheca Ecclesiastica, (Leipzig, 1866), p. 200 records the comments on Manuel's concern by Nicolas of Mettrone.
20. Kinnamos, II, 12, CSHB, pp. 67-69; Dölger, II, No. 1353. See Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, p. 279; Casper, op.cit., p. 375. Conrad was pleased with his reception by the Greeks. See P.Jaffé, Bibliotheca rerum Germanicarum, (Berlin, six volumes, 1864-1873), volume I, Monumenta Corbeiensis, containing the collection of letters bearing the name of Hilald, abbot of Corbie. For this, see letter No. 48, p. 126. Hereafter this indispensable collection will be referred to as Hilaldi Ep. with the proper number and page.
21. Nicetas, I, 4, CSHB, p. 81. See also Helmold, Chronica Slavorum, I, 59, MGSS, XXI, p. 57. Dölger, II, No. 1355.
22. This may be seen in the account of Kinnamos, II, 13, CSHB, p. 70.
23. Kinnamos, II, 13, CSHB, p. 71.
24. Both Kinnamos and Nicetas placed the blame directly on Frederick Barbarossa. See Kinnamos, II, 13, CSHB, pp. 70-71 and Nicetas, I, 4-5, CSHB, pp. 83-87. Odo of Deuil had little good to report of their behaviour, but he omits their atrocities at this stage of their journey. See Odo, Berry, p. 47.
25. Kinnamos, II, 14, CSHB, p. 72. See Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, p. 275 and Kap-Herr, op.cit., pp. 27-29. Dölger, II, No. 1357.
26. For the disaster at Adrianople, see Otto, Gesta, I, 45, MGSS, XX, pp. 375, 376; Odo, Berry, pp. 48-49; Kinnamos, II, 14, CSHB, pp. 73-74; Nicetas I, 5, CSHB, pp. 85-86; Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 4; Casus monasterii Petrishusen-sis, MGSS, XX, p. 674; Helmold, Chronica Slavorum, I, 60, MGSS, XXI, p. 57; Theodore Prodromos as quoted in the MGGr., II, p. 270.
27. Kinnamos, II, 14, CSHB, p. 72.
28. Kinnamos, II, 14, CSHB, p. 74. This is dated by Dölger, II, No. 1359, as 7-8 September, 1147.
29. Kinnamos, II, 14, CSHB, p. 73.





50. Kinnamos, II, 15, CSHB, pp. 75-77. This attack seems to have escaped Conrad's notice, Kinnamos, II, 16, CSHB, pp. 78-79. Many Western sources recorded faithfully the damage wreaked by the Germans at Constantinople and elsewhere. Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, pp. 3-4; Gisleberti Chronicon Hanoniense, MGSS, XXI, p. 516; Vincentii Bragensis Annales, MGSS, XVII, p. 663.
  
31. Kinnamos, II, 15-16, CSHB, pp. 78-80, Dölger, II, No. 1360, No. 1362, No. 1363.
  
32. The Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 4 attributes to Irene some moderating influence on the tense relations between the two monarchs. It should be remembered that at this time Manuel had negotiated an alliance with Ladislaus of Bohemia. This must have acted as a restraint on Conrad's actions. Kinnamos, V, 8, p. 223. Dölger, II, No. 1358. Vincentii Bragensis Annales, MGSS, XVII, p. 681. Of course, the Greeks assumed Conrad was resolved to capture the city but renounced this ambition when he saw its great fortification, Kinnamos, II, 14, p. 75.
  
33. Odo, Berry, pp. 48-50.
  
34. Many sources give the impression that an interview occurred: Annales Herbipolenses, Annales Salidenses, Annales Regavenses, MGSS, XVI, pp. 5, 82, 238; Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 310; Romuald, Chronicon, MGSS (new), VII, I, p. 229; Tyre, XVI, 19, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 165-166, MGSS, I, p. 736. However, our eyewitness source, Odo of Deuil, categorically denies this, Berry, p. 48.
  
35. Kinnamos, II, 16-17, CSHB, pp. 80-83; Odo, Berry, p. 50; Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 5.
  
36. This embassy is Dölger, II, No. 1354. See Odo, Berry, pp. 26-28, Kap-Herr, op.cit., pp. 30-31.
  
37. Nicetas, I, 5, CSHB, p. 88.
  
38. Kinnamos, II, 17, CSHB, p. 92.
  
39. Kinnamos, II, 17, CSHB, p. 92.
  
40. Odo, Berry, p. 58.



41. The letter of Manuel to Louis at the beginning of the Crusade is found in RHGE, XVI, pp. 9-10 and will be discussed more fully in section three.
42. Odo, Berry, p. 26.
43. Greek hatred was sufficient to produce the forged imperial letter of 1147 wherein Manuel urged the Turkish sultan to attack the Germans. Dölger, II, No. 1366.
44. Odo, Berry, p. 58.
45. Dölger, II, No. 1361, No. 1364.
46. The Franks arrived at Constantinople in the first week of October, 1147. See Louis' letters to Suger, IL, 186, cc. 1350-1351, 1357-1358.
47. Odo, Berry, pp. 56 ff.
48. Odo, Berry, pp. 56-72; Kinnamos, II, 17, CSHB, pp. 82-83.
49. Odo, Berry, pp. 68-70. As he says on p. 66: "Licet utraque nullum argumentum perfidiae demonstrarent, credo enim illos non tam sedulum exhibuisse servitium si bona cogitarent".
50. Odo, Berry, pp. 68-72; Kinnamos, II, 17, CSHB, p. 83. JGR, III, p. 526 also reveals Manuel's fear that the French would join with Roger in a concerted attack on the Empire.
51. Odo, Berry, pp. 74-80.
52. Odo, Berry, pp. 74-82. See Dölger, II, No. 1367 for the treaty; Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 310; Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, p. 304; Caspar, op.cit., p. 380.
53. Vivid accounts of the Crusade may be found in the Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, pp. 5-7; Books V-VII of Odo; Annales Palidenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 83; Conrad's letter to Wibald, Wibaldi Ep., No. 78, pp. 152-153; Nicetas, I, 5-6, CSHB, pp. 89 ff; Kinnamos, II, 17-18, CSHB, pp. 82-86. Nicetas, no friend to Manuel, suggests indirectly that Manuel was responsible for the debacle. Helmold, I, 60, MGSS, XXI, p. 58, accuses the Greek guides. Michael the Syrian, hating the Greeks, is more explicit in his denunciations, III, p. 276. However, Conrad's letter to Wibald does not support this.



See William of Tyre who accepts the charges of Greek treachery as probably true, XVI, 21, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 170, Riisecc., I, pp. 741-742.

54. Dölger, II, No. 1368; the text is in Kinnamos, II, 19, CSHB, pp. 85-86.
55. Kinnamos, II, 19, CSHB, p. 86; Annales Palidenses, MGSS, XVI, pp. 82-83; Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, pp. 6-7; Wibaldi Ep., No. 78, p. 153. Kinnamos' report is inaccurate here when he says Manuel met Conrad in Thrace. The imperial ships brought directly to the capital. As for Manuel's personal attention, see Wibaldi Ep., No. 237, p. 356.
56. For the journey from Constantinople to Jerusalem, Wibaldi Ep., No. 78, p. 153; Otto, Gesta, I, 58, MGSS, XI, p. 385; Annales Palidenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 83; Kinnamos, II, 19, CSHB, pp. 86-87; Tyre, XVI, 28, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 181, Riisecc., I, p. 753-754.
57. All knew, however, that the crusade had been lost in Asia Minor. Odo put it magnificently, Berry, p. 118: "Marcoscut flores Francie antequam fructum faciant in Damasco".
58. The above cited Wibaldi Ep., No. 78, p. 153 is sufficient proof. Conrad never forgot Manuel's hospitality and care. Wibaldi Ep., No. 237, pp. 355-357: "Quanta nos karitatis et devotionis instantia, quanto fidei et humilitatis studio in sacris edibus gloriosi imperii tui susceperis, quanta humanitatis et liberalitatis gratia in lecto infirmatis nostre non solum per tuos et tua set etiam in propria persona---ministraveris", (p. 356).
59. For the treaty against Roger, see Kinnamos, II, 19, CSHB, pp. 86-87, IV, 1, p. 135; the letter which Conrad wrote a year later to Irene, Wibaldi Ep., No. 242, pp. 363-366; Annales Palidenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 83; Annales Melliconenses, IX, p. 504; Annales Magdeburgenses, XVI, p. 188; Annales Jasinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 310; Sigoberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, p. 454; Continuatio Sancti Blasiani Ottonis Chronici, MGSS, XX, p. 305. For secondary accounts, Ksp-Herr, op.cit., pp. 32-36; Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, pp. 326-327; Kugler, Nouveau Anecdote, p. 34.
60. Otto, Gesta, I, 59, MGSS, XI, pp. 385-386; Annales Magdeburgenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 188.
61. These embassies to Venice are Dölger, No. 1356, No. 1373. See Historia Ducum Veneticorum, MGSS, XIV, p. 75; Dandolo, Riisecc.



(new), XII, I, pp. 242-243; Kap-Herr, op.cit., p. 48. The treaties may be seen in Tafel-Thomas, pp. 109-113; JGR, III, pp. 525-529. See also Hoyd, op.cit., I, pp. 199 ff; Kretschmayr, op.cit., I, pp. 233, 469; Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, pp. 321-322; Chalandon, Domination Normande, II, p. 138.

62. See Tafel-Thomas, pp. 113-124; JGR, III, pp. 433-440.
63. Nicetas, II, 2, CSHB, pp. 102-103; Kinnamos, III, 2, CSHB, p. 92.
64. Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, p. 454. For Roger's conquests in North Africa, see Constable, op.cit., p. 235.
65. Kinnamos, III, 2-4, CSHB, pp. 92-98; Nicetas, II, 2, CSHB, pp. 103-105.
66. These are phrases used by him in an imperial rescript to the orthodox clergy. See JGR, III, 443.
67. Kinnamos, III, 5, CSHB, p. 98; Nicetas, II, 5, V, 9, CSHB, pp. 113-115, 222-226.
68. Dandolo, RIS (new), XII, I, p. 243; Kinnamos, II, 19, CSHB, pp. 87-88; Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, p. 454; John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, XXVIII, Boole, p. 61.
69. Dolger, II, No. 1376, Libaldi Ep., No. 344, p. 477.
70. Kinnamos, III, 5, CSHB, pp. 98-101.
71. For this first attempt to secure Ancona, see Kinnamos, III, 6-7, 9, CSHB, pp. 101-106, 109-113. For Venice's attitude, see Kinnamos, III, 6, IV, 14, CSHB, pp. 102, 170.
72. For the wars with Serbia and Hungary, Kinnamos, III, 7, 10-11, CSHB, pp. 103-106, 113-118; Nicetas, II, 7, CSHB, pp. 121-124.





Section Two:

THE LATIN CHURCH OF THE EAST DURING THE  
PONTIFICATE OF EUGENE III.

1. Fulcher of Jerusalem.

William of Jerusalem died on 27 September, 1145.<sup>1</sup> By the unanimous choice of the suffragans of the church of Jerusalem, Fulcher of Tyre was elected to the see of Jerusalem. The Archbishop took possession of his see on 25 January, 1146.

At the election of a new metropolitan for Tyre, the patriarch, the King and his mother, together with the clergy of the archiepiscopal see gather in Tyre. The King and his mother were in favour of Ralph, the Chancellor of the kingdom of Jerusalem. The office of chancellor of the kingdom had risen to great importance in the life of the Latin establishment of the East,<sup>2</sup> and it was but natural that Melisende and her son wished to reward Ralph for his services to the crown. Probably because of their support, William of Tyre describes Ralph as learned but too worldly.

There was a strong party opposed to the royal will. Fulcher of Jerusalem, John, Archdeacon of Tyre,<sup>3</sup> were joined by Bernard of Siden and John of Beirut in their opposition to Ralph. Possibly the true nature of the division lay in the fact that Ralph was judged to be too close to the King of Jerusalem. As we mentioned previously, Tyre tells us in his history that the see of Tyre was not united, even in his day when he was writing his history. Perhaps some of the bishops of the church of Tyre still hoped that the northern sees of Jebail, Tripoli and Tortosa would become effectively part of the archiepiscopal church of Tyre. The



Jerusalem patriarchs, the popes of Rome and the kings of Jerusalem had worked to rob Tyre of her unity. They might therefore have been disposed to reject a royal nominee for the archbishopric of a see, crippled in part by royal policy.

Tyre informs us that Ralph was introduced by force, i.e. the power of the King, into the see of Tyre. He remained archbishop-elect of Tyre until as late as 22 June, 1151.<sup>4</sup> Tyre further informs us that he was deposed by Eugene III who declared his election null and void. However, the royal influence was great enough to obtain for Ralph the see of Bethlehem from Hadrian IV.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately the papal correspondence does not survive. We can assume with safety that the Papacy felt that Ralph had been elected thanks to an undue exercise of the royal power. As for the delay in the matter, we can also assume that Fulcher refused to consecrate Ralph as Archbishop. Ralph's successor at Tyre was Peter, prior of the church of the Holy Sepulchre. A native of Barcelona, Peter occupied his see in 1151.<sup>6</sup>

Such a disagreement between King and patriarch might have augured unfavourably for the future peace of the Holy Land. In fact nothing seemed to come of it. Patriarch and King worked together in peace and harmony. When the Second Crusade arrived in the Holy Land there was nothing but peace and unity between the temporal and the spiritual powers. The question of the disputed sees of Antioch and Tyre seems to have fallen into the background.

During the Second Crusade there were two papal legates present at one time in the Holy Land. There were Theodwin, the cardinal-bishop of Porto, and Guy of Florence, cardinal-priest of St. Chrysogonus in Rome.<sup>7</sup> It may be that Guy remained in the



Holy Land for some time since we have evidence which places him in the Holy Land as late as 28 June, 1152.<sup>8</sup>

The most important aspect of Guy of Florence's activities in the East seem to have been that he once again opened the problem of the allegiance of the sees of the county of Tripoli to Tyre and to the patriarchate of Jerusalem. In June 1149 the Prince of Antioch was killed in battle. The two defenders of the principality remaining were the Patriarch Aimery and Raymond's widow, Constance. About the ambitions of Aimery we shall have more to say in the concluding part of this dissertation. However, suffice it to say for the present, that he was intent on keeping all the northern bishoprics of Tripoli in his control. When therefore the papal legate was invited to Antioch to participate in a council which had as its purpose the defence of the principality of Antioch, Aimery commanded his suffragans not to appear. He himself refused to attend the meetings. Various excuses were alleged. It was said that the peril from the Saracens was so great as to render it impossible for the bishops to leave their sees. However, they could not hide the fact that the Antioch Patriarch did not wish his suffragans to appear. There was no Prince now in Antioch to compel the submission of the Patriarch before the power of Rome. There was no protest from the lay power for this defiance, and therefore there was no disobedience to the wishes to the Patriarch of Antioch. However, the bishop-elect of Tripoli was present at the council and annoyed the legate, chiefly, it would seem, because he made plain that he preferred obedience to the Patriarch of Antioch to an acknowledgment of the power of Rome. Guy, angry with this defiance, deposed the bishop and an appeal was directed



to Rome. In Rome, the bishop met with a stony reception, thanks to the report of the legate. However, when the rights and claims of the Roman church were set forth, the bishop acknowledged his sins and Eugene graciously restored him upon his submission to Rome.<sup>9</sup>

Our only source for this is John of Salisbury, save for a brief comment by Tyre who intimates that at this time Aimery was in trouble with the Roman church.<sup>10</sup> The significance of this is plain. First of all, the bishops of the county of Tripoli refused to acknowledge the authority of Tyre, taking additional advantage at this time from the fact that the archbishopric of Tyre was in dispute. They preferred obedience to the Patriarch of Antioch. Secondly, the account in Salisbury reveals that some resistance to the Roman primacy was used as a basis for their continuing disobedience. Hence Eugene had had the rights and privileges of the Roman church read to the bishop-elect of Tripoli. The days of Ralph and his predecessor, Bernard, were not altogether vanished. No evidence remains to show that the Papacy took steps to curb this new display of independence from the Patriarch of Antioch, beyond this discipline meted out to Tripoli.

The Second Crusade had a demoralizing effect upon the kingdom. The ignominious retreat from the walls of Damascus, the slanders arising from this, the unhappy stay of Louis VII at Antioch, the narrow self-regarding ambition of the Prince of Antioch, the expenses brought upon the kingdom during the Crusade, all these weakened the Christian cause in the Orient. The see of Tyre remained divided. At the famous council of war held at Palma, 24 June, 1148, when Louis, Conrad, and the survivors of the





wretched expedition gathered with Baldwin III and his barons to discuss their course of action against Islam, the northern bishops of the church of Tyre were conspicuous by their absence,<sup>11</sup> yet another indication of their continuing loyalty to the cause of the Patriarch of Antioch. Probably, as we suggested before, this was only a cloak for their desire to remain independent of any ecclesiastical authority greater than their own. Most important of all, of those who survived the Crusade, many accused the Latins of the Orient as responsible for the failures of the armies of Louis and Conrad to accomplish anything in the East. The East would not be ~~as~~ concerned over the Christian cause in the East as it had been. When Raymond of Antioch was killed in battle on June 27, 1149, appeals for help were sent to the West. As we shall see, nothing came of this by way of a new expedition. It is therefore logical that the Latins of the East should look for a new protector. Accordingly in our final part, we shall see the rising ascendancy of Manuel Comnenus over the Latin states.

After the departure of Conrad and Louis, peace and harmony returned to Jerusalem. Patriarch and monarch built together, for the defence of the realm in the winter of 1149-1150, the fortress of Gaza which when completed was given into the care of the Templars.<sup>12</sup> However disturbances began to arise from another matter. As we have briefly indicated Melisende had inherited the kingdom of Jerusalem by hereditary right and acted as regent for her son Baldwin who had been crowned king, however. Melisende, capable woman, was overly partial to a certain Menasses who had become her favourite. Baldwin became increasingly restive under the rule of his mother, and there were those nobles who resented the pretensions of the



Queen's favourite. Trouble thus in 1151 broke out, the year in which Baldwin attained his majority. In the contest for power which followed, the Patriarch attempted to moderate the ambition of the King which was to reduce his mother's power to as small an area as possible. William of Tyre makes it plain that the Patriarch favoured the mother against the son. Further when Baldwin appeared in public, crowned as the sovereign of the kingdom of Jerusalem, it seems certain that the Patriarch had had no part in the placing of the diadem on his head. The King was determined to rule for himself and to dispense with both his mother and her supporters.<sup>13</sup>

This period during the second crusade sees the usual papal interest in the religious establishments in the East. Like his predecessors, Eugene favoured the Orders of the Temple and the Hospital.<sup>14</sup> As for the rest, there are the usual confirmations, of St. Mary's of Jehosaphat,<sup>15</sup> the Holy Sepulchre,<sup>16</sup> and of the archiepiscopal see of Nazareth-Mt. Thabor.<sup>17</sup> Beyond this, there was nothing of any striking interest. The religious foundations were continuing to grow in power and wealth, and the Papacy continued to protect them.



1. Tyre, XVI, 17, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 161-162, RHCOcc., I, p. 733. See L. de Mas Latrie, "Les Patriarches Latins de Jérusalem", p. 18. Fulcher waited until as late as February, 1146, to be confirmed by Rome. See RR, No. 240. In connection with this section the useful works, already cited, are the two articles in the Revue de l'Orient Latin by L. de Mas Latrie on the patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem, Röhricht's "Syria Sacra", the work of Dodu and La Monte on the political institutions of the kingdom of Jerusalem and the three standard crusade works of Grousset, Runcimen and Röhricht.
2. Dodu, op.cit., pp. 157-158.
3. John was the future John of Pisa, cardinal priest of Saints Martin and Sylvester.
4. Tyre, XVI, 17, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 162-163, RHCOcc., I, pp. 733-734. William of Tyre's chronology is faulty in that he says that Ralph remained at Tyre for only two years. See RR, No. 252.
5. Tyre, XVI, 17, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 163, RHCOcc., I, p. 734. With a touch of malice, Tyre attributes his appointment to the fact that both Hadrian and Ralph were Englishmen. Ralph was consecrated only in June - November, 1158. RR, No. 321, No. 322. Gerard was still bishop of Bothleken and died three years later, Tyre, XVII, 21, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 213, RHCOcc., I, p. 796.
6. Peter was no longer prior of the Sepulchre in 1151. See RR, No. 271. On Peter see William of Tyre, XVI, 17, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 163, RHCOcc., I, p. 734; Röhricht, "Syria Sacra", p. 17. Peter was in possession of his see by May, 1151; see RR, No. 266.
7. Tyre, XVII, I, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 184-185, RHCOcc., I, pp. 758-759, and RR, No. 250.
8. RR, No. 275, No. 277.
9. John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, XXXVII, Poolo, pp. 74-77.
10. Tyre, XVII, 10, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 199-200, RHCOcc., I, p. 775.



11. See the list of persons listed in RR, No. 259.
12. Tyre, XVII, 12, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 202-203, R130cc., I, pp. 777-778.
13. Tyre, XVII, 13-14, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 204-207, R130cc., I, pp. 779-782.
14. The papal favour shall be described in the next section.
15. JL, 8741, 9099.
16. JL, 8939, 9260.
17. JL, 8915.





Section Three:

THE SECOND CRUSADE.

1. Eugene III.<sup>1</sup>

Lucius II died on 15 February, 1145, under the most disturbing circumstances. We have alluded briefly at this time to the difficulties which the Papacy found itself in connection with the citizens of Rome. The relation between Pope and city had never been easy. Since the tenth century the aristocracy had distinguished itself by a willingness to make trouble. The schism of Anacletus had given the Roman nobility additional opportunity for civil strife. To this was added the hostility of the proletariat as well as the bourgeoisie. The radical urban movements, rampant in northern Italy for many years, had arrived in Rome in the last years of the pontificate of Innocent II. Nobility, middle class and proletariat, had united in revolt in 1143 against that pontiff and had established a commune.<sup>2</sup> Innocent died in the midst of this uproar, and Celestine II did not long survive. Lucius, who came to the throne in March, 1144, saw the situation assume greater proportions. The commune had abolished the urban prefecture through which the Popes had ruled the city for centuries. They had then turned to the realization of a chimerical dream for the restoration of ancient republican Rome. The Pope would be replaced in his temporal authority by a patrician and a member of the Pierleoni family was elevated to this great task.<sup>3</sup> The pride and arrogance of the Roman commune elicited many a denunciation, the most impressive of which was that of St. Bernard.<sup>4</sup> Such



were not sufficient to restore papal power. Lucius, as we know,<sup>5</sup> tried an appeal to Conrad, but the German king was not able to respond. Although at peace with Roger, Lucius could not expect help from him.<sup>6</sup> This failing, Lucius decided to resort to force. In an attack on the capital when the Senate was sitting, Lucius received a wound which led directly to his death.<sup>7</sup>

The successor to Lucius was the Lisan, Bernard de Paganolli, who assumed the name of Eugene III. The situation in Rome was such as to force his withdrawal to the monastery of Farfa for his consecration, thus abandoning Rome to the tyranny of the Senate which proclaimed the Patriarchate and undertook to crush all opposition by violence and force.<sup>8</sup>

It was not an auspicious beginning for Eugene. The new pope was an intimate of St. Bernard. He had spent his early days in the monastery at Clairvaux. His mentor in Cistercian discipline attempted to rally European opinion to the support of Eugene, driven from his see.<sup>9</sup> These had little effect upon the Romans. As for Conrad in Germany, he was too preoccupied with his own nation to intervene on behalf of the Papacy. Although Eugene was able to reach a compromise with the Romans and re-enter the city on 19 December, 1145,<sup>10</sup> dissension again drove the pope from the city in the spring of 1146. His departure from the city was paralleled by the arrival of the tragic figure of Arnold of Brescia. His teaching received a warm welcome, and for the time the pontifical power had ended in Rome.<sup>11</sup>

The importance of these bitter struggles for us is that they form the background for the papal crusade bulls which were to appear in December-March, 1145-1146. The Papacy had no one to assist it in these difficulties, beyond the inspiration of Bernard.



Conrad was occupied with the ~~Wells~~ in Germany. As for Roger, we have seen how Innocent II had been humiliated by ~~him~~ at the battle of Garigliano. Forced to recognize Roger's title and domain, the papacy and the Norman monarch had been estranged by Roger's determination to control episcopal appointments in his realm without papal interference, yet another example of that Byzantine Caesaropapism which the Normans had adopted in their kingdom. Celestine II, in truth, hated Roger, refusing to renew the treaty of San Germano.<sup>12</sup> Lucius II wanted peace but with the Roman populace at his door obtained only a truce in October, 1144, from the Norman monarch who was quick to profit from any papal discomfiture.<sup>13</sup>

## 2. Reports of the Capture of Edessa.

By the spring of 1145, the fall of Edessa was reported in Europe. The news, borne first by rumour, and then by messengers from the East, told of the sudden attack by the heathen and the carnage that followed upon their defeat of all Christian resistance. The murder of the Archbishop and his clergy, the profanation of the church of the Virgin and of the tomb of the Apostle, St. Thomas, were soon known throughout the West. Reports followed with increasing regularity. Antioch was in peril. The entire Christian establishment in the East was in jeopardy. The future seemed dark. The Holy Places might once again be polluted with the touch of the infidel. The name of Christ, by the capture of Edessa, had been held in derision, and the valour of the Franks had been set at naught. The mediaeval mind, echoing the Psalmist, asked itself if the heathen could not now with justice say: "Where is now your God?"<sup>14</sup> Crosses were seen in the sky as a sign of divine judgment and as a summons to revenge.



The Papacy was the recipient of an appeal. Otto of Freising saw the Bishop of Jabala kneel before the Pope, (c) 15 November, 1145. Vividly and with the deepest emotion, the Bishop described the capture of Edessa, the danger to the Church, and of his desire to appeal for aid to the kings of the Germans and Franks.<sup>16</sup>

The Pope's immediate reaction to this appeal is not preserved to us.<sup>17</sup> The fact remains that appeals for help came to the Pope directly. They also were received by others, notably the king of France. It is possible that Hugh of Jabala did go across the Alps to Louis. The celebrated Abbot of Clairvaux also received an appeal for help. Kings and princes, Pope, bishops and saint, all heard of the wretched conditions in the East and of the infidel threat to the Holy Places unless the leaders of Western Christendom came to the aid of the Latins in the East.<sup>18</sup>

### 3. The Origin of the Second Crusade.<sup>19</sup>

We have attempted to describe something of the temporal situation in which the Papacy was placed at the beginning of the pontificate of Eugene III. In the midst of this had come rumours and then accurate reports of the peril to the crusade establishments in the East which had arisen, consequent upon the fall of Edessa. We know that the news of Edessa aroused Europe to a fever-pitch of anxiety and expectation. The problem now appears as to the Papacy's role in summoning the Second Crusade. Did the Papacy take the initiative?

Much controversy has arisen over this question.<sup>20</sup> The problem arises when we consider in this connection that we have





two crusade bulls from the chancery of Eugene III. One is preserved for us in the Gesta of Otto of Freising<sup>21</sup> and the other has been edited in recent years by Hassow in the Neues Archiv.<sup>22</sup> The bulls, although most similar, diverge in certain places. Since we have not an exact date for either one at the conclusion of the bulls,<sup>23</sup> scholars long debated as to which bull was prior in time and which was a new edition of the other.

The problem is not easy and is still perhaps not fully illuminated when the evidence of Odo of Deuil and Otto of Freising in regard to the origin of the Crusade is considered. If we consider Odo, Louis seems for a long time to have considered the possibility of a journey to the Holy Land. This "secret of his heart" he exposed before the assembled nobles of France at this Christmas court which he held at Bourges in 1145.<sup>24</sup> Odo does not mention a papal exhortation to the crusade as being prior to this Christmas announcement, and in another place indicates that Louis' request elicited from the pontiff the first crusade bull.<sup>25</sup> According to Odo, Louis took the initiative and Eugene responded.

In Otto of Freising's Gesta Friderici we find also that Louis had long desired to go to the East and without papal prompting revealed this desire to a gathering of princes. Otto goes on to relate that the princes consulted St. Bernard who in his turn remanded the entire matter to the Pope who responded to the enquiries of the princes by issuing the bull "Quantum praedecessores nostri".<sup>26</sup> Here once again Eugene III took no initiative, but acted only upon the action of France.

The problem is a considerable one. First, in regard to Eugene and the position of the papacy, the Pope was in difficult



straits in south Italy. He was estranged from Roger of Sicily and involved in a bitter struggle with the city of Rome. If we are to believe John of Salisbury who was at the papal court of Eugene, the character of Eugene was marked by the temperamental weakness of over-cautiousness and suspicion. He had difficulty in making decisions and standing by them.<sup>27</sup> Thus one could attempt a psychological reconstruction to explain why Eugene had not taken the initiative in the summoning of a new crusade which was the clear prerogative of the Papacy since the days of Urban II and even before. Perhaps Eugene feared to risk a crusade a peal. Spain was busy with its own struggle against the aracen. Would Roger answer? Probably not, and if so, a most dangerous development. Conrad was absorbed in home affairs. He had not been able to protect the Papacy against the Romans, nor had he as yet appeared in Italy to seek coronation at the hands of the Pope. England was divided by civil war. There was only France and northern Italy.

Thus, one could analyze the Papal position and Eugene's character and conclude that he probably had not thought that a crusade bull could be issued. Thus the traditional papal duty of summoning a crusade passed by default to the King of France.<sup>28</sup>

To some of the later chroniclers, St. Bernard is described as the chief author of the crusade, but there is no evidence for this.<sup>29</sup> The difficulties, if one wished to establish the papal initiative, hinge largely on the difficulties in establishing the papal itinerary during the years 1145-1146. Jaffé first and then his editor, Löwenfeld, became involved in controversy over the December bull. The bull of March the first, given at Trastevere,



fitted clearly into the itinerary of March, 1146.<sup>30</sup> However, while many such as Löwenfeld argued for placing the December bull in 1145, at Vetralla, no conclusive argument could be found.<sup>31</sup>

The conclusive argument appeared when Caspar in 1924 published a philological analysis of the two bulls showing that the December bull was prior to the one dated 1 March.<sup>32</sup> Thus the priority of the December bull for which Giesebrecht had first argued on the basis of a line in a letter of St. Bernard was established and has been accepted.<sup>33</sup>

The evidence in Odo may be accounted for by remembering that the French cleric in his De profectione had as one of his primary aims the exaltation of the glory of his master. However, that the idea of a pilgrimage to the East had occurred to Louis is likely. The explanations of Otto and Odo in this regard point to that highly scrupulous piety, a marked characteristic of the French monarch, which had perhaps seen in a journey to the East an expiation for responsibility, real or imaginary, for certain events in the years before his accession to the crown of France. As for the testimony of Otto, we know, from his eyewitness report, concerning Hugh of Jabala, that Otto had been with Eugene in the closing months of 1145. Leaving Eugene, he probably carried a copy of "Quantum praedecessores nostri" home with him. His copy was filed in his papers until he was compiling his Gesta. He realized its historic importance and inserted it at what he considered to be the most likely place in his narrative. As for psychological analyses of Eugene's personality, we shall show in this section of our investigation that if cautious and suspicious



to a remarkable degree, these qualities did not render Eugene morally inert, but served rather to increase his political tenacity and his awareness of the political issues involved. Further, for all his difficulties with Roger and the Romans, the Pope could still recall the political insecurity of his great predecessor when he had, at Clermont, summoned the Franks to glory on the crusade. That the French would respond again was probably. They had inherited the crusade tradition, and the loyalty of the French hierarchy was beyond question.

Moved by these considerations, and mindful above all of his duty to defend Christendom against the infidel, Eugene issued the first version of "*Quantum praedecessores nostri*", directed to the King of France, his barons and to all the faithful of France.

Eugene begins<sup>35</sup> by a reference to all that his predecessors had done for the liberation of the Eastern Church in the past especially Urban II who had summoned "as if by a heavenly trumpet the sons of the Roman church to the liberation of the Church in the East."<sup>36</sup> The armies, thus summoned by the Pope, composed especially of men from France and Italy, had liberated the city of Jerusalem the scene of Christ's sacrificial death and burial, from the contaminating hand of the heathen. With sadness, Eugene recounts that now, for the just punishment of the sins of the Latins in East and West, Edessa has been captured. The Archbishop, his clergy and many Christians have been slaughtered, and the relics in the churches of Edessa have been trampled under foot and dispersed by the infidel.<sup>37</sup>

The Pope is confident that his readers will realize the danger involved in this to the Church and indeed all of Christendom.<sup>38</sup> It remains therefore that the sons prove their own worth





by preserving what their fathers' strength had won. Therefore the faithful of God, especially the princes and leaders, are exhorted and indeed commanded for the remission of their sins to defend with their own blood, as their fathers had done, the Eastern Church against the heathen who now rejoice in the victory they have won over the Christians. They are to liberate also the many Christians who languish in the dungeons of the infidel, restore the honour of the Christian name and preserve the Frankish reputation for valour.<sup>39</sup>

For those who undertake the crusade, Eugene promises the same remission of sins which Urban had promised to their fathers.<sup>40</sup> The wives and families, goods and chattels of the warriors are taken under the care and protection of Holy Church. The protection of these was to be the direct responsibility of the hierarchy of the Church. All questions, such as legal suits and the like, which touch the possessions and rights of the crusaders are to be held in abeyance or until their deaths have been ascertained.<sup>41</sup>

Having attempted to protect the crusaders from any anxiety over the welfare of their families and the safety of their possessions, the Pope proceeded to make a few practical commands concerning their equipment. In this Eugene was moved both by a practical desire to avoid expense and also by his Cistercian abhorrence of things worldly and luxurious. The wealthy should leave their precious clothing, their dogs and hawks at home, - anything that tends to be showy and extravagant. Such are not in keeping with the holy undertaking, and besides, the crusaders should concentrate their energies on horses and arms, things pertinent to the struggle against the infidel.<sup>42</sup> Those also



embarking on this expedition out of sincere motivation are not to be bound by usury. To go on the crusade was expensive for any knight. Was he to fall victim to usurers in order to obtain his equipment? Or was he, who was already in debt to the money-lenders, to be hindered in fulfilling his zeal for the crusade by their demands. Eugene's answer is firmly in the negative and hence these expressions, protecting the crusader from extortion.<sup>43</sup> A final thought of the pontiff's is the protection of fiefs while their incumbents were away on the Crusade. Interestingly enough, Eugene permitted fiefs to be mortgaged without the consent of the overlord.<sup>44</sup>

In closing Eugene repeats the solemn absolution absolving from all sins those who go on the journey with "contrite heart and a humble confession", promising to these an eternal reward from Him who is the giver of all rewards.

Plainly marked through all of this is Eugene's respect for the example of Urban II. A cautious man, imbued with tradition, Eugene issued his bull with the crusading activity of Urban II much under his eyes. However, this bull was notable in that it provided a locus classicus for all future bulls. Urban had not issued a crusade bull or such although most of Eugene's directions were anticipated in the speech at Clermont and in the few crusade letters of Urban which remain.<sup>45</sup>

The bull was issued on 1 December, 1145, and we can assume that within fifteen days it had arrived in France. As we have already said, France had received reports, perhaps from Hugh of Jabala,<sup>46</sup> as to the tragic conditions in the Holy Land. Louis, Bernard, bishops and others had heard many describe the fall of



Edessa, the murder of the Christians, the profanation of holy relics, and the rising Moslem peril to Jerusalem.

The papal bull was delivered to the King of France prior to Louis' convening of his court at Bourges.<sup>47</sup> It is possible that the bull crystallized Louis' long present desire to go on a pilgrimage. The King also realized that upon the "franks" would rest the burden of first taking the cross. However, we can only conjecture as to the precise character of his reaction in the papal appeal.

Piety was certainly one of his motives. Was there, as Otto suggests, a secret desire to fulfill the vow of pilgrimage which his brother Philip had left unfulfilled by his early death?<sup>48</sup> Or was it something more mundane arising out of Louis' difficulties with the Archbishop of Bourges?<sup>49</sup> Or did Louis wish to atone for the massacre of Vitry in 1143?<sup>50</sup> Whatever the reason, in ringing tones the monarch revealed to the assembled company that the idea of a crusade had long lain on his heart, and that the fall of Edessa was the occasion to discharge this heavy burden.

To the exhortation of the king was added the appeal of Godfrey de la Roche, Bishop of Langres. With true Bistorcian fervour the bishop recounted the sufferings of the eastern church.<sup>51</sup>

However, no one seems to have been impressed. The great Suger, mindful perhaps of the difficulties of the crown with its great feudatories, was not in favour of a removal of the King from France.<sup>52</sup> If Suger openly demurred, the great nobles showed no interest. This much Louis was able to gain: there would be a meeting on Palm Sunday at Vézelay to consider the matter further.<sup>53</sup>

If royal eloquence had availed little, greater power would have to be brought to bear on the reluctant baronage. This was



found in St. Bernard who seems to have been involved in the developments for the Crusade since "quantum praedecessores nostri" had arrived in France. After Louis and Geoffrey had failed to obtain support at Bourges, they undoubtedly appealed to the saint for support. Perhaps also those nobles who had been reluctant to act at Bourges consulted him also.<sup>54</sup> With the papal bull as a basis, Bernard was enthusiastic, and he wrote to Eugene to congratulate him on the beginning which had been made at Bourges.<sup>55</sup>

Meanwhile Eugene was busy also. Having received the support of Louis and of Bernard, he returned to the Abbot of Clairveaux giving him the burden of preaching the Crusade at the forthcoming meeting at Vézelay. If Eugene, because of his difficulties, with the Romans and his suspicion of Roger, could not preach the Crusade in person as his predecessor Urban had done, he gave this task over to the greatest spiritual force in Europe.<sup>56</sup> Not only this, he issued a new edition of his first bull from Crastavero on 1 March, 1146.<sup>57</sup> This, together with the voice of Bernard, might well produce the same effect which the thunderous voice of Urban had elicited on that far distant day at Clermont. The new papal bull was the same as the one before, although it was a little more explicit in its interdiction of frivolities and luxuries on the Crusade.<sup>58</sup>

Quickened by knowledge that Bernard has undertaken to preach the Crusade as the papal representative, a great multitude assembled on 31 March, 1146, in Vézelay, inside the Cathedral. The press soon was too great and the celebrated monk, together with the splendid retinue of Louis of France, went into a field outside the town. There the king summoned his host to join him





on the Crusade, appealing to the piety and the pride of the Franks. This was only the prelude. Bernard of Clairveaux brandished in the face of Christian France the papal authorisation. The indulgences, the papal directives were read out. To the papal exhortation, Bernard added his own matchless eloquence. Of the themes of his address we have but little information. He referred to the feudal warfare, that worldly combat which only hastened the day of destruction, both spiritual and temporal for its participants. Now was the day of salvation to atone for wrongs and to defend the honour of God. The response was overwhelming. King and queen pressed forward to take the cross. Nobles, inspired by the exhortation and the royal example, knelt before the Abbot. The multitude in its frenzy to do likewise threatened to crush the Abbot in the press. Soon the crosses which had been prepared were exhausted. Impromptu crosses were cut from garments. The Second Crusade had entered history.<sup>59</sup>

Meanwhile, the news of the royal desire had passed quickly from Bourges into the countryside where town and manor, lord and serf suffered under the curse of famine and under the scourge of private warfare. The flames of crusading zeal blazed brighter for the misery and wretchedness of human life, and there began a gradual revival in the hopes and aspirations of men generally.<sup>60</sup> Memories probably still persisted of the past glories of French arms, of the journey of Urban through France in 1095-1096 preaching the journey of the Cross, of the departure of Raymond of Toulouse, of the Duke of Aquitaine, of the visit of that hero, Bohemund of Antioch. We have remarked before on the ties which existed between Syria-Palestine and Europe, the pilgrims who brought news from the East, the military Orders who reminded all



of the necessity for the continued support of the crusade, the exchange of letters between East and West. Then too there were the historians who had perpetuated the crusade tradition, the anonymous author of the Gesta with the editions by Guibert, Baldric and Robert the Monk, the work of Ralph of Caen, the second generation history of Albert of Aachen, the writings of Raymond and Fulcher. All this assisted in preparing the fertile soil into which St. Bernard was to sow the seed of eloquence and reap a rich response in zeal and enthusiasm for the new expedition.

#### 4. Diplomatic Negotiations in 1146.

Enthusiasm to be effective has to be organized. With this in mind, Louis proceeded to make his plans. At Vézelay, all had promised to depart on the crusade within a year, and although this plan was to be changed, there was but little time to prepare for the crusade, and settle the affairs of the kingdom. A detailed reconstruction of these negotiations and of the activity of St. Bernard in all of this is beyond the scope of our investigation.<sup>61</sup>

Nonetheless, there are some aspects of the diplomacy at this time which concern us. Louis wrote to those monarchs whom he thought would be interested in the developments at Vézelay. The Crusade was to be announced as a fait accompli and their assistance solicited. One monarch to receive a letter was Roger of Sicily who in reply offered food, supplies and transportation for the crusaders. The Norman monarch also promised that either he or his son would join the expedition to the East. As we know now, this was but the first step in Roger's plans to divert the crusade to his own hostile intent against the Byzantine Empire.<sup>62</sup>



To Manuel of Constantinople, Louis also wrote.<sup>63</sup> The letter does not survive but it probably announced the Crusade for the following year and asked for Manuel's assistance since the French army would probably pass through the imperial realm and cross into Asia Minor at the Propontis. Manuel's reply has been preserved to us.<sup>64</sup> In this he assured Louis of friendship, co-operation, a safe passage and an adequate supply of food to be sold to the crusaders. Manuel makes reference to the co-operation between his grandfather and the crusaders which had proved to be advantageous to all concerned. This might be a veiled reference to the oath but Manuel this time faced a crowned king, not a mere count or duke, and he would have to broach this subject carefully.<sup>65</sup> The imperial reply was brought to France in the late fall of 1146, by the Greek ambassador, accompanied by two Templars.

Various other letters were dispatched by Louis.<sup>66</sup> Favourable replies were received, and indeed all was going well save for the great hardships which the heavy taxation, levied on the realm for the Crusade, had produced.<sup>67</sup>

Manuel received more than one letter from the West at this time of year. Eugene III had also attempted to smooth the path of the crusaders and had written to Manuel in Constantinople. This occurred when the Pope and his cardinals had already started on his journey into France. The letter reached Manuel at the same time as the letter from Louis.

It is even more unfortunate that Eugene's letter has not been preserved. Just as the question of church reunion entered into our interpretation of Urban II's Eastern policy, so here also the same question arises.



As far the relations between the two churches, they were all but officially non-existent. Evidence is lacking to support this contention directly, but the direction of our investigation would lead us to say that the papal name was probably not on the diptychs of Constantinople. As for the papacy, we know already that John Comnenus had been regarded as excommunicate. The Pope in his letter of 1138 had described him as one withdrawn from the unity of the Church. Little had altered that situation. John was dead; Manuel was unknown. What the papal reaction was to the East-West alliance at this time and the third submission of Raymond of Antioch to the Byzantine Empire in 1144 is not known.

What is important is to understand the difference in the relations of the Churches between the years 1095-1096 and 1146-1147. Between the First and Second crusade were the dishonest occupation of Antioch by Bohemund and Alexius' activity to regain the same, Alexius' war with Bohemund which had seen the Pope favouring the Normans, the attempted intervention in Italy by Alexius, the Venetian raids, the abortive union negotiations of the Popes with John, the Byzantine advance towards Antioch, the letter of Innocent II. The years had seen the growth of resentment and hatred on both sides. If the Crusade had contributed to the increased alienation of the two societies, becoming a source of political dispute and even an occasion for war, it had also brought face to face as never before two races, one considering the other to be effeminate, crafty and treacherous, and in return considered as brutal, barbaric, avaricious, cruel and proud.

Eugene knew that the past relations between the churches had been unhappy and destructive. As for the present, the





Emperor Manuel and his Empire were unknown quantities, and not beyond suspicion. Eugene had had no correspondence with Manuel whom he knew as the friend of Conrad, the enemy of Leo and the son of an excommunicate father. Not only this, we remember, that it had been Hugh of Jabala who had brought an eyewitness report of the fall of Edessa and the crisis in the life of the Latin Orient to the Pope. It had been Hugh who had resisted to his face John Comnenus' claims to Antioch. Could it not be that Hugh also had told the pontiff of the difficulties the Greek advance against Antioch had caused, of the fact that during the assault on Edessa, the Prince of Antioch had been occupied with military action against the Greeks? Perhaps Eugene was also informed of the humiliating journey which the Prince of Antioch had been forced to make to Constantinople and of his reaffirmation of his vassalage to Manuel Comnenus. Otto of Freising tells us<sup>68</sup> that Hugh was concerned to draw the Church of Antioch more deeply into the Roman orbit. There is perhaps reason to think that Hugh therefore informed Eugene as to the position of Antioch in regard to the Byzantine Empire. Unfortunately, exactly what Hugh did report to Eugene in regard to the Greeks remains unknown. We have conjectured that his account might well have been hostile. Certainly, the account in Otto of Freising's Chronicon, which relates the entrance of the Emperor John Comnenus into the province of Antioch is highly critical. Indeed Otto goes so far as to say that the damage wreaked upon the conquered territory was of such a cruel and wanton nature as to belie John's nickname "the Good."<sup>69</sup>

Further, if Innocent had been concerned to preserve the Patriarchate of Antioch within the Roman orbit, what would Eugene think of John and Manuel's practice of restoration of the Greek



hierarchy in those towns, taken in 1137-1144, from the Latins of Antioch and the Armenians. This was probably known to Eugene.<sup>70</sup> It may also be that the legation from the church of Armenia at this time appealed to the Pope citing instances of their sufferings at the hands of the Greeks, their traditional enemies on account of their racial and religious antipathies. It was of the highest political expediency that the Armenians draw closer to the Latins of the East, in face of the ever-expanding Greek power in Asia Minor.<sup>71</sup>

However, the Pope knew that the interests of the Crusade came first. He probably in his letter to Manuel passed over the past relationship between Latin and Greek and courteously solicited imperial favour for the expedition. Whatever his feelings, the assistance of Manuel was a practical necessity for the existence of the Crusade. Would not the armies pass through his realm? However, we may look deeper and see that in all of this there was a profound concern: what might the Crusade do to relations between East and West? What might happen along the way? What might happen to the crusaders at the hands of the Greeks, considering all that had happened in the past? He knew the Western suspicions of the Greeks, and perhaps even shared them to some extent. Also he probably knew the Greek fear of the West. Thus Eugene decided to rise above his own fears and suspicions, to attempt to allay any fear on Manuel's part and at the same time advance the cause of the Crusade.

In his reply to Eugene,<sup>72</sup> a reply perhaps carried to the West by the same embassy which brought the imperial reply to Louis of France, Manuel remarks that he has received in addition to



Eugene's letter, a letter from the King of France announcing the crusade. While the realm is both ready and happy to receive them, Manuel expresses his wish that they honour his realm as they honoured Alexius, his grandfather.

In this last lies hidden the imperial desire to obtain the oath of allegiance which would guarantee the honour of Manuel and the integrity of his realm. Manuel was naturally concerned for his Empire, and his concern is shown when he asks the Pope to use his influence to insure the fact that the crusaders will honour the realm of Manuel as their fathers honoured the realm of Alexius.<sup>73</sup>

In closing, Manuel says that this is the first time he has heard from the Pope, thus confirming our judgments given above as to the low state of relations between the two churches. Nonetheless, Manuel informs the Pope that his realm prays daily for him.<sup>74</sup> This may possibly have been hyperbole since to our knowledge the papal name had not been replaced on the diptychs of the Hagia Sophia. On the other hand, by virtue of his power over the Church, Manuel may have had the Pope's name placed on the diptychs. This action certainly would have been part of his overall plan to re-create the universal empire of Justinian.

All this is conjecture, but we shall see that the Papacy was to act upon this letter, attempting to bring about church union. It should be pointed out that church reunion was much in the air at the papal court. With Hugh of Jabala, there had also arrived from the East legates from the Armenian Catholicos and his episcopal colleagues. We remember that the Armenians had talked to Alberic of Ostia when he was in the Holy Land as the



legate of Innocent II about the subject of church reunion. The matter had proceeded well at that time, and the Armenians, who hated the Greeks, had decided to pursue the matter further, seeing in church union a development with many possibilities, especially in regard to the defence of Armenia against the Byzantine Empire.

Eugene probably could remember that his celebrated predecessor, Gregory VII, also had opened negotiations with the Armenians. He received the legates gladly and there was much exchange of information of divergence in faith and practice. Since the Armenians seemed so deferential to the papal authority, all went smoothly, and the legates departed, presumably to discuss matters with the Katholikos and the rest of the hierarchy.<sup>75</sup> Such an event must well have stimulated, along with the advent of a crusade, the mind of the Pope towards the possibility of Church reunion with the Greeks. However, he delayed before he took positive action.

### 5. The Preaching of Bernard.

In 1146-1147, St. Bernard departed north and then east through the realm of Conrad, engaged in the greatest preaching tour of his career.<sup>76</sup> All this was done in fulfilment of what he considered to be the task laid upon him by Eugene III.<sup>77</sup> The crusade preaching affected men throughout the West: England,<sup>78</sup> Spain,<sup>79</sup> to the East on the German marches.<sup>80</sup> Wherever Bernard went, crowds gathered to hear him speak of the necessity for repentance, for expiation, for the defence of the Christian name.<sup>81</sup>





In Germany, no decisive action had been taken. In the first place, it was not an auspicious moment for a crusade. Despite early victories, Conrad had by no means crushed the power of the house of Welf. This danger had been increased through the continued alliance of the Welfs with that arch-enemy to imperial dignity, Roger of Sicily. The destruction of the power of the Norman king had become intimately connected with the advance of the royal prerogative in Germany. Further, to the East were the Slavs. There, in a sense, the crusade had always existed. The conversion or extermination of these barbarians, who constituted an ever-present menace to German life, was a real task, beside which the war against the infidel in far-off Syria-Palestine seemed a bit theoretical and romantic.

The Papacy was on good terms with Conrad. Eugene on 12 March, 1146, raised Henry II to the honours of the altar.<sup>82</sup> The pontiff quite naturally looked to the German king to protect the Papacy and its estates against the menace of the Roman commune and also of Roger of Sicily who still refused to allow the Church the freedom of episcopal election for which Gregory VII and his successors had struggled so long and so tenaciously. It is clear that Eugene saw that Germany was in no position to respond to a crusade appeal. However, this aside, the pontiff did not wish the Germans to leave him unprotected against the papal enemies in Rome and southern Italy. Events were to change all this considerably.

The news of Vézelay provoked an outbreak of religious enthusiasm in the Rhineland. Unfortunately, led by a monk, Ralph, the enthusiasm appeared in the guise of anti-Semitism, a



phenomenon endemic in the Rhineland since the wretched outbreaks during the First Crusade. Massacres began.<sup>83</sup> Bernard in Flanders, moving slowly up the Rhine, attempted to crush this cruel parody of the crusade idea and wrote a long exposition of the crusade to the faithful of Germany and Bavaria.<sup>84</sup> He called upon his readers to "test the spirits".<sup>85</sup> Further, fearing that there might be many undisciplined bands setting out for the East as in the days of Gottschalk and Peter the Hermit, Bernard ordered that all were to go to the East together.<sup>86</sup>

The enthusiasm which Ralph had kindled soon disappeared into the growing enthusiasm for the crusade. Where Bernard could not go, his letters went for him, being read in hundreds of village churches throughout Germany and France. His exhortation and invective, his pleading and his prophetic spirit went before him.<sup>87</sup>

Arriving at Speier, Bernard found Conrad assembled with his barons for the Christmas festivities and for a consideration of the crusade. If Conrad first hesitated at Frankfurt, he could not resist for long when Bernard spoke to him with that candour and homiletical fervour which was one of the saint's most powerful weapons. As if confronted by Christ Himself, Conrad, Frederick of Swabia and his nobles took the cross.<sup>88</sup>

At Ratisbon there was also a great response.<sup>89</sup> By the time Bernard returned to France in February, 1147, the Empire was on the march.

In all this it is to be clearly noted that Bernard did not appoint any legates, papal or otherwise, or any leaders for the expedition. Nor did he attempt to tell the German leaders



how they should proceed to the East beyond trying to make certain that undisciplined bands did not travel apart from the main armies. Beyond this, he merely insisted that real soldiers be responsible for the expedition.<sup>90</sup>

Eugene was not idle at this time. His troubles with the Romans continued. Roger offered little encouragement. In an attempt to forward the crusade in Italy, on 5 October, 1146, he issued "Divina dispensatione", addressed to the clergy of Italy.<sup>91 92</sup> Eugene first refers to the decision made by Louis of France and his baronage to "liberate the Eastern Church" and to "wage war against the enemies of Christ." The Pope wishes that the Italian princes join the French in this task. Having done this, the bull continues, following closely the model of "quantum praedecessores nostri". The same indulgence, the same privileges and prohibitions are pronounced.

Our attention is attracted by the fact that Eugene had not urged the Germans to join the crusade. The bulls he had issued were direct to the French and the Italians. Conrad he wished to stay at home to assist him in Italy against the Romans, thus freeing the Papacy from a dangerous dependence upon the Normans of south Italy. Here, however, events were to work against the Pope. Bernard's independent action in preaching the Crusade in Germany was to alter the papal plans.

In January, 1147, Eugene surrounded by his cardinals left the vicinity of Rome. The conditions there showed little improvement. From the example of his predecessors Eugene knew that he would be safest in France, away from the Romans and Roger. Further, there was the Crusade to be supervised and sanctioned



by his presence. It may be even that Bernard and Louis had summoned him. Perhaps Eugene had heard of Suger's reluctance to assume the direction of France in the absence of his royal master. All things therefore pointed to the papal departure from Rome.<sup>93</sup>

#### 6. The Departures for the East.

When Eugene arrived in France, he found all making final arrangements for departure.<sup>94</sup> By 15 February, 1147, at the councils at Etampes, the first stage of the preaching of Bernard had been completed.<sup>95</sup> Suger was chosen regent of France, and Eugene used his authority to convince the Abbot of St. Denis that he should accept the burden.<sup>96</sup> All was proceeding so well that a rendezvous with Conrad was fixed for 15 June, 1147, at Metz.<sup>97</sup>

Bernard's work was not yet done. In Germany, his preaching had aroused great enthusiasm, and indeed King Conrad had taken the cross. However, to the East were the Slavs whose conquest and conversion had occupied the Germans in sporadic fashion since the days of Otto the Great. A crusade against these developed and grew to such proportions that Bernard was summoned to Germany again to be present at the March Diet of 1147 at Frankfurt. There the saint delivered his exhortations and announced the same privileges for those going to the Crusade against the Slavs as those who were going to the East against the infidel.<sup>98</sup> This done, Bernard returned to France to assist his old friend, the Pope, during his stay in France.<sup>99</sup>

The arrival of the Greeks in the fall of 1146 had precipitated a sinister diplomatic manoeuvre on the part of Roger which ended only at the Etampes council. His ambassador had





clearly indicated in the previous year that Roger was most anxious to assist the Crusade in any way. Roger's aim was, of course, to convince the King of France that his expedition should journey through his domains and not follow the route of the First Crusade which passed through the Greek empire. The crusaders would also use Roger's supplies and his transportation. If he could but divert the French expedition, perhaps he could turn it against the Byzantine Empire. His representatives accordingly alluded to Greek trickery. To no avail. The Greek offer of friendship and hospitality was accepted, and Roger's ambassadors departed. Checked in his design, as we know, Roger resorted to direct attack on the Empire. It is possible that the Franks knew of Roger's design upon Syria-Palestine. Perhaps the hatred and fear of the Antioch and Jerusalem baronage for Roger had passed back into France. As for Manuel, we have already remarked on his fears of Roger II. His concern for his realm's safety is further revealed in the second letter he wrote to Eugene in the spring of 1147. Here his concern for the security of the Empire is manifest. Manuel reiterated his desire that the Franks take the oath of non-injury to his realm and swear also to return all territory, reconquered from the heathen, which belonged to the Empire. That he feared the crusade harboured men who sought to conquer the Empire is explicitly stated.<sup>100</sup>

What is plain is that there were many who agreed with the Normans from Sicily. They had heard from rumours or had read of Greek trickery. They knew their Gesta and other monuments of the First Crusade which had described the treachery of the Greeks. In the Frankish expedition, there appeared an anti-Greek



faction whose chief spokesman was Godfrey, Bishop of Langres. Opposed to him was Arnulf, Bishop of Lisieux. The king himself, perhaps counselled by the Pope, Bernard,<sup>101</sup> and other clergy<sup>102</sup> was to remain friendly with Manuel during the march to the East. However, it is important to point out that anti-Greek sentiment was present in the crusade from its inception.

Nothing remained now but departure. On 11 June, 1147, being feast day of St. Denis, the patron of France, Louis knelt before the saint's shrine in Paris, in the presence of Eugene III. He venerated the holy relic and received a pilgrim's wallet and the oriflamme. Then, protected by that holy banner, by the prayers of Christendom and the papal blessing, by his own piety and humility, Louis left Paris for the defence of Zion.<sup>103</sup>

Conrad had already departed for the East, refusing to accede to Louis' request that all travel to the East together. At first, it had looked as if they might not go at all. Some of his great vassals held back. This rendered the cause of the crusade suspect in the eyes of the emperor and his house. He could not leave a Germany which was open to rebellion on the part of his vassals, a rebellion which might be raised when he was overseas. There was another consideration. To the north and to the east, the forces of the Northmen and the Huns ranged, pressing into the Empire from time to time, to pillage, to kill and to burn. Against these heathen, the Germans had fought valiantly. Were the forces of Germany to be withdrawn and leave the frontiers open to the infidels? A third consideration was an uneasiness in the mind of Conrad concerning the Church. Peace existed between the spiritual and the temporal powers. Perhaps his departure



might bring discord which would end the reasonable amicability then existing between the two powers. The fourth consideration was, of course, the King of Sicily.

It cannot be said that Conrad was restive under his oath of pilgrimage which he had made in the presence of Bernard. There were these difficulties, however. After having arranged for the coronation of his son Henry, he turned to the Pope who was by this time in France. Towards March, 1147, he wrote to Eugene.<sup>104</sup>

Now as we have said before, Eugene had not looked for a German expedition to the East. Nor had he encouraged Bernard to carry his preaching across the Rhine. When, however, he heard of the events of Spier, he seems to have dispatched an ambassador to Conrad, the cardinal Theobald.<sup>105</sup> Hence, this letter acknowledges the papal gesture. The Pope is informed of the meeting of Conrad with his princes at Frankfurt (2 February, 1147) where Henry's election and coronation were assented to. The coronation, the Pope was informed, would take place (c) 30 March.<sup>106</sup>

The real purpose of the letter now appears. Conrad reveals himself to be concerned about problems arising from the crusade, and he wishes to discuss these matters with the Pope. Conrad is well aware of the fact that he had assumed the cross without explicit papal permission. The Emperor pleads the influence of the Spirit which had touched the imperial heart to undertake the Crusade.<sup>107</sup> Therefore, knowing that he has come into France, Conrad asks Eugene for a parley at the Rhine to deal with matters concerning the peace of the church and the realm. Since he is setting out shortly, he asks the Pope to go on to Strassbourg. The letter closes with an introduction of the imperial legates, Bucco of Turenne, Anselm of Havelberg and Hilbold of Corbie.<sup>108</sup>



It is probable that Conrad wanted assurance that the Pope would lend his apostolic protection to Germany and his son, Henry in his absence. This would protect the realm against rebellion. The Pope, for himself, had probably indicated that he needed Conrad's help against the Romans. Both knew that Roger of Sicily was a threat, in different ways, to each of them.

The proposed parley did not take place, perhaps because Eugene had commitments to Suger, Bernard and Louis of France. It is certain that his discussions with the imperial legates were satisfactory, at least to Conrad. The Pope promised full protection to Germany during Conrad's entrance. True, he had wished Conrad might stay behind to solve the Roman problem. Indeed, when he heard of Bernard's preaching at Frankfurt, he was not overly pleased. His zeal, therefore, for the proposed crusade against the Slavs was all the more ardent.<sup>109</sup> He regretted that Conrad was for the East and not for this other expedition which would have kept him in Europe. He would give this expedition an equal status with the one to the East. Were not all the foes pagans? The Slavs were, to be sure, the same as the Saracens of Spain, Africa or Syria.<sup>110</sup> On all fronts, Christendom would advance with the papal blessing.<sup>111</sup> Hence, as one annalist remarked, papal letters of exhortation to the Crusade were everywhere.<sup>112</sup>

Although Eugene did not have the proposed parly with Conrad, the imperial legation proved satisfactory. As for the crusade against the Slavs, Eugene extended the same crusade privileges to all fighting against the infidel, whether in the Orient, the East or in Spain.<sup>113</sup> This general bull he issued on 11 April, 1147, at Troyes, directing it to all the Christian faithful.<sup>114</sup>





In different places he writes, the faithful are preparing to wage war on the infidel. Kings are preparing to deliver the Eastern church, once again referring to Edessa. Further the war against the infidel is being conducted on all fronts. The king of Spain fights the unbeliever in Iberia.<sup>115</sup> Some of them, and this was directed especially at the Germans, have undertaken an expedition against the Slavs. All those, regardless, who fight against the infidel in any place will be given the same privileges, including the plenary indulgence.

Eugene continues to state that if the pagans are conquered by the crusaders, they are not to be allowed to remain in their heathen condition, and indeed the crusaders are forbidden to take money as a bribe to allow them to do so.<sup>116</sup> This established, the Pope shows his concern that the expedition against the Slavs have its own papal legate. The Pope is anxious that someone be provided who is a man of religion, an educated man who is equipped thus to bring peace, order, and unity to the expedition and to admonish them in regard to the things of religion. Such a man he proposes is Anselm of Havelberg in Prussia. He is given this task and thus becomes a kind of legate for the Papacy. Eugene asks that he be received with honour and obeyed out of reverence for Blessed Peter and for the authority of the Pope.<sup>117</sup> The letter concluded with a promise that all who go on the crusade will have their goods, chattels and families protected by the Church in their absence.

Thus all was arranged. The Crusade against the Slav would protect the Empire.<sup>118</sup> Henry was crowned, and the Pope had shown his goodwill. With a host of about one hundred thousand men, Conrad departed from Bamberg in May of 1147. The arrangement for a sojourn in Metz awaiting the armies of the king of France was not aside,



perhaps because he wished to leave as soon as possible and therefore return as soon as possible. Perhaps Conrad did not wish to share his rule and prominence in the crusade with a mere king. Accordingly by summer of 1147, two armies were moving across Europe in the direction of Constantinople.<sup>119</sup>

Had the Papacy given the crusaders any special directions in regard to the Greeks? We know already that Roger had unsuccessfully attempted to divert the French expedition so that it would pass through his own realm and be all the more useful in his general campaign against the Greeks and also in extending his hegemony over the Eastern Mediterranean. We have already described how at the very onset of the Second Crusade there had formed among the French, two factions, Godfrey of Langres' anti-Greek faction and the Arnulf of Lisieux's group which opposed such sentiments. The Pope had written in friendly fashion to Manuel. So also had Louis of France, Bernard and Peter of Cluny. From a purely practical standpoint, it was to the Latin advantage to remain on the best terms possible with the Greeks. In view of this, together with the friendly overtures of the King, Bernard and Peter of Cluny, and Louis' persistent refusal to be influenced by the hostile sentiments of Godfrey and others during the course of the expedition, there is every likelihood, although at this point direct evidence is lacking, that Eugene advised moderation and friendship for the Greeks. While the Papacy might deplore the continued resistance of the Greeks to the Roman primacy, or feel anxiety over the significance over their alliance with the Hohenstaufens, their hostility to the Normans, their continuing claims to south Italy, and above all their manifest ambitions in the East, the Papacy knew that friendly relations would have to be maintained with the Greeks. Like his predecessor,



Urban II, Eugene probably advised the crusaders to tread carefully where the Greeks were concerned. The two letters which Eugene had received from Manuel were sufficient stimuli for the Papacy. Manuel's concern for his realm had been clearly marked in both.

However, the evidence indicates that Eugene went farther than Urban. Perhaps the crusade could be used as an occasion for the reunion of the churches, a kind of by-product arising out of this new confrontation of East and West. By the time he had arrived in France, Eugene knew that a Greek embassy had waited upon the German king at Speier, Christmas, 1146.<sup>120</sup> Knowing that the King was bound in a military alliance to the Greek ruler, Eugene hoped that through this the matter of church union might be brought up. Perhaps the German monarch could be persuaded to broach the problem of reunion to Manuel during the course of the crusade. On 17 July, 1147, with Conrad already on the road to the East, he wrote to Henry of Moravia, a man who had shared the burden of the preaching of the Cross in Germany. The first part of the papal letter is devoted to the introduction of the papal legates for the expedition. About these we shall have more to say shortly. At the close the Pope urged Henry to use all his power and influence with the German monarch to the end that Conrad might strive to unite the church of Constantinople to the Roman church, as once upon a time it has been.<sup>121</sup> The pontiff was determined that the Crusade would be an occasion for bringing the two churches more closely together.

The papal concern was to be checked because of the personal desires of Henry of Moravia. Henry, like many another German, was more interested in the Crusade against the Slavs than in the Crusade in the East. Shortly after composing this letter, the Pope



heard that Henry had elected not to accompany Conrad to the East but rather to join the expedition to the Slavs. Eugene wrote again before July was out.<sup>122</sup> Eugene professed himself pleased with Henry's zeal for the expedition against the Slavs. However, the Pope could not hide his disappointment. He had hoped that Henry might go to the East with the German king. Further, the Pope had hoped that Henry might insinuate in Conrad's mind the need for church union with the Greeks. If Henry were removed from the royal side, then the Pope admitted that he despaired over the entire matter. However, the Bishop was given the papal blessing to accompany him against the Slavs.<sup>123</sup>

From the papal letter we may assume that Henry had quite independently raised the matter of church reunion with the pontiff. Their letters crossed, and besides, it was too late, for Conrad had already departed. However, it is interesting to note that someone else, in addition to Eugene, had had the idea of church union, arising out of the Crusade. Of course, the reunion of the churches would have solved many problems for Eugene. In addition to the supreme duty of uniting the church around the see of Peter, which Eugene believed to be his task as universal bishop of the Catholic Church, it would help the papacy in its dealings with the Normans of south Italy, with the Germans, perhaps solve the problem of the Byzantine claims to Antioch and allay all the animosity which had arisen on both sides from this conflict. We may assume that the two cardinals, despatched by Eugene to be papal legates for the crusaders were fully aware of the pontifical desires on this matter. However, we shall see that their influence on the armies was next to nothing, and the documents do not reveal any interest in the problem of church union during the course of the Crusade.





One final matter, and it is of great importance. We have seen that Eugene took comparatively little personal part in the recruitment for the Crusade. This task had been delegated to St. Bernard, but other bishops, such as Henry of Moravia, had done their share in the proclamation of the Cross. The expedition was clearly undertaken with papal authorization whether in Spain, Eastern Europe or in the journey to the Holy Land.

Nonetheless, the influence of the papacy on the expedition to the East was not as marked as it had been in the previous crusade. Consider the matter of papal legates. For this John of Salisbury, bears important testimonial.<sup>124</sup> John first tells us of the discord generated in the army of the Franks by Godfrey of Langres and Arnulf of Lisieux. The principal subject of their dissonance, i.e. the attitude to be taken by the Latins towards the Greeks, has been discussed before. John tells us that they both claimed to be papal legates although they had no right to this claim at all. Whatever influence they might have exerted upon the crusaders in the name of God and Blessed Peter for the cause of religion was utterly vitiated by their continued bickering and discord. Godfrey aroused further opposition when he claimed to be the representative of St. Bernard. No doubt he did this, attempting to gain support for his policies and views, but the result seems to have lowered him even farther in the eyes of the crusaders. Further, Bernard himself, had directed that the expedition be commanded by competent soldiers. Godfrey's posturing was therefore all the more ludicrous. John of Salisbury does not hesitate to accuse them of turning their pretended papal legatine office into a clever money-making proposition.<sup>125</sup>

There were two bona fide legates: Theodwin, the cardinal



of Horto and Guido, cardinal presbyter of St. Chrysogonus. As John says, both men were good men but unsuited for their office. They seem to have been hampered by the conflicting racial tensions which are at the root of the failure of the Second Crusade. The first sign of this racial antagonism had been Conrad's refusal to wait for Louis at Metz. We have already seen how Manuel used this racial antagonism for his own purposes when the French were at Constantinople.

At any rate, Theodwin, a German, was despised by the French for his language and his customs. Guido, although well educated, a lover of books, letters, with a good scholar's genial disposition, disliked crowds and preferred the atmosphere of the classroom to that of the camp. As a papal legate therefore he was useless.<sup>126</sup> Thus the Second Crusade had no Adhemar to remind it of its religious vocation and to exercise the authority as papal legate. John's picture should be emphasized. The Crusade had no unifying spiritual leader and therefore papal influence on the course of the expedition and its activities was little indeed, in comparison with the First Crusade.

In fact, it is not clear as to which legate travelled with which army. When Eugene wrote to Henry on 17 July, 1147,<sup>127</sup> introducing the papal legates who were being despatched to journey with the crusaders as a sign of papal support of the expedition and to encourage its efforts in the cause of the holy warfare against the infidel, Conrad had already left for the East. Perhaps therefore, they travelled together with the French armies. The account of Salisbury is not plain on this point, merely indicating the unsuitabilities of both men. Odo does not mention them at all. This



could well be because the antics of Arnulf and Godfray thrust the true papal representatives into the shade. Or perhaps, the two cardinals did not agree with the fierce anti-Greek sentiment of Odo and the Bishop of Langres. Odo, therefore, showed his feelings against this attitude by omitting mention of them altogether. William of Tyre, however, clearly places Theodwin with Conrad and the cardinal Guy of Florence with Louis.<sup>128</sup> It may well be that Theodwin caught up with Conrad and Guy stayed behind to join the French when they passed through Germany on their way to the East. If this is correct, then Salisbury's remarks that Theodwin was repulsive to the Germans because of his manners and Guy was inadequate because of his slight knowledge of French and his love of letters become more intelligible. However, lacking any positive evidence, the two legates cannot be located with certainty in either army.

Eugene continued through France, occasionally holding councils of which the most famous one was at Rheims. When he returned to Italy he held a council at Cremona.<sup>129</sup> Nowhere in these activities do we find any mention of the Crusade. He knew that all had been done which was possible to do. His prayers and the prayers of all Europe now attended the crusaders as they approached the imperial city of Constantinople, first stop in the journey to the earthly Jerusalem.

#### 7. The Aftermath of the Second Crusade.

In the first crusade, papal influence was more clearly marked through the influence and prestige of Adhemar. Not only this, the religious ideal then dominated national cleavages and political rivalries. In the Second Crusade, not only papal influence but also the influence of religion could not break down the political rivalries



and racial tensions. Further, the Second Crusade was important more for its political consequences than for anything else.<sup>130</sup> These we shall now proceed to investigate.

During the course of the expedition, Eugene seems to have devoted little energy to the prosecution of the Crusade.<sup>131</sup> As we suggested above, he probably thought that all had been done which was humanly possible. Towards the German Empire and its King, Henry, he maintained a cordial attitude, no matter what misgivings he may have had in regard to Hohenstaufen ambition. The honour of the Church, the protector of all those on crusade, was at stake. To Henry of Germany, the Pope therefore showed friendliness and encouragement. The realm of Conrad was under the protection of Blessed Peter and there is every sign that Eugene exercised that protection as Peter's vicar.<sup>132</sup>

As for the French, the situation was roughly analogous. At home in the kingdom of the Franks, Suger faced the difficult task of keeping the crown of France intact during his master's absence. In this he had the full support of Eugene III. However, the news of the disaster in the East, with all the uncertainty which rumour can breed and the hopes which such rumours may arouse in the mind of an ambitious vassal, rendered Suger's task all the more difficult. The Papacy rose to the occasion and assisted Suger in the difficult task of keeping peace in the French kingdom.<sup>133</sup>

By the year 1148, the Pope and indeed all of Europe had heard of the disastrous course of the Second Crusade. The reports of the chroniclers mirror the reception of the news. Some refused even to discuss the matter since nothing had been accomplished either to the glory of God or the glory of man.<sup>134</sup> Otto of Freising's shame is





barely concealed when he leaves to others the task of narrating the events of the expedition. The Gesta was to be a comedy, not a tragedy.<sup>135</sup>

To some, such as William of Tyre, the annihilation of the armies was a manifestation of the inscrutable will of God whose judgments were hidden in the abyss of mystery.<sup>136</sup> Others were more explicit in their analysis. That splendid observer, John of Salisbury, attributed the collapse of the Crusade to the following: the treachery of Constantinople, the strength of the Turks, the discord and mutual jealousy among the leaders and the bickerings within the clerical ranks.<sup>137</sup> One cannot judge as to whether or not John listed these reasons in the order of their importance. What is important for us is that many chroniclers agreed, to a greater or lesser extent, with his analysis. The wastes of Asia Minor, the hunger and thirst, the power of the Turks, and Greek treachery were mentioned by many.<sup>138</sup> The work of Odo of Deuil, which was written for Suger, probably received rapid circulation, and while it mirrored the despair and the shame of the Frankish monarch and his lords, it placed the onus of blame on Manuel of Constantinople.

The Second Crusade had little in it that was creditable beyond Louis' idealism and the sacrifice to which the bones of those who died in the passes of Taurus and elsewhere bore mute witness. A scapegoat had to be found, and there is much evidence in Odo, and elsewhere, that the Greeks were to be the chosen victims of Latin injured pride and humiliation. Odo regarded Manuel as the enemy of Christendom. Not only this, the Greeks were heretics in rebellion against Blessed Peter. Like others, Odo noticed that the Greeks purified their altars after they had been used by Latins, that the



Greek church demanded re-baptism when a Latin married a Greek. He and others were enraged by Greek "obstinacy" in refusing to admit the doctrines of the Double Procession and the Petrine supremacy and various Latin practices.<sup>139</sup>

Not all the chroniclers singled out the Greeks as responsible. For these the cause of the failure lay in the ardors of the journey, the shortage of food and water, the strength and cunning of the infidel. For the more piously minded, the Crusade failed because of human sin, human pride and a blasphemous trust in human ability.<sup>140</sup> Further, certain groups in European politics had nothing to say against the Greeks. As we have mentioned before, Conrad never referred in any way to "Greek treachery". Nor did he think that the Greeks had in any way failed or betrayed the crusaders.<sup>141</sup> His evidence is, of course, suspect. Manuel had been especially kind to him when his power was broken. There were the political considerations involved in the alliance of the two Empires. As for Louis, the French king was moderate in his attitude towards the Greeks. If his motives in assuming the Cross were more wholehearted than Conrad's, his piety and good judgment operated to produce a just attitude towards the Greeks. His letters to Suger thus are moderate in their tone in regard to Manuel. While he did think that the Greek assistance had been defective, in no way did he represent the Greeks as traitors and enemies of the crusade.<sup>142</sup> On the other hand, Louis criticized the "fraud" of Manuel who permitted the Turks to enter imperial territory to attack the Crusade. This charge was to have its effect.<sup>143</sup>

One final matter. Many crusaders brought back reports concerning the Latins of the Orient, reports not at all flattering to



them. Many spoke of "treason before the walls of Damascus", casting doubts upon the honesty of the king and patriarch of Jerusalem and even upon the Order of the Temple. The significance of this is that the notion of a crusade to the East was undermined in the popular mind and helps to explain the difficulties the papacy had in later years in kindling enthusiasm for continued support of the crusade in the Orient.<sup>144</sup>

At any rate, Europe felt the disaster keenly. Even Bernard, a man whose spiritual authority and sanctity made him the arbiter of Europe, found that the failure of the crusade had had an adverse effect on his reputation. Although not the man to be concerned for himself, Bernard was concerned to explain the failure of the expedition, and thus "justify the ways of God to man".<sup>145</sup> In this task he was joined by Otto of Freising and Eugene III.<sup>146</sup>

Our concern here is not where the blame rightly should be placed for the failure of the Crusade, but rather attempt to show the confused climate of public opinion in Europe following the Second Crusade. Reports, as the above footnotes show, were conflicting. Men of acute mind, the Pope, Bernard, and others were well aware of the fact that the conflicting reports were coloured by personal animosity, by political ambition and by racial antagonism. To separate the chaff from the wheat, this, wiser men realized, was all but impossible.<sup>147</sup>

However, there was one monarch who was quick to take advantage of the situation. This was Roger II. It was necessary for him to do something. The year 1149 saw Manuel's triumphant recapture of Corfu with Venetian help. If Roger's spies told him of a growing tension between Manuel and Venice, there was little immediate comfort to be found in this. Other steps would have to



be taken. For instance, he would have to protect himself against the alliance between the two Empires which had as its chief purpose the punishment of Roger and indeed the annihilation of the royal power. Accordingly, Roger began to spin a ~~web~~<sup>web</sup> of intrigue on the largest proportions. For this, he had plenty of material at hand.

In the first place he was assisted by the fact that many were so blinded by their hate of the Greeks that they saw Roger as an innocent victim of Manuel's aggression. For such as these, it was Manuel who had forced Roger to retaliate against Manuel's hostility by attacking the Greek mainland in 1147.<sup>148</sup>

In the second place, he had the Holf alliance. As we know, this had existed for several years. Roger was soon to turn this into a formidable threat to Conrad's power. Thirdly, he could perhaps realize the advantage over Eugene, now that the papacy had returned to Italy and Conrad and Louis had gone off on a crusade.

The Pope must have returned to Italy in an uneasy state of mind. There was no sign of improvement in his relations with the Roman commune. Further, Eugene hated Roger of Sicily as a king bent on depriving the Church in Sicily and south Italy of her liberty and also as the victor over Honorius and Innocent. Before Roger the Papacy had twice been humbled. On the other hand, the Papacy no longer had any potential champion. Conrad had gone to the East. Who would crush the pretensions of the Roman commune? Eugene, after delaying his approach to the Eternal City as long as he could, finally settled in Viterbo in December of 1148.<sup>149</sup> There it was plain that he could not re-enter Rome merely by his own power. Not only this, he soon heard of the sojourn of the German king at the court of Manuel on his way home. He also heard of the treaty which





they had signed which looked forward to an attack on Roger in 1149. Perhaps also the Pope had heard that Manuel had been promised the Byzantine lands in south Italy as part of his share in the war against the Norman monarch. This was ominous. Further, there were the slanderous charges levelled against the Greeks by returning pilgrims. As we have said before, the wiser men realized that it would be all but impossible to separate the true from the false in this matter. However, men of John of Salisbury's intellect had referred to Greek treachery,<sup>150</sup> and at the least Eugene must have been suspicious of the Greeks, for their alliance with the Germans, for their pretensions to south Italy and their share in the failure of the crusade. However, it is impossible to determine Eugene's attitude towards the Greeks at this time.

Be that as it may, suffice it to say for the present, that this news, combined with the continuing difficulties with the Romans, forced him closer to Roger II. Conrad was no longer his protector. He was the potential invader of Italy. The Roman question was pressing. Governed by his fears of what might develop from an Italian invasion by Greeks and Germans, Eugene consented to receive the ambassadors of Roger at Tivoli where he arrived in April of 1149.<sup>151</sup> A truce of four years was agreed to. Roger received the apostolic legation to Sicily although the Pope reserved the question of ecclesiastical appointments for future discussion. In return, Roger promised to give him military assistance against the Romans.<sup>152</sup>

This agreement was a serious one. Eugene was mindful of this. He had needed Roger's support and protection, but he was afraid of the consequences and also of the ambition of the Sicilian monarch. What now would his enemies report to Conrad when he returned?



He would be completely identified in the eyes of Conrad with the arrogance and rebelliousness of the King of Sicily. What might therefore happen if there were a German-Greek invasion of Italy? The Papacy might be crushed between the Roman commune, the Greeks and the Germans. It might be thrown on the mercy of Roger of Sicily, and the Pope could imagine what might come of this. It was essential therefore that he not become too entangled in the ambitions of the Norman monarch. Therefore, when he heard that Eugene was passing through northern Italy, on his way home to Germany, the Pope decided that he would approach the German carefully and with discretion.

On 23 June, 1149, he wrote to the Emperor of Germany, offering consolation for the outcome of the Second Crusade. Like Bernard and Otto of Freising, he commented on the ways of Providence. He professed, therefore, that he was not too downcast over the results of the expedition. Eugene indicated to Conrad that he wished to see him personally while he was still in Italy. He had sent therefore the Archbishop of Bremen and Anselm, Bishop of Havelberg, to have a conference with Conrad, but they had been unable to reach him prior to his departure from Tuscany and Lombardy for Germany. He, therefore, sends an ambassador whom he asked to be informed by Conrad on the state of the realm. This papal letter shows the papal desire to console the German monarch and to indicate concern for his kingdom. Nothing more, at least on the surface. However, the strength of the papal concern is indicated when Eugene indicated he was interested in a personal interview with the Emperor.<sup>153</sup>

As for Conrad, he returned to Europe with, no doubt, a sigh of relief. He had been won to the Crusade only by the dramatic eloquence of St. Bernard. He feared the power of the Holf faction.



He feared also the activities of the Papacy. But above all he feared the power of Roger of Sicily, his enemy. His fears were quickly shown to have foundation.

Sometime in April-May, 1149, shortly after the conclusion of the treaty between the Pope and Roger, a Roman notary wrote to Norman exiles living in Germany about new developments in the politics of the city of Rome.<sup>154</sup> An ardent supporter of the commune, he informed his readers that an alliance between Roger and the Welf faction had been concluded and that a large sum of money had been given by Roger to foster discord in Germany.<sup>155</sup> This negotiation had come to light when his ambassadors had been captured in Rome by the commune and Roger's seditious letters to Frederick of Swabia and others fully exposed.<sup>156</sup> The notary's correspondents are told to be on their guard. Not only this, the Pope was described as working hand in hand, through his Roman supporter, Cencio Frangipanni, in the plots of Roger, and further, the correspondents were told that in Rome the Germans and the Greeks were considered the puppets of Venice.<sup>157</sup> They and the Greeks are warned not to trust the Pope or pay him any heed. They can, however, have reliance upon the Roman commune. Further, let the Greeks spend money since money commands all things.<sup>158</sup>

This letter must have reached Conrad's hands shortly after its composition. It showed that Roger's ambition was at work to make trouble for him in Germany. It showed also that the Roman commune was in full support of the German-Greek alliance. As for the Papacy, it was revealed in the worst possible light. The letter drips with malice towards the pontiff and his cardinals. They were displayed as working hand and glove with the King of Sicily. Their attitude towards the Germans, Venetians and Greeks was, at the



least, described as contemptuous, and at the worst, murderous.

This, plus the news of Eugene's treaty with Roger, must have been sufficient in the mind of Conrad to place the Papacy on the side of the Norman king and the Welf faction in Germany, becoming thereby a threat to his crown and to the purposes of the East-West alliance. It is no wonder that Eugene did not obtain the requested interview. Despite the loyalty shown by Eugene to the young Henry during the crusade, - and there is no evidence but the malice of the Roman notary which made Eugene party to the plots of the Welf and Roger, - the evidence must have indicated to Conrad that Eugene was, at the very least, a silent partner in Roger's malicious designs.

Conrad, once back in Germany, proceeded to summon his supporters and advisers to consider the state of the realm. Through the summer of 1149 it was common knowledge, although it was supposed to be secret, that Conrad intended an Italian expedition in fulfilment of his pact with Manuel Comnenus against Roger of Sicily. Eugene probably knew of these rumours and suspicion grew on both sides.<sup>159</sup> That Conrad meant to take his promise to Manuel seriously is beyond question. In the late summer, the royal will seemed to be moving not only in the direction of an Italian expedition but also towards the sending of a mission to not only the Pope but also to the Romans. When Eugene heard this, he perhaps recalled the fact that the slavery of the Roman Papacy to the German crown had begun in the days of Otto under circumstances which were too similar to be reassuring.<sup>160</sup>

Roger had thus succeeded in incriminating the Papacy in the eyes of Conrad. Perhaps, however, he sensed the papal dilemma. Despite the treaty of 1149 at Tivoli, he well knew that Eugene still





suspected him and his motives. Something more would have to be done to forward his schemes. He would have to play on the pontifical fears of the significance of the Greek alliance. In this he was to have a most fortunate turn of luck. Not only did he have the anti-Greek sentiment to play on, he soon had something else with which to convince the pontiff that the East-West alliance was of supreme danger to the Papacy and indeed to all of Christendom. Thanks to the zeal of Manuel's sailors and the daring of his Admiral, George of Antioch, he soon had Louis of France as his honoured guest. We have mentioned in a previous section the mistaken attack by the Greeks on the Norman vessels which were bearing Louis and his queen home from the Holy Land. The speedy action of the Admiral, George, had prevented the capture of the King, but the queen was temporarily separated from her husband. Upon his arrival in Salerno, Louis was received with the greatest cordiality by Roger, who had every reason to welcome Louis to his court. The two monarchs are reported to have spent much time in conversation. It is usually assumed that from these conversations there emerged the proposed plan for attack on the Greek Empire which we are about to discuss. It is true that Louis was probably disturbed by the Greek attack on his ships. Not only this, in his entourage was Godfrey of Langres, whose anti-Greek sentiments have been recounted above. No doubt Roger found much in common with the zealous bishop. However, we must remember that Louis had kept his head during the course of the Crusade in regard to the Greek question. If pious and weak, he was not stupid. We have suggested that perhaps he had appreciated Manuel's position, to some degree, vis à vis the crusaders, especially when Roger had been in the act of attacking the Byzantine Empire at the moment



when the Empire was host to the crusade armies. Not only this, his criticisms of the Greeks in the letter to Suger from Antioch had been moderate and balanced. He acknowledged that he had been kindly received. As for the Crusade, he admitted the blame was to be shared by both Greeks and Latins. He had gone so far as to say that the Turks had been permitted by the Emperor to attack the crusading armies, probably a reference to the truce concluded by Manuel with the sultan of Iconium.<sup>161</sup>

It is probable, indeed certain, that Roger tried to play up the theme of Greek treachery, but we cannot be sure to what extent Louis agreed with all of this. No other letter extant to Suger makes any mention of the Greeks. If Odo and Godfrey hated the Greeks and thought them traitors, there is little reason to believe that Louis shared their convictions completely. He was probably too much concerned about the state of his kingdom and even more about his future relationship to his estranged wife, a matrimonial fact whose political consequences were plain to Louis. Louis probably listened in friendly fashion to the schemes of Roger. Perhaps he was encouraging, but there is no reason to believe that he fell in with the plans of the Norman monarch.<sup>162</sup> Unfortunately, this is only conjecture since no record remains of their conversations. However, I judge this to be the direction of the evidence.

Roger thus was a trifle disappointed. There was consolation in this that many in the royal entourage shared his opinions, such as Godfrey of Langres. There was also a more positive move on the part of the erstwhile papal legate, the cardinal Theodwin of St. Rufina and Porto. He at least had been convinced by Roger. Accordingly he took it upon himself to write letters to Conrad on Roger's behalf.<sup>163</sup> Proceeding northward, Louis was received by the



Pope. Once again we do not know if they discussed the Crusade beyond the usual offer, as with Conrad, by the hope of consolation for its failure. Eugene did what he could to reconcile Louis and Eleanor who had now rejoined her husband.<sup>164</sup> It may be that he exposed to Louis his difficult political position and questioned Louis in regard to the Greeks and their intent as shown during the course of the crusade. All this is conjecture. However, if Louis did mention another expedition to the pontiff and even raised the question of punishing the Greeks, - which I incline to believe that he did not do, - it is likely that the Pope held his peace. Eugene was fearful of the political dangers implicit in such a proposal. Not only this, he had a lively appreciation of the political difficulties which Suger had undergone in his attempt to preserve the crown of France intact during his master's absence on the Crusade. He probably saw that, like it or not, for Louis another crusade was impossible. Suger's anxiety to get Louis home as soon as possible was evidence of this.<sup>165</sup>

Even though Louis was not as sanguine about another expedition as Roger and others had hoped, the idea was in the air. Not only this, the papal political position with regard to the Germans was becoming intolerable. The papal nerves were wearing thin. The rumours continued to arrive from Germany. The Italian expedition was reported to be a certainty. Eugene could only conjecture what might be the outcome of the Roman problem if Conrad entered Italy. Further, there was the alliance with the Greeks. What did that mean? Finally he could wait no longer and began a series of enquiries. In the fall of 1149, Guy, cardinal deacon of Saints Cosmas and Damian, Chancellor of the Roman church, approached Wibald of



Corbie, a man known to be loyal to the papacy and also close to the counsels of the German monarch.<sup>166</sup> The cardinal assured him that only the papal influence had protected the realm of Conrad from the Welfs during Conrad's absence. Now, rumours, ever increasing, told of Conrad's hostility towards the Roman church. He would repay good with evil. Had he not made a pact with the Emperor of Constantinople against the Roman church?<sup>167</sup> Wibald was ordered to fight for the protection of the Roman church against such hostility. At the close of the letter, the Chancellor cleverly stated that he and the Pope did not doubt the loyalty of Conrad. They merely wished to be reassured. The letter is priceless testimonial to Eugene's uncertainties during this period and it reveals that the papal concern was for the relations of Pope and Emperor and the significance of the Greek alliance. Behind all of this stood the Roman question and the power of Roger of Sicily. Eugene was afraid of the alliance for its bearing on Italy and the Roman problem. He was also afraid of Roger, not only in himself and for his ambition, but also for what might come if he became too entangled in his policies. The Papacy had known little but defeat and humiliation at his hands.

The Pope might well make these discreet enquiries. In the winter of 1149, Conrad received legates from Rome. These in the name of the Senate and the people of Rome summoned him to the Eternal City.<sup>168</sup> The glories of Constantine and Justinian were recalled. They called for the defeat of the Pope and Roger of Sicily now presented by the Romans as being allied with one another.<sup>169</sup> Further, the papal supporters, the pierleone, the Frangipanni, were also described as "vassals and friends of Sicily".





Conrad was reminded of the evil done in the past to Roman emperors by the papal curia. It was time to break this clerical domination. Attention was drawn again to the papal alliance with Roger.<sup>170</sup> Other letters reiterated the same themes; restore the glories of Rome and of the Empire. Break the "clerical domination" and the alliance between Rome and Sicily whose sole purpose was to decrease the power of Conrad and his realm.<sup>171</sup>

Roger now had all the cards in his hand. He judged that despite everything, the Pope was hopelessly incriminated in the eyes of the Germans. He had found some support for his ideas among the French king's entourage and thought that these could bring influence to bear on Louis once he was home in France. Further, he had constructed an alliance with the Hungarians against the Germans and Greeks as the case might be.<sup>172</sup> This also had been done with the Serbs. Thus, in the autumn of 1149, the Hungarians and the Serbs attacked the Greek Empire.<sup>173</sup> In January of 1150, the Melits revolted against the Emperor. The master plan of Roger had begun. Conrad, just recovering from a six months' illness,<sup>174</sup> seemed no match for the rebels at first. His alliance with Manuel had brought nothing but trouble to the two of them.

We have already indicated that Suger was anxious to have Louis home in France. But there was something else at work in the life of the great Abbot. As reports increased concerning the shame of the Crusade, Suger seems to have become less and less reconciled to the fact that the great expedition had indeed been a failure. If we are to believe his biographer, the Abbot was possessed by a sense of shame for the loss in glory to the Christian name which had come about through the Second Crusade. Further, he was concerned for



the safety of the Holy Places.<sup>175</sup> It does not seem certain that Suger envisaged an expedition which would aim at the punishment of the Greeks. Piety and honour were his motives. He was assisted in this resolve by the fact that the Prince of Antioch, Raymond had, as we have seen, exposed himself carelessly to the full force of the infidel army. In an ambush he and his army had been annihilated, 27 June, 1149. The news of the disaster spread to Europe by letter. The King of Jerusalem, the Patriarch of Antioch, wrote to Suger in the most piteous terms, describing the death of the Prince and begging for his help.<sup>176</sup> At this time, Andrew of Montebarro wrote to Everard, Master of the Temple, who was in Europe recruiting men and money for the Order, that Raymond had been killed and that the entire position of the Christian cause in the Orient was in doubt. The siege of Antioch would begin at any moment.<sup>177</sup>

The news of disasters in the East quickened these feelings of Suger. He resolved to do something about it. He had the support in this of a considerable climate of public opinion. First of all there was St. Bernard. The saint himself was suffering the anguish of unpopularity since, as we have shown, there were not a few who ridiculed Bernard for the great role which he had taken in the recruitment of the original expedition. To a natural desire to banish this shame was added his own concern for the safety of the Christian cause in the Holy Land. He had heard the news of the disasters from representatives of the Order of the Temple. He too wished to take action. Encouraged by Bernard, Suger proceeded to summon a series of councils. The first, held at Laon on 1 April, 1150 accomplished nothing. Suger decided to try again before a larger audience of clerics and lay lords. Bernard continued to be encouraging. He



wrote to Suger, acknowledging that through the Templars he had heard the distressing news from the East. He had also been encouraged by Godfrey of Langres to come to the forthcoming council at Chartres. He promised that he would be there.<sup>178</sup> Another expedition was clearly beginning, and Suger and Bernard were determined to push this through.

It is important to stress the fact that there does not seem to have been any specific notion in Bernard's or Suger's mind that the purpose of this expedition was to punish the Greeks for their actions. True, Bernard mentioned the support given to Suger's plans by Godfrey of Langres, but the saint himself does not refer in any way to the treachery of the Greeks, a theme which we can be sure that Godfrey was eager to stress again and again. Not only this, in the apology for the crusade, De Consequetudine, to which we have referred in the notes, the saint had blamed the crusade's failure on the arduous character of the journey, hunger, the bad roads, and also upon the "dissension of the princes". This might be interpreted to include the Greeks, but there is no explicit denunciation of the Greeks at this point in his writings.

However, when all this has been said, there can be no denying the fact that anti-Greek sentiment was much in the air at this time. This was to be increased when Roger of Sicily entered the scene. The Sicilian monarch was determined to support the crusade enthusiasm which was beginning to appear in France, thanks chiefly to Suger and to St. Bernard. Further, always anxious to turn such an expedition to his own design against the Greek empire, he would attempt to take advantage of the anti-Greek feeling which the reports of Godfrey of Langres and Odo of Deuil had aroused.



Accordingly he opened correspondence with various people in France. To Suger he wrote saying that friends should enquire after one another's health and state of affairs. He requested that Suger write him concerning his condition in life, a clever bit of flattery.<sup>179</sup> The reply was undoubtedly not all that Roger would have liked. The Abbot remarked that never before had one of such an exalted station as Roger's enquired after his good health. He, like the Sicilian monarch, was happy to say that all was well. The letter concluded briefly with the remark that while he would like to write about many things to the King, he would not run the risk of being prolix.<sup>180</sup>

This was a disappointing letter as far as Roger was concerned. We find no reference to the intense activity which Suger was expending on the crusade agitation. One would have expected him to ask for the monarch's help. We find no mention of the Crusade at all, especially in regard to its possible use as method of punishing the Greeks for their treachery. We often tend to assume that Suger had accepted Odo of Deuil's criticism of the Greeks at its face value. Once again it is necessary to remind ourselves that Louis' attitude towards the Greeks was moderate enough. Further so far, nothing which could be construed as anti-Greek in sentiment can be found in the activities of Suger and St. Bernard. As we have said, the reports which came back to Europe were not unanimously against the Greeks.<sup>181</sup>

However, Roger, did find one avid supporter among the French clergy. This was the Abbot of Cluny. It is probable that the Abbot had received a letter from Roger, perhaps one which was of the same general nature as the letter to Suger. In a letter to Roger, Peter begins by voicing his regrets for the enmity which exists between Roger and Conrad of Germany. This causes great damage to the





Christian cause. Peter then acknowledges that he has heard much of Roger's brave wars against the infidel, a reference to Roger's attacks on the coast of North Africa. How much more Roger could do if peace were effected between himself and Conrad.<sup>182</sup>

This is not enough. The Abbot reveals that there is something more which has disturbed not only him but also all of France. This is the crime of the Greeks. The Greeks were, in Peter's eyes, clearly responsible for the annihilation of the flower of France and Germany. They should be revenged, and only Roger can do this. Alone of all the princes in the West, Roger can avenge this treason. The Abbot therefore exhorts his royal correspondent to undertake this task. Further, he promises that he will write again and inform Roger of the proceedings of a council which is to take place shortly. This last probably refers to the council to be held at Chartres.<sup>183</sup>

Roger might well feel pleased with such a letter. He had had indifferent success with Louis. The Pope, as we shall see, was still keeping his opinion to himself and taking no decisive action. On the other hand, Roger knew well enough that Eugene could not refuse to sanction another expedition if such were proposed to him. The papal tradition dictated that the Papacy was the inspirer and the supporter of the crusade movement. Therefore, Roger could feel hopeful. Perhaps Eugene's hand would be forced. Perhaps the anti-Greek sentiments of the Abbot of Cluny and Godfrey of Langres would win the day.

In France, there was much preparation for the forthcoming meeting at Chartres. We have already referred to Bernard's agreement to the council which he had written to Suger. The saint also



invited the Abbot of Cluny to the meeting in the warmest tones.<sup>184</sup> With deep regret, Peter indicated that he would not be able to be present.<sup>185</sup> When Suger invited him to be present also,<sup>186</sup> the Abbot had once again to make his excuses.<sup>187</sup> In point of fact, there were many refusals to the council, a disheartening fact for Bernard and Suger.<sup>188</sup> Once again we note that the theme here stressed in this correspondence is the peril to the Christian name in the East and the necessity of defending the honour of God from the attacks of the infidel.

About this time, in the spring of 1150, Suger also undertook to write to the Pope. In reply the Pope was encouraging but curiously restrained. To Suger's piety and zeal, Eugene offered consolation. He knew that Suger had been deeply offended by the failure of Christians to defend the honour of God. As for his suggestion of another expedition, he proposed that Suger take this up with the King and the baronage of France. If Suger were able to find anyone who would be interested in the undertaking of such an arduous task, the Pope promised that he would have the counsel and aid of the Papacy as well as the usual plenary indulgence which was customary for crusaders.<sup>189</sup>

The papal letter was only mildly encouraging. If a crusade were formed, the Pope would give it the usual indulgences, but there was no great display of enthusiasm. As for his advice, as we know, Suger had already appealed to the lay power of France. The reaction of King and barons, not to mention the hierarchy, seems to have been mixed. As was suggested previously, Louis was not overly enthusiastic. Apart from his letter to Suger from Antioch, Louis had displayed no resentment against the Greeks, and secondly,



there were the difficulties arising from his marriage and his realm. Had not Suger had difficulty in preserving the Crown intact for Louis when he had been on the Crusade? Were there adequate resources for the expedition? Where would the soldiers come from? Those who had survived the Second Crusade would be weary and unwilling to return to the Holy Land. As for those who might go for the first time, the lurid tales of the ferocity of the Turk, the treachery of the Greek, the horrors of the mountain passes in Asia Minor, all these would tend to discourage those taking the Cross.<sup>190</sup>

As for Eugene, he had reason to hesitate. The intrigues of Roger were probably known to him. If a crusade were harnessed to the Norman ambition, there would be no telling what damage might be done. Further, the hope seems to have exercised his common sense. As we suggested before, it was most unlikely that Louis and the French baronage would be interested in another crusade which might cost an even greater loss in blood and treasure and further endanger the welfare of the crown of France.

This was not the only disappointment in store for Suger. At the council of Chartres nothing occurred. There was almost no response. When another council was tried at Compeigne, this too proved to be a failure.<sup>191</sup> It was clear that the baronage of France had defected. It was most disturbing for Bernard. Further, the saint seems to have been disturbed by Eugene's attitude. To Suger, he wrote exhorting the Abbot to stand fast in the midst of his disappointment.<sup>192</sup> To the Pope he wrote enquiring why he seemed to be hesitating at the moment that the Eastern Church was in deadly peril. Was the Pope going to be discouraged by the previous defeat? After a long exhortation to courage and resolution, the saint



informed the pope, with something very much like despair, that at the Chartres council he had been made the leader of the crusade. What had this task to do with his fitness to bear arms? How was this congruous to his profession? The saint was clearly bewildered by the course events had taken. The barons had failed to see the plain call of God. The Pope was hesitating. No great papal appeal to the French had appeared. Why?<sup>193</sup> The answer is to be found in Eugene's position in Italy.

Once again, we should point out that the anti-Greek sentiment on which Roger had placed so much hope was not voiced by the saint in his letters. Indeed, things were not going as well for Roger as he had hoped. In the first place, early in 1150, the self rebellion had been crushed completely by the young king Henry.<sup>194</sup> Further, the wars which Roger had arranged between the Serbs, the Hungarians and the Greeks were not proving to be as successful as the wily Norman monarch had hoped.<sup>195</sup> Manuel was in possession of Corfu and the Greek sea power was still a menace. Further, as we know, the Greek emperor had taken a decisive step towards intervention in Italy by sending John Ducas to Ancona. Eugene's attitude towards the Greeks we have described as one of suspicion. We have seen how the Pope had been concerned by the significance of the German alliance with the Greeks. Indeed the letter which the papal chancellor had written to the Abbot of Corbie had put it forth that he and the Pope considered the treaty to be of hostile intent towards the Roman church. This indicated to us that the papacy feared the treaty and feared the unknown role the Greeks might come to play in the life of Italy. Not only this, we saw in the first section, the winter of 1149-1150 brought the mission of John Ducas to the city of





Ancona. This was probably quickly known to the papacy and confirmed many of its suspicions concerning the Greek ambition in Italy.

As we indicated at the beginning of this section, Eugene showed some concern for the state of relations existing between the Papacy and the Eastern empire. He had written to Manuel and in the letters to Henry of Moravia he had indicated his concern for the problem of church reunion. However, trouble on this point had developed in Venice. We remember that the Byzantine emperor had been able to draw the Venetians as his allies into the war against Roger and the attack on Corfu. He mentioned briefly at that time that within the city of Venice itself there was a strong faction, headed by the Patriarch, which was opposed to this alliance. They refused to support any cooperation with a schismatic who was attacking a fellow Latin Christian. The doge refused to listen to these arguments, and in the increasing bitterness of debate, exiled the patriarch and his followers from the city. These in their turn seem to have appealed to the Pope. Eugene, thus was involved in this difficulty sometime in 1149. His eventual action was to place the city under interdict. After some time, the patriarch and the doge were reconciled and the interdict was removed.<sup>196</sup>

The significance of this is not clear. Perhaps we have underestimated Eugene's feelings towards the Greeks. He had been friendly with Manuel. He had been concerned for church union. Further, he had not given for them any evidence of the common anti-Greek sentiment of these days, in his discussions with Louis of France. Nor had any appeared in connection with the agitation by Roger, Suger and Bernard for a new crusade. However, there is another piece of evidence.



In February, 1149, Anselm, Bishop of Havelburg, had gone to Rome.<sup>197</sup> In a work which we have mentioned before and shall mention again, the Dialogi, he wrote an epistle dedicatory to the Pope recalling that day in Tusculum of March, 1149, when they were talking together. The Pope had referred to a certain Greek bishop who had arrived from Constantinople with letters from the Emperor and from important Greek officials, i.e. the patriarch. While there, the Greek prelate had discoursed on the faith and practice of the Greek church. Of this, the Pope had remarked to Anselm that it was not at all in accord with that of the Roman church. The Pope went on to remark that the Greek had cited authorities only to twist them to his own purposes. It would seem that the Greek doctrine of the Holy Spirit, their use of leavened bread loomed largest in the papal concern. Curiously, at this point the papal concern does not seem to have been directed towards the Greek rejection of the Petrine supremacy. However, Anselm was to consider this later in his treatise.<sup>198</sup>

Does this evidence indicate a genuine animosity on the part of Eugene against the Greeks? The problem is complicated. It is clear from Anselm and from Eugene's previous actions that the papacy was at this time concerned over the divergence of the Latin and Greek churches in regard to matters of faith and practice. As for the matter of Venice and her alliance with the Greeks, there is the obvious interpretation which is that the papacy was determined to punish the Doge for his continual interference in the affairs of the Church and for his attempt, through the exile of the patriarch, to deprive the Church in Venice of her liberty. The Doge had acted against the canons and must be punished. Hence the papal interdict.



The evidence in Kehr is defective,<sup>199</sup> but it does indicate that a quarrel between the Doge and the Patriarch had been continuing for many years and that the Papacy was finally called in to support the Patriarch. The alliance with the Greeks may only have been an excuse for continuing resistance against the Doge by the Patriarch and his faction, or it might have added fuel to the flames. Be that as it may, was this a move on the Papacy's part against the Greeks?

The direction of the evidence is that Eugene in this was continuing to follow his cautious policy. He was determined to be restored to power in Rome and this could only be done with the aid of Conrad. He intended also to solve the problem of Roger of Sicily, and for this also he needed the aid of the German king. Roger had deprived the Church of its liberty within his realm. He threatened also the existence of the papal states and through his alliance with the Romans, the very existence of the Papacy itself.

Yet on the other hand, we have described Eugene as probably being suspicious of the Greeks for their actions during the Crusade, for their territorial pretensions in Italy, substantiated by the sending of John Ducas to Ancona, a clear attempt to revive the Byzantine exarchate of Ravenna which had been established in the days of Justinian, and for the alliance with the Germans, an alliance whose full purport the pontiff did not understand. Yet how could he keep the Venetian-Greek-German alliance from bringing a war into Italy, the consequences of which might be disastrous to the Papacy. Eugene was suspicious of Conrad, too.<sup>200</sup> Yet, if he proceeded against the Greeks too openly, he might lose the support of Conrad and be thrown on the tender mercies of Roger and the Romans. He could not sanction Roger's agitation for a Crusade which would



alienate the Papacy from the Germans as well as assist in the betrayal of the crusade ideal through the possible use of the expedition as a weapon against Constantinople.

Eugene was caught in a ring of fires. It is probable that in addition to securing the liberties of the Church in Venice, the Pope also acted to "contain" the war between Roger and Manuel. Further, Eugene acted so as to reduce the Greek influence in Italy. We know from Anselm that Eugene had received an ambassador, a Greek bishop, from Manuel. The exact purpose of the Greek bishop's visit is hidden from us although the passages quoted above from Anselm might lead us to believe that the emperor had once broached the subject of the reunion of the churches.<sup>201</sup> Eugene's reply is unknown to us. We may suppose that it was encouraging but indeterminate in character. Further, the ambassador may have had as his aim the detachment of the Papacy from all connection with the Normans, offering aid, as Alexius had done to Paschal in regard to Henry V, against the Roman commune. This Eugene would have refused, for it would bring the Papacy into alliance with the Greeks. No matter what Eugene himself thought of the Greeks, an alliance of this sort at this time would be the occasion of scandal to all of Europe. Yet on the other hand, if the Papacy were to attempt to adhere to the cause of the Germans, the Papacy might find itself allied to a force supporting a Greek intervention in Italy. Once again the Papacy would suffer.

This was the papal political situation. Fear of Roger, the Romans, Conrad and the Greeks, a firm grasp of the political situation in the kingdom of the Franks, a fear of what Roger might do to the crusade movement, a concern for the relations between the





churches of East and West -- all had combined to make the Pope lukewarm to the appeals of Bernard and Roger.<sup>202</sup>

The great Abbot had, however, enough prescience to see the situation of the Papacy. He could see that the Pope was caught between Scylla and Charybdis: Conrad and Roger. He also had attempted to ease the situation by using his influence to end the enmity between Roger and Conrad.

Sometime in May of 1150, the Abbot of Corbie undertook to answer the letter which the papal chancellor had directed to him in the fall of the previous year. In this he mentioned that letters had arrived on the first of March from the Abbot of Clairvaux. In these Bernard praised the King of Sicily, describing how useful Roger had been to the Catholic Church and how much more useful he might be in the future but for the power of Conrad of Germany. If it were agreeable to Conrad, Bernard offered to play the role of mediator.<sup>203</sup> Gone were the days of Lothair and Innocent when Bernard had denounced the King of Sicily as a tyrant. Further, it would seem that Bernard did not know of Roger's plotting with the house of Welf.

Bernard thus seems to have joined the ranks of those who, like the cardinal of St. Rufina, were determined to bring peace between Conrad and Roger for the sake of the health of the Church. Not only this, it would appear that the saint saw in Roger a powerful defender of Christendom. Does this mean that Bernard would have sanctioned the organization of an expedition whose purpose was to punish the Greeks for their treachery? In many ways his attitude towards Roger sounds much like the attitude of Peter the Venerable, whose exhortation to Roger to revenge the slaughtered men of France



and Germany we have described above. The answer to this is not clear. Suffice it to say that nowhere do we find any explicit reference to the Greeks in the letters of the Abbot. We have suggested that Peter had fallen completely into Roger's way of thinking. We have also suggested that Suger remained a bit distant and aloof, giving the Sicilian monarch no comfort. It could be suggested that Bernard saw in Roger only a prince who was anxious to succour the Holy Land. It is not correct to present Bernard as sharing the same attitudes as Peter. The evidence will not warrant it.<sup>204</sup> If anything, one could say that Bernard and Suger were duped by the projected plans of the German monarch. In their haste to succour the Christian Orient, they failed to see the sinister side of Roger and his proposed "services" to the Catholic church.

Eugene was not duped in any way. Since the beginning of 1150, the pontifical policy had undertaken a new direction. The aim was to solve the Roman question and the problem of Roger through a rapprochement with the Germans. The new policy further illuminates the papal hesitation which St. Bernard found so disheartening. The first step had been the support of the policy of Conrad in regard to the difficult situation in Poland.<sup>205</sup> This must have been gratifying to Conrad. The step came at just the right time. On the eighth of February, 1150, the young King Henry had defeated the Welf faction decisively. The news soon was bruited about Germany and must have reached the Pope in short order. Along with this came the news that Conrad, having recovered his strength, and seeing that the Welfs were broken, was disposed to take stronger measures for the honour of his realm and was now considering a new legation to Italy. He was now in a position to deal with Roger and the Roman question.<sup>206</sup>



The Pope was quick to see that the invasion of Italy was an event which could no longer be postponed.<sup>207</sup>

The German monarch in February confirmed this rumour by writing directly to the Papacy. He referred to the difficulties he had undergone since his return from Jerusalem: his bad health and the disorders in the realm. Now things had improved to the point where he could take measures for the reform and the strengthening of the Empire. He announced a legation to the Pope which would open the discussion of these matters. The papal favour was asked in regard to various ecclesiastical matters.<sup>208</sup> The Pope could take heart from this resumption of communications. When Conrad wrote Eugene at a later date, interceding for the Archbishop of Cologne, he assured the Pope that the Archbishop's delay in coming to Eugene was not due to any rebelliousness but rather to his age and his health. Further, the King described himself as the divinely ordained protector of the Roman church. The Pope could always rely on the counsel and aid of his good son Conrad.<sup>209</sup>

Conrad, however, was determined to hold on to the Greek alliance. He regretted deeply that so far he had not been able to undertake the expedition against Roger which was the purpose of the alliance. In February, 1150, he wrote Manuel in reply to a Greek embassy sent to him by Manuel. He recalled Manuel's care of him when he was sick. He spoke of the disorder he had found in his realm when he had returned to his land. He spoke also of the serious illness which he had suffered from six months. However, the promise would be kept.<sup>210</sup> A legation was despatched. Two months later, in April, 1150, the German king wrote to his own daughter, the Empress of the Greeks. Here Conrad expressed himself



in the strongest terms. He would love as his own all those things which pertained to the good fortune of his son-in-law and resist to the death his enemies as if they were his own. However, he reminded his daughter of the conditions of the pact which had been signed. The pact against Roger would not be put into effect if it endangered the crown of either party or if either were seriously ill. This is what had happened. Welf, supported by Sicilian money, had raised a rebellion. Further he cites the fact that from August until December of 1149 he had been seriously ill. However, he had recovered from this. Further, the welf has been defeated at Blochberg.

This done, the King acknowledged that he had begun to think of an attack on Roger. However, in this he had been hindered by the report that the French, their king and all the people were planning to attack the realm of the Greeks. This conspiracy was the work of Roger of Sicily. That was plain. However, Conrad had refused to countenance such a thing and had taken the firmest stand against it. The letter goes on to discuss a new marriage between Greek and German.<sup>211</sup> Manuel and Irene were to receive a letter also from Henry announcing the defeat of the welf at Blochberg.<sup>212</sup> Further encouragement was to be found in the letter which Wibald of Corbie wrote to Manuel. He professed his loyalty to the Greek emperor and spoke against Roger who had expelled him from the monastery of Monte Cassino years before. Manuel was reassured to hear Roger called a tyrant and to receive assurances that the Germans would not delay in the Italian invasion.<sup>213</sup>

Thus Conrad held fast to the Greek alliance and thus helped to render the proposed Crusade an impossibility. In his eyes, it





was too much the work of the Norman monarch and had as its intent, not the relief of the Holy Land, but also the attack on the Greek empire. Hence a deaf ear was turned to the appeals of St. Bernard and to the earlier solicitations of the cardinal Theodwin on behalf of the Sicilian monarch. As we know, Suger's attempts to create crusade enthusiasm had come to nought. The important fact here is that the French were not interested. Louis of France had other things to consider. It is certain that Conrad either exaggerated or was misled into thinking that the kingdom of France and its monarch was heart and soul in the plans of Roger. The evidence we have discussed shows that the French response was too slight to warrant such a conclusion. In vain was Suger to appeal once again to the Papacy for support in regard to the crusading movement. The papal answer was one of the most qualified approval. Eugene intimated that he did not think that the expedition would gain the necessary support. True, he commented favourably on Suger's zeal adding that others had written to him on the same subject.<sup>214</sup> Plainly Eugene could not deny the request for another expedition, but his reaction was even more lukewarm than it had been before. His zealous correspondents could not conceal the fact that the French were, in the main, not interested. Not only this, Eugene was aware of the schemes and ambitions of Roger of Sicily. Further, if an expedition were formed, the Papacy might find itself involved in a punitive movement against the Greek Empire. There is no reason to believe that Eugene wished the Greeks to be punished for the failure of the Second Crusade. That he was against Greek intervention in Italy is likely. As we have suggested, the Pope, caught between many fires, was attempting to



control the destructive forces at work. Nothing would be placed in the hands of the Norman monarch which would bring down the wrath of the Germans and the Greeks on Italy. Further, the Crusade would be a weapon which Roger might use to advance his own power in the peninsula itself. If therefore in an attempt to keep the situation under control, Eugene had acted against the Doge in Venice, not forgetting that there was another reason for his action, the defence of the liberty of the Church, he also would act to curtail the incipient conflict in another way, i.e., the deprecation of the crusade idea. The more the evidence is studied, the more one becomes convinced that the political dexterity of Eugene was in the main responsible for the shipwreck of the sinister plans of Roger which, in the guise of a crusade, would have attempted to repeat the war of Bohemund in 1108. Unlike Paschal, Eugene saw more clearly the true character of the Normans in south Italy. All things conspired to ruin the plan of Roger and the zealous attempts of Suger. The unhappy Abbot of St. Denys turned his attention, as did Peter the Venerable, to the support of the Order of the Temple.<sup>215</sup> As for Bernard, he remained to the end of his days, conscious of the failure of the French princes.<sup>216</sup> As for Eugene, himself, he tried to divert the French crusade enthusiasm to Spain. In June 1152, he issued an appeal to the faithful to join the Count of Barcelona in a crusade against the infidel.<sup>217</sup>

Thus the spring of 1150 sees the gradual rapprochement of the Hohenstaufens and the Papacy. The correspondence between Conrad and Eugene reveals this.<sup>218</sup> To make up for his previous silence, Conrad offered as an excuse, once again, his long illness.<sup>219</sup> Others interested themselves in these promising developments.



The Abbot of Corbie, whose true loyalties are a trifle difficult to determine, wrote to the Pope that he had done all that he could to stimulate Conrad to a greater sense of loyalty and devotion towards the Roman church.<sup>220</sup> The Abbot also finally acknowledged that he had received the letter of the papal chancellor, Guy. This was the letter which the cardinal had written trying to find out the true significance of the German alliance with the Greeks, which had seemed to be directed against the Roman church. As for this particular concern, Wibald acknowledged that the King was a little "corrupted" by the Greeks; he had done what he could to counteract it. This interesting observation came from a man who had written such an obsequious letter to Manuel in fullest support of Conrad's alliance with the emperor in the East. But then, Wibald had previously acknowledged that upon Conrad's return from the East, that he had detected "a change" in him.<sup>221</sup>

The Abbot went on to mention the activity of the Abbot of Clairvaux and also the solicitations of the cardinal Theodwin on behalf of Roger of Sicily. With great political astuteness, the Abbot indicated that he had not supported these pleas since he was uncertain as to the papal attitude towards this matter. This was a canny judgment indeed. As we have seen, Eugene had been pursuing a policy of the utmost caution, one of whose aim was that there would be no undue involvement of the Papacy in the schemes of Roger. However, in this case, Wibald of Corbie was playing a double game, attempting on the one hand to remain in the good graces of the Papacy and also those of his royal master. The purpose of this would be to bring the two closer together. His devotion to the Roman see he further exhibited when he passed on to the cardinal



copies of the letters which the Roman senators had written to Conrad, those letters highly incriminating to the Papacy, which had arrived in Germany in January of 1150. The cardinal thus was enabled to act against those traitors to the papal power in the city of Rome.<sup>222</sup>

Wibald was not alone in this attempt to bring peace between the Papacy and the German monarch. In previous places in this dissertation we have referred to the Dialogi which Anselm of Havelburg wrote concerning the differences existing between the churches of the East and West. We remember that it was dedicated to Eugene III. Its date, we recall, was uncertain. However, it was suggested that its proper composition would be in the years 1149-1150.<sup>223</sup> The purpose of this treatise to decrease the papal conception of the Greek church as being quite different from the Roman in matters of faith and practise. The method was to recall a series of discussion which he had had with the Archbishop of Nicomedia, while on a mission in Constantinople for the emperor Lothair in 1135-1136. Anselm spoke highly of his theological antagonist, and the Greek in his turn paid many a tribute not merely to Anselm's learning but also to the fact that for a Latin he was remarkably clothed with the virtue of humility. Throughout the treatise, Anselm attempted to show Eugene that the Greeks were not as divergent from Latin faith and practise as he had thought, and that further that the Greeks were not as dishonest in their use of the fathers as authorities as the Pope had alleged. At the conclusion of the treatise, the Greek Archbishop, convinced that Anselm had defended the Latin church victoriously, suggested that a general council be held by Roman authority and the estrangement of the churches done away with in council.<sup>224</sup> What Eugene thought of this treatise is not certain.





Its purpose was plain. At a time when the Papacy was fearful of the significance of the Greek alliance, the Bishop had attempted to apologize for Conrad's involvement with those who rejected the primacy of Peter and who were also implicated to a greater or lesser extent in the failure of the Second Crusade. Probably, it had only a slight effect. Manuel's attempted negotiation with Eugene had come to nothing. The Greeks had become too suspect politically for Eugene to act seriously upon the advice of Anselm, i.e. to seek church union via a general council.

Matters proceeded apace between Eugene and Conrad. If on the one hand, Eugene refused to restore the Archbishop of Cologne to his see,<sup>225</sup> he responded eagerly to the letters and the legations which Conrad had sent to him. In June, 1150, he wrote to Conrad professing his happiness over the efforts of the King for the peace and reformation of the church.<sup>226</sup> Things were clearing up between the two. The clouds of suspicion which had hung between the Pope and King since the latter's return from the crusade were further dispelled when the Roman chancellor, the cardinal Guy wrote to Wibald of Corbie, lauding him for his devotion to the Roman church. The Abbot was told in the clearest terms that the Papacy had had nothing to do with the attempts on the part of "certain religious persons", i.e. St. Bernard and the cardinal of St. Rufina, to intercede with Conrad on behalf of the King of Sicily. As for "that man", Roger of Sicily, his continued arrogance was described. He would obey no one unless Conrad himself forced him in person to do so. It was not expedient to the Roman church to have such interference in its business from such people, another reference to Bernard and Theodwin. Thus in the clearest language the Papacy



renounced the Roger-French crusade agitation. The hesitancy of Eugene to accede completely to the requests of Bernard and Suger is set in fuller light. Eugene had broken away from the tutelage of his great Cistercian teacher. At the close of the letter, the cardinal intimates that the Papacy would be pleased and confident if Conrad came to Italy.<sup>227</sup>

This letter is most important in that it shows the clear development of the papal policy away from the snares of Roger. The papal anxiety to complete the reconciliation with Conrad now becomes more clearly marked. The Roman problem still pressed for a solution since the assistance of Roger to the Papacy would be withdrawn as soon as the Sicilian realized that the Papacy was turning more and more to the Germans for aid and protection.<sup>228</sup> However, there were difficulties remaining. The Papacy was still uneasy over the East-West alliance. The Greeks had intervened in Ancona. The war with Roger continued. The Greeks also had secured Pisa to their policies and the alliance of Venice as yet was unbroken. When Wibald of Corbie was asked by Conrad in the summer of 1150 to undertake a legation to the Papacy on his behalf, the Abbot excused himself. Although he pleaded that he could not afford the journey, the real reason is that he had been disturbed by the reports of Alexander of Gravina, veteran negotiator for the realms of Manuel and of Conrad.<sup>229</sup> However, Conrad insisted, all the more because Wibald was thoroughly equipped to discuss with the Pope the problems arising which concerned both Manuel and Roger. Conrad knew well how much Wibald had done for his realm and what this devotion had cost him. However, the monarch assured the Abbot that he would pay for the expenses of his journey.<sup>230</sup> Wibald agreed to undertake



the legation.<sup>231</sup> He faced losing the good opinion of Conrad and Eugene alike. If he upheld the East-West alliance with all its aims and objectives, he feared he would lose papal favour. If he frankly and completely renounced Conrad's alliance with the Greeks, he would become the enemy of his king. However, events conspired to delay his departure.<sup>232</sup> Wibald attempted to placate the Pope.<sup>233</sup> The Abbot of Corbie was also in receipt of a letter from Manuel of Constantinople in which the Greek praised the monk for his loyalty to his master and for his assistance against Roger of Sicily.<sup>234</sup>

To the south, the expected break between Roger and Eugene had occurred. We remember that it was thanks to the troops of Roger that Eugene had re-entered the palace at the Lateran by the end of the year 1149.<sup>235</sup> However, it was now the Pope who had the upper hand. Roger was plainly worried over the collapse of the Welf rebellion, the comparative failure of the Serbian-Hungarian war against the Greeks. Not only this, the first six months of 1150 saw the complete collapse of all his carefully laid plans for fomenting a new crusade in France which would be useful to his hostile design against the Greeks and the Germans. Eugene now saw that he could obtain new concessions from the Sicilian. At the July interview at Ceprano between Norman and Pope, the pontiff obtained Roger's promise that all ecclesiastical elections would be free.. Not only this but the King also admitted Eugene's right to send legations into his kingdom with or without his consent. Once this was conceded the Pope went on to quash some of the elections held recently within the kingdom of Sicily. Roger, in his turn, requested the papal investiture of his estates. The privilege of Innocent II, which



Roger had forced from the Papacy by the treaty of San Germano, was to be re-issued. Roger's power in south Italy was to be thus placed on a legitimate basis in face of the approaching attack of the Greeks and the Germans. Eugene refused, clear sign that he looked forward to the day when Roger's power would be crushed by German intervention.<sup>236</sup>

As we know, Eugene was in correspondence with the Germans. The significance of the papal refusal did not escape Roger. The rift between the two powers widened during the winter of 1150-1151. The overt breach came when Roger had his son, William I, crowned king in the cathedral at Palermo on 8 April, 1151, without duly consulting the Pope who theoretically had a right to give consent to this event.<sup>237</sup> The Pope thus saw that no reliance could be placed on the Norman from the standpoint of papal policy. Accordingly, he turned directly to Germany and despatched the cardinals Octavian and Jordan to Germany.<sup>238</sup> When they arrived they were greeted with the news that at Ratisbon in June, the king had decreed to invade Italy.<sup>239</sup> This decision was reiterated by the diet held in September at Wurzburg.<sup>240</sup> All divided loyalties now a thing of the past, and mindful of Manuel's many gifts to himself, Wibald wrote to Manuel, wishing him well, even that his realm might increase to the stature and extent that it had had in the days of old. He informed the Greeks that at Wurzburg, the expedition against Roger of Sicily had been passed by imperial decree.<sup>241</sup> Complete harmony existed between East and West. Conrad supported Manuel's diplomatic negotiations with the Pisans.<sup>242</sup> He informed them and others that he was about to descend on Italy.<sup>243</sup>

The legation of Arnold of Cologne, Wibald and Henry, the royal notary, made its way into Italy, announcing to all and sundry





the forthcoming descent of Conrad into Italy. As for the Romans, Conrad gave them due warning that he was not altogether in sympathy with their actions and opinions although he professed himself glad to acknowledge their loyalty to him. He informed them that he was coming to bring peace and order to Italy and that legations were bearing this news throughout Italy.<sup>244</sup> To Eugene III, he wrote also informing the Pope of the expedition,<sup>245</sup> and Eugene responded that he was happy to receive the news and that he awaited his arrival with impatience.<sup>246</sup> As proof of his good faith, the Pope urged the German nation to support their king in this undertaking.<sup>247</sup> Eugene had now become convinced that the advent of the German monarch was necessary to the Papacy. The Greeks had, by this time, been ejected from Ancona. Perhaps also the Pope knew that Venice was becoming more fearful of the Greek ambition to resurrect the Exarchate of Ravenna. Venice had been instrumental in the Greek failure at Ancona. That problem could perhaps be settled in a personal interview with Conrad. At any rate, the East-West alliance was not as menacing as Eugene had once supposed, although the Greeks would have to be dealt with. As for Roger and the Romans, Conrad's assistance was needed, now that the Papacy need have no fears of the imperial intention.

This letter written on 27 January must have arrived in Germany just at the time when Conrad was dying. His death was most opportune for all concerned.<sup>248</sup> It was most fortuitous for Roger, so much so that Otto von Freising thought that Roger had had Conrad poisoned.<sup>249</sup> Further, it was a most serious check to the Greek alliance. The entire alliance was now of no effect since Manuel would have to get Frederick to re-affirm it for himself. The



tentative negotiations for another imperial marriage were set aside. For Eugene this must have been welcome news, in respect to the suspension of the Greek alliance. On the other hand, it was not welcome news at all in that it left the papacy face to face with Roger of Sicily and the Romans. At first the situation with the newly-elected Frederick Barbarossa was delicate.<sup>250</sup> However, Eugene soon recovered his confidence and urged Frederick to come to Rome to fulfil the promises made by Conrad.<sup>251</sup> The Pope was still concerned over the Romans and Arnold of Brescia.<sup>252</sup> Despite the fact that Frederick was soon to reveal his true colours, in March, 1153, he and the papacy concluded the treaty of Constance.

The treaty of Constance confirms the interpretation which we have attempted to argue for Eugene III's activities since the departure of the crusaders for the East. In the first place, Frederick swears that he will not make peace with the Romans or Roger of Sicily without the consent of the Roman church and the Pope. Further, Frederick agrees that he will labour to crush the Romans and force their submission to the Roman church and its pontiff. As the special defender of the Roman church, he will defend her against all enemies. As for the king of the Greeks, he was not to have any lands in Italy. If he invades, all power will be brought to bear to cast him out. The Pope, for his part, also swears to eject him with the powers of blessed Peter. Thus at the outset of his reign Barbarossa renounced the Greek alliance.<sup>253</sup>

We have made this excursion into Eugene's difficult political position after the second Crusade if only because it shows how much the Crusade had become part of the politics of the Roman church. The politics of Eugene achieved great success: Roger was



deprived of a weapon against the Greek Empire. For this Eugene deserves much of the credit. Had he allowed himself to become the tool of the Norman monarch, he would have been implicated in the raising of an expedition which might well have been directed against the Greeks as opposed to the Saracens. In this achievement, Eugene showed greater insight than his predecessor, Paschal II, who had allowed himself to become a tool in the ambition of Bohemund of Antioch.

One cannot but wonder that, had the political circumstances been right, if Eugene would have sanctioned the zeal of Roger and Bernard which coincided with the ambition of Roger and the lust for revenge of Peter the Venerable, thus producing an attack on Constantinople. It seems to me that there is little which could indicate this. For the Greek ambitions in the east, he had no sympathy whatsoever. This had been part of his difficulty. He wished to destroy Roger's hostile design against Constantinople and at the same time, he was fearful of Greek ambition as manifested in the alliance with Conrad. Hence the peace of Constance was directed against Greek territorial ambition in Italy, in Ancona and to the south. However, as far as spiritual matters went, Eugene showed himself concerned for church union. The attempt of Manuel in 1149 to reopen the problem was cut short by the pontiff, not so much because of Greek divergence in faith and practise but rather because of his suspicion as to the political import of such a move.

In this complicated piece of diplomacy, extending over the years 1149-1153, Eugene showed his concern for the preservation of the ideals of the crusade movement. He had taken the initiative in the crusade, he had commissioned Bernard to preach. Like Urban II, he had seen the movement grow out of all proportion to his expectations



He had tried to use the crusade as an occasion to bring the Latin and Greek churches closer together. In this, he was more positive than Urban, who had merely counselled friendly relations with the Byzantine Empire. Like Urban, he tried to exert influence through papal legates. If he failed it was because there was no one of Adhemar's stature and because the Europe of 1147 was a more highly developed society than that of 1096. Although papal influence on the expedition was less direct than in the first crusade, nonetheless the papal role as the initiator and organizer of the crusade was fulfilled as well as it could be. With Peter's blessing, Latin Christendom made a great attack on the infidel.

If Eugene was largely instrumental in preventing the abuse of the crusade after the failures of 1147-1149, he also attempted to continue to exercise his leadership in the struggle against the heathen. He encouraged pilgrimages to the East.<sup>1</sup> Like his predecessors, he continued papal support for the military Orders, in company with Louis of France, Peter, Hugh and Bernard.<sup>2</sup> Beyond therefore the fact that the papal influence on the crusade was more indirect than in 1095, Eugene discharged successfully the crusading duties of his office.

For his relations with the crusaders in the East, there is little to summarize. Relations between the Jerusalem patriarchate and the Papacy were not without tension. The see of Tyre was in dispute for some time. Beyond this, relations between Pope, king and patriarch remained as before. To the north, Antioch continued to go its way. We have seen how the patriarch of Antioch and his suffragans defied the papal legate. Tripoli, it is true, was humbled. However, Antioch and the sees of the county of Tripoli remained recalcitrant.





FOOTNOTES:

1. For a working bibliography in the history of the Papacy at this time, the following works are cited: Volume IX, part One of the Histoire de l'Eglise, entitled Du Premier Concile du Latran à l'Avènement d'Innocent III, (Paris, 1948), by A. Fliche, R. Foreville and J. Rousset. This work will be abbreviated as Histoire IX-I. Indispensable is the recent monograph of H. Gleber, Papst Eugen III, (Jena, 1936), and A. Cartellieri, Der Verrang des Papsttums zur Zeit der Ersten Kreuzzüge 1095-1150, (Munich-Berlin, 1941). The reader's attention is once again called to the work of Bernhardt on the reign of Conrad III, Chelandon's essay on the Normans of south Italy, the biographies by E. Curtis, E. Caspar of Roger II, the writings of Brehier and Norden for the relations between the Church and the East at this time, and the standard crusade histories of Runciman and Grousset. Useful also is the synthesis of E. Jordan, L'Allemagne et l'Italie aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles, Volume IV, Part One, Glotz, Histoire Generale, (Paris, 1939).
2. Otto, Chronicon, VII, 27, MGSS, XX, p. 263; Godfrey of Viterbo Pantheon, MGSS, XXII, p. 261; cf. E. Jordan, op.cit., pp. 35-4; Bernhardt, op.cit., pp. 349-351; Chelandon, Domination Normande, II, pp. 90-91.
3. This dream for a revival of republican Rome had been in the air for some time. It had appeared in the revolt against Innocent II. Otto, Chronicon, VII, 27, MGSS, XX, p. 263, says: "---ac in ipso impetu venientes, antiquam urbis dignitatem renovare cupientes, ordinem senatorum, qui iam per mutua curricula temporum deperierat, constituunt,-----". His account continues Chronicon, VII, 31, MGSS, XX, p. 264. See also John of Salis Historie Pontificalis, XXVII, Poole, p. 60.
4. Bernard attempted to enlist Conrad's support for the Papacy. Bernardi Ep., No. 244, PL, 182, cc. 440-442. That Bernard was fully aware of the necessity of relations between Empire and Papacy is shown by letter No. 183, PL, 182, c. 345.
5. Otto, Chronicon, VII, 31, MGSS, p. 264.
6. Romuald, Chronicon, RISS (New), VII, I, p. 228; Annales Casertenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 310. Chelandon, Domination Normande, II, pp. 113-115.
7. Godfrey of Viterbo, Pantheon, MGSS, XXII, p. 261. See Bernhardt op.cit., pp. 450-451.



8. Otto, Chronicon, VII, 31, MGSS, XX, pp. 264-265. Siccard has a report of his consecration, Chronicon, ALB, VII, p. 598.  
  
Bernhardi, op.cit., pp. 457-458; H.Gleber, op.cit., pp. 8-9; 17-18.
9. Liber Pontificalis, II, pp. 386-387. Mansi, XI, cc. 621-626 has an excellent Vita. For St. Bernard's letter at his point, see Bernardi Ep., No. 243, PL, 182, cc. 437-440. The Romans themselves attempted to enlist imperial support. See Otto, Gesta, I, 28, MGSS, XX, pp. 366-367.
10. Otto, Chronicon, VII, 31, 34, MGSS, XX, pp. 265-266; Gleber, op.cit., pp. 21-22; Bernhardi, op.cit., pp. 461-463.
11. For the date of his arrival, see R.L. Moore, "John of Salisbury at the Papal Court", (English Historical Review, LXXVIII, 1923), pp. 321 ff. Arnold had been deprived by Innocent II for his teaching and activity. He was also favoured by the hostility of Bernard. Bernardi Ep., No. 195, No. 196, PL, 182, cc. 361-364. See also Otto, Gesta, I, 27, II, 20, MGSS, XX, pp. 366, 403-404; John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, XLI, pp. 63-66. John informs us that he had been received back into communion by Eugene at Viterbo, but during the course of his performance of penitence at the shrines of Rome, he was taken up by the commune and he reverted to his old teachings.
12. Remuald, Chronicon, RSS (new), VII, I, p. 227; E Chronicis Haugustaldensibus, MGSS, XXVII, p. 14.
13. Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 310; JL, 8653, being a letter to the Abbot of Cluny, announcing the truce.
14. For a few of the chroniclers' reactions to the fall of Edessa, see Richard of Poitiers, RHGF, XII, p. 415; the Chronicon Mauriniacensis, RHGF, XII, p. 88; the Anonymous Latin chronicle of the life of Louis VII, RHGF, XII, p. 199; Otto, Chronicon, VII, 30, MGSS, XX, p. 264; Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, pp. 452-453; Annales Sancti Disibodi, MGSS, XVII, p. 26; Sigeberti Cont. Comblacensis, MGSS, VI, p. 389.
15. Annales Sancti Disibodi, MGSS, pp. 26-27; Comets are the divine portents in the Annales S. Columbae Senonensis, MGSS, I, p. 107.
16. Otto, Chronicon, VII, 33, MGSS, XX, p. 266. Tyro, XVI, 18, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 163-164, RHGOcc., I, pp. 734-736. Otto says: "audivimus eum periculum transmarinae ecclesiae post captam Edissam lacrimabiliter conquerentem et ob hoc Alpes transcendere ad regem Romanorum et Francorum pro flagitando auxilio volentem".



17. It is incorrect to accept Brehier's judgment that no great enthusiasm was aroused by Hugh of Gibellet's appeal, L'Eglise, p. 104.
  
18. Otto, Chronicon, VII, 31, MGS, XX, p. 266, reports this as his intention. Tyre, XVI, 18, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 165, McCoc., I, pp. 734-735, says that appeals were sent throughout Europe. The Chronicon Mauriniacensis, RHGF, XII, p. 38 states explicitly that Louis VII was directly informed of the conditions in the East by messengers from Antioch. The Annales Reichenpergenses, MGS, XVII, p. 461, says that Conrad and Louis were moved by reports concerning the affliction of the Oriental church. Messengers had been sent to warn kings, princes, the Pope and St. Bernard of the peril.
  
19. For a working bibliography in regard to the Second Crusade, the following have been used: B. Kugler, Studien zur Geschichte des Zweiten Kreuzzuges, (Stuttgart, 1866); Analekten zur Geschichte des Zweiten Kreuzzuges, (Tübingen, 1878) and Neue Analekten zur Geschichte des Zweiten Kreuzzuges, (Tübingen, 1883); C. Neumann, Bernhard von Clairveaux und die Anfänge des Zweiten Kreuzzuges, (Heidelberg, 1882); Giles Constable, "The Second Crusade as seen by Contemporaries", (Traditio, IX, 1953), pp. 213-279, in itself an excellent introduction to the Second Crusade, equipped with complete bibliographical information. Of great importance is the article of Valmar Cramer, "Kreuzpredigt und Kreuzzugsgedanke von Bernhard von Clairveaux bis Humbert von Romans", (Das Heilige Land in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, XVII-XX, 1939, Köln). Secondary accounts of the Crusade may be found in Bernhardt, op.cit., pp. 512-653, Runciman, op.cit., II, pp. 247-288, a vivid and concise narrative and Grousset, op.cit., II, pp. 225-270. Bréhier, op.cit., pp. 103-108 has a brief summary. Especially interesting is the chapter devoted to St. Bernard in Paul Rousset, Les Origines et Les Caractères de la Première Croisade, (Neuchâtel, 1945), 152-168 and the juridical analysis of the crusades of H. Villey.
  
20. For a brief bibliography connected with this much discussed problem, see E. Caspar and P. Rassew, "Die Kreuzzugsbulen Eugens III", (Neues Archiv, XLV, Berlin, 1924), pp. 285-303; Valmar Cramer, op.cit., p. 45, n. 1 for a summary of opinions; G. Hüffer, "Die Anfänge des Zweiten Kreuzzuges", (Historisches Jahrbuch, VIII, 1887), pp. 301-429; H. Cosack, "Konrads III Entschluss zum Kreuzzug", (Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung, XXV, 1914), pp. 278-296; C. Neumann, Bernhard von Clairveaux und die Anfänge des Zweiten Kreuzzuges, (Heidelberg, 1882), pp. 15 ff; E. Vacandard, Vie de Saint Bernard, (two volumes, Paris, 1927), pp. 268-276; E. Pfeiffer, "Die Stellung des heiligen Bernhards zur Kreuzzugsbewegung", (Cisterciensenchronik, LVI, 1934), pp. 273-283, 304-311; W. Williams, Saint Bernard of Clairveaux, (Manchester, 1935), pp. 262 ff. Gleber, op.cit., pp. 35-61;



Grousset, op.cit., II, pp. 225-226; M.W. Baldwin, "The Papacy and the Levant during the Twelfth Century" (Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, III, No. 2, January, 1945), p. 280. Baldwin incorrectly adopts the opinions of Grousset, Bréhier and others, depicting Louis of France as taking the initiative in the Crusade.

21. Gesta, I, 35, MGSS, XX, pp. 371-372.

22. Rassow, op.cit., pp. 300-305.

23. Otto's bull ends with: "Data Vetrallae Kalendis ecombris", MGSS, XX, p. 372; Rassow's March bull reads, "Data Transtiberin Kal. Martii", op.cit., p. 305.

24. Odo, Berry, p. 6.

25. Odo, Berry, pp. 6-8: "Rex interim, pervigil in incepto, Roman Eugenio papae super hac re nuntios mittit. Qui laetanter suscepti sunt laetanteaque remissi, referentes omni fave litteras dulciores, regi obedientiam, armis modum et vestibus imponentes, ----".

26. Gesta, I, 34, MGSS, pp. 370-371.

27. John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, XXI, Moore, p. 51: "Erat namque suspiciosissimus, ut vix alicui crederet nisi in hiis que rerum experientia vel auctoritas perspicua suadebat. Suspicionem vero ex duabus causis provenisse arbitror, tum ex infirmitate nature, tum quia conscius erat egritudinis laterum suorum; sic enim assessores et consiliarios consueverat appellare".

28. Further evidence could be found in that the Liber Pontificalis, II, p. 387, places Louis clearly at the centre of proceedings issuing in the Second Crusade. So also does the anonymous life of Louis VII, RHGF, XII, p. 199. The Annales Cameracenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 516 seem to make Louis responsible for the crusade although the writer's chronology is defective. Authorities who support the French initiative are Bréhier, op.cit., p. 104; Vacandard, op.cit., II, p. 273; Kugler, Analekten, pp. 28 ff; A detailed criticism of these views is presented by Gießer, op.cit., pp. 37-42.





29. Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 3, says that "in some hidden way" (*nescio qua latenti occasione*) Eugene III was moved by the support of Bernard to exhort Conrad and Louis to go on the crusade; Annales Besuonsos, MGSS, II, p. 250 attribute the crusade to Bernard; Monachi Lazavensis Cont. Cosmae, MGSS, IX, p. 159, says that Bernard acted upon learning of events in the Holy Land; Annales Brunwilerenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 727, wherein the author says that he knows not whether by God or man, Bernard was inspired to preach the crusade; Annales Scheftlarienses Maiores, MGSS, XVII, p. 336, make Bernard responsible; the Annales Reicherspergenses, MGSS, XVII, p. 461, relates that Bernard received an appeal from the East, describing the afflictions of the Oriental Church; Bernard is responsible for Louis' assumption of the cross in the Annales Vincentii Pragensis, MGSS, XVII, p. 662- ; in the Annales Colonienses Maximi, MGSS, XVII, pp. 761-762; Bernard shares honours for the authorship of the crusade with the monk Rudolph; Annales Magdeburgenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 188. While the importance of St. Bernard in the Second Crusade is clearly marked in all the documents, these make him the originator of the movement. Schwerin argues, quite unsuccessfully, that Eugene was too weak to write "*quantum praedecessores nostri*" and that it was done by St. Bernard. See U. Schwerin, Die Aufrufe der Päpste zur Befreiung des Heiligen Landes von den Anfängen bis zum Auszug Innozen IV. (Berlin, 1937), pp. 26, 74-75.
30. JL, II, p. 31.
31. JL, II, p. 26.
32. E. Caspar and E. Jansson, op.cit., pp. 285-300.
33. The line, found in Bernardi Ep., No. 247, PL, 182, c. 447, when the saint refers to the calling of the Bourges Christmas council of 1145 to consider the projected crusade.
34. Sources which clearly emphasize the primary importance of the Papacy in the launching of the crusade are as follows: Tyre, XVI, 18, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 163-164, RHCOcc., I, pp. 734-736; Annales Egmundani, MGSS, XVI, p. 456; Liber de Investiture S. Martini Tornacensis Continuatio, MGSS, XIV, p. 326; Historiae Tornacenses, MGSS, XIV, p. 345; Annales Palidenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 82. Early in 1146, St. Bernard congratulated Eugene on the good work he had begun in King Louis of France at the Christmas conference at Bourges, 1145. See Bernardi Ep., No. 247, PL, 182, c. 447; Annales Magdeburgenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 188, although giving a large place to St. Bernard, acknowledges the importance of the papacy; Annales Egmundani, MGSS, XVI, p. 456, refers to the papal letters.



35. The text used here is from Otto, Gesta, I, 35, MGSS, XX, pp. 371-372. This is JL, 8796, dated 1 December, 1145, from Vetralla.
36. Ibid, "Quantum praedecessores nostri Romani pontifices pro liberatione orientalis ecclesiae laboraverint, antiquorum relatione didicimus, et in gestis eorum scriptum reperimus. Praedecessor etenim noster felicitis memoriae papa Urbanus, tamquam tuba coelestis intonavit, et ad ipsius liberationem sanctae Romanae ecclesiae filios de divirsis mundi partibus sollicitare curavit".
37. Ibid, "Edessa civitas, quae nostra lingua Rohais dicitur, ---- ab inimicis crucis Christi capta est, et multa Christianorum castella ab ipsis occupata, ipsius quoque civitatis archiepiscopus cum clericis suis et multi alii christiani ibidem interfecti sunt, et sanctorum reliquiae in infidelium conculcationes datae sunt et dispersae".
38. Ibid, "In quo quantum ecclesiae Dei et toti Christianiti periculum immineat, et nos cognoscimus, et prudentiam vestram latere non credimus".
39. Ibid, "Universitatem itaque vestram in Domino commonemus, rogamus atque praecipimus, et in peccatorum remissionem iniungimus, ut qui Dei sunt, et maxime potentiores et nobiles, viriliter accingantur, et infidelium multitudini, quae se tempus victoriae super nos adeptam laetatur, sic occurrere, et ecclesiam orientalem tanta patrum vestrorum, ut praeceiximus, sanguinis effusione ab eorum tyrannide liberatam, ita defendere, et multa captivorum milia confratrum nostrorum de ipsorum manibus eripere studeatis, ut christiani nominis dignitas vestro tempore augeatur, et vestra fortitudo, quae per universum mundum laudatur, integra et illibata aervetur".
40. Ibid, "----- illam peccatorum remissionem, quam praefatus praedecessore noster papa Urbanus instituit, auctoritate nobis a Deo concessa concedimus et confirmamus, atque uxores et filios eorum, bona quoque et possessiones sub sanctae ecclesiae, nostra etiam et archiepiscoporum, episcoporum et aliorum praelatorum ecclesiae Dei protectione manere decernimus".
41. Ibid, "Auctoritate etiam apostolica prohibemus, ut de omnibus, quae, cum crucem acceperint, quiete possederint, nulla deinceps quaestio moveatur, donec de ipsorum reditu vel obitu certissime cognoscuntur".
42. In this Eugene was to foreshadow Bernard's insistence that the expedition be truly military.



43. These prohibitions were reiterated later by St. Bernard when he exhorted Ladislaus of Bohemia to the Crusade against the Slavs. Bernhardi Ep., No. 458, PL, 182, c. 654. For Eugene's decree, Otto, MGSS, XX, p. 372: "quicumque vero aere pronuntur alieno, et tam sanctum iter puro corde inceperint, de praeterito usuras non solvant, et si ipsi vel alii pro eis occasione usurarum astricti sunt sacramento vel fide, apostilico eos auctoritate absolvimus".
44. Ibid, "Licet eis etiam terras sive caeteras possessiones suas, postquam commoniti propinqui sive domini, ad quorum feudum pertinent, pecuniam commodare aut noluerint aut non veluerint, ecclesiis vel personis ecclesiasticis vel aliis quoque fidelibus libere et sine ulla reclamazione inpignerare".
45. For discussions of this crusade bull, Villey, op.cit., pp. 105-111; Gieseler, op.cit., pp. 43-48; Constable, op.cit., pp. 244-254.
46. We cannot be certain of this. No documents refer explicitly to his presence in France. Since Otto tells us that Hugh had other things on his mind in addition to the crusade, the protection of his see against the Queen of Jerusalem and the Patriarch of Antioch, perhaps he returned directly to the East when he saw that Eugene was taking direct action for the crusade.
47. That the meeting would be concerned among other things with a proposal for a crusade seems to be indicated by the letter Bernard wrote to Eugene afterwards, No. 247, PL, 182, c. 447: "Dies celebris, sollemnis curia, juvenis rex; et, quod his majus est, Dei negotium, de Hierosolymita scilicet expeditione, propter quod omnes convenerunt".
48. Otto, Gesta, I, 34, MGSS, XX, p. 370.
49. Ralph de Diceto, quoted in RHGF, XIII, p. 183; Gallia Christiana, IX, c. 86.
50. Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, p. 452. This event is reported by the Anonymi Historia Francorum, RHGF, XII, p. 116; Sigeberti Cont. Gemblacensis, MGSS, VI, pp. 387-388.
51. Odo, Berry, p. 6; Gallia Christiana, IV, c. 578.
52. Vita Sugerii, III, 1, PL 186, c. 1201, edited by A. Lecoy de la Marche, Suger, Oeuvres Complètes, (Paris, 1867), p. 394.



53. Odo, Berry, pp. 6-8.
54. Otto, Gesta, I, 34, MGSS, XX, pp. 370-371.
55. Bernardi Ep., No. 247, PL, 182, c. 447.
56. Otto, Gesta, I, 36, MGSS, XX, p. 372; Continuatio Sanblasiana Ottonis Chronici, MGSS, XX, pp. 304-305; Odo, Berry, p. 8; Richard of Poitiers, RHGF, XII, p. 415; Bernhardi Vita Prima, III, 4, c. 9, PL, 185, cc. 308-310; RHGF XIV, pp. 370-371.
57. The text is given in Rassow, op.cit., pp. 303-305. This is JL, 8876.
58. The additional portions are lines 13-15 in Rassow, op.cit., p. 304.
59. For the meeting at Vézelay, see Annales S. Columbae Senonensis, MGSS, I, p. 107; Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, pp. 453-454; the Chronicon Mauriniacensis, RHGF, XII, p. 88; the anonymous Historia, printed in RHGF, XII, p. 120; Richard of Poitiers, RHGF, XII, p. 415; who stresses that Bernard was there by papal command; Otto, Gesta, I, 36, MGSS, XX, p. 372; Continuatio Sanblasiana Ottonis Chronici, MGSS, XX, pp. 304-305; Odo, Berry, pp. 8-10 and the Vita Ludovici VII, written much later and probably derived at this point from Odo, RHGF, XII, p. 199.
60. Annales S. Columbae Senonensis, MGSS, I, p. 107; Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, p. 453.
61. Odo, Berry, pp. 10-14.
62. Odo, p. 10, reports this exchange of letters. For secondary accounts of Roger and the Crusade, E. Caspar, op.cit., pp. 370 ff; Chalandon, Domination Normande, II, pp. 131 ff; E. Curtis, op.cit., pp. 212-214.
63. Odo, Berry, p. 10.
64. RHGF, XVI, pp. 9-10; Dölger, II, No. 1349; Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, p. 264; Bernhardi, op.cit., pp. 539, 618.





65. C.Cohen, La Syrie du Nord à l'Epoque des Croisades, (Paris, 1940), pp. 380-381, stresses this difference from Alexius and the crusaders of 1095.
66. Other letters mentioned in Odo, Berry, p. 10; to Conrad, to Grisa II, the young king of Hungary.
67. For the taxes and the hardships they produced, see Fragmentum De tributo Floriacensibus imposito, RHGF, XII, p. 95; Chronicon S. Columbae Senonensis, RHGF, XII, p. 288; Ralph de Diceto, excerpted in, RHGF, XIII, p. 183; Ex libro de Translationibus Reliquiarum, RHGF, XIV, p. 324; Superii Ep., c. 24, PL, 186, c. 1359, RHGF, XV, p. 497; Robert of Torigny, RHGF, XIII, p. 291; Annales Rodenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 718. Comparatively little is known concerning the financing of this crusade.
68. Otto, Chronicon, VII, 33, MGSS, XX, p. 267.
69. Otto, Chronicon, VII, 28, MGSS, XX, p. 263.
70. Odo, Berry, pp. 68-70, knew about this. He refers to this substitution of the Greek episcopate as one of the concrete bases for Godfrey of Langres' constant agitation against all things Greek during the second crusade.
71. Contrary to Cleber op.cit., p. 36, this does not appear in the account of Otto, Chronicon, VII, 32, MGSS, XX, p. 265; F. Tournet, Histoire politique et religieuse de l'Arménie, (Paris, 1910), pp. 235-239 thought that the sole purpose of the Armenians' journey was to get help against Constantinople.
72. Dolger, II, No. 1348, RHGF, XV, pp. 440-441. The text may also be found in A.Theiner and F.Miklosich, Monumenta spectantia ad unionem Ecclesiarum Graecae et Romanae, (Vindobonae, 1872), pp. 6-8 and J.Ch.Amadutius, edited by B.Stephanoopoulos, Epistulae tres Graecolatinae, (Rome, 1781), pp. 385-388. See also Kap-Herr, op.cit., p. 15.
73. A.Theiner and F.Miklosich, op.cit., p. 7, RHGF, XV, p. 440: "Verumtamen vult et imperium meum, ut ipsi quae sunt ad honorem ipsius faciant, sicut fecerunt et prius egressi Franci ad in Imperatoribus memorabilem avum imperii mei.
74. Ibid, p. 8, RHGF, XV, pp. 440-441: "Imperium vero meum valde mirabatur, quoniam nunc usque non misit apocrisarios ad ipsum tua Sanctitas, et de concessis a Deo sibi salutibus non scripsit imperio meo. Magnam enim ad iam fidem et affectionem possidit propter florentem in ea virtutum ornatum. Sancta vero oratio tuae Sanctitatis donetur imperio meo".



75. Otto, Chronicon, VII, 32, MGSS, XX, p. 265. See M.Ormanian, The Church of Armenia, (London, 1912), p. 61.
  
76. An early attempt at the reconstruction of his itinerary may be found in PL, 185, cc. 1812-1827. A modern attempt, rendered difficult by a lack of precise information, may be found in Vacandard, op.cit., II, pp. 282-312.
  
77. While it is important to recognize that Bernard saw this tour as the fulfillment of the papal command, it is certain that the Pope had not planned to include the Germans in the Crusade.
  
78. Odo, pp. 10-12, Gesta Stephani, (edited R.Howlett, Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I, four volumes, London, 1884-1889), III, p. 122; Ex breve chronico S.Dionysii, RHGF, XII, p. 216; Nicolas of Clairveaux wrote to England, exhorting them to the crusade and giving a vivid description of the events at Vezelay, PL, 182, cc. 671-672. See the foot-notes to Vacandard, op.cit., II, p. 301.
  
79. See Vacandard, op.cit., II, p. 301, notes.
  
80. See Hel mold, I, 59, MGSS, pp. 56-57; Monachi Sazavensis Cont. Cosmae, MGSS, IX, p. 159. For the letter of Bernard to Ladislaus of Bohemia, Bernardi Ep., No. 458, PL, 182, cc. 652-654; Otto, Gesta, I, 41, MGSS, XX, p. 373-374.
  
81. For a general picture of Bernard's preaching, see Bernardi Ep., No. 363, No. 457, No. 458, PL, 182, cc. 564-568, 651-652, 652-654; Otto Gesta, I, 38, MGSS, XX, p. 372; for the famous sermons before Conrad at Speier, PL, 182, cc. 381-383. For a modern treatment of his preaching, see Paul Rousset, op.cit., pp. 152-168.
  
82. See JL, 8882.
  
83. Reports of the outbreak may be seen in Otto, Gesta, I, 37-39, MGSS, XX, pp. 372-373; Annales Rodenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 718; Gesta abbatum Lobbiensium, MGSS, XXI, p. 329.
  
84. Text, Bernardi Ep., No. 363, PL, 182, 564-568; RHGF, XV, pp. 605-607. It is to be noted that Bernard had no sympathy for anyone practising usury at the expense of the crusaders. The massacres also provoked a letter of Peter the Venerable, Petri Ep., IV, 36, PL, 189, cc. 366-369, RHGF, XV, pp. 641-643; in this letter while he also deplores the slaughter, Peter spoke out against usury and also, quite unnecessarily referred to



a famous Jewish ritual "murder" of his day, the supposed "crime at Norwich, England". This crime is mentioned in the Auctarium Mortuimaris, MGSS, VI, p. 465 and the Auctarium Ursicampinum, MGSS, VI, p. 472.

85. Bernard also wrote to the Archbishop of Maine, concerning Ralph, Bernardi Ep., No. 365, PL, 182, cc. 570-571.
86. Otto, Gesta, I, 41, MGSS, XX, pp. 373-374; Bernardi Ep., No. 363, PL, 182, cc. 568; RHGF, XV, p. 607.
87. Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 3; Annales Rodenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 718; Annales Vincenti Pragenses, MGSS, XVII, pp. 662-664.
88. For the Christmas meeting at Speier, see Otto, Gesta, I, 39, MGSS, XX, pp. 372-373; Continuatio Sanblasiana Ottonis Chronici, MGSS, XX, p. 305; Annales Brunwilarenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 727; Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, p. 453 incorrectly places Conrad's assumption of the cross at Frankfurt, 2 February, 1147; Annales Corbeiensis, MGSS, III, p. 13; Annales Vincenti Pragenses, MGSS, XVII, pp. 662-664, passion; S. Bernardi Vita Prima, PL, 185, cc. 381-386; Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 3; Annales Halidenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 82; the Annales Magdeburgenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 188 has a magnificent report of the crusade but is confused as to the diet at which Conrad took the cross. The anonymous life of Louis VII, RHGF, XII, p. 99 is incorrect when it says that Frederick and Conrad took the cross upon reception of the news of the fall of Edessa. However, this source is a thirteenth century compilation.
89. Otto, Gesta, I, 40, MGSS, XX, p. 373.
90. Annales Ratisponenses, MGSS, XVII, p. 586, says that the two cardinal legates and other bishops were chosen to lead the army. That this report is totally incorrect we shall show. As for Bernard himself, Bernardi Ep., No. 363, PL, 182, c. 568.
91. P. Kehr, "Papsturkunden in Malta", (Nachrichten ~~von~~ der König. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, 1899, No. 3), pp. 367-409.
92. Ibid., pp. 388-390.
93. cf. Gleber, op.cit., pp. 49-51.



94. The papal itinerary is found in JL, II, pp. 38-41. See also Odo, pp. 14-16; Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 310, and the fragments and selections of chroniclers and annalists to be found in RHGF, XII, pp. 90, 215-216, 411; RHGF, XV, pp. 423-425.
  
95. For the councils at Chalons and Étampes, see Odo, Berry, pp. 12-14; Vita Bernardi Prima, VI, 9-13, PL, 185, cc. 392-402 for the saint's activities and miracles at this time. Bernard continued to write letters of exhortation to all parts of Europe. See Vacandard, op.cit., II, pp. 300 ff with important notes.
  
96. For the appointment of Suger as regent of France, see Vita Sugerii, III, 1-2, RHGF, XII, p. 108, PL, 186, cc. 1201-1202; Rx breve chronico S. Dionysii RHGF, XII, pp. 215-216; Sugerii Ep., No. 14, PL, 186, c. 1353; Boso in the Liber Pontificalis, II, p. 387, suggests that Louis wanted Eugene to rule France in his absence. Bernard always gave support to Suger in the difficult days which lay ahead, Bernardi Ep., No. 377, PL, 182, c. 581 -
  
97. Odo, Berry, p. 12.
  
98. Otto, Gesta, I, 53, MGSS, XX, p. 374; Annales Palidenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 82. This Annales is especially informative for all twelfth century expeditions against the barbarians of Eastern Europe. Sigeberti Cont. Gemblacensis, MGSS, VI, pp. 387-388; Annales Stadenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 327. Bernard received a letter from Christians in the East asking for his support in the holy war against the Slavs and the Ruthenians, PL, 182, cc. 681-682. Bernard in addition to his personal appearance at Frankfurt wrote to the Eastern Christians. This is Bernardi Ep., No. 457, PL, 182, cc. 65-652, announcing identical privileges for the crusaders against the Slavs. On the same subject, Bernard wrote Bernardi Ep., No. 458, to Ladislaus of Bohemia, PL, 182, cc. 652-654. In this he was assisted by the preaching of Henry of Moravia and others. Annales Vincenti Pragenses, MGSS, XVII, p. 66 Monachi Sazavensis Continuatio Cosmae, MGSS, IX, p. 159; Annales Magdeburgenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 188.
  
99. See Bernardi Ep., No. 484, PL, 182, cc. 692-693 for a letter dealing with the difficulties of the bishop of Amiens in connection with the crusade.
  
100. Odo, Berry, pp. 12-14. The imperial letter to Eugene is Dölger, II, No. 1533. In this connection, see W. Ohnsorge, "Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Manuels I. von Byzanz", (Festschrift Albert Brackmann, edited by Leo Santifaller, Weimar, 1931), pp. 371-393, reference here, pp. 391-393. The letter is printed in RHGF, XV, p. 974-5.





101. Bernard wrote to Manuel about this time. Bernardi Ep., No. 462, PL, 182, cc. 672-673. In this letter, the saint says that papal command and his own "indifferent" preaching had aroused the Franks to the crusade. The emperor's generous protection and hospitality was requested for the travellers.
  
102. At this time, Peter the Venerable was also friendly and wrote Manuel and the Patriarch of Constantinople on behalf of Cluny. See PL, 189, cc. 260-263.
  
103. Odo, Berry, pp. 16-18; the Liber Pontificalis, II, p. 387; the Anonymi Gesta Ludovici VII, RHGF, XII, p. 200.
  
104. Wibaldi Ep., No. 33, pp. 111-112; PL, 180, cc. 1616-1617. The Abbot of Corbie was especially concerned to receive papal confirmation of his election as abbot. Wibaldi Ep., No. 34 - No. 38, pp. 112-119. The embassy met Eugene at Dijon on 30 March. Wibaldi Ep., No. 150, p. 242.
  
105. Theodwin had anointed Conrad as king of the Romans, Otto, Chronicon, VII, 22, MGSS, XX, p. 260.
  
106. Wibaldi Ep., p. 111, "Litteras sanctitatis vestrae per legatum vestrum, ---- Theodevinum sanctae Rufinae episcopum missas gratissime accepimus ----. Siquidem de ordinatione regni nobis a Deo concessi, super qua nos paterna sollicitudine monere et exhortari curastis, magna cum attentione et diligentia in frequenti principum conventu apud Frankenevort, ubi generalem curiam habuimus, ---- filium nostrum Heinricum in regem et scepti nostri successorem unanime principum conventu et alacri totius regni acclamatione electum, mediante hac quadragesima in palatio Aquisgrani coronare, ---- decrevimus". For other notices of this diet, see Annales Corbienses, MGSS, III, p. 13; Otto, Gesta, I, 43, MGSS, XX, p. 374.
  
107. Wibaldi Ep., pp. 111-112: "Sane quod dulcedinem vestram movit, nos rem tantam, scilicet de signo vivificae crucis et de tantae tamque longae expeditionis proposito, absque vestra conscientia assumpsisse, de magno vera dilectionis affectu processit. Sed Sanctus Spiritus, qui ubi vult spirat, -- nullas in captando vestro vel alicuius consilio moras nos habere permisit; ----"
  
108. Ibid., p. 112.
  
109. Eugene's zeal for the crusade against the Slavs is shown in Wibaldi Ep., No. 150, pp. 242-243.



110. JL, 9325, is a papal letter which reveals this identification in the papal mind. See also Annales Vincentii Pragenses, MGSS, XVII, p. 664.
111. See JL, 9255, to Alfonso of Spain, for Eugene's concern with the crusade against the Saracen in Spain. To Helbold, the Crusade was one single entity with three fronts. See Chronica Slavorum, I, 59, MGSS, XXI, p. 57.
112. Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 3.
113. For the crusade expedition against Lisbon, see the De expugnatione Lyxbonensi, (edited by C.W. David, New York, 1936); Annales Rodenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 718; Sigeberti Cont. Comblaciensis, MGSS, VI, p. 389; Annales Colonienses Maximi, MGSS, XVII, pp. 762-763; Annales S. Disibodi, MGSS, XVII, pp. 27-28; Robert of Torigny, MGSS, XXI, p. 58; Annales Magdeburgenses, MGSS, XVI, pp. 189-190; Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, p. 453.
114. JL, 9017, PL, 180, cc. 1203-1204. Constable, op.cit., p. 255, calls this a new edition of "Divina dispensatione", issued in October, 1146, in Italy. Beyond an identical "incipit", there is little similarity between the two bulls.
115. See the Caffaro, Annales, FSI, I, pp. 33-35, 79-89. It is important to notice that the papal initiative is found here. FSI, I, p. 79.
116. PL, 180, c. 1203: "----eadem auctoritate sub excommunicatione prohibentes, ut nullus de paganis ipsis, quos Christianae fidei poterit subjugare, pecuniam ad aliam redemptionem accipiat, ut eos in sua perfidia remanere permittat". Odo, Berry, p. 70, repeats the notion of forced conversion.
117. Ibid, c. 1203: "Praeterea quid expedire cognoscimus ut aliqua religiosa discreta, litterata persona sit inter vos, quae paci et tranquillitati vestrae provideat, et unitatem inter vos conservet, et vos de promovenda Christiana religione commoneat, venerabilem fratrem nostrum Anselmum, Havelburgensem episcopum religiosum ---- ad hoc providemus, et hanc sollicitudinem injunximus. Quocirca pro apostolica vobis scripta praecipimus, ut eum pro reverentia beati Petri nostra et omnium vestrum salute diligatis et honoretis ----".
118. For the campaign against the Slavs, see Annales Halidenses, MGSS, XVI, pp. 82-83; Annales Magdeburgenses, MGSS, XVI, pp. 188-190; Sigeberti Cont. Comblaciensis, MGSS, VI, p. 453; Chronicon Montis Sereni, MGSS, XXIII, p. 147.



119. For Conrad's departure from Bamberg, see Annales Relidenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 82; Sieberti Cont. Premonstratensis, VI, p. 453.
  
120. This embassy is Dolger, II, No. 1350. With this embassy came the bishop of Wurzburg who died on the way. See Otto, Gesta, I, 23, MGSS, XX, p. 363; Annales Horbiplenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 3; Annales S. Diribedi, MGSS, XX, p. 27 and Ex Necrologio S. Michaelis Posterioris in Jaffé, Bibliotheca rerum germanicarum, V, p. 578. St. Bernard performed a miracle before one of the ambassadors, Vita, PL, 185, c. 383.
  
121. JL, 9095, PL, 180, cc. 1251-1252. "----quatenus regem adhortari, monere modis omnibus studeas, ut ad honorem et exaltationem matris suae Romanae Ecclesiae intendat, et Constantinopolitanensem Ecclesiam ei unire, sicut olim cognoscitur, juxta potentiam a Deo sibi concessam fideliter elaboret".
  
122. JL, 9110, from Auxerre; PL, 180, c. 1262.
  
123. PL, 180, c. 1262: "Sane quidem acriori pungere stimulo laetitiae, quando ex nuntio tuo audivissem, tuae personae prudentiam, sagaxque tuum ingenium in corde Romanorum regis seminaturn semen, ex quo Constantinopolitanae Ecclesiae unio tanquam fructus excrevit mihi et matri omnium ----, longe fecundissimus. Ex quo vero te a regis latere remotum cognovi, de prosperando in tali negotio omnis diffido. Sed res erat certe ardua".
  
124. Historia Pontificalis, XXIV, Poole, pp. 54-56.
  
125. Ibid, pp. 55-56. John's judgment is damning: "Quicquid predicabat unus alter depredicabat, ambo facundi, ambo sumptuosi, ambo (ut creditur) discordio incentores et exportes timoris Domini; ----. Exercitui et publice rei Christianorum rarus aut nullus fuit hiis perniciosior. Habebat uterque populum qui sibi crederet, et ab egrotantibus et morientibus quos visitabant et absolvebant vice domum pape, quam se habere iactitabant, multam accipiebant pecuniam, ut plus lucrati esse credantur in expeditione quam ibi in proprio expendisse". However, Salisbury thought Langres better than Lisieux. For additional information, see Odo, Berry, passim, and the Callia Christiana, XI, p. 774. An Anonymi Vera Narratio fudationis prioratus S. Barbarae, in RHGF, XIV, p. 502 credits them with bonafide legatine powers. Odo's failure to describe them as papal legates and John's remarks are sufficient to set this aside. For another false ascription of legatine powers, see MGSS, XIV, 588, Historia Monasterii Aquicinctini. On this, see Constable, op.cit., p. 263, who accepts Arnulf and Godfrey as papal legates without any criticism. See RR, No. 250, where Theodwin and Guy are listed as legates and Godfrey and Arnulf are not. The papal letter, JL, 9095, cited above and below does not refer to the two bishops as papal legates.



126. Ibid, pp. 55-56: "Tadewinus enim moribus et lingua dissonans Francis barbarus habebatur. Guido vero linguam Francorum tenuiter noverat, et erat pro faculate liberalis, natura benignus, dulcis affatu, et minimum habens de fastu Romano, sed litterarum amator et scrutator librorum: tumultuo oderat, collationibus delectabatur, et questiunculas dialecticas et philosophicas sepius et libentius agitabat".
127. JL, 9095, PL, 180, cc. 1250-1251.
128. Tyre, XVII, 1, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 184-185, MGCC, I, pp. 758-759.
129. The papal itinerary is clearly marked in JL, II, pp. 42-60. Indispensable for these years is the priceless testimony of John of Salisbury. In XVIII, Ecce, p. 44, he gives a curious explanation for the Pope's return to Italy: "Cum itaque causa tantorum principum que in consistorio sperabatur dominum papam non retardaret. Italiam ingressus est et ideo, prout ab aliquibus dicebatur, festinacius, quia iam audierat Christianorum exercitus in oriente esse confectos. Nolebat enim in tanta tristitia Francorum et Alemannorum manere inter illos, licet in Francia posset esse tutissimus".
130. See the wonderful summary of motives which were present in the Crusade in the Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 3.
131. See JL, 9165, 9166, of December, 1147.
132. For examples of Eugene's attitude towards Henry; see Wibaldi Ep., No. 42, No. 43, No. 68, No. 81, No. 95, No. 116; pp. 120-122, 144-145, 155, 169, 190-192; JL, 9084, 9214.
133. JL, 9345, 8 July, 1149, PL, 180, cc. 1394-1395 authorizes Hugh of Sens and his suffragans to excommunicate all disturbers of the peace since the King had left his kingdom for the Crusade in the Church's care. JL, 9346, PL, 180, cc. 1395-1396, addressed to Suger, concerns the same topic. JL, 9347, 15 August, 1149, announces to Suger that Louis is at hand although the whereabouts of his queen are unknown. PL, 180, c. 1396. Suger was, of course, impatient for Louis' return, c.f. PL, 186, cc. 1377-1379.
134. Robert of Torigny refused to discuss it, MGSS, VI, p. 497; the author of the Annales S. Disibodi, MGSS, XVII, p. 28, dismisses the Crusade with the words "nichil dignum memoriae referens". The sense of shame which the disaster brought is clearly marked in the Annales Colonienses Maximi, MGSS, XVII, pp. 761-762.





135. Otto, Costa, I, 44, MGSS, XX, p. 375: "Verum quia, peccatis nostris exiscentibus quem finem praedicta expeditio sortita fuerit, omnibus notum est, nos qui non hac vice tragoediam sed iocundam scribere proposuimus historiam, aliis vel alias hoc dicendum relinquimus".
  
136. Tyre, XVI, 19, 25, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 167, 177, RHCocc., I, pp. 736-737, 747-749. The Annales Herbinolenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 3, attributes much of the failure of the crusade to the wicked or inadequate motivations of the crusaders; Annales S. Columbae Senonensis, MGSS, I, p. 107 ascribes all to the inscrutable judgment of God.
  
137. John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, XXIV, Poole, p. 54: "Preter incomoda que dolo Constantinopolitani imperatoris et Turcorum viribus acciderant Christianis, exercitum eorum debilitabat invidia principum et contentio sacerdotum".
  
138. Sigoberti Cont. Valcellensis, MGSS, VI, p. 460; Romuald, Chronicon, RISS (new), VII, I, p. 229, blames the Greeks, citing especially their failure to give adequate food and guides to the crusaders. Both Conrad and Louis were thus deceived by Manuel; the Annales Reicherspergenses, MGSS, XVII, pp. 461-462, blames the Greeks for the wretched roads of Asia Minor and for the diversion of the armies; the Annales Rodenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 719, lays the blame in part on the Greeks; Sigoberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, pp. 453-454; the Annales Egmundani, MGSS, XVI, p. 456, refers to "bad Christians", hunger, and the Turks although the root cause of the failure was human pride; this is similar to the attitude of the Annales Magdeburgenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 188, who, while referring to human pride, hints at Greek treachery in veiled language. Dandolo includes the deceit of the Greeks among his reasons for the failure, RISS (new), XII, I, p. 242. Helmold, I, 60, MGSS XXI, pp. 57-58 criticizes Manuel's behaviour. The Notae Fisanus, MGSS, XIX, p. 260, make him the sole author of the disaster. Tyre, XVI, 20-21, 25, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 168-170, 175-176; RHCocc., I, pp. 738-742, 747-749, despite his submission to the judgment of God, blames the deceitfulness of the Greek guides for the disaster. It should be remembered, in regard to the evidence of monastic annalists, that cloisters were accustomed to passing reports of events along to one another with little exercise of critical judgment.
  
139. We have already cited his approval of the hostile attitudes of Godfrey of Langres. For his hatred of the Greeks and his conviction that the failure of the crusade should be laid at their door, see Berry, pp. 54-56, 68-70, 90-94, 120-124.



140. Robert of Torigny, although refusing to discuss the crusade, does not blame the Greeks, MGSS, VI, p. 497; the Annales Palidenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 83, after recounting the disasters of the crusade, does not heap odium on the Greeks; a similar attitude is taken by the Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, pp. 4-8; the Sigeberti Cont. Comblacensis, MGSS, VI, p. 390, attributes the failure to misfortune, hunger, disease and the Turk; on the other hand to the Annales Vincentii Aragenensis, MGSS, XVII, p. 663, the failure of the crusade was due to Latin pride; the Annales Leuvenenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 258, emphasizes the good treatment the Germans received from the Greeks. For this writer blame is laid upon the difficulties of the journey and the power of the Turk. The Annales Magdeburgenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 188, blames the expedition for its reliance on human power; Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 310, lays no blame on the Greeks; the Annales Reicherspergenses, XVII, p. 463; Richard of Poitiers has a brief account of the crusade but does not blame the Greeks. In this also, the Annales Leubionenses, MGSS, IV, p. 23.
  
141. Conrad's letters home show no hostility or resentment. Wibaldi Ep., No. 48, No. 78, No. 90, No. 144, pp. 126, 152-153, 163-164, 225-226.
  
142. The correspondence between Suger and Louis during the crusade may be found in RL, 186, Sugerii Ep., No. 22, cc. 1357-1358, reports his arrival in Constantinople and good reception at the hands of Manuel; No. 39, cc. 1365-1366 was written upon his arrival in Antioch. Here Louis accuses Manuel of permitting the Turks to enter imperial territory so as to attack the crusaders, no doubt an echo of French resentment of his truce with Iconium. However, Manuel shares the blame with Frankish folly and the power of the Turk. In letters, No. 48, No. 50, No. 52, No. 53, No. 56, No. 57, No. 60, No. 69, No. 94, No. 96, RL, 186, cc. 1374-1380; 1384, 1394-1396, there are no accusations of Greeks.
  
143. I think that Louis' critique of the Greeks is often underestimated. cf. Constable, op.cit., p. 218; Runciman, op.cit., II, pp. 214-211.
  
144. The Annales Brunwilerenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 727, accuse the king and patriarch of Jerusalem of bad faith, Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, p. 454, accuses the Latins of Jerusalem of "deceit" at Damascus; Annales Reicherspergenses, MGSS, XVII, pp. 463-464; the Annales Palidenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 83, blames the patriarch and king of Jerusalem; the Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 6, recounting the failure at Damascus, accuses the Templars; the Annales Rodenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 719, refers vaguely to Jerusalem treachery; the Annales Magdeburgenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 190, accuses the king of Jerusalem of fraud at Damascus; so also



the Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 310; the Cont. Sanblasiana Ottonis Chronici, MGSS, XX, p. 305, accused the Templars; the Annales Reicherspergenses, MGSS, XVII, p. 463, accuses the king of Jerusalem. Important also is the report of Conrad in regard to the Damascus siege. The Emperor alludes discreetly to treason by the Jerusalem baronage, Gibaldi Ep., No. 144, pp. 225-226. The chronicle of Ernoul accuses both Temple and Hospital of corruption in this regard; p. 12. Our most reliable source, John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, XXV, Roole, pp. 57-59 accuses the Temple and the Syrian Christians of malfeasance. As for Louis of France, who remained loyal to the Templars, he referred in a letter to Suger of the activities of "unfaithful Christians" at Damascus, Sugeri Ep., No. 60, PL, 186, cc. 1379-1380.

145. The Annales Herbipolenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 3, says that for its sins the Western Church was seduced by false prophets to undertake the crusade; the author of the Annales Brunwilarenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 727 says that he knows not whether by God or by man but Bernard was inspired to preach the crusade. Bernard's attempts to apologize for the Christian failure may be seen in the devotional treatise written for Eugene III, De Consuetudine, II, 1; PL, 182, cc. 741-745; further attacks on Bernard may be found in the Annales Rodenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 718; some were mindful of the Abbot's humiliation. See Bernardi Ep., No. 286, PL, 182, cc. 590-591.
146. Otto's attempt to apologize for the crusaders' failure is scattered through his historical writings. For a clear statement, along with an attempt to defend St. Bernard, see Gesta, No. 60, MGSS, XX, pp. 386-387. For Eugene's reaction to the crusade disaster, see JL, 9347, 9385, 9398, PL, 180, cc. 1396, 1414, 1419. His interpretation of the disaster is best seen in the letter to Conrad upon his return from the East, JL, 9344, PL, 180, cc. 1393-1394.
147. Modern historians have attempted to assess the Greek responsibility for the failure. Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, pp. 311-312, investigated the problem and exonerated the Greeks, which it is to be expected when the purport of Chalandon's work is considered as a whole. Bernardi, op.cit., pp. 629-633, was less partial to the Greeks. His verdict could be described as "Not proven". Runciman, op.cit., II, pp. 274-277, however, will allow no blame to be cast upon Manuel at all.
148. For an example, see Sigoberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, p. 454, who reports that Manuel had thrown into prison Roger's ambassadors who had intended to propose a peace plan to the Greeks. The first concept is correct, but the second is a ludicrous misunderstanding of Roger's ambitious policies.



149. Wibaldi Ep., No. 159, p. 264; JL, II, p. 60.
  
150. In addition to the passage described above, John refers again to the deceits and wiles of the Greeks. See his account of Louis' encounter with the Greek navy, upon his return from the East, and his reception by Roger, Historia Pontificalis, XXVIII, Poole, p. 61.
  
151. Romuald, Chronicon, RISS (new), VII, I, 230; Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 310, Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, XI, p. 454; John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, XXVII, Poole, pp. 60-61.
  
152. For this treaty see Wibaldi Ep., No. 147, No. 214, pp. 229, 334; P.Kehr, Italia Pontificia, VIII, pp. 44-45; Romuald, Chronicon, RISS (new), VII, I, p. 230.
  
153. JL, 9344, PL, 180, cc. 1393-1394, Wibaldi Ep., No. 185, pp. 303-306. This letter was inserted by Otto of Freising in his Gesta, I, 61, MGSS, XX, pp. 387-388.
  
154. Wibaldi Ep., No. 147, pp. 228-229.
  
155. Ibid, p. 228: "Sciatis itaque, Guelfum, domni regis Conradi proditorem, cum Siculo concordem esse magnamque pecuniam ab eo accepisse".
  
156. Ibid, pp. 228-229: "Homines tamen sui cum quatuor Saracenis et totidem detiarus Rome a senatoribus capti et dimissi fuere. Qui litteras ex parti Siculi Frederico duci Suevia ---- pro dampno et guerra domini regis Conradi defferebant,----".
  
157. Ibid, p. 229: "---- se conclusisse vos et graecos Venetiae tamquam canes et mastinos, ----".
  
158. Ibid, p. 229: "Graeci autem large distribuerant sua, quoniam dicente Salomone: pecuniae obediunt omnia".
  
159. See Wibaldi Ep., No. 181, No. 186, pp. 301-302, 306-307.
  
160. Wibaldi Ep., No. 182, p. 302.
  
161. Sugerii Ep., No. 22 and No. 39, PL, 186, cc. 1357-1358, 1365-1366.





162. Sibegerti Cont. Praenonstratensis, MGSS, VI, pp. 454-455, Romuald, Chronicon, RSS (new), VII, I, p. 230; John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, XXVIII, Boole, p. 61: "Anno gratiae millesimo centesimo quinquagesimo rediit rex Francorum. Sed redeunti galie imperatoris Constantinopolitani tetenderunt insidias, a quibus et regina capta est et alii qui in eius vehebantur navi. Rex eciam conventus ut rediret ad fretum suum et amicum Constantinopolitanum, et iam ius parabatur. Sed ab adverso subvenientes galie regis Siculi reginam liberaverunt et expedierunt rogem, et eos leti cum gloria et triumpho in Siciliam deduxerunt. Nam ut ita fieret procuraverat Siculus rex, timens insidias Danaorum et desiderans oportunitatem exhibendi devotionem quam habebat regi et regno Francorum. Occurrit ergo ei et adductis equitaturis ad sufficienciam perduxit eum Panormiam cum summo honore, et tam illum quam omnes suos multis donariis studuit honorare; et cum eo profiscens fecit ei per totam terram suam usque ad Cipranum pro voto suorum necessariis ministrari. Hic est terminus et limes principatus Capuani et Campaniae ad domni pape mensam pertinentis. Cardinales et ministri ecclesiae ibi occurrunt regi, et omnia providentes ad nutum perduxerunt Tusculanum ad dominum papam". The account of John has been quoted for its full exposition of this visit of Louis to Roger. See also the Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 310.
  
163. Wibaldi Ep., No. 252, p. 377.
  
164. Salisbury has an account of Eugene's efforts as a marriage counsellor, XXIX, Boole, p. 62; Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 310; Sugerii Ep., No. 96, PL, 186, c. 1396.
  
165. See Suger's letter to Louis and his replies, No. 57, No. 60, No. 69, No. 94, No. 96, PL, 186, cc. 1377-1380, 1384, 1394-1396. JL, 9347, PL, 180, c. 1396, in which Eugene announces Louis' return. Letter No. 94 informs us that Godfrey of Langres, tired and ailing, was with the king at this time. Letter No. 74, PL, 186, cc. 1386-1387 shows us some of Suger's difficulties.
  
166. Wibaldi Ep., No. 198, pp. 316-317.
  
167. Ibid, p. 316: "Nunc autem, sicut domino papae ac nobis significatum est et rumores etiam increverunt, pater ipsius rex Conradus mala pro bonis, quod Deus avertat, reddere nititur, et cum Constantinopolitano imperatore sanctam Romanam ecclesiam, Catholicorum omnium matrem, graviter si poterit affligere et infestare disponit".
  
168. Wibaldi Ep., No. 214, pp. 332-334.



169. Ibid, p. 333.
170. Ibid, p. 334.
171. Wibaldi Ep., No. 215, No. 216, pp. 334-336.
172. See the Historia Welforum Weingartensis, MCBS, XXI, p. 468.
173. Kinnamos, III, 6, 7-11, CSHB, pp. 101, 103-113; Nicetas, II, 7, CSHB, p. 122.
174. For references to Conrad's illness, August - 30 December, 1149, see Wibaldi Ep., No. 231, No. 236, No. 248, pp. 350, 355, 371.
175. Vita Sugerii, III, 8, PL, 186, c. 1204.
176. Vita Sugerii, III, 8, PL, 186, c. 1204 RHGF, XII, p. 110.
177. RR, No. 261, PL, 139, cc. 434-436.
178. Bernardi Ep., No. 380, PL, 182, c. 583-584.
179. Sugerii Ep., No. 143, PL, 186, cc. 1415-1416. The dating of this letter and No. 146, below is not fully established.
180. Sugerii Ep., No. 146, PL, 186, c. 1417.
181. For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that Suger's biographer refers to Greek deceitfulness. However, this is not Suger himself. Vita, III, 6, PL, 186, cc. 1203.
182. Petri Ep., VI, 16, PL, 189, c. 424.
183. PL, 189, c. 424: "Est et aliud quod longe magis accendit animos nostros, et animos pene omnium Gallorum nostrorum, ad amandam et querendam pacem vestram, illa scilicet poasima, inaudita et lamentabilis Graecorum, et nequam regis eorum de perigrinis nostris, hoc est exercitu Dei viventis, facta proditio. ----Exsurge in adiutorium populo Dei, zelare sicut Machabaei legem Dei, ulciscere tot opprobria, tot injurias, tot mortes, tantum tam impio effusum sanguinem exercitus Dei".



184. Bernardi Ep., No. 364, PL, 182, c. 568-570.
185. Petri Ep., VI, 18, PL, 189, cc. 425-426. Peter professed himself mindful of the difficulties in the Holy Land. He would go to Jerusalem with an expedition, circumstances permitting.
186. Petri Ep., VI, 19, RHGF, XV, p. 523. The abbot here stresses the peril to the Christian establishment in the East.
187. Petri Ep., VI, 20, PL, 189, cc. 426-427. This letter is also Sugerii Ep., No. 133, PL, 186, cc. 1410-1411.
188. See Sugerii Ep., No. 134, No. 135, No. 155, PL, 186, cc. 1411-1412, 1421-1422.
189. Vita Sugerii, III, 8, PL, 186, cc. 1204-1205. JL, 9385, 25 April, 1150, PL, 180, cc. 1414-1415.
190. Vita Sugerii, III, 8, PL, 186, c. 1205. It is to be noted that in c. 1204, the author rather overstates the papal zeal for a new crusade exhortation. It is Suger, not Eugene, who had taken the initiative.
191. Vita Sugerii, III, 8, PL, 186, c. 1205. See Vacandard, op.cit., II, pp. 445, No. 1, 2 respectively for the evidence of this third and final council.
192. Bernardi Ep., No. 377, PL, 182, cc. 581-583.
193. Bernardi Ep., No. 256, PL, 182, cc. 463-465. I note in passing that Mabillon's dating of this letter, repeated by Migne, is incorrect.
194. This occurred 8 February, 1150. See Wibaldi Ep., No. 226, pp. 344-345.
195. Kinnamos, III, 7, CSHB, pp. 103-113; Nicetas, II, 7, CSHB, p. 122.



196. Dandolo, RIS (new), XII, I, pp. 242-244; Historia ducum Venticorum, MGSS, XIV, p. 71. See Paul Kehr, Italia Pontificia, VII, II, pp. 21-22.
197. Wibaldi Ep., No. 158, No. 159, pp. 263-264.
198. Anselm of Havelburg, Dialogi, PL, 188, c. 1139: "Cum in praesentia beatitudinis vestrae esset monachos Martio apud urbem Tusculanam, inter multa quae sanctitati vestrae necum conferre placuit, dixistis mihi quod quidam episcopus legationem Constantinopolitani imperatoris et epistolam Graecis apicibus conscriptam perferens, ad sedem apostolicam nuper venerit. Dixistis etiam quod idem episcopus Graecorum litteras plurimum instructus, et decenti sermonum facundia ornatus et confisus, multa de doctrina et ecclesiastico Graecorum ritu proposuit, quae doctrinae Romanae Ecclesiae minime concordant, et a ritu ejus valde discrepant.----". As for the dating of the treatise, the Pope was in Tusculum in March 1149, JL, II, p. 62.
199. Paul Kehr, Italia Pontificia, VII, II, pp. 21-22.
200. There was some correspondence concerning Henry of Latisbon, who was on his way to Jerusalem. Wibaldi Ep., No. 217, p. 336. Papal suspicion of Henry is clearly referred to in this letter, and Conrad hastens to assure Eugene of Henry's loyalty to the Roman church.
201. This would be at least in line with Manuel's policies. Cf Norden, op.cit., p. 89.
202. I cannot agree with the opinions of W. Norden, op.cit., p. 86, who describes Eugene's efforts as directed to obtaining German neutrality in the proposed "crusade" against Constantinople.
203. Wibaldi Ep., No. 252, p. 377: "Porro in capite quadragesimo dominus abbas Clarevallensis, misit domino regi litteras---, in quibus collaudabat dominum illum Siciliae, eo quod in multis utilis et necessarius fuisset Catholicae ecclesiae, futurus utilior, si non prohiberetur virtute et potentia nostri principis, de quorum pace et concordia se libenter acturum promittebat, si sciret, domino nostro non fore ingratum".
204. Lack of evidence does not prevent Runciman, op.cit., II, pp. 286-287 from presenting Bernard as pleading for an anti-Greek crusade.





205. Wibaldi Ep., No. 224, p. 343.
206. Wibaldi Ep., No. 226, No. 232, pp. 345, 351-352.
207. Wibaldi Ep., No. 232, p. 352, Wibald, writing to Eugene announcing the self defeat, concludes with the words:  
"Per quod confidemus complanatas esse omnes difficultates,  
que videbantur obsistere ad introitum domini regis in Italian".
208. Wibaldi Ep., No. 231, No. 236, pp. 350-351, 355.
209. Wibaldi Ep., No. 242, pp. 362-363. For letters pertinent to the issue between Eugene and Cologno, see Wibaldi Ep., No. 204, No. 223, No. 226, No. 227, No. 239, pp. 323-324, 343, 344-346, 358-360.
210. Wibaldi Ep., No. 237, pp. 355-356. Dölger, II, No. 1378.
211. Wibaldi Ep., No. 243, pp. 363-366. The most pertinent passage for us is p. 365: " ---- nunciatur nobis, quod omnis Francorum populus cum ipso rege suo contra imperium precellentissimi germani nostri, ---- conspiraret et arma movere, auctore et incentore Sicilye tyranno, ----".
212. Wibaldi Ep., No. 244, No. 245, pp. 366-368.
213. Wibaldi Ep., No. 246, p. 368-369.
214. JL, 9398, 19 June, 1150, PL, 180, c. 419. The author of the Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MOSS, VI, p. 455 tends to exaggerate the papal role in regard to French crusade agitation: "Habitis per Franciam conventibus, convente etiam papa Eugenio, ut abbas Clarevallis Ierosolimam ad alios provocandos mitteretur, grandis iterum sermo de protectione transmarina celebratur".
215. See RHGF, XV, p. 458; Petri Ep., VI, 26, PL, 189, cc. 434-436.
216. Bernardi Ep., No. 288, PL, 182, cc. 493-494.
217. JL, 9594.
218. Wibaldi Ep., No. 248, No. 249, pp. 371-372.



219. Wibaldi Ep., No. 248, p. 371.
220. Wibaldi Ep., No. 251, pp. 374-375.
221. Wibaldi Ep., No. 195, p. 314.
222. Wibaldi Ep., No. 252, pp. 376-378.
223. Dialogi, PL, 188, cc. 1139-1248. On Anselm, see J. Draske, "Bischof Anselm von Havelberg und seine Gesandtschaftsreisen nach Byzanz", (Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, XXI, 1900), pp. 160-185; G. Schreiber, "Anselm von Havelberg und die Ostkirche", (Zeitschriften für Kirchengeschichte, LX, 1941), pp. 357-362.
224. PL, 188, cc. 1247-1248.
225. Wibaldi Ep., No. 269, pp. 397-398; JL, 9400.
226. Wibaldi Ep., No. 272, pp. 399-400, JL, 9403.
227. Wibaldi Ep., No. 273, pp. 400-401. The most interesting passage is as follows, p. 401: "Illud vero, quod a domno Conrado serenissimo rege per quasdam religiosas personas perquisitum fuisse significastis, sciatis, de voluntate domni papae vel conscientia nullatenus processisse; praesertim cum sciamus, hominem illum, quo mentionem fecistis, nihil honorificentiae regi culminis exhibiturum, nisi regium adventum in Tuscia vel in Romania iam certo certius presentiret. Nec Romanae ecclesiae expediret, ut, ea exclusa, tales personae super tanto negotio convocarent".
228. Wibaldi Ep., No. 276, pp. 402-403.
229. Wibaldi Ep., No. 279, pp. 406-407; p. 407: "et non videbatur nobis parvitate nostri ingenui, quod iuxta qualitatem huius temporis et rerumstrarum statum hoc tempore hanc legationem fieri oporteret, maxime cum incertum sit, quidnam rerum comes Alexander de Gravina ab imperatore Grecorum referat".
230. Wibaldi Ep., No. 280, p. 408.
231. Wibaldi Ep., No. 281, No. 282, pp. 408-410.



232. Wibaldi Ep., No. 285, No. 286, No. 295, pp. 412-414, 423-424.
233. Wibaldi Ep., No. 298, pp. 425-426.
234. Wibaldi Ep., No. 325, pp. 454-455.
235. Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 310; see Wibaldi Ep., No. 347, pp. 480-481 for the Roman oath to the Papacy.
236. The papal itinerary for 1150 in JL, II, pp. 67-69 shows that the Pope was in the area of Coprano, Anagni and Togni for the summer and autumn. For these negotiations see the Romuald, Chronicon, RISS (new), VII, I, p. 230-231; John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, XXXII, Poole, pp. 66-68; Annales Ceccanenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 283.
237. See Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 310; Romuald, Chronicon, RISS (new), VII, I, p. 231; John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, XXXIII-XXXIV, Poole, pp. 68-70.
238. Wibaldi Ep., No. 334, pp. 465-466. Salisbury's comments on their activities are most bitter, Historia Pontificalis, XXXVIII, Poole, pp. 77-70; Annales Palidenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 86; cf. Gleber, op.cit., pp. 137-135.
239. Wibaldi Ep., No. 344, pp. 477-478. Otto, Gesta, I, 63, MGSS, XX, p. 389.
240. Wibaldi Ep., No. 333, p. 479.
241. Wibaldi Ep., No. 343, pp. 475-477.
242. Wibaldi Ep., No. 344, pp. 477-476.
243. Ibid, p. 478. See Annales Palidenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 86 for the report of a German legation to the East.
244. Wibaldi Ep., No. 345, pp. 478-479.
245. Wibaldi Ep., No. 346, pp. 479-480.
246. Wibaldi Ep., No. 349, pp. 483-484, JL, 9517.



247. Wibaldi Ep., No. 362, pp. 490-491, JL, 9541.
248. Wibaldi Ep., No. 364, pp. 492-493.
249. Otto, Gesta, I, 63, MGSS, XX, p. 389.
250. See Wibaldi Ep., No. 372, No. 374, No. 375, pp. 499-501, 501-505.
251. Wibaldi Ep., No. 382, No. 402, pp. 513-514, 535-537, JL, 8577, 9605.
252. Wibaldi Ep., No. 403, pp. 537-539, JL, 9606. See also, Wibaldi Ep., No. 404, pp. 539-543, written to Frederick, attacking Papal domination in Rome.
253. Wibaldi Ep., No. 407, pp. 546-547. Cf. Gleber, op.cit., pp. 145-160.
254. For the pilgrimage of Henry of Ratisbon, see Wibaldi Ep., No. 217, No. 218, pp. 336-337.
255. Bernardi Ep., No. 288, PL, 182, 493-494. Eugene's bulls in favour of the Temple, especially in regard to financial support of the order are JL, 8821, 9164, 9193, 9291a (JL, II, p. 759), 9383, 9438, 9659a (JL, II, p. 759). For the Hospital, see JL, 9396, 9505a (JL, II, 759); Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 193, No. 217, the latter being the papal confirmation of the Order's privileges. For Louis' concern for the Templars, see Sugerii Ep., No. 50, No. 58, No. 59, No. 60, PL, 186, cc. 1374-1375, 1378-1380.





PART FOUR

Hadrian IV.

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Section One:

THE BYZANTINE ASCENDENCY OVER THE LATIN ORIENT

1. Manuel and Antioch.

As we have indicated above, the period of years embracing the Second Crusade was filled with danger to the Byzantine Empire. If Roger of Sicily had turned to his own advantage the weakness of the Empire during the Crusade, the Turks also had profited from Manuel's discomfiture. On the other hand, the manifest failure of the Latins on the Crusade, the bitter feelings, barely disguised, toward the Latins of the East, which the crusaders bore homewards to the West, and above all, the death in battle of Raymond of Antioch, 29 June, 1149,<sup>1</sup> left the Byzantine Empire in a position wherein it might realize its self-appointed role as the protector of the Latin cause in the Orient.<sup>2</sup>

In the summer of 1150, the principality of Antioch was defended only by the baronage, Constance and the Patriarch Aimery. Joscelin of Edessa, who had lost his own seat years before, had been captured.<sup>3</sup> The Latin holdings in Syria were limited only to the great city of Antioch and the coastline. A few fortresses remained inland, held by the Countess of Edessa, Beatrice, but she could not be expected to hold them for very long. The Byzantine Emperor thus decided to turn this situation to his own advantage. He despatched an embassy to the Countess of Edessa. Despite the continuing force of the infidel in Asia Minor, Manuel felt that a display of Byzantine suzerainty would be profitable, if only for diplomatic purposes. To the Countess, therefore, his ambassadors offered not only a pension suited to her station but also to defend



with Byzantine garrisons what remained of her principality. After consulting Baldwin of Jerusalem, Beatrice accepted.<sup>4</sup>

Baldwin III was in a difficult position after the fiasco of the Second Crusade. Bereft of possible benefit from that ill-starred expedition, faced with the disunion which the armies of the West had introduced into his kingdom, and confronted with Antioch which had no effective leadership beyond that of the patriarch, Baldwin saw that the loss of the countess' remaining strongholds was all but certain. On the other hand, to agree to Manuel's offer would be to allow the Emperor to pose as the champion of the Latin cause in the East, thus increasing the Latin dependency upon the power of the Greeks. As we have shown, the Latins never had exhibited any pronounced degree of loyalty and affection for the Empire. Their usual attitude was compounded of indifference and hostility. This attitude produced a strange reasoning in the mind of Baldwin which eventually delivered the fortresses of Beatrice into the hands of Manuel. The Latins of Jerusalem had little confidence in the ability of the Greeks to defend what remained of the countess' holdings. Yet they reasoned that it would be better if the remaining fortresses were lost to the infidel while in Greek hands rather than Latin ones. With Baldwin's permission, the strongholds were surrendered into the power of Byzantium. Suffice it to say that they were soon lost to the generals of the great Nur ed-Din and his allies.<sup>5</sup>

This short-lived occupation of Beatrice's lands was but part of a vast plan of Manuel to extend his prestige wherever possible. Constance was a widow in Antioch. It was necessary for the health of her Principality that she choose a husband. The efforts of her



baronage and the King of Jerusalem to choose a husband for her proved ineffective.<sup>6</sup> In this, the patriarch of Antioch played no small role since he wished to rule with the princess as the effective power in the state. Constance, in turn, decided to rid herself of the importunities of her brethren in Jerusalem by appealing to Manuel as the suzerain of Antioch to protect her principality. Further, he was to find her a husband.<sup>7</sup> This event probably encouraged Manuel to make some display of his power in that he accepted the offer of Beatrice. It was gratifying to Byzantine pride. However, there were problems. He knew, almost beyond a doubt, that he could not effectively defend the holdings of Beatrice. On the other hand, there were the troublesome Armenians. The prince Thoros had escaped from Constantinople, to which he had been taken earlier by John Comnenus after the Emperor's first descent on Antioch. Thoros now attempted, when the Turks were busy attacking the fortresses of Beatrice, now in Greek hands, to recover some of the Sicilian holdings of the Empire. Manuel therefore dispatched Andronicus Comnenus to settle the problem of Constance, -- he was to marry the Latin princess, -- and also to defeat Thoros. In this double mission he failed.<sup>8</sup> Nor was Manuel any more successful with the Caesar John Comnenus who had been restored to favour after his abortive revolt against the power of Manuel in the first year of the emperor's reign. However, Constance would have nothing of the middle aged Norman.<sup>9</sup> Constance seemed determined to resist all suitors. Once again the hand of the Antioch patriarch was in this. The marriage of the Princess with a Greek might mean his expulsion from his see. Marriage with a Latin would reduce his power. When Roger of Sicily, still dreaming of a vast eastern Mediterranean empire, offered to provide a husband for Constance, he too was repulsed.<sup>10</sup>





In all this, Manuel found little encouragement. He had even to turn to the Sultan Masudi of Iconium in February, 1154, for help against the Armenians, a procedure which did not increase any love for him on the part of the Latins.<sup>11</sup> Further defeats for Byzantine policy were in store.

Constance had bided her time. However, her single state could not last forever. Her barons insisted that she take a husband, not a Greek but a Frank. After four years of widowhood, in 1153, Constance obliged. For a combination of reasons, romantic and political, she chose the handsome Renaud of Chatillon as her husband.<sup>12</sup> Manuel once again was annoyed by this implied disregard of his suzerain rights. However, he was disposed to make use of Renaud against the Armenians. He called for military support, and the new prince did make a successful skirmish against Thoros. However, when the promised Greek gold for such an expedition did not arrive on time, Renaud showed his cruel and violent nature at once. Hating the Greek suzerainty, and fearful of Byzantine power in Cilicia, he made peace with Thoros and then, allied with him, proceeded to raid Cyprus. In 1155-1156, they inflicted a raid on Cyprus, the horror of which are recorded by Latin and Greek historians. The raid itself was infamous and demonstrated the weakness of the Greeks. Yet, curiously enough, it created a revulsion of feeling which operated favourably towards Manuel. The King of Jerusalem had tried to warn the Cypriots of the approaching raid but had not acted quickly enough. Perhaps now the Latins realized that there was no hope of assistance from anyone save the Greeks. The many appeals which they had dispatched to the West after the death of Raymond in 1149 had not produced any results. Pilgrims and members of the military



orders told of the apathy of Europe and of the papal hesitations, of which we spoke at length above.<sup>13</sup>

The recognition of the assistance which the Greeks might bring to the Latins grew as the reversals of the Christians continued. Ascalon had been captured but the steady war of attrition on Latin military power, illustrated in the disasters at Banyas, could not be hidden. The violent earthquakes of 1157 did little to bolster Frankish morale.<sup>14</sup>

In addition, to the uncertainty occasioned by the power of the infidel and their unceasing attacks on the Christian powers, there was the matter of the king's unmarried state. This threw into question the succession of the realm, a grave concern to all the Latin princes, secular and ecclesiastical. Prolonged discussion produced little. Their meagre resources forced the princes to weigh seriously the possibility of a marriage with a Greek princess. If the crusaders had little confidence in Byzantine military ability, they did have confidence in the power of Byzantine gold. Had the position of the Latins been stronger, there is little doubt that such a move would not have been considered. To introduce a Greek into the kingdom of Jerusalem was to provide the Greek Empire with claims to the throne and to the control of the Latin states. Support from the West was uncertain. The Second Crusade had done nothing but harm. The Papacy seemed unable to help. Therefore, the Crusaders despatched to Constantinople in the fall of 1157 an embassy headed by the Archbishop of Tyre. The results of the mission were anxiously awaited.<sup>15</sup>

Within a year the envoys returned bearing good news.<sup>16</sup> The Emperor had agreed to their proposal and had bestowed upon Baldwin



the hand of Theodora together with a handsome dowry. He did make stipulations. If Baldwin died, Theodora was to hold Acre for life, a reasonable request and one which would give the Eastern Empire influence in the Latin territories. Acre might even become a permanent possession of the Empire. The demand of Manuel was agreed to, the dowry was delivered, and the Princess Theodora arrived to be crowned Queen of Jerusalem by Aimery, the Patriarch of Antioch.<sup>17</sup>

This done, Manuel decided that he would act at once so as to extend his power over the Holy Land. The year 1158 had seen the conclusion of peace with William of Sicily. Manuel was now free to devote his attention to the East. Further, he had old scores to settle. Thoros was to be checked in his ambitions for Cilicia.<sup>18</sup> Renaud was to be punished for his cruel raid on Cyprus. The Byzantine prestige which had suffered due to the loss of the lands of Beatrice was to be restored. By forced marches, Manuel soon arrived in Cilicia. The province was quickly overrun. Thoros was attacked.<sup>19</sup> By the 1st of December, 1158, the Latins of the Orient found the King's father-in-law at their gates. We can imagine the state of mind of Renaud of Antioch when he discovered the imperial army so close at hand. He knew that this time Manuel would be satisfied with nothing less than total control of the principality. Therefore there was little to do but place Manuel in a position where he would be forced to be magnanimous. With the Bishop of Laodicea, Gerard, Renaud set out to Mamistra and there before the eyes of all the East, Latin, Greek and infidel, humbled himself in the most abject fashion at the feet of Manuel.<sup>20</sup> Manuel accepted this method of clearing away his difficulties. He had had another alternative offered to him. The Patriarch of Antioch and Baldwin, the Count of



Tripoli, had offered to deliver Renaud into the hands of the Emperor and in exchange for this they had proposed to rule Antioch for themselves. This was not pleasing to Manuel. He knew that it would be of no advantage to the power of his throne.<sup>21</sup> He wished to exalt Byzantine prestige in the eyes of all the East. In this he was determined to succeed.<sup>22</sup> He wanted a humble client, within his Empire, who would be his faithful vassal and auxiliary. He had no desire to let Antioch pass into the hands of the Patriarch, the Count of Tripoli or the King of Jerusalem. For this reason, as a sign that Antioch had been drawn into the Oecumene, he would insist that a Greek, appointed by Constantinople, would be placed in the throne of St. Peter.<sup>23</sup> Thus the treaty with the humbled Renaud reiterated the Byzantine suzerainty over Antioch, made Renaud promise to contribute regular military support to the Byzantine Army, confirmed the right of the Empire to occupy the citadel whenever it so desired and use the entire city for any purpose which it deemed useful. Finally, Renaud agreed to substitute a Greek patriarch for the Latin Patriarch Aimery.<sup>24</sup>

## 2. The Triumph of Manuel.

The news of Renaud's humiliation reached the ears of Baldwin in Jerusalem. He realized at once the consequences of the terms of the treaty which Renaud had been forced to sign. He knew also that nothing could be done against the overwhelming military and financial power of Manuel. Baldwin bowed to the wishes of his father-in-law. He appeared in the imperial camp, there to be received as a beloved son of the Empire. Baldwin made an excellent impression upon Manuel and his court. His zeal for his kingdom and for the imperial cause was amply demonstrated by the fact that he and the





Templars persuaded Thoros of Armenia to surrender and become the vassal of the Byzantine Empire. Manuel was pleased with this deference to his authority. He rewarded Baldwin and others with many costly gifts. Not only this, he listened attentively when Baldwin opened delicately the matter of the Greek patriarchate. While direct evidence is lacking, we do know that the Greek patriarch was not introduced into Antioch until 1165. It could be supposed that the young king of Jerusalem stressed the value of Aimery and the endless disturbances which would result if a Greek were substituted for a Latin in the great see. Perhaps the King of Jerusalem was incautious enough to remind the great emperor of that papal letter which had greeted John Comnenus upon his arrival at Antioch in 1137-1138. To these arguments, Manuel listened. Other concessions Manuel would not make, but it is likely that he agreed to delay the introduction of the Greek patriarch into the city. However, he would not surrender any other claim. For these the Empire had laboured for sixty years.<sup>25</sup>

Manuel tarried at Hamistra until the Easter festivities of 1159 had passed. Leaving Cilicia, he proceeded to the great city of Antioch.<sup>26</sup> Arriving at the city, he spared no pains to make his entrance as impressive as possible. Hostages from Renaud were placed in the van of his triumphal procession. He was met by the patriarch and the clergy of the church of Antioch. He established himself at once in the citadel and having raised the imperial standard he then proceeded to treat his Latin guests for eight days to a glorious display of Byzantine wealth and power, thus demonstrating to them the many advantages of having such a great overlord and protector as the Emperor Manuel. The history of the Latin Orient has



no brighter and more splendid picture than Manuel presiding over the festivities in Antioch. East and West had at last met, and as the symbol of their fusion, Manuel himself successfully entered the lists against the finest Frankish and Norman knights. The glorious spectacle concluded, Manuel departed from the city. A final triumph was obtained when Nurreddin out of deference to Manuel and in recognition of the truce already concluded between them, released some Latin prisoners to the Crusaders.<sup>27</sup> Thus, by the year 1159, Manuel had established his Empire as the ascendant star over the Latin Orient. Renaud was his vassal. The king of Jerusalem was his friend and dependant, his ally as well as his son-in-law. If the Byzantine claims actually only included Antioch, Manuel had succeeded in gaining at least the semblance of friendship from the Latins of Jerusalem and further had raised Byzantine prestige to the point where the Empire could pose with some effect as the defender of the Latins in the East. What is significant for our purposes here is the part which the Papacy played in all these events after the failure of the second Crusade. We have no direct evidence in this section to work on. We have suggested that Baldwin had perhaps used the attitude of the Papacy to discourage Manuel from introducing a patriarch at once into the see of Antioch. Suffice it to say for the present that this time Manuel was not received at Antioch with a papal letter which forbade on pain of excommunication the Latins from having anything to do with the Greek emperor as in the case of Innocent II and John Comnenus. Perhaps in the final section of this part of our dissertation we can cast some additional light upon this problem.



FOOTNOTES:

1. Tyre, XVII, 9, Kray-Babcock, II, pp. 196-198, RHCOcc., I, pp. 771-773. See also Michael the Syrian, III, pp. 288-289; Gregory the Priest, RHCarmen; I, pp. 161-162; H.A.R.Gibb, Damascus Chronicle, pp. 288-292; Kinnamos, III, 14, CSHB, pp. 122-123.
2. For a working bibliography for this section there is need only to recall to the reader's attention the works of Grousset and Runciman, Rohricht's history of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, and Cahen's great monograph on Syria at the time of the crusade. The standard authority for the reign of Manuel is Chelandon. Most useful also is the charming monograph of G. Schlumberger, Renaud de Chatillon, (Paris, 1923).
3. Tyre, XVII, 11, Kray-Babcock, II, p. 201, RHCOcc., I, pp. 776-7 Michael the Syrian, III, p. 295; Gregory the Priest, RHCarmen; I, p. 164; Bar Hebraeus, pp. 276-277.
4. Tyre, XVII, 16, Kray-Babcock, II, pp. 208-209, RHCOcc., I, pp. 784-786, of Chelandon, Jeen et Manuel, p. 425; Rohricht, Geschichte, p. 266. See also Michael the Syrian, III, p. 297. The Greek historians do not mention this venture which cost the Empire much prestige. On the chronology, see Cahen's chronological analysis of the Arabic sources, op.cit., p. 388, n. 24.
5. Tyre, XVII, 16-17, Kray-Babcock, II, pp. 208-212, RHCOcc., I, pp. 784-789. See Bar Hebraeus, p. 277; H.A.R.Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle, p. 309.
6. Tyre, XVII, 18, Kray-Babcock, II, pp. 212-214, RHCOcc., I, pp. 789-791.
7. Kinnamos, IV, 17, CSHB, p. 178. Kinnamos, for obvious reasons, represents Constance as doing this at once. There was, however a delay of more than a year after the death of Raymond.
8. Kinnamos, III, 14-18, CSHB, pp. 121-130, for this mission of Andronicus, joined with other accounts of early incidents in his magnificent, if terrible, career; Gregory the Priest, RHCarmen, I, pp. 166-169; Michael the Syrian, III, pp. 281-282, relates the reign of Thoros in Cilicia; Bar Hebraeus, p. 280 reports Andronicus' defeat.



9. Kinnamos, III, 14, CSHB, p. 122-123. The CSHB translation reads concerning Constance's reaction to John: Antiochiam profectus, cum iam setate provector Constantiae haud placius-set, rebus quarum causa veneret infectis, Byzantium rediit; ---
10. Kinnamos, IV, 17, CSHB, p. 178.
11. For the defence against the Armenians, Kinnamos, III, 14, CSHB, p. 121, IV, 16-17, CSHB, pp. 176-178. See Dolger, II, No. 1393
12. Tyre, XVII, 26, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 224, RHCoccc., I, p. 802; Kinnamos, IV, 17, CSHB, p. 178. The letter says that Constance acted upon the advice of the Antioch baronage.
13. Tyre, XVII, 10, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 253-254, RHCoccc., I, pp. 774-776; Kinnamos, IV, 17, CSHB, pp. 178-179; Michael the Syrian, III, pp. 314-315; Bar Hebraeus, pp. 283-284; Gregory the Priest, RHCarmen, I, p. 187. Renaud, fearful of Greek reprisals at this time, wrote to Louis of France, reporting the serious military weakness of Antioch and asking Louis to provide husbands for the two daughters of his wife, Constance. Nothing resulted from this as we shall see in section three.
14. Bar Hebraeus, pp. 284-285.
15. Tyre, XVIII, 16, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 264-265, RHCoccc., I, p. 846.
16. During the mission, Attard of Nazareth died and was replaced by Letard, prior of the canons of Nazareth.
17. Tyre, XVIII, 22, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 273-275, RHCoccc., I, pp. 857-858; Gregory the Priest, RHCarmen, I, pp. 185-189; Ernoul, pp. 14-15.
18. Thros' attacks on Byzantine territory were continuing with, no doubt, the encouragement of Renaud of Antioch. Kinnamos, IV, 16, CSHB, p. 176.
19. Kinnamos, IV, 17, CSHB, pp. 178-18; Nicetas, III, 1, CSHB, pp. 134-135; Tyre, XVIII, 23, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 275-276, RHCoccc., I, pp. 859-860; Bar Hebraeus, pp. 287-288.





20. Tyre, XVIII, 23, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 275-277, RHCOcc., I, pp. 859-861; Gregory the Priest, RHCArmen, I, pp. 188-193; Kinnamos, IV, 18, CSHB, pp. 182-183; Grousset, op.cit., II, pp. 400 ff.
  
21. Kinnamos, IV, 18, CSHB, pp. 181-183 of Chalandon, Joan et Manuel, pp. 443-448.
  
22. Tyre, XVIII, 23, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 277, RHCOcc., I, pp. 860-861.
  
23. Kinnamos, IV, 18-20, CSHB, pp. 183-186, makes the question of the patriarchate of Antioch the chief bone of contention. From IV, 16, CSHB, p. 177, it would seem that Manuel had planned this for some time.
  
24. Dölger, II No. 1430; Gregory the Priest, RHCArmen, I, p. 189; Schlumberger, op.cit., pp. 110-116; Röhricht, Geschichte, pp. 298-299.
  
25. Tyre, XVIII, 24, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 277-279, RHCOcc., I, pp. 861-863; Kinnamos, IV, 21, CSHB, p. 186. See Dölger, II, No. 1428, No. 1429; Röhricht, Geschichte, p. 299; Schlumberger, op.cit., pp. 114-115. For the arrival of the Greek patriarch, Athanasius (c) 1165, see Michael the Syrian, [REDACTED] III, p. 326. This problem of the Greek patriarch in Antioch was to continue for many years. See S. Löwenfeld, Epistolae Pontificum Romanorum ineditae (Leipzig, 1885) pp. 164-165, and A. Rothast, Regesta Pontificum Romanorum (two volumes, Berlin, 1874-1875), 3314, 4685.
  
26. For Manuel at Antioch see Kinnamos, IV, 18-20, CSHB, pp. 181-188; Nicetas, III, 3, CSHB, pp. 141-145; Theodore Prodromos' verses, RHCGr, II, pp. 752-766; Tyre, XVIII, 23-25, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 275-281, RHCOcc., I, pp. 859-864; Gregory the Priest, RHCArmen, I, pp. 186-189.
  
27. For Manuel's relations with Nur ed-Din, see H.A. L. Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle, pp. 353-355; Tyre, XVIII, 25, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 279-280, RHCOcc., I, pp. 863-864; Kinnamos, IV, 21, CSHB, p. 188-190; Gregory the Priest, RHCArmen, I, pp. 190-191. See the illuminating comments on this in W.B. Stevenson, The Crusaders in the East, (Cambridge, 1907), p. 181; Runciman, op.cit., II, pp. 355-357; Grousset, op.cit., II, pp. 416-417.



Section Two:

THE PAPACY AND THE LITURGY IN THE ORIENT

1. The Patriarch of Antioch.

If the loss of Edessa, the death of Raymond and the capture of Joscelin proved to be all but disastrous to the principality of Antioch, these also brought a sharp decrease in the ecclesiastical power of the Patriarch of Antioch, Aimery.<sup>1</sup> The three archbishoprics of the County of Edessa were swept away by the armies of Nur ed-Din. However, if the extent of his jurisdiction was decreasing, the Antioch patriarch soon revealed his determination to keep intact the power of his predecessors and perhaps even attempt to extend this to the cost of the power of the temporal rulers of Antioch.

As we know, Constance was left a widow in the year 1149. She was ill-equipped for the defence of her lands, and the effectual exercise of power passed into the hands of the Patriarch Aimery. The Patriarch was a man of force and talent. His zeal and ambition for his own power and prestige had already led him into difficulties with the suffragan see of Jabala. We remember that Hugh of Jabala had brought complaints to Eugene III at Viterbo in November of 1145 directed against the Patriarch of Antioch and Queen Melisende of Jerusalem.<sup>2</sup> The outcome of the bishop's case is not known to us although we incline to think that whatever the papal decision, Aimery had things pretty much his own way.

We have seen in the previous part of this dissertation that the Bishop of Tripoli was forced to submit to Rome upon the action taken against him by the cardinal Guy of Florence, papal legate during



during the crusade and in the Orient in the years immediately following the Second Crusade. We saw in this the continuing refusal of the bishops of the county of Tripoli to obey the archbishop of Tyre and the patriarch of Jerusalem, and secondly, that their resistance was based upon a denial of the rights of the Roman church. Tripoli had submitted. Reinstated, we can assume he returned to his see in the East. We cannot be sure that he continued in this obedience. As we have said before, when William of Tyre was writing, the church of Tyre was still deprived of the obedience of the northern sees of Tripoli, Tortosa and Jebail. They preferred to acknowledge the patriarch of Antioch, partly as has been suggested before, because they found greater independence in this, a reflection of the quasi-independent status of the county of Tripoli in regard to the temporal power of Jerusalem and Antioch. As for the patriarch of Antioch, he was the real centre of resistance against Rome. No evidence remains to show that the Pope attempted to discipline Aimery for his defiance of the papal legate Guy in 1149. Aimery had thus achieved a great measure of independence with which to pursue his ambitions for supreme power within the patriarchate of Antioch. The old dream of the Antioch patriarchs of an ecclesiastical state, with the patriarch supreme within Antioch and independent of Rome, was not dead.<sup>3</sup>

If the administration of the principality passed by default to Aimery, be it said to his credit that he did his job well. He used his great wealth to hire mercenaries for the protection of the great city.<sup>4</sup> His zeal for the defence of Antioch won even the grudging admiration of those members of the Antioch baronage who did not approve of power in the hands of an ecclesiastic. However the power of Aimery in temporal matters was doomed to a cruel and humiliating defeat.



However, the continued widowhood of Constance alarmed many. We know that at this time Emperor Manuel was attempting, if unsuccessfully, to extend his power over Syria. However, in the year 1151, when Baldwin, mindful of Manuel's ambition and of the power of the Turk, summoned a council to meet at Tripoli, together with the Patriarch of Antioch, his suffragans, and many prominent nobles, Constance refused to listen to their persuasions that she marry a man who could defend her principality. This was due for the most part to the influence of the Patriarch Aimery who wished to enjoy the high position and lucrative temporalities which he had gained for himself as the most powerful figure in Antioch. Aimery was fully alive to the advantages, beyond the personal, of maintaining Constance as a widow. He knew that the Emperor of Constantinople wished to have the hand of the Princess for the Caesar John Comnenus. With the Latins anxious for Constance to marry one of themselves, and the Greeks likewise, Aimery thought that the principality would survive the onslaughts of the heathen since it could rely on the forces of Greeks and Latins for its defence.<sup>6</sup>

Quite suddenly and of her own choosing Constance decided to marry. She chose in 1153 a young soldier of fortune who had come but recently to the Holy Land, Renaud of Chatillon. Physically attractive, strong and warlike, Renaud proved to be just the man to put strength into the fading power of Antioch. However, for the Patriarch Aimery this was a challenge. The era of his own personal rule in Antioch gone, Aimery welcomed this husband with bad grace. He voiced his disapproval of the new Prince of Antioch in the clearest terms, provoking Renaud to anger and eventually to cruelty. A further incentive for an attack on Aimery was found in that Raymond needed money for his attack on Cyprus. He was poor, and the Patriarch





was rich. The Prince, with the full consent of his wife, inflicted a series of vicious indignities and injuries on the person of the aged patriarch, personal indignities which were also accompanied with the confiscation of the vast wealth of the prelate. Only the intervention of Baldwin of Jerusalem saved the life and sanity of the Patriarch. His property was restored in part, and Aimery received his freedom. However continuing residence in Antioch was impossible since the hatred of Renaud was an unchanging factor. Accordingly, he took himself to Jerusalem where he lived for several years.<sup>6</sup> It is significant for our purposes that nowhere do we find evidence which shows that either Renaud or Aimery appealed against one another to the court of Rome. Further, it was Baldwin who had protected Aimery and also made possible his return to his see, and also, as we have shown, prevented the immediate introduction of a Greek archbishop into the church of Antioch. The papal power and the papal interest in Antioch seems to have disappeared. However, we shall comment further on this at a later date.

## 2. Fulcher of Jerusalem.

The continuing strength of the Kingdom of Jerusalem was demonstrated in the capture of the city Ascalon in January-February, 1153.<sup>7</sup> To the Patriarch Fulcher of Jerusalem goes the credit for maintaining the morale of the crusading army in the face of overwhelming odds.<sup>8</sup> After the capture of the city the Patriarch busied himself in the organization of the church of Ascalon. He introduced canons and prebends, and then he proceeded to the consecration of a bishop for the city. The choice fell on Abealom, canon of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. However, the erection of the see of Ascalon was to bring trouble to Fulcher. As we know the see of Bethlehem



had been erected many years before by the king of Jorusalem with Papal sanction, thus reversing the ancient ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Eastern church. Originally Ascalon had been an episcopal city and Bethlehem merely a parish within its diocese. When Fulcher restored Ascalon to its episcopal rank, Gerald, Bishop of Bethlehem protested and the case was taken to Rome. Eventually, Hadrian IV sustained the objections of the Bishop of Bethlehem, and the episcopate was removed from the city of Ascalon.<sup>9</sup> What became of Absalon, its bishop, we do not know. Ascalon remained a parish held by the see of Bethlehem in perpetual right.

This was Fulcher's first humiliation at the hands of the Papacy. A second was not far off. A man of great capacity and sincere devotion, Fulcher had brought a certain amount of peace and stability to the life of the church of the Holy Land. During the opening years of his reign as Archbishop of Tyre, he had given the patriarch of Jerusalem and the Papacy a great deal of trouble. However, in late years, he bowed to the will of Rome and proved obedient to the see of Jerusalem. Once patriarch himself, Fulcher was able to accept the divided condition in which the church of Tyre had remained. Antioch was declining in power. Fulcher of Jerusalem was to have Aimery on his hands as a guest for several years, after the patriarch's brutal treatment at the hands of Renaud of Antioch. If the sees of the county of Tripoli remained indifferent to the rights of the sees of Tyre and Jerusalem, Fulcher perhaps saw behind this the desire of the counts of Tripoli and of the bishops themselves to retain their quasi-independence from the powers, spiritual and temporal, of Jerusalem. Fulcher was content to let the situation alone.



In other portions of this dissertation, we have outlined briefly the growing power of the military Orders of the Holy Land. We have seen their humble beginnings, their growing popularity, and the favour increasingly extended to them by the lords, spiritual and temporal of the Holy Land and by the princes of Europe and the Papacy itself. Their rights and privileges had accumulated as had their holdings. They soon became an object of envy on the part of the clergy, particularly in the East. Their wealth and their power, built on the vast revenues which they received from their holdings and from the offerings of the faithful in the West, had made them almost a church within a church. Further, the kingdom of Jerusalem was always in financial difficulties, and the king must have regretted often that so much of the money of the faithful went into the hands of the Temple and the Hospital, and not into his or into the hands of the church of Jerusalem where it could be reached by one means or another, considering the close relationship between the king and the church of Jerusalem.

During this time, the situation between the Patriarch Fulcher and the Hospital had become intolerable. Much of this was due to the latest papal bull in the favour of the Hospital. We have seen in various places how the Papacy had gradually increased the privileges of the Hospital to the point where they were slowly passing out from under the jurisdiction of the local episcopal authority, becoming more and more subject only to the direct supervision of the Papacy. William of Tyre, our chief source for these tensions, placed the blame clearly on the Papacy. He forgot, -- and we in turn must not forget that William himself was Archbishop of Tyre and therefore resented the privileges and wealth of the Orders with



special vehemence, -- that the bishops of the Holy Land had begun the wave of exemptions which soon clothed the Orders with extraordinary power and that it had been the Patriarch, Stephen of Jerusalem who had petitioned the Papacy to recognize the rule of the Templars. The situation became acute when the successor of Eugene III, Anastasius IV, issued on 21 October, 1153, a new bull. He confirmed the rights granted to the Hospital by his predecessors and, more important, took the Order under the special protection of the apostolic see. Bishops were ordered to support the Order's requests for money in their dioceses. The faithful were to receive indulgences for their contributions. The Order was exempted from the discipline which the local diocesan authority might wish to bring to bear upon it. During a time of interdict, they could celebrate the divine mysteries in their churches. They needed no diocesan sanction to found their houses. This bull, together with others, formed the climax of the long process by which the Papacy had removed the Order from the jurisdiction and supervision of local episcopal authority. The decisions of Anastasius were renewed by his successor, Hadrian IV.<sup>10</sup>

If we are to believe William of Tyre, and once again we must remember his prejudiced viewpoint, the Hospital exceeded even these handsome privileges. The papal bull had permitted the celebration of the divine office in places interdicted by local authority, but without the sounding of church bells. The Order, according to Tyre, refused this prohibition, and rang its bells despite any interdict. Further, disorders between the Hospital and the patriarch once resulted in violence in the church of the Holy Sepulchre. However, if we read the complaints of Tyre, we see that beyond these they





acted within the limits of the papal bulls. Their most heinous offence, in the eyes of William, was that they were building a church in Jerusalem, adjacent to the church of the Holy Sepulchre which would far outshine that sacred edifice by its size and cost of construction. Fulcher, no doubt encouraged by the animosity of his clergy, decided to resist their arrogance by a direct appeal to the Pope. In company with the rulers of the churches of Tyre, Acre, Sidon, Caesarea, Lydda, Sebaste and Tiberias, the aged prelate set out to Rome.<sup>11</sup>

The old man took ship and arrived at Otranto in the spring of 1155. He arrived when the Papacy was in most difficult straits. Hadrian IV was at war with William of Sicily. Not only this, Frederick Barbarossa was moving south towards Rome. Hadrian was well aware of the vast imperial pretensions of this latest suitor for the crown of Empire. In this difficult situation the patriarch found it difficult to reach Hadrian and his cardinals. Receiving in most gracious fashion a safe-conduct from Frederick, the Patriarch and his retinue of bishops reached Rome only to find Hadrian on his way to direct the defence of Benevento. It seemed to the Patriarch and his party as if the Pope were avoiding them. Perhaps even the Hospital of St. John had reached the papal ear<sup>12</sup> and bribed Hadrian not to receive Fulcher of Jerusalem. At least the injured feelings of Fulcher and his party gave rise to these rather ridiculous suspicions. Finally, at Ferentino they caught up with Hadrian. Fulcher's first audience with the Pontiff ended in a complete rebuff for the Patriarch. Yet the aged prelate still possessed resources of courage and strength. He bided his time and quietly took his place among the cardinals attending the Pope. At length



a series of audiences was arranged, but the results were a repetition of the original humiliation. The Papacy refused to accede to Fulcher's requests that the powers, privileges and exemptions of the Orders be curtailed.<sup>13</sup> William of Tyre, who resented the Roman church for her meddling which had deprived his see of Tyre of her ancient integrity through the loss of her northern sees in Tripoli, accuses the Hospital of having successfully bribed all but two of the cardinals in the papal curia. Perhaps Fulcher and his bishops thought the same. It was a common reaction on the part of men who had lost their case at Rome. If we examine the evidence of Tyre and the papal bulls in favour of the Hospital, we see, as was said above, that the Hospital was generally acting within the limits of the privileges granted to her by the Papacy. We should remember that these years see the continual growth of direct papal authority throughout the entire church. To Hadrian, Fulcher must have been a man who was a reactionary of doubtful motivation, who could not see the necessity for the direct papal control of the Order whose possessions and activities spread over all of Christendom. Looked at from another aspect, it could be suggested that this was the papal method of controlling the patriarchate of Jerusalem, whose loyalty the Papacy had reason to suspect.<sup>14</sup> We have found no evidence to support this. Not since Stephen had there been a patriarch in Jerusalem who had given the slightest evidence for the Papacy to think that the Jerusalem patriarchate shared the same dreams of independence as did the patriarchate of Antioch. Almost certainly the real reason behind Hadrian's rejection of Fulcher's plea was the papal determination to ensure the proper advance of the life and activities of the military Orders by direct supervision. It may be that the bad



reputation which the survivors of the Second Crusade brought home to the West concerning the Latins of the East operated against the claims and objections put forward by the Patriarch Fulcher. It was left to him merely to accept the decision of the see of Peter and to abide by it. Shortly after his return to the East, no doubt overtired by his journey, the aged prelate died, 20 November, 1157.<sup>15</sup>

### 3. Amalrich of Jerusalem.

The successor of Fulcher was Amalrich, Prior of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.<sup>16</sup> A Frank by birth, from Nesle in Noyon, well educated, Amalrich proved to be ineffective as patriarch of the Latin church of Jerusalem. In the first place, there seems to have been more than the usual amount of intrigue surrounding his election. William of Tyre upholds the common report which declared that his election had been due to the influence of members of the royal family of Jerusalem. William's report is undoubtedly true, for the election of Amalrich aroused great resentment of temporal influence and authority among the clergy. Indeed, Hernoisius, the Archbishop of Caesarea, and Ralph, Bishop of Bethlehem, opposed the election of Amalrich and appealed the case to Rome.<sup>17</sup> Hence, Amalrich was not able to crown Theodora, Queen of Jerusalem in the spring of 1158. She was crowned by Aimery, the Patriarch of Antioch in exilo.<sup>18</sup>

Amalrich was successful in Rome. Frederick of Acre, who had been sent to plead the Patriarch's cause, returned bearing the pall, symbol of metropolitical jurisdiction and papal support.<sup>19</sup> Once again it seemed that the papal court had supported the temporal power over against the wishes of those clergy who stood much upon the rights of the Church to independence of the temporal power. Indeed it could be suggested that there was a growth of resentment



in the Latin Orient against the Roman see, a resentment which gave rise to notions of independence in action and indifference to Rome. The hierarchy had been rejected in its complaints against the military Orders. The church of Tyre resented to some degree the part which the Papacy had played in splitting the church of Tyre between Antioch and Jerusalem. Now the Papacy had upheld the cause of the king's nominee for the patriarchal throne of Jerusalem.

Much of this resentment against Rome is seen in an incident arising from the papal schism which had broken out during the election of Alexander III, in 1159.<sup>20</sup> In the fall of 1160, there arrived at the port of Jebail, a Genoese fleet bearing John, cardinal priest of Saints John and Paul. His position was legate to the Latin Orient. As the representative of Alexander III, John's purpose was to obtain the support of the Jerusalem church for his master. Therefore he requested admittance into the country from Baldwin. The request precipitated a long discussion of the schism by the lords spiritual and temporal of the kingdom of Jerusalem.

We have shown that there was some cause for clerical resentment against the court of Rome. We have also shown, in another place, that the Greek Empire's ascendancy was at its greatest during these years of Manuel's reign. To all intents and purposes, he was the protector of the Christian cause in the East. Further, the princes of the East knew from pilgrims and visitors that the schism had had an unhappy effect upon Europe. Many rulers and distinguished men had hesitated a long time before deciding in favour of Alexander, e.g. Henry II of England and John of Salisbury. Mindful of the fact that the arrival of the legate might split the kingdom of Jerusalem into two camps, the princes of Jerusalem at the first adopted a strict neutrality. However, their own particular private





opinions could not remain hidden for long. In open discussion they could not agree as to what should be done with John who was waiting patiently at the port of Jebail for a decision. Peter of Tyre favoured Alexander. Others preferred Victor, reminding the nobles that the cardinal Octavian had always been a friend to the crusaders. They urged that John be turned away from the kingdom since he represented Alexander. The king, with the support of a few barons and bishops, urged the adoption of a middle road: they would admit John as a pilgrim only. After he had fulfilled the requirements of prayer and devotion, he would leave at once. William of Tyre, never friendly to Rome, places in the king's mouth two reasons for this decision. First, the king pointed out that no one knew which faction had the stronger cause and that it was difficult to adopt an opinion independently. Secondly, there was no need to have a legate who would burden the churches and monasteries with expenses, weakening them by his extortions. In this we find the voice of the disaffected hierarchy of the Holy Land. However, when we consider the precarious position of the crusaders and the possibility that the schism might aggravate the destructive internal quarrels which had proved so harmful to the Christian cause in the East, there was sense in the suggestion of the king of Jerusalem. Further, we might add that information was difficult to obtain and the princes must have felt hampered by their lack of precise information.<sup>21</sup>

The opinions of the Archbishop of Tyre prevailed although we are not informed as to how the opposing factions were won to this point of view. The legate was admitted to the country, and William of Tyre with great satisfaction reports that he proved to be a financial burden to the land. John succeeded in his purpose.



Perhaps he pointed out to the king and the nobles how much they owed to Rome, mother of all the churches, as other Popes had indicated in the past. Late in 1160, the Jerusalem church at a synod at Nazareth declared itself in favour of the claims of Alexander.<sup>22</sup>

While it is true that in his letter to the Archbishop of Salzburg, cited in the notes, Alexander indicated that he had the support of the Eastern churches, we do not see any evidence that the legate attempted to get the support of the church of Antioch. However, we have noted before that the Papacy had always been primarily concerned with the Jerusalem church and that at this time, the Antioch patriarchate seemed to be far removed from effective obedience to Rome. Aside from the submission of the bishop-elect of Tripoli, there had been no continuing papal activity in regard to the patriarch of Antioch. Aimery had not appealed to Rome against Renaud, nor had the latter appealed to Rome against the Patriarch as Raymond had done against Ralph. Antioch's independence of Rome is marked in these years. Perhaps Rome did not care, having other problems to consider. It raised no protest against the growing Byzantine ascendancy over the principality. Perhaps the Papacy had felt powerless to protect the city against the Greeks or to interfere in its internal affairs. We must wait once again until our survey of Adrian's pontificate is complete before we attempt to frame any answers to these problems.



FOOTNOTES:

1. For Aimory, see L. de Mas Latrie "Les Patriarches Latins d'Antioche", (Revue de l'Orient Latin, II, 1894), pp. 193-194. There is no new bibliography to cite for this brief section.
2. Otto, Chronicon, VII, 33, MGSS, XX, p. 266.
3. Tyre, XVII, 10, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 199-200, RHCOcc., I, pp. 774-776.
4. Tyre, XVII, 10, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 199-200, RHCOcc., I, pp. 774-776.
5. Tyre, XVII, 18, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 212-214, RHCOcc., I, pp. 790-791.
6. Tyre, XVII, 26, XVIII, 1, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 226, 235-236, RHCOcc., I, pp. 802-804; Kinnamos, IV, 18, CSHB, pp. 181-182, links the wretched abuse of the patriarch with the vicious raid on Cyprus. Grousset, op.cit., II, pp. 329-332.
7. Tyre, XVII, 21, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 217-218, RHCOcc., I, pp. 794-796 for the beginning of the great struggle for Ascalon.
8. Tyre, XVII, 28, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 229, RHCOcc., I, p. 807.
9. Tyre, XVII, 30, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 233, RHCOcc., I, pp. 812-813.
10. For these bulls of Anastasius and Hadrian, see J. Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 226, No. 227, No. 228, No. 229; JL, 9930, 9931; RR, No. 294.
11. For a few examples of these difficulties, see RR, No. 316, No. 317, No. 318, No. 323. See also Tyre, XVIII, 3-6, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 239-247, RHCOcc., I, pp. 820-827.
12. The Caffaro, Annales, FSI, I, p. 43 refers to the presence of Raymond, Master of the Hospital, before Hadrian when Fulcher and his colleagues presented their complaints.



13. Tyre, XVIII, 7-8, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 247-250, RHCoccc., I, pp. 828-831. See also H. Simonsfeld, Jahrbücher des Deutschen Reiches unter Friederich I., (two volumes, Leipzig, 1900), I, pp. 367 ff; J. Delaville Le Roulx, Les Hospitaliers en Terre Sainte et à Chypre, (Paris, 1904), pp. 56-57.
14. Krey-Babcock, II, p. 246, n. 24.
15. Tyre, XVIII, 19, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 269, RHCoccc., I, p. 851.
16. Tyre, XVIII, 20, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 271, RHCoccc., I, p. 854. Here is further animosity against the Roman church on William's part. For Amalrich, see Rohricht, "Syria Sacra", p. 43, and Grousset, op.cit., II, pp. 321-323.
17. Tyre, XVIII, 20, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 271-272, RHCoccc., I, p. 854.
18. Tyre, XVIII, 22, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 275, RHCoccc., I, p. 858.
19. Tyre, XVIII, 20, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 272, RHCoccc., I, p. 854. Once again William accuses the papal curia of venality.
20. Tyre, XVIII, 26, Krey-Babcock, II, p. 281, RHCoccc., I, p. 865.
21. Tyre, XVIII, 29, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 285-286, RHCoccc., I, pp. 870-871.
22. Tyre, XVIII, 29, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 285-286, RHCoccc., I, p. 871. See also BR, No. 357, Mansi XXI, cc. 1145-1146. Amalrich's letter of support to Alexander is PL, 200, cc. 1362-1363. Alexander's letter to the Archbishop of Salzburg is JL 10645, dated 20 January, 1161.





Section Three:

HADRIAN IV.

1. The Papacy and the Two Empires.

The death of Eugene III brought to the papal chair Anastasius IV who reigned from 12 July 1153 to 3 December 1154.<sup>1</sup> For our purposes there is little which we must say concerning his reign. We have already referred to the great bulls which the Pope issued at this time in favour of the Hospital of St. John. The only other papal act pertinent to our investigations is the confirmation of the rights and possessions of the great church of St. Mary in the valley of Jehosaphat.<sup>2</sup> Anastasius' successor was the Englishman Nicolas Breakspear who assumed the name of Hadrian IV.<sup>3</sup> It will be our task to briefly sketch the course of the reign of Hadrian in order to determine if the many problems which confronted Hadrian had any bearing on the papal policies in regard to the crusaders in the East.

The political situation of the Papacy at the time of Hadrian's coronation as Pope was full of tension and danger. To the south was the kingdom of the Normans, from which the Papacy had withdrawn, preferring an alliance with the new monarch across the Alps, Frederick Barbarossa. We have traced in some detail the development of this new political alignment in the later years of Eugene III. The death of Roger II in February 1154 had not effected any significant alteration in papal policy. The situation in Rome continued most difficult. At the beginning of the reign of Hadrian, Arnold of Brescia had reached the zenith of his power. The Papacy had only the German king for its protector against Roman and Norman.

Eugene had signed the treaty of Constance with Barbarossa



in 1153. In this treaty, both powers had agreed to resist the Greeks in their desire to establish Byzantine rule in Italy. The German had guaranteed the defence of the Papacy against the power of the Normans and the Romans.<sup>4</sup> The great significance of this treaty for us had been the exclusion of the Greeks from Italy and also that the Papacy had renounced any support whatsoever for the Greek desire to unite the crowns of East and West by an alignment of the Papacy with Constantinople. The Empire was to be German, Latin and papal. Hence Manuel had been slightly referred to in the treaty of Constance as the "king" of the Greeks.<sup>5</sup>

Yet even before the death of Eugene in July 1153, there had been new developments which showed the treaty of Constance to be a meaningless document. When Manuel heard of the death of Conrad, he realized that it was necessary to renew the East-West alliance with Conrad's successor, Frederick Barbarossa. In this he had been stimulated also by reports as to the contents of the treaty of Constance. In June 1153, Manuel took steps to meet the new challenge. He sent an embassy to Frederick whose purpose was to secure the renewal of the East-West alliance against Roger of Sicily. Not only this, Manuel instructed his representatives to press Frederick to accept the hand of an imperial niece, thus sealing the re-affirmation of the alliance by a royal marriage. This marriage had been under discussion since the last years of Conrad III.<sup>6</sup> The Greek monarch also wrote to that friend of the house of the Comneni, Wibald of Stavelot, urging him to use his influence with the new German king for the perpetuation of the alliance between the two Empires.<sup>7</sup>

This embassy seems to have stimulated new thoughts in the mind of Barbarossa. What would happen if he turned his back on the



treaty of Constance and renewed the alliance.<sup>7</sup> The Emperor in Constantinople would undoubtedly ask for the possession of south Italy. What would the Papacy's reaction be to this? Eugene's suspicions of the alliance were well known. Further, was Barbarossa willing to offer south Italy to the Greeks? At this time there were the beginnings in Frederick's mind of a plan for the conquest of Hungary. This would bring him into conflict with Byzantium which had for many years periodically been at war with the Hungarians.<sup>8</sup> As for the Papacy's reaction to the renewal of the East-West alliance, the problem was complicated by Frederick's notions of the significance of his imperial office, the first sign of which had been his attempt to increase his control over the Church within his realm. Trouble with the Papacy seemed to be certain.<sup>9</sup> Yet on the other hand, the Papacy expected him to be its protector against the Romans and the Normans. The Norman nobles in exile at his court begged him to invade Italy and crush the power of the Norman kings forever.<sup>10</sup> Then there were those who urged the continuation of the Greek alliance, men like Wibald of Stavelot. The German ruler thus saw that the treaty of Constance must not be taken as the final determination of his policies. Perhaps, after all, the diplomacy of Conrad had been correct.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, Frederick concluded that it might be well to play with the idea of the East-West alliance. Accordingly he wrote back to Manuel a most friendly letter, indicating that he had gladly undertaken the duties of the friendship which had existed between Conrad and Manuel. He indicated his interest in Manuel's proposal for a marriage and spoke of his eventual descent in the summer of 1154 upon Apulia and Sicily.<sup>12</sup> Anselm of Havelberg and Alexander of Gravina were dispatched to carry this reply back to



Manuel. They carried also the letter of Wibald of Stavelot who assured Manuel that he had done and would do all that was possible to maintain the East-West alliance.<sup>13</sup> The letters, however, were vague as to a definite re-affirmation of the alliance and its terms.<sup>14</sup> Nonetheless, the German reply was pleasing to Manuel. The door was opened to future negotiations. The matter was made all the more urgent since the war with the Normans continued to drag on. Roger of Sicily was determined to revenge the re-capture of Corfu.<sup>15</sup>

Manuel therefore sent off a reply as soon as possible.<sup>16</sup> He was determined to continue the marriage negotiations. A marriage would secure the alliance far better than endless promises of friendship. The Byzantine embassy which travelled with Anselm and Alexander left Constantinople in the last week of November, 1153, reaching Germany around the first of the new year, when preparations were already afoot for the Italian expedition. Here they discovered that Frederick's thinking had developed still farther. He had decided that he wanted all of Italy for himself. Further, he had concluded that the ambitions of Manuel would sooner or later become explicitly hostile to the claims and prerogative of his own crown.<sup>17</sup> Despite the fact that Manuel appealed once more to Wibald of Stavelot to forward these negotiations,<sup>18</sup> the Greeks found themselves completely rebuffed by Frederick. When Wibald answered Manuel's letter, he wrote only empty assurances that he would do all that he could to further the cause of the Greeks.<sup>19</sup> The Greek embassy returned empty-handed to the East to consult with the Greek monarch. Interestingly enough, although the East-West alliance was a thing of the past, the negotiations encouraged rumours in Italy that Manuel and Frederick were allied to destroy the Norman kingdom.<sup>20</sup>





All in all, this was a serious check for Manuel's expansionist policies. The next step was in doubt. War had begun again with the Hungarians.<sup>21</sup> There was the continued power of Roger. When the great monarch died in February 1154, he bequeathed to his son William a kingdom of power and stability, extending from Italy to North Africa. At first all was well. William had addressed himself to the problem of Barbarossa. His agents had told him of Frederick's determination to come to Italy in the fall of 1154. Believing probably that Barbarossa would be joined in this expedition by the Greeks, William had tried to deprive Frederick of his allies. Therefore he turned to Manuel. His representatives offered to return the booty and captives which Roger had taken during the raids of 1147. Manuel refused, determined now to profit by the Norman's difficulties. In the first place, the time had come for another attempted intervention in Italian politics.<sup>22</sup> Secondly, the embassy, which had arrived early in 1154, shortly after William's accession, arrived in Constantinople before Manuel had been informed of the collapse of his negotiations with Barbarossa. He had every reason to believe they would be successful. This encouraged him to refuse William's offer. On the other hand, if Manuel did know at that time of Barbarossa's refusal, it may be that he decided to prove to the German the worth of the Greek alliance. Besides, the imperial dream was not to be surrendered. A fleet was ordered to ravage Norman possessions, but due to the stupidity of the Greek admiral, it was utterly defeated.<sup>23</sup>

Further reverses were in store. By the summer of 1154, Alexander and Anselm had arrived in Constantinople to await further instructions.<sup>24</sup> From them, Manuel learned that the alliance with the Germans lay in ruins. Not only this, Venice was no longer



within the orbit of Byzantium. We have already referred to the rift that had slowly developed between Constantinople and Venice, largely due to the fact that Venice had realized that Manuel was intending the re-establishment of the old Byzantine exarchate in Italy at Ancona, and in a much smaller measure, to the resistance of the Patriarch who had had papal support in his resistance to the alliance with the "schismatic" Greeks. Venice in 1154 shifted her allegiance to William of Sicily.<sup>25</sup> The loss of Venice was a serious matter in that the Venetian navy would no longer assist Byzantium in the control of the seas against the Normans.

Thus things were going well for William. If Manuel had rejected his overtures, Venice had been drawn into the Norman camp. The East-West alliance had ceased to exist. True the papacy had remained aloof.<sup>26</sup> but time and providence were on William's side. Self-interest, ambition and mutual suspicion were to keep his enemies from forming an effective alliance against himself.

The key to the political situation was Frederick. Without waiting to hear definitely of Barbarossa's appearance in Italy, Manuel sent to Italy Michael Paleologus, John Ducas and Alexander of Gravina, who had returned to Constantinople after Frederick's rejection of the marriage plans of Manuel.<sup>27</sup> The plan was a double one. One ambassador would stay behind in Italy to raise an army with the huge sums of gold which Manuel had given them to forward their operations. The other two would seek to make contact with Frederick wherever he might be.<sup>28</sup> The Greek mission arrived in Ancona late in the fall of 1154. They were met with news that Frederick was already in Italy.<sup>29</sup>

Frederick had crossed the Brenner in October of 1154.<sup>30</sup> He had come to Italy to re-assert his imperial authority and to



receive the imperial crown. Further, he wished to punish the Normans for their long-standing defiance of his imperial authority.

As we know, Hadrian IV succeeded Anastasius IV in December of 1154. The political problems of the Papacy demanded immediate action. Rome had been lost to Arnold of Brescia.<sup>31</sup> The German monarch must be made to protect the papacy against the Romans and also against the Normans. Yet the Papacy had its suspicions of Frederick.<sup>32</sup> Hadrian also had his suspicions of Greek ambition.<sup>33</sup> Simultaneous almost with the arrival of Barbarossa in Italy had come the arrival of the Greeks in Ancona. Rumours had been circulating before that the East-West alliance was not completely dead. Hadrian therefore acted at once to prevent any revival of this old alignment. He sent his ambassadors to obtain a re-affirmation of the treaty of Constance. In this he was completely successful.<sup>34</sup> To the south there were dramatic developments. The spring of 1155 saw the outbreak of a revolt of the Norman baronage of south Italy against William I of Sicily. Shortly thereafter, the royal armies wantonly devastated the papal Patrimony, and therefore Hadrian had excommunicated William and thrown his power in with the rebels against the Norman monarch.<sup>35</sup> Further, in Rome things had come to such a pass that the Pope felt constrained to place the city under interdict.<sup>36</sup> With Rome under interdict and William excommunicated, Hadrian saw that his only hope lay in Frederick. Accordingly he moved north to meet the German ruler who was approaching Rome, seeking his coronation at the hands of the Pope.<sup>37</sup> Despite the re-affirmation of the treaty of Constance and the coronation of Barbarossa in Rome, 18 June 1155,<sup>38</sup> the meeting of Pope and Emperor served only to heighten the tensions between them. The incidents



which had marked their negotiations immediately prior to Frederick's coronation could not be forgotten. Secondly, Frederick had not been able to crush the power of the Roman commune once and for all. The Papacy had had to leave the city in the train of its imperial protector.<sup>39</sup> The newly crowned emperor also had not intervened in the civil war in south Italy despite the appeals of the Norman rebels.<sup>40</sup> Frederick, perhaps seeing that his army was suffering the usual heavy losses due to disease and desertion, decided that he could not stay in the south of Italy for very long. He turned north, leaving Hadrian to face the Romans alone and to prosecute the war against William of Sicily without his support. Frederick had not only failed to give the Papacy the support and protection it needed, but also he had revealed himself to be the potential enemy of papal prerogative in the incidents preceding and following his coronation at the hands of Hadrian.

We turn back now to the Greeks at Ancona. The three ambassadors had arrived in the fall of 1154 with huge sums of money with which to forward their master's political ambitions. Their hopes of forming some kind of agreement with Frederick were dashed when the German king and the Pope re-affirmed the treaty of Constance which, as we remember, had been opposed to the extension of Greek power into Italy. Not only this, the ambassadors realized that the transportation of troops to Italy would be all the more difficult now that Venice had defected into the Norman orbit. However, they still had their gold. "Conquest by gold" was a characteristically Byzantine device,<sup>41</sup> and all the ambassadors needed were troops and allies which could be supported by their funds. Fortunately for them, events in the south provided new opportunities for pursuing their master's wishes.





The revolt of the Norman vassals placed a weapon in the hands of the Greeks. Negotiations with the rebels were begun at once. When Frederick returned from the south, the Greeks approached him once more. Although they obtained little satisfaction and indeed received clear indication that Frederick was determined to resist Manuel's design on Italy and also that the German Emperor was not disposed to recognize the Greek Manuel as his imperial equal, nonetheless some success was obtained in that Frederick agreed to send Wibald of Stavelot on a diplomatic mission to Constantinople.<sup>42</sup>

The only hope now of the Greeks for the success of their mission was to gain control of the rebels in southern Italy and use them to crush the power of William of Sicily. Accordingly, they offered aid to Robert Barsavilla, count of Conversano and Loritello.

Robert, in return, offered Manuel the rule of Apulia in exchange for Byzantine gold to raise an army to defeat William. A treaty was concluded,<sup>43</sup> and at first success attended them.<sup>44</sup>

The Greeks were not satisfied with only this one alliance. More alliances were required. In July of 1155, the imperial representative Michael Paleologus tried to compensate for the loss of Venice by concluding new treaties with Venice's rivals, Genoa and Pisa. This would assist the Eastern Empire in the control of the seas against the Venetians and the Normans. Further, that control of the seas was all the more necessary of Manuel were determined to send a Greek army to take part in the fighting in the south of Italy.<sup>45</sup> As for the Papacy, it was clear to the Greeks that Hadrian had been left to fend for himself by Barbarossa. Throughout the peninsula, savage warfare raged. The rebels were in possession of Bari and Taranto. The papal banner had been unfurled at Brindisi.



It was clear to Hadrian and to the Greeks that they needed each other. If the treaty of Constance had not brought to the Papacy the protection and the support which it needed, if Frederick were helpless and indifferent, then a new protector of the Papacy and its Patrimony would have to be found. Hence the Pope contacted Alexander of Gravina, asking for assistance in his struggles. When Alexander offered subsidies to Hadrian, the Pope was only too happy to accept them. As for Hadrian, he also at this time wrote to Manuel, asking for his support and protection. The arrival of this letter must have been highly gratifying to the Greek ruler.<sup>46</sup>

It should be pointed out, however, that if Hadrian thought that Manuel might replace Frederick, this only served to increase the tension between Hadrian and the German Emperor. The re-affirmation of the treaty of Constance had been rendered null and void by mutual betrayal. Frederick had refused to protect the Papacy and the Papacy had allied itself with the Greeks. The papal-Hohenstaufen alliance was destroyed. It is likely that Frederick saw that the forces of Greek, rebel and Papacy would not be sufficient to crush the power of William of Sicily. It would be to his advantage therefore if he did not ally himself with the losing side of this struggle.

In Constantinople, Manuel received the papal appeal. This was all the encouragement that the Greek ruler needed to advance his plans for the conquest of south Italy. A small force was sent out to the West, and another huge sum of money was allotted to assist the Byzantine generals in their prosecution of the war against William. This occurred in the late autumn of 1155.<sup>47</sup>

Frederick's assessment of the outcome of the war proved to be correct. Dukes requested reinforcements and additional money from Manuel. Due to the cowardice of the Greek naval commanders,



the fleet did not arrive. William's power increased steadily. Brindisi was soon taken, and the fearsome punishments inflicted on the rebels dispersed the allies.<sup>48</sup> With the cities of Apulia in the hands of the Norman monarch, Hadrian was the first to acknowledge defeat. On 18 June, 1156, he concluded a treaty with William, abandoning those allies to whom he had promised the eternal aid of the Roman church. The terms of the treaty signed with William were humiliating to the Papacy. They set aside, once and for all, the treaty of Constance and the re-affirmation of that treaty which Hadrian and Frederick had concluded in January of 1155.<sup>49</sup> Frederick was not to forget that by this treaty Hadrian invested William with his estates. The Papacy thus returned to its traditional alignment with the Normans. Hence at the Diet of Besancon in 1158, when the rift between Barbarossa and Hadrian became plain, the German monarch accused the Pope of having broken his word.<sup>50</sup>

As for Frederick and Manuel, the East-West alliance had remained a dead letter. He had sent Wibald of Stavelot to Constantinople to investigate the situation. When he returned in June of 1156, he brought Greek ambassadors. At this time, the cause of the Greeks was still successful in the south. Frederick, annoyed at this, was enraged when the Greek ambassadors vaunted Byzantine claims to the maritime provinces of Italy.<sup>51</sup> However, when the news of the Greek defeat arrived, Frederick's ire abated.<sup>52</sup> ~~There~~ <sup>Yet,</sup>, when Manuel tried to renew the marriage negotiations and to seek aid against the Hungarians,<sup>53</sup> he was rebuffed by Frederick at Nuremberg in July, 1156.<sup>54</sup> The marriage question was closed by Frederick when he espoused Beatrice of Burgundy.<sup>55</sup> However, perhaps because he was intending one day to attempt the conquest of Hungary, he returned the embassy in 1156.<sup>56</sup>



To the outside world, this looked as if the East-West alliance was restored. Hadrian, worried about Frederick's reaction to his treaty with William, accused Wibald of plotting harm to the Roman church when he was in the East.<sup>57</sup> In other words, Hadrian feared that his alignment with William would draw Manuel and Frederick back together again. However, this fear had no foundation. One Greek legation was brusquely treated at Wurzburg in a squabble arising over problems of etiquette.<sup>58</sup> The supporter of the Greeks, Wibald, died on a legation in 1158.<sup>59</sup>

Manuel, although rebuffed by Frederick and defeated by William, would not surrender his desire to establish Byzantine power in Italy. There were possibilities there: the continuing enmity between Sicily and Germany, the break between Hadrian and Barbarossa, occasioned by Hadrian's recognition of William and the incipient clash between the claims of Empire and Papacy. Accordingly he sent off a new mission to Ancona whose purpose was to build up support for a Byzantine attack on William.<sup>60</sup> However a radical shift in policy was not far away. The Byzantine plans for the defeat of William came to nothing.

In the first place, the Greeks had lost command of the seas. In the spring of 1158, William's fleet attacked the realm of Manuel with great success.<sup>61</sup> Perhaps they penetrated even to the environs of Constantinople.<sup>62</sup> In the second place, the Greek intervention in Ancona had produced little results. At first all had gone well. Genoa had been kept within the imperial diplomatic design.<sup>63</sup> Ravenna had declared itself for Manuel.<sup>64</sup> So also had Ancona although the Italian city-state had been careful to respect the rights of Barbarossa in its agreement with the Greek ruler.<sup>65</sup> However, when the





Greek generals led an attack on the lands of William, they were successfully driven off by the combined forces of the Pope and the Norman monarch.<sup>66</sup>

With these defeats in mind, Manuel was driven to consider the possibility of making peace with the Normans. Indeed he wrote to his ambassadors, lying in chains in Norman prisons since the defeat of 1156, warning them of an impending change in policy. He listened now to the ambassadors of Hadrian who for some time had been urging him to make peace with the Normans.<sup>67</sup>

With papal aid in negotiations, he sought a treaty with William. To him he offered recognition of his royal title and aid against Frederick Barbarossa. A truce of thirty years would be declared. William agreed, and the treaty was signed in the spring of 1158. The Norman king agreed to return the spoils which his father had taken in 1147 in the raids on the Greek mainland.<sup>68</sup>

We have undertaken this cursory investigation of Hadrian's pontificate, with regard only to the activities in Italy of the Normans, Greeks and Germans, in order to show the growing rapprochement between Hadrian and the Emperor Manuel. At the beginning of his reign, Hadrian had shown himself anxious to prevent the establishment of Greek power in Italy. Prior to Frederick's coronation, Hadrian and the German ruler had re-affirmed the treaty of Constance which had declared against the extension of Greek power into Italy. Frederick, as we have shown, had continued, more or less consistently, to develop this line of policy. Hadrian had not been able to do so. Barbarossa had not become the defender of the papacy as Hadrian had hoped. Not only this, these years saw the growing split between the Empire and the papacy. Left to himself, Hadrian



had attempted to defend the patrimony by an alliance with the Greeks and the rebel Norman baronage. This had failed. Defeated, Hadrian had been forced to re-assume the traditional papal alignment with the destinies of the Normans of Italy.

As for the Greeks, Hadrian was concerned to prevent the revival of the East-west alliance which had caused Eugene III and himself no little uneasiness. Hence the letter to Wibald of Stavelot in which the Pope had accused the Abbot of plotting the ruin of the Roman church during his stay in the East. Here Hadrian's fears proved to be foundless. The East-west alliance was a thing of the past. However, the Pope took other steps to prevent any revival of the ancient alliance between German and Greek. He would seek to bring peace between the Greeks and the Normans. Besides, he was quick to see that the continuing war between the Greeks and the Normans was dangerous for the entire life of Italy. The Greeks must be kept out of Italy, reconciled with the Normans and thus drawn into an alliance against Barbarossa. The papal diplomacy, coupled with the defeat of Manuel on land and sea, was successful. Peace between the ancient enemies was signed at the very moment that Frederick entered Italy. The war between Empire and Papacy was about to begin.

Thus in 1153, a kind of informal alliance had developed between William, Hadrian and Manuel, directed implicitly against Frederick Barbarossa. It is possible that by now the Papacy saw in Manuel a possible substitute for Frederick Barbarossa. As for Manuel, the old dream of uniting the crowns of East and West once more became a genuine possibility. Further, peace with the Normans and with the Papacy left him free to pursue his ambitions in the East.



It is not without significance that in 1159 Manuel undertook his final and most glorious descent upon Antioch. Further, when the disputed election of 1159 was to divide Western Europe into two camps, Manuel declared at once for Alexander III against Frederick and his anti-Pope, Victor.<sup>69</sup>

## 2. Hadrian and the Crusade.

We have seen that the appeals addressed to the west after the death of Raymond of Antioch in battle in 1149 had aroused considerable enthusiasm and agitation for a new expedition. Appeals to the West for continued assistance to the Latins in the East now became a familiar phenomenon. Within this period of papal history we find an appeal which may be dated c. 1155-1156, from Renaud of Antioch to Louis of France.<sup>70</sup> The Prince wrote the French king of the troubles which had continually befallen his principality, assuring the king of France that if help was not given that he would hear of these difficulties all the more frequently in the future. A specific request to Louis was that the King of France provide a husband for the two daughters of the Princess of Antioch.

Louis was to receive another appeal several years later, c. 1161, this time from the Master of the Hospital, Gilbert.<sup>71</sup> The Master after describing in a general fashion the difficulties of the Christians in the East, asked for the king's continued patronage of the Order and for his royal protection to its possessions in the West.

It is unfortunate that we cannot date the letter of Renaud with greater exactitude. Perhaps it was written immediately after the vicious raid on Cyprus. Renaud would be more than anxious to secure protection against the counter-attack by the Emperor Manuel. As we know, the revenge of Manuel came in 1159. However, the letter



of Renaud does not contain any reference to the Greeks at all. Nor does the letter of Gilbert or the letter which Bohemund wrote to Louis when Renaud was captured in 1160.<sup>72</sup> Perhaps this indicates the Latins had accepted Manuel as their rightful lord and suzerain in Antioch. Besides, saving Western support, Antioch had only Manuel for its protector.

We cannot ascertain Louis' reaction to these letters. The stream of pilgrims and penitents, soldiers of fortunes and adventurers to the East does not seem to have been increased by these appeals for help. Of course, the veteran traveller, Thierry of Flanders, who made four trips to the Holy Land, including participation in the Second Crusade, might have been stimulated to continue his journeys to the East by these letters. Beyond this, we know little.

As for the Papacy, we note first of all that Renaud had addressed his appeal to the king of France. There was method in this since, as Renaud pointed out, he was a Frenchman, and from that realm over which Louis was king.<sup>73</sup> We have no record of the Papacy receiving any such appeals although this does not rule out the possibility that it may have done so. The Papacy was fully informed as to life in the Holy Land, and the difficult conditions there were not hidden from the Popes. Nonetheless, this direct appeal, which had appeared before in our investigation, should remind us once again that the Holy Land was the common patrimony of all Christians and not merely a papal state.

Hadrian himself was not unconcerned for the progress of the crusade. Two letters remain to illustrate this concern. When the monks on the island at Lerins ask for his help in their defence





against the Saracens and pirates of the Mediterranean, the Pope ordered the citizens of nearby Grasse to defend the monks on pain of remission of their sins.<sup>74</sup> When William of Montepessulo went to the Holy Land, Hadrian took his lands under the special protection of the Holy See, a protection granted to all those on pilgrimage. He ordered the Archbishop of Narbonne and his suffragans to undertake the defence of William's lands, authorizing them to excommunicate all those who encroached on William's lands during his absence.<sup>75</sup> In these two letters we see the Papacy acting as the leader of Christendom in the struggle against the infidel, and as the protector of all those who made the pilgrimage to the East.

Of greater interest is the letter which Hadrian wrote to Louis of France on 18 February, 1159.<sup>76</sup> It was composed in reply to a letter which Louis had written to the Pope. Concern had arisen in France and England for the war against the infidel. Unfortunately, we cannot determine what events had stimulated the interest and concern of both Louis and the king of England. However, it is clear that their concern was directed not towards the East but towards the West, to Spain. This zeal was therefore directed to a place nearer home and therefore had greater chance of bringing positive results. It would seem therefore that Hadrian had been informed by Louis that he and Henry of England had decided to go to Spain to fight the infidel. Louis had therefore written to the Pope to ask the advice and counsel of the Roman Church.<sup>77</sup> He had also wanted the Papacy to issue a crusade bull in favour of the proposed expedition. The Pontiff was fully aware of the need to take action against the infidel. He could appreciate the royal haste.<sup>78</sup> However, he proceeded to advise caution. Hadrian made it plain that Louis and his



allies must first of all be invited into the country by those living there, the temporal and spiritual lords in Spain. Louis had not so enquired. How did he know, asked Hadrian, if they in Spain wanted his presence and assistance?<sup>79</sup>

After making this point plain to the king, the Pope then proceeded to draw an illustration. He was asked to remember what had happened on the Second Crusade. None of the lords of the East, spiritual or temporal, had asked for their assistance. The resulting damage was very great. Because the West had failed to consult the people of the land, i.e. of Syria-Palestine, great harm had been done to the Church of God, to all Christians and especially to the church of Rome, which was dragged down through humiliation and blamed for all that happened. Mindful of all of this, Hadrian refused to grant Louis' request that the Bishop of Evreux be given papal permission to preach the Crusade to the Franks. The Pope promised that this was not a final refusal, and gladly acceded to Louis' request that he take the kingdom of the Franks under his apostolic protection during Louis' absence on the crusade. Other papal suggestions in this regard would be given orally to the Bishop of Evreux who had been entrusted with the embassy to the pontiff.<sup>80</sup>

Thus, Hadrian restrained the ardour of the kings of France and England for the crusade against the infidel in Spain. We cannot but agree with the papal reasoning. Although the Latin Orient did send personal appeals to the princes of the West for help after the fall of Edessa, it remains true that the life of the Latin states in the East had not been improved by the arrival of the remnants of the armies of Louis and Conrad. Not only this, those who lived to return to the West brought with them tales of



"treason" at Damascus and at Jerusalem, as we have shown above. Further, the Pope was correct when he suggested that much of the shame over the failure of the crusade had been responsible for a loss of prestige to the Roman church. Of course, the Papacy was attempting to defend its reputation, and the Pope seems to have found the true explanation for the crusade's failure in the fact that the princes of the West had not acted in consultation with the spiritual and temporal authorities in the East. The letter is valuable in that it reveals the cautious attitude which the Papacy had developed towards the entire notion of a crusade to the East. We have seen how the caution of Eugene III was instrumental in preventing the inauguration of an expedition which might have had as its purpose the punishment of the Greek Empire. Further, we remember that Eugene had restrained the ardour of Suger by pointing out that the crusade he so ardently desired must receive proper backing, support, which we suggested, Eugene believed would not be forthcoming. Hadrian continued this cautious attitude. The days of Urban II's splendid carelessness were past. However, Europe had changed greatly since 1095-1096. Latin attitudes towards the crusade to the East had changed too. Not the least significant fact found in this letter is that Henry and Louis had chosen to go to Spain because it was closer to home and as such promised a more successful expedition than any to the far away East.

It is unfortunate that the language of this letter is so vague. We have interpreted all references in regard to the Second Crusade and the "damage done to the nation and its ruler" to be in reference to the Latin states of Syria-Palestine. But was the pontiff thinking of another nation and another ruler? Manuel and his nation of Greeks perhaps?



### 3. The Papacy and the Greeks.

In the first two sections of this concluding part of our dissertation, we have commented on the rising ascendancy which the Greeks had achieved over the Latin States of Syria-Palestine. True enough, time was to prove that this ascendancy over the Latin states was more illusory than real, more motivated by fear, by desperate need for support on the part of the Latins, by an awareness of the relative helplessness of the West, than by genuine confidence and regard for Manuel. However, the triumph of Manuel in 1159 was seemingly complete. Manuel in 1160-1161, was to demonstrate his power by demands for Latin military support and also by the opening of marriage negotiations which would unite the house of Comneni with a Latin princess.<sup>81</sup> In this triumph, Manuel had met with no opposition from the Roman church. When he descended upon Antioch, there had been no papal letter to refer to him as excommunicate, no Bishop of Jabala to warn him away from the principality by the authority of the Emperor and the Pope. We inquired as to the significance of this.

We have shown in this section how the last years of Hadrian's life saw the gradual emergence of an informal entente of Byzantium, Sicily and the Papacy against the power of Frederick Barbarossa. True, the Papacy, once the Greeks had been ejected from Italy, could afford to have friendly feelings towards the Greeks. Eugene III had been assured by the Emperor Manuel that the realm prayed for him daily. The Papacy could be sure that not all the blame for the failure of the Crusade should be laid at the door of the Greek empire. Not only this, Eugene had worked to prevent the corruption of the crusade notion and ideal into a vicious punitive attack on the Empire





of Manuel which, disguised by the highest ideals, would have been in effect nothing but a weapon for the ambitions of the King of Sicily. The Papacy had feared the Greeks as regard their political ambitions in Italy. Beyond that, it saw profit from their friendship. Hadrian had found them willing to cooperate in the days of the rebellion against the Norman vassals. They had proved to be more ready protectors of the Patrimony of Peter than the German monarch. Barbarossa had emerged more and more as the mortal enemy of the Papacy. The Papacy might need a defender in the days to come. It may well be that the Pope had considered the transference of the imperial crown to the Greeks. A false papal bull,<sup>82</sup> dating from Hadrian's reign, argues this as a possibility. The bull in question is undoubtedly false, but it does show that the idea was current. If the Papacy could bestow the crown of the Empire, - and this was the issue with Barbarossa, - then she could assign it to whomsoever she wished. With this we should recall the fact that the Papacy had interested itself in securing peace between Manuel and Sicily. We suggested that the dream of uniting the imperial crowns with papal support had made Manuel surrender, at least on paper, the Greek claim to south Italy through the recognition of William's royal title.

During the time of the negotiations for peace between the Greek ruler and William of Sicily, Hadrian had had correspondence with a Greek theologian, Basil of Achrida, Archbishop of Thessalonica. Basil had had theological discussions with Latins before. We know that Anselm of Havelburg, in April of 1155, had engaged in a theological disputation with the Archbishop of Thessalonica.<sup>83</sup> It was Anselm's second attempt to open discussions leading to union between the Greek and Latin churches. Quite possibly Hadrian heard of this



colloquy, and looking for peace between Manuel and William, undertook to advance the cause of the church union. He also wished to request protection and assistance for the envoys of the king of Jerusalem who were at that time in Constantinople seeking to arrange a wedding between Baldwin and the princess Theodor .

Hadrian tried to be tactful in his letter.<sup>84</sup> Unfortunately, he failed utterly to do so as far as Greek prejudice went. He attributed to the wiles of Satan the fact that the children of the church of Rome, i.e. the Greek Christians, had dropped away from the communion of the see of Peter. He pointed out that the Roman church had laboured long to restore this unity. Now, said Hadrian, he would adopt an attitude of humility as a means of restoring unity to the Church.<sup>85</sup> He had chosen to write to the Archbishop of Thessalonica. Hadrian begins his argument by declaring that the preservation of the unity of the Church is necessary in order that the sanctification of the human race can go forward without interruption. This unity is to be found in the see of Peter and the Fathers of the Church are marshalled to give their support to the papal claim of universal jurisdiction. It follows therefore that one by one the Greek church and the rest of her wayward sisters should return into the fold of the Chief Shepherd. Hadrian thus sought to recover the "lost penny" and the "lost sheep". At the close of the letter, he asked Basilius to protect the envoys of Baldwin of Jerusalem.<sup>86</sup>

The letter could not be calculated to win the support of the Greek bishops. While the answer which Basil sent to Hadrian is free from polemic and anger, it is filled to the brim with the most subtle irony.<sup>87</sup> The Archbishop acknowledged that he had nothing but praise for Hadrian's humility and indicated that his reputation as



father, a spiritual shepherd and archpastor was not unknown to him. Yet Basil professes that he cannot understand the papal references to the "lost penny" or the "lost sheep".<sup>88</sup> The Greek church, it is made plain, does not consider itself to be lost at all. They too stood on the confession of Blessed Peter. They had added nothing to the councils or to the Gospels, certainly a reference to the Western doctrine of the Double Procession and perhaps to the Petrine supremacy. Obviously, says Basil, the Greek church has been slandered to the Pope of Rome by travellers and pilgrims.<sup>89</sup> As for the unity of the church, it exists in that part is under the primacy of Constantinople and the other part under the primacy of Rome. There are differences between the two, but they do not amount to much. The Pope is assured in closing that in the Emperor Manuel he has a strong supporter for the abolition of these differences which impair the unity of the two divisions of Christendom.<sup>90</sup> The letter shows clearly how intransigent had become the Greek resistance to the claims of the Roman church.

Although Hadrian's letter was not at all successful in capturing the sympathetic response of the Greek church, the Pope's motives were plain. Friendship of some sort with the Greeks was to be desired. For this reason, Hadrian raised no objection when Manuel advanced his power over the Latins in the East. When the treaty with Sicily was signed in 1158, a treaty long desired by the Pope, Manuel at once set out for Antioch. It is probable that he felt that he would have no opposition from the Papacy this time. There would be no turning back for fear of political consequences in the West. It may be that Manuel had been told by the papal ambassadors that their master would raise no objection.



The reasons once again are plain. If Hadrian had worked to secure peace between Manuel and Sicily it was because he saw the need for a united political front against Barbarossa. If the Greeks came to Italy again, they would come as the friends of the Papacy and as the enemies of the Hohenstaufen. Further, it would be necessary to have the full strength of Sicily behind the Roman church and there was no point in having that strength impeded by the continuing hostility of the Greeks. Further, there was no danger of an East-West alliance which had plunged the peninsula into turmoil and had placed the Papacy at the mercy of Norman, Roman, Greek and German.

Granted that these political motives were present, perhaps there were other motives. Perhaps Hadrian approved of the ascendancy of Manuel over the Latin Orient. His reference to the envoys of Baldwin at Constantinople shows that he had, at least, a tacit acceptance of their mission. Then he issued no bulls against Manuel during his triumph at Antioch. It may be that the news of Renaud's agreement to bring in a patriarch of the Greek church into Antioch did not arrive in Rome until after the death of Hadrian on 1 September, 1159. Perhaps the Pope heard that Baldwin had persuaded Manuel to delay in this matter. Whatever the reason, there is no sign that the Pope or his legates objected to the rising Greek hegemony in the Latin States. Probably they felt that only Manuel could assist the Latins in the defence of their holdings.<sup>91</sup> The Pope felt that aid from the West was not a thing to be counted upon, being fraught with too many difficulties, and with too many dangerous political consequences. With the Crusade, the Papacy had learned to be cautious. Besides, it was uncertain as to how much support the West would give to the crusade to the East. Hadrian probably concluded that he could best support the Latin Orient by supporting the Military Orders in Europe.





One final point, and it can only be a suggestion since direct evidence is lacking. It may be that out of the new political alignments, and out of the rising ascendancy of the Greeks over the Latins in the East, the Papacy saw that there was a chance as never before for the reunion of the churches.<sup>92</sup> All things pointed towards unity: Unity was desirable in itself; the claims of the see of Peter must be upheld; the Latins in the East had to be fostered and protected; Manuel was useful for this as well as a counter-foil against the claims of Barbarossa. As long as all these aims and purposes coincided all would be well between Pope and Eastern Emperor.

#### 4. Hadrian and the Latin Orient.

This pontificate sees the continued papal patronage of the military Orders. We have suggested that the increased papal patronage of the Orders was due to the papal realization that Europe was somewhat indifferent to the continuing needs of the Latins in the East, to papal fear of the political ramifications, for the Papacy and the Church as a whole, of another large scale movement to the East. We have seen that Anastasius and Hadrian granted full exemption to the Hospital and that when Fulcher of Jerusalem protested in person, he was met with papal refusal to reduce the independence which the Hospital had acquired from the local diocesan authorities.<sup>93</sup> Further, the Temple was not neglected. The Church was urged to foster the growth of the Order, to urge the faithful to contribute to its life and activity. Kings were urged to protect the possessions of the Temple. In fact, so powerful had the Order become that Hadrian was forced to discipline the Temple by placing limits on its greed and by commanding that its priests have proper episcopal licenses for the performance of their duties.



As for the rest, two bits of evidence remain. In 1155, Hadrian confirmed the privileges of the monastery of St. Mary in the valley of Jehosaphat, with the significant addition that the foundation pay a small annual tribute to the Roman church. The growth of this practise of tribute indicates the mounting centralization which is the dominant trend in the Roman church's development in the twelfth century.<sup>95</sup>

We remember that the Genoese had requested and received from the Roman church a confirmation of all their lands in Syria. They too had been required to pay tribute. Now in 1155, at a time when Fulcher and his bishops, together with Raymond, Master of the Hospital, were before Hadrian, the Genoese sent a representative to the pontiff. They accused the king of Jerusalem, the count of Tripoli and the prince of Antioch of infringing Genoese treaties. They had taken land which the Latins had given to the Genoese in exchange of their services to the Latin cause in the Orient. They had denied the Genoese money and dues which had been guaranteed to the Genoese many years before. When Hadrian heard this, he sided at once with the Genoese. A letter was sent to the king of Jerusalem.<sup>96</sup> In this Hadrian pleaded with Baldwin to restore to Genoa that which was rightfully hers. The Pope pointed out the scandal which had come upon the kingdom of Jerusalem by the royal action. If Baldwin hoped to continue in the good graces of the Roman church, he must restore to the Genoese what he had taken.

Hadrian acted within his rights. The Papacy had guaranteed more than a decade before the possessions of the Genoese in the East. The Church, further, had always regarded the preservation of oaths and contracts as within the scope of her jurisdiction. Not only this,



Hadrian knew that the services which the Italian maritimes had rendered, and which they still continued to render to the crusaders in the East, were beyond price. Any strife between Genoa and Baldwin of Jerusalem was sure to endanger the cause of the Christ and reconquest in Syria-Palestine. Hadrian, as he stated in his letter, knew that his duty was to redress wrong wherever it occurred. This zeal for righteousness and for the protection of the Latin establishments in the East motivated the papal action.

It should be stated that this intervention of the papacy in the temporal life of the Latin Orient should not be interpreted as proof that the Latin Orient was a papal state. While the incident is but one sign, among innumerable other signs, of the growth of papal power in Western Christendom at this time, the true significance of this is that the Papacy had once again acted to protect the crusade. In this the Pope was correct.

However, Hadrian probably did not appreciate that the king of Jerusalem was paying a ruinous price for the generosity which his predecessors in the East had displayed to the Italian communes in their overly generous and sometimes indiscriminate granting of rights and privileges. Perhaps Hadrian did not fully appreciate the desperate financial conditions of the temporal power in the East, which desperate condition had driven the king of Jerusalem to disregard the rights of Genoa in the first place. Morally the right lay with Hadrian and Genoa. Practically speaking, we can sympathize with the situation of Baldwin.

The king of Jerusalem and his successors paid no heed to the papal injunction. The papacy could do no more than to reprimand the erring monarchs. The Annales of Caffaro go too far when they say



that Hadrian threatened Baldwin with excommunication.<sup>97</sup> That the Papacy could not do. What would happen to the Latin establishment in the East if the Pope excommunicated the leading temporal authority? The infringement of the rights of Genoa continued up to the capture of Jerusalem in 1187. The Genoese, finding that papal influence was insufficient to force the restoration of their rights, took to forging letters which, in the papal name, ordered the count of Tripoli, the prince and patriarch of Antioch to bring pressure to bear upon the king of Jerusalem to restore Genoese possessions.<sup>98</sup> These proved as ineffective as the papal letters.

The reign of Hadrian IV can be summarized briefly. Relations between the Papacy, the king and the patriarch of Jerusalem continued much as before. The Church in the Orient continued subordinated to the temporal power in the fashion which we have described above. The Papacy in no way extended its influence over the royal power in these years. As we have seen, Hadrian's pleas for justice to Genoa went unheeded by the kings of Jerusalem. Between the patriarchs of Jerusalem and Rome there existed considerable tension. Fulcher of Jerusalem was rebuffed by the Papacy in connection with the see of Ascalon and in regard to the Templars. Here we suggested that the Papacy was concerned to keep these military Orders under its direct protection for the sake of their own well-being. However, in the Latin Orient, Fulcher's humiliation at the hands of Hadrian did much to increase bitterness. This bitterness, which is mirrored in the pages of William of Tyre, expressed itself in the debates over the admission of the representative of Alexander III. Nonetheless the Jerusalem church affirmed its loyalty to the Apostolic see by supporting Alexander III.





To the north in Antioch, the Patriarch Aimery and his clergy seem to have become increasingly estranged from Rome. We remarked on the fact that when this ambitious prelate quarrelled with Renaud that there were no appeals to the court of Rome. It had been the king of Jerusalem who had saved the life and sanity of the Patriarch, not Hadrian IV. Nor do we find any surviving letter which shows that Hadrian was even concerned to preserve the honour of the Church of God against the hand of the violent and cruel prince of Antioch. Of course, in her dealings with Jerusalem and Antioch, Rome was hampered by the usual difficulties of communication and of time and space.

If Renaud triumphed ingloriously over Aimery, he received his due in the dust before the feet of Manuel Comnenus. If Antioch had asserted her independence of Jerusalem, temporally, and Rome, spiritually, the year 1159-1160 saw the re-affirmation of Antioch's place within the realm of the Greek Emperor. We noted that in this, Hadrian also was silent. No threatening letter awaited Manuel when he took temporary possession of the great Latin fortress on the Orontes. However, the papal influence was great enough, we suggested, to prevent the immediate introduction of a Greek patriarch into the see of Antioch.

For the rest, we noted that the ancient problem of the allegiance of the sees of Tripoli remained as before. All in all, the reign of Hadrian had seen a decline in the extent and scope of papal influence over the Latin Church in the East.

For the papal activities in the West, we suggested that Hadrian had turned his attention to the re-alignment of the Greeks with the Normans and himself against the growing pretensions of Frederick



Barbarossa. The two Greek interventions in Italy were failures. Hadrian wished the Greeks to keep out of Italy and wished also to bring peace between Greeks and Normans, thus ensuring the Papacy of a solid basis for defence against the German monarch. The old East-West alliance was killed by Frederick's ambition, but its remains were interred only when Manuel was constrained by military defeat and papal diplomacy to recognize the royal title of William of Sicily. We suggested that this informal papal-Norman-Greek entente was to bring about a more favourable attitude towards the Greeks on the part of the Papacy. Nothing was said to prevent Manuel's descent upon Antioch. Further, Hadrian attempted, unsuccessfully to be sure, to open the negotiations which might lead to reunion. Equally significant in this was the tacit papal approval of the new dependence of the Latins in the Orient upon the power and the wealth of Manuel of Constantinople.

Hadrian was only adopting a realistic policy. He hoped that Manuel and his power might serve to advance the cause of the Latin Christians in the Orient. Further, he knew that Europe, perhaps influenced by the bad reports of the Latins in the Orient after the Second Crusade, was not interested in large scale expeditions to the East. Further, Hadrian had learned caution. He knew the shame which had come to the Roman Church after the Second Crusade. Hence he advised caution to Louis when the king of France had suggested a large expedition into Spain. If, however, Hadrian was cautious, he perceived with new vigour and understanding the role which the military Orders might play in sustaining the Christian cause in Syria-Palestine. Hence he issued the great bulls in favour of the Temple and confirmed the rights and privileges of the Hospital. Here again the Papacy continued its policy of fostering the crusade, a policy at once practical and idealistic.



FOOTNOTES:

1. For the various Vitae of Anastasius, see Manai, XXI, p. 773; Liber Pontificalis, II, p. 388.
2. This bull is JL, 9847, dated 11 March, 1154. See RR, No. 290, and Delaborde, No. 28. Tribute was levelled on this foundation at this time.
3. For the Vita of Hadrian, see Liber Pontificalis, II, pp. 388-397.
4. For a working bibliography for his reign, the works of Chalandon and Kap-Herr are useful. The pertinent volume in the Histoire de l'Eglise is volume nine, part two, R. Foreville, J. Rousset de Pina, Du Premier Concile du Latran a l'Avènement d'Innocent III, (Paris, 1953), abbreviated Foreville-Rousset de Pina, Histoire IX (2). The work of Heyd will be cited below. Indispensable is H. Simonsfeld, Jahrbücher des Deutschen Reiches, (two volumes, Leipzig, 1908).
5. Wibaldi Ep., No. 407, pp. 546-547.
6. Dölger, II, No. 1383. Kinnamos, IV, 1, CSHB, pp. 134-135 errs in making Frederick open negotiations. Wibaldi Ep., No. 410, No. 411, pp. 548-550 reveals that Manuel took the initiative. See Kap-Herr, op.cit., pp. 148-151. Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, pp. 344-345; Simonsfeld, op.cit., I, p. 198.
7. Wibaldi Ep., No. 411, p. 550; Dölger, II, No. 1389.
8. Kinnamos, III, 10-11, CSHB, pp. 113-118; Nicetas, II, 7, CSHB, pp. 121-124; Otto, Gesta, II, 6, MGSS, XX, p. 393; Continuatio Zwettlensis Prima, MGSS, IX, p. 538.
9. Otto, Gesta, II, 10, MGSS, XX, p. 395.
10. Otto, Gesta, II, 7, MGSS, XX, p. 393.
11. The date was fixed in May-October, 1152, for the fall of 1154. See Otto, Gesta, II, 7, MGSS, XX, p. 393 and the Factio Friderici regis et Bertolfi IV ducis de Leringen, printed in Jaffe's Bibliotheca rerum Germanicarum, I, p. 515.



12. Wibaldi Ep., No. 410, pp. 548-549; Otto, Gesta, II, 11, MGSS, XX, p. 395. Contrary to Chalandon, Domination Normande, II, p. 155, we do know the purpose of the embassy. Further, Chalandon, ibid., p. 140 n. 2 and Kap-Herr, op.cit., pp. 148-149, do not assign this legation to Alexander and Anselm. The chronological problems here are all but insoluble. Otto's account makes it sound as if they were not sent off until after the death of Roger of Sicily in February, 1154. However, Kinnamos reveals that Frederick's first response to Manuel was mildly encouraging as to the proposed marriage but that his second was completely in the negative. Chalandon and Kap-Herr do not see these inner contradictions. They accept Frederick's second response as refusing the alliance and yet assign Anselm and Alexander to carry this reply to Manuel. This they do on the basis of Otto's reference to Roger as dead, but fail to see that Otto makes the purpose of their mission the continuation of the alliance against Roger of Sicily. It would be better to accept the following chronology: (1) c. June, 1153, Manuel sends an embassy to Barbarossa to renew the pact against Sicily, this to be sealed by marriage; (2) Barbarossa gives a vague but encouraging reply, returns Anselm and Alexander with Greek ambassadors who reach the Greek ruler in November and are sent back at once; (3) they arrive c. 1 January, 1154 and are rebuffed; (4) they, after some delay, return to the East in May, 1154 to consult with Manuel. This tallies better with Kap-Herr's own investigations as to the whereabouts of Anselm, 1152-1155. cf. Kap-Herr, op.cit., p. 148.
  
13. Wibaldi Ep., No. 1411, p. 550.
  
14. Kinnamos, IV, 1, CSHB, p. 135 says that Frederick promised to uphold the treaty signed by Conrad upon his return journey from Palestine. He would also uphold Conrad's acknowledgment of the Byzantine claim to south Italy. This, however, is not in the imperial letter, and I am inclined to discount it.
  
15. Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, pp. 45 -456.
  
16. Dolger, II, No. 1391, No. 1392; Wibaldi Ep., No. 424, p. 561.
  
17. Kinnamos, IV, 1, CSHB, p. 133; Simonsfeld, op.cit., I, p. 201, (chronology mistaken here); Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, pp. 344-347; Kap-Herr, op.cit., p. 55. See also the account of Frederick's preparations in Otto Morena, MGSS, XVIII, pp. 588-591 and Wibaldi Ep., No. 425, pp. 562-563. That Frederick in the last analysis had no intention of admitting Greek authority in Italy is often made plain in Otto. See Gesta, III, 20, MGSS, XX, p. 428.
  
18. Wibaldi Ep., No. 424, p. 561.





19. Wibaldi Ep., No. 432, p. 568.
20. Robert of Torigny, MGSS, VI, pp. 504-505.
21. Kinnamos, III, 12, CSHB, pp. 119-120.
22. Kinnamos, III, 12, CSHB, pp. 118-119.
23. Kinnamos, III, 13, CSHB, pp. 120-121; Sigeberti Cont. Praemonstratensis, MGSS, VI, p. 456; Romuald, Chronicon, RSS (new), VII, I, pp. 239-240.
24. We have already commented on the chronological difficulties arising from these embassies.
25. Dandolo, RSS (new), XII, I, pp. 245-246. See also Hugh Falcando, FSI, p. 22; Tafel and Thomas, p. 174.
26. Romuald, Chronicon, RSS (new), VII, I, pp. 237-238. Hadrian refused to recognize his royal title.
27. Dölger, II, No. 1396; See Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, pp. 344-345; Kap-Herr, op.cit., p. 58; Simonsfeld, op.cit., I, p. 310.
28. Kinnamos, IV, I, CSHB, pp. 135-136.
29. The chronological problems here are difficult. It is clear that Ancona was chosen as a check against the pretensions of the Venetians. Chalandon, Domination Normande, II, p. 191, would not place their arrival before 1155. However, this rests on his assignment of Alexander of Gravina to the second legation from Frederick to Manuel in September, 1154. This I have rejected. Alexander was in Constantinople by the summer of 1154. There is no difficulty here in time. Anselm of Havelburg, however, stayed behind.
30. Otto, Gesta, II, 11, MGSS, XX, p. 395; Annales Mediolanenses, MGSS, XVIII, p. 393. See also Frederick's letter to Otto, MGSS, XX, pp. 347-348.
31. Liber Pontificalis, II, p. 389.



32. Ibid., II, p. 390.
33. Nicetas, VII, 2, CSHB, p. 265, shows an admirable grasp of Manuel's aims in the West.
34. Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Legum Sectio IV. Constitutiones et Acta Publica Imperatorum et Regum, I, p. 258: "Illius autem foedius tenor et contentus talis erat: ut neutra istarum partium sine alterius partis consensu et voluntate cum Greco aut cum Siculo aut cum senatoribus Romanis amicitiam vel pacem vel treugam componeret, manifestos etiam Romani imperii adversarios, si post ternam admonitionem non resipiscerent, Romana ecclesia excommunicaret, et e converso Romanae ecclesiae adversarios divus imperator viibus imperii coerceret".
35. Liber Pontificalis, II, 389-390; Romuald, Chronicon, RIS (new), VII, I, p. 238.
36. Liber Pontificalis, II, p. 389.
37. JL, II, pp. 110-111.
38. For the coronation, see Simonsfeld, op.cit., I, pp. 338 ff.
39. JL, II, p. 112. See Otto, Gesta, II, 23, MGSS, XX, pp. 407-408.
40. Otto, Gesta, II, 20, MGSS, XX, p. 403.
41. For some examples of the use of gold in Byzantine diplomacy, see Kinnamos, IV, 14, CSHB, p. 170; V, 9, CSHB, p. 228. Examples may also be found in Otto, Gesta, Wibaldi Ep., No. 147, William of Tyre, XX, 23-24, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 379-383, RHCocc., I, pp. 983-987. No wonder Nicetas and his generation of Greeks complained that Manuel had wasted Byzantine treasure in the West. See Nicetas, II, 7, CSHB, pp. 126-127, and VII, 2, CSHB, pp. 265-268. Kap-Herr, op.cit., p. 60.
42. Otto, Gesta, II, 23, MGSS, XX, p. 408. On Frederick's refusal to stay in southern Italy, see Simonsfeld, op.cit., I, pp. 335-336. Frederick's letter to Otto of Freising refers to this meeting, MGSS, XX, pp. 348-349. See Wibaldi Ep., No. 442, p. 575.
43. Dölger, II, No. 1399, Kinnamos, IV, 2-3, CSHB, pp. 136-138.



44. Kinnamos, IO, 4, CSHB, pp. 138-141.
  
45. Dolger, II, No. 1400, No. 1402; Cuffaro, Annales, FSI, I, II, pp. 41-42. Lloyd, op.cit., I, pp. 202-204; Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, pp. 338, 375-376; Simonsfeld, op.cit., I, p. 407. See also JGR, III, p. 494; A. Sanguinetti and G. Bertolatto, "Nuova Serie di Documenti sulle Relazioni di Genova coll' Impero Bizantino", (Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, XXVIII, Genova, 1896), pp. 339-573, reference here, pp. 343-348; C. Manfroni, "Le Relazioni fra Genova, L'Impero Bizantino e i Turchi", (Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, XXVIII, Genova, 1896), pp. 577-858, reference here, p. 602.
  
46. Kinnamos, IV, 5, CSHB, p. 146; Tyre XVIII, 2, Kroy-Babcock, II, pp. 236-238, RHCOcc., I, pp. 817-819; Liber Pontificalis, II, pp. 393-394; Romuald, Chronicon, RIS (new), VII, I, p. 239.
  
47. Dolger, II, No. 1403; Kinnamos, IV, 6, CSHB, p. 148. See the Liber Pontificalis, II, pp. 394-396; Simonsfeld, op.cit., I, p. 404.
  
48. Kinnamos, IV, 5-13, CSHB, pp. 145-169; see also Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 511; Hugh Falcando, FSI, pp. 20-22; Annales Ceccanenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 284; Romuald, Chronicon, RIS (new), VII, I, pp. 239-240; Liber Pontificalis, II, pp. 394-395.
  
49. See Chalandon, Domination Normande, II, pp. 231-234.
  
50. Otto, Gesta Cont. Ragewini, IV, 31, MGSS, XX, p. 462. See also the MGH, Legum Sectio IV, Constitutiones et Acta, I, p. 258.
  
51. Otto, Gesta, II, 29-30, MGSS, XX, pp. 413-44; Wibaldi Ep., No. 442, p. 575, n. 2. This reply to the mission of Wibaldi is Dolger, II, No. 1403.
  
52. Otto, Gesta, II, 30, MGSS, XX, p. 414.
  
53. For the Hungarian wars during this period, Kinnamos, III, 14, 19, pp. 121, 130-134; Otto, Gesta, II, 6, 31, MGSS, XX, pp. 393, 414.
  
54. Otto, Gesta, II, 31, MGSS, XX, p. 414.
  
55. Otto, Gesta, II, 29, MGSS, XX, p. 412.



56. Otto, Gesta, II, 31, MGSS, XX, pp. 414-415.
57. Wibaldi Ep., No. 454, p. 585.
58. Otto, Gesta, III, 6, MGSS, XX, p. 419. This is Dolger, II, No. 1414. cf. Simonsfeld, op.cit., I, pp. 558-560. Frederick never respected the imperial title of Manuel. See Otto, Gesta Cont. Ragewini, IV, 76, MGSS, XX, p. 491.
59. Otto, Gesta Cont. Ragewini, IV, 76, MGSS, XX, p. 496; Wibaldi Ep., p. 607. This is Dolger, II, No. 1424.
60. Dolger, II, No. 1415; Kinnamos, IV, 14-15, CSHB, pp. 170-172. See also Otto, Gesta, III, 20, MGSS, XX, p. 428.
61. Annales Pisanae, RIS (new), VI, II, p. 17; Romuald, RIS (new), VII, I, p. 241.
62. Nicetas, II, 8, CSHB, p. 130.
63. Caffaro, Annales, FSI, I, pp. 47-48.
64. Otto, Gesta Cont. Ragewini, III, 20, MGSS, XX, p. 428. This is Dolger, II, No. 1421, Kap-Herr, op.cit., pp. 64-65.
65. Kinnamos, IV, 14, CSHB, p. 170; Nicetas, II, 8, CSHB, p. 129.
66. For the brief war, see Kinnamos, IV, 14-15, CSHB, pp. 170-175, Nicetas, II, 8, CSHB, pp. 129-130. It is reflected in the papal letters, JL, 10301, 10302, 10303, 10304, 10305, 10306, dealing with riots in Rome. Also see Annales Ceccanenses, MGSS, XI, p. 284; Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 311. A complete secondary treatment may be found in Chalandon, Domination Normande, II, pp. 249-254.
67. Nicetas, II, 8, CSHB, p. 128. It should be mentioned that when Anselm of Havelburg returned from the East in the spring of 1155, he was elected archbishop of Ravenna.
68. Nicetas, II, 8, CSHB, pp. 129-130; Kinnamos, IV, 15, CSHB, pp. 173-175. See Dolger, II, No. 1416, No. 1417. Romuald, Chronicon, RIS (new), VII, I, p. 241; Annales Casinenses, MGSS, XIX, p. 311, Hugh Falcando, FSI, p. 24.





69. The support of Manuel was solicited by Alexander I-I. See Liber Pontificalis, II, p. 403.
70. RHGF, XVI, pp. 14-15, RR, No. 319.
71. RHGF, XVI, pp. 28-29, RR, No. 379.
72. RHGF, XVI, pp. 27-28, RR, No. 392. Rohricht places this letter, correctly I think, in 1163-1164. The tone of the letter suggests that the capture of Renaud had happened only a short time before.
73. RHGF, XVI, p. 15: "Ego autem de vestris naturalibus hominibus natus et nutritus, ad jussum vestrum adimplendum paratus sum".
74. JL, 10438, PL, 188, cc. 1501-1502, dated 1154-1159.
75. JL, 10514, PL, 188, c. 1603, dated 1157-1159.
76. JL, 10546, PL, 188, cc. 1615-1617.
77. Ibid, c. 1615.
78. Ibid, cc. 1615-1616.
79. Ibid, c. 1616: "Accidit ad hoc quod alienam terram intrare, nec providum videtur esse, nec tutum, nisi a principibus, et a populo terrae prius consilium requiratur. Tu vero, sicut accepimus, inconsulta Ecclesia, et principibus terrae illius, accedere illuc et festinare disponis, cum hoc deberes nulla ratione tentare, nisi cognita per principes terrae necessitate, et ab eis prius esses exinde requisitus". Ibid, c. 1616: "----ad memoriam revocare, qualiter alio tempore, cum tam Conradus ----, quem tu ipse, inconsulto populo terrae, Hierosolymitanum iter minus caute aggressi estis, speratum fructum et optatum commodum non perceperitis, et quantum Ecclesiae Dei et universo fere populo Christiano detrimentum exinde provererit et jactura. Sanctae quoque Romanae Ecclesiae, quia vobis super hoc consilium praestiterat et favorem, in ipso facto fuit non modicum derogatum; et omnes adversus ipsam ex multa indignatione clamabant, decentes, eam auctricem tanti periculi existitisse".
80. Ibid, cc. 1616-1617.



81. Dölger, II, No. 1435, No. 1436; Annianos, IV, 24, CSHB, p. 199; V, 1, CSHB, p. 202, V, 4, CSHB, pp. 203 ff; Nicetas, III, 5, CSHB, p. 151; Tyre XVIII, 30-31, Krey-Babcock, II, pp. 287-290, RHCocce., I, pp. 872-876. It should be pointed out that the marriage negotiations are fraught with chronological difficulties for the historian.
  
82. JL, 10393.
  
83. See Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, p. 190, n. 2, who cites there the work of J. Schmidt, Des Basilius aus Achrida Erzbischofs von Thessalonich bisher inedito Dialoge, (Munich, 1901). Schmidt was able to show the presence of Anselm in Thessalonica at this time.
  
84. JL, 10437, PL, 182, cc. 1580-1581. Jaffe dated it 1154-1159. The reference to the Latin ambassadors makes a more precise dating possible.
  
85. Ibid., c. 1580: "Ex quo per invidiam hostis antiqui Constantino-politana sedes a sacro sancta Romana et apostolica (quod sine lacrymarum inundatione vix famur). Ecclesiam seipsam separavit ----. Ideoque ad introductionem liberorum in locum Ecclesiae et unitatis, inventionemque amissae drachmae properamus----".
  
86. Ibid., cc. 1580-1581: "Nam una sola est Ecclesia, et unde sola sanctificationis arca, in quam unumquemque fidelium e diluvio servari oportet. ---ecclesia Dei non possit divisa consistere, ut omnem animam viventem e praesentis diluvii procellis intra unam arcam Ecclesiae congregari oporteat ad beatum Petrum omnium fidelium gubernatorem. Traditum est quoniam modo sancti Patres,--- omnium Ecclesiarum primatum sacrosanctam Romanam Ecclesiam absolute obtinere jusserint ---. Primum apud seipsum, deinde in aliis, quatenus divina gratia largitur, da operam, ut grex cum Ecclesia uniatur, et qui seipsos Dominicas oves confitentur, ad gregem B. Petri revertantur, ----".
  
87. Mansi, XXI, cc. 799-802.
  
88. Ibid., c. 800: "Quid igitur ad nos errantis ovie similitudo, sanctissimo papa? quid imago amissae drachmae?"
  
89. Ibid., cc. 800-802: "Tuto autem--stetimus in beati Petri confessione. ----nihil ex synodalibus sanctorum patrum decretis inovantis, nec adjicientes evangelis et apostolicis verbis, ad unum episcopum usque, vel jota unum. ----etiamsi tua sanctitas (contrarii) persuasione decepta, maxima quaedam de nobis suspicata sit, ex dilectione quorundam, qui hic peregrinati, nos allocuti sunt.



90. Ibid., c. 802: "ua autem integritas, unigue perfecti christi, tam sedo, quam peritia, et vitae splendore, imaginem et similitudinem referens, poterit omnino diffidio causam praebentis, scandala removere, et ecclesiis unionem soliditatenque restituere. Habet autem ad hoc sanctitas tua unanimem et adiutorem potentissimum, et inter imperatores maximum ac summum pietate, qui et viribus inexpugnabilis, et prudentia excellens, et inter omnes bonos qui unquam admirationi fuerunt celeberrimus ----".
  
91. The Annales Cameracenses, MGSS, XVI, p. 532, portrays the Greek emperor and king of Jerusalem as equal allies in 1159 against the "pagans".
  
92. On 13 June, 1157, Hadrian granted to Henry, Patriarch of Grado the right to consecrate a bishop for all the churches which Venice possessed within the boundaries of the Byzantine Empire and in Constantinople itself. It is possible to see in this concession papal confidence in an eventual reunion of the churches. JL, 10296.
  
93. See Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, No. 233, No. 235, No. 236, No. 239, No. 243, No. 248, No. 254, No. 256, No. 267; JL, 10524 for papal disciplining of the Hospital in its quarrel with the archbishop of Arles over tithes.
  
94. JL, 10342, 10415a, 10416b, 10573a. The first letter is important for its recitation of Baldwin's defeat in 1157. The last three are in the supplement to JL, II, pp. 760-761. JL 10416b and JL, 10524 all both papal attempts to discipline the Templars, in regard to its priests and in regard to the claims of the archbishop of Alres. See also JL, 10330, 10335. On this point, see the just remarks of Foreville-Lousset de Pina, Histoire - IX(2), p. 38. On these bulls see U.-chworin, Die Aufrufe der Päpste zur Befreiung des Heiligen Landes von den Anfängen bis zum Ausgang Innocenz IV., (Berlin, 1937), pp. 28, 75.
  
95. JL, 10003, 10004.
  
96. For this letter, see JL, 10107, JL, 183, cc. 1440-1441. The text of the letter may be found in the Codice Diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova, FSI, No. 273, pp. 331-332. The papal justification is worth quoting: "ad hoc in eminenti sedis apostolice specula divine sumus disponente gratia constituti ut nostre considerationis oculum ad universas mundi partes extendere debeamus, ut ea que contra iustitie tramitem et ordinis rationem commissa esse noscuntur, nos oporteat attentius emendare".



97. Caffaro, Annales, FSI, I, p. 45. PL, 183, c. 1644 is Genoa's complaint to Hadrian.
98. These forged letters are JL, 10108, 10109, 10110. See Paul Kehr, Italia Pontifica, VI, 2, pp. 326-327. La Monte, Feudal Monarchy, p. 239, has a short notice of the controversy, but he errs in stating that it began under Anaury rather than Baldwin III.





## CONCLUSION



The sixty years of papal activity covered in this dissertation present an interesting and instructive approach to the understanding of the Papacy in the first half of the twelfth century. We have described the relationship between the Papacy and the Latin establishments in the Orient as governed by a "practical idealism". Urban II had, in all probability, envisaged the introduction of the Latin temporal power into Syria-Palestine, and his successors were determined to let nothing hinder or impede the growth in strength of the temporal power in the Latin Orient. Upon the power of the lay lord depended, in the last analysis, the defence of the holiest shrine in Christendom against the power of the infidel.

We have argued that the papal favour and protection shown to the temporal power did not signify that the Papacy claimed suzerainty over the Latin Orient. If, as the leader of a militant Latin Christendom in the struggle against the infidel, the Papacy assumed the the major share of responsibility for the continuing power of the Latin Christians in the East, nevertheless the Popes did not claim to be the suzerains of the temporal power in the Latin Orient. The kings of Jerusalem were the representatives of all Latin Christians, and they were the vessels of the Holy Sepulchre alone. This is not to deny the great influence exercised by the Papacy over the life of the Latin Orient but rather to correct the views of some who, influenced by a profound misunderstanding of the aims and objectives of the Hildebrandine Papacy, have seen the Papacy as intending the establishment of a papal state in the East.

The papal favour, shown to the temporal power, is more clearly illuminated when seen in the light of the Papacy's relationship with the Latin Churches of Syria-Palestine. It had been the will of



Urban II, in all likelihood, that the Latin hierarchy be introduced into the East. Once established, the Papacy was not concerned to exalt the spiritual power over and against the temporal power. Further, she regarded the patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem as little more than primates, there being no room in the Roman scheme of things for any resurgence of the Eastern notion of independent patriarchates.

The relations between the Latin Church of the East and the Papacy followed the normal procedures of Latin Christendom in the twelfth century. Legates were regularly sent out from Rome, sometimes for the purposes of a general visitation but more often to deal with specific problems and disputes which the Papacy felt were dangerous to the peace of the Church in the East. By letter, by commands, oral and written, and by these legations, the Papacy sought to promote the spiritual vigour and zeal of the Latin Churches. However, once again, the Papacy would not sacrifice the temporal power to the ambition of any prelate. Further, the Papacy was wary of the independent attitudes which the patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem displayed upon occasion. Daimbert and Stephen received no support in their desire to create a theocratic state at Jerusalem. The Patriarch Ralph of Antioch, after a clear defiance of the prerogatives of the Roman Church was forced to recant. We remember also that bishop of Tripoli who was humbled before Eugene III after having denied the supremacy of the see of Peter.

Although the Popes refused to countenance any display of ambition on the part of a prelate towards the exaltation of the spiritual power at the expense of the temporal, or at the expense of the claims of the Roman Church, nonetheless, the Papacy would not



allow the temporal power to reduce the spiritual power to complete subservience. The canonical liberties of the Church were to be respected. The papal objectives were realized to a great extent. Despite occasional storms, the two powers grew together in strength and vigour. In Jerusalem, the relationship between the two powers soon reached smooth waters after the disturbances aroused by Daimbert, Ebremar and Arnulf had died away. To the north, the Patriarch Aimery ruled peaceably and well for thirty-five years. His successor, the brilliant, if violent Ralph, was humbled by the combined forces of the temporal power and the authority of Rome.

The Papacy's attitude we have described as a mixture of idealism with a firm grasp of the difficult situation which the Latins faced in the Orient. The entire complex of papal motives in regard to the Latin Church in the East is illustrated in the disputes surrounding the see of Tyre. The long controversy also illustrates admirably the difficulties which the Papacy encountered in dealing with the Latin Church of the East.

After a momentary hesitation under Paschal II, the Papacy had set its course towards the unequivocal exaltation of the power of the kingdom of Jerusalem. The two powers of Jerusalem had as their goal the full possession and control of Tyre and the cities and dioceses which ancient tradition had placed within her jurisdiction. Antioch by the same ancient church tradition was the spiritual lord of Tyre. If she were allowed to assert her claims to Tyre, then not only would Jerusalem be deprived of those churches which the strength of the kingdom had conquered for the church of Jerusalem but also the temporal power of the king of Jerusalem might suffer serious diminution.





The Papacy refused to permit any divided loyalties. Tyre would be oriented towards Jerusalem in matters spiritual and temporal. A divided loyalty would sap the Christian cause in the Latin Orient. Further, it was the defence of Jerusalem and the strength of the Latins there which mattered most to the Papacy. The liberation of that city had, after all, been one of the prime motivating factors in the launching of the Crusade. Despite a compromise formula, brought forward more as a counsel of despair than anything else by Paschal II, the Papacy resolutely set out to sacrifice the pride of the Antioch patriarchate to the needs, claims and ambitions of the kingdom of Jerusalem.

Throughout this thesis, we remarked on the fact that the Papacy from the first was more interested in the welfare of Jerusalem than in the welfare of Antioch. The factors in this are hard to isolate with any exactitude. We suggested that the Popes feared the appearance of an independent attitude on the part of the Antioch patriarch who might resurrect the notion of an independent Greek patriarchate, a claim which would be buttressed with a theory of Petrine Supremacy, interpreted to the advantage of Antioch and to the disadvantage of Rome. Further, the papal interest in Jerusalem was dictated by the fact that Jerusalem's shrines were to a great extent the raison d'être of the crusade, as said above. However, we also suggested that Rome was perhaps not concerned to protect and defend the power of a church and principality whose future as a Latin possession had been in doubt since the signing of the treaty of Devol in 1108. After his defeat by Alexius, Bohemund had acknowledged Antioch as a vassal state of the Empire and had agreed to introduce a Greek patriarch into the city as a sign of Antioch's incorporation into the Oecumene.



This is not to suggest that Rome was indifferent to Antioch's welfare. As we know, Innocent II acted decisively to save Antioch from the hands of John Comnenus in 1138. However, if the Papacy had been desirous of preserving Antioch for the Latins and had given through its legate implicit sanction of the removal of the Greek patriarch John from his see in 1100, still Antioch remained for Rome an unknown quantity, whose hostility to Rome was often apparent. Antioch clearly had defied the wishes of Rome in regard to the re-alignment of the suffragan sees of Tyre. Despite Ralph's deposition and the humbling of the bishop of Tripoli before Eugene III, Antioch continued on its course of independence, a course which had existed since the re-capture of the city in 1098. Otto of Freising praised Hugh of Jabala for the incorporation of the church of Antioch into the Roman orbit. This is sufficient judgment on the relations between Rome and Antioch from 1100-1138. However, we know that Otto's report is matched with the evidence which shows that Antioch after the Second Crusade became, if anything, even more progressively detached from the Roman orbit.

Hence it is that in Part Four of this thesis, we suggested that the papal power over the Latin Churches of the East was in something of a decline. Granted that Hadrian's action on behalf of the Genoese illustrates the great position which the Papacy occupied over the Latin Orient, a position paralleled by the growing papal influence in all of Western Christendom, the papal power received a notable series of checks in the East. Antioch remained indifferent to Rome's wishes in regard to the sees of the county of Tripoli. Those bishops themselves remained under Antioch's jurisdiction although here we suggested that their own desire for independence and the loose fluctuating ties of feudal suzerainty between the counts



of Tripoli and the kings of Jerusalem entered into this continuing obstinacy. As for the patriarchs of Jerusalem, they often displayed a desire to rule the see of Tyre and its dependent suffragans directly without acknowledging the ancient metropolitical rights of the see of Tyre. Or again, we described the actions of the Archbishop Fulcher who attempted to unify his church, apart from either patriarchate. Eventually, the church of Tyre was incorporated into the see of Jerusalem and received there its due recognition and honour. While this was a triumph for papal prestige, the northern sees remained recalcitrant, and many were they who blamed the Papacy for the destruction of the integrity of the church of Tyre. Other dissenting and critical voices were heard, from those who had long disliked the papal favour of the temporal power and from those who had resented the papal exemptions granted to the military Orders. These tensions should be added to the difficulties attendant upon ruling churches so far from Rome, where the Popes were dependent on the reports of legates who were often unduly influenced by party politics in the East, where often cases of appeal had to be decided on the basis of information which the Papacy knew to be biased and inadequate.

The papal dealings with Antioch lead us naturally to the part played by the Byzantine Empire in the Crusade and to the influence which it had upon the papal policies in regard to the crusading movement. If Urban had found inspiration for the Crusade in the appeals of the Emperor Alexius Comnenus, he nevertheless created an expedition whose purposes were quite independent of the aims and objectives of Byzantine policy in the twelfth century. Any aid which the crusaders might give to the Greeks was quite incidental to the real task of the expedition: the defence of the Eastern Christians and the liberation of the Holy Places in Jerusalem. Yet Adhemar was advised to tread



softly where the Greek church was concerned, lest the crusade drive a wedge between the two Churches already separated by theological dogma, cultural tradition and racial animosity. This moderate policy brought about the restoration of all re-conquered imperial territory to Alexius and the restoration of the Greek Patriarch John to his see in Antioch.

However, this friendly relationship was temporary. Bohemund's ambition deprived the Greeks of Antioch and drove John from his see. Racial and cultural animosity grew apace. Byzantine machtpolitik and the greed of the Italian maritimes completed the breakdown of relations between the Greeks and the crusaders. Alexius became to Westerners the enemy of the crusade, and the Papacy became more and more to the Greeks the enemy of the Empire, who supported Bohemund in his sinister "third" crusade, who continued to be the friend of the hated Normans of south Italy, those deadly enemies who along with the crusaders had brought nothing but insult and the loss of blood and treasure to the Empire.

Urban's desire for friendly relations while pursuing independent aims and objectives and also while preserving Latin independence through the introduction of the Latin temporal and spiritual power in the East thus soon disappeared. The estrangement continued. Attempts were made to heal the breach. When Alexius sought to unify the two imperial crowns in 1111, Paschal demanded first of all an alliance between the Greeks and the Normans and then the submission of the Greek hierarchy to Rome. Following upon the wanton attacks of the Venetians on the Greek possessions, the Papacy, perhaps in the interests of the Crusade, made overtures to the Emperor John Comnenus. The Papacy was refused by John in this. The Greek resentment against the Latins, a thing of long standing, grew more bitter.





The Greek hierarchy had refused to countenance the doctrine of papal supremacy unless such were placed up for free and full debate in a general council. This attitude applied also to the other theological and liturgical divergences between the two churches. These antagonisms, the racial and political animosities arising from the Crusade, the continuing alliance between the Papacy and the Normans and the irreconcilable notions of Petrine supremacy and Byzantine Caesaropapism combined to frustrate the reconciliation.

The matter was not advanced by the attack on the Papacy by the Greek ambassador to Lothair, an attack which illustrated the Greek hatred for the Papacy, a hatred confirmed in the writings of Anna Comnena. Innocent II in the next year denounced John for his descent upon Antioch, determined, all treaties notwithstanding, to save the city for the Latins. Hugh of Jabala reiterated the papal command, ordering the Emperor to retire from Antioch in the name of the Pope and the Western Emperor.

The Byzantines were not easily put off. Since 1098 they had laboured for the recovery of Antioch, a fortress so necessary for the defence of their lands in Asia Minor. Tensured, the Armenians, the native Christians, and now the Papacy had frustrated the Byzantine ambition. However, the house of the Comneni never surrendered its plan to reduce Antioch to the status of an obedient vassal state and duchy, serving as a base for Byzantine military operations and as a buffer against the onslaughts of the infidel.

The problem here was complicated further by the growth of Byzantine ambition. The Emperors of Constantinople met the challenge of the Normans of south Italy and the expanding Latin power in the Mediterranean by an aggressive policy of their own. The venerable East-West alliance was renewed, its purpose being the destruction of the power



of Roger of Sicily. However, this made the Papacy more suspicious than ever of the Greeks. We suggested that the preservation of friendly relations with the Germans and the Papacy had influenced the Emperor John Comnenus to withdraw from Antioch. The Greek conquest of Antioch would be a permanent barrier to any reconciliation between Greek and Latin, between Pope and Byzantine Emperor.

The imperial ambitions were advanced by the increasing estrangement between the Papacy and Roger of Sicily. It was also furthered by the Second Crusade. We noted that Eugene III hoped that the Crusade would bring about the reconciliation of the two churches, a "difficult and arduous" matter to this Pope who a few years later remarked to Anselm of Havelberg on the great divergence in faith and practise between the two churches. The papal desire was frustrated by circumstance. However, it is of the greatest importance that if in the years after the Second Crusade the Papacy feared the East-West alliance for its possible consequences for the Italian peninsula, it would not allow Roger to raise a "crusade" to punish the Greek Empire for its part in the failure of the Second Crusade. Wiser than Paschal, Eugene saw that this was only a device to further the ambitions of the Norman and but also a profound perversion of the ideal of the Crusade. With Greek ambitions in Italy, the Papacy had no sympathy. When however, Manuel had been defeated in his attempted interventions in Italy and Hadrian had seen the emergence of Hohenstaufen ambition, bringing on the second great crisis in Europe between the regnum and the sacerdotium, the leaders of Greek and Latin Christendom came closer together than ever before. The Pope opened the matter of church union. No threatening papal letter diminished Manuel's glory at Antioch. For the first time, it seemed as if cooperation for the sake of the Crusade between Greek and Latin might become a reality.



This informal entente arrived at an opportune time. The need of the Latin Orient for military assistance and financial support had never been greater. It is all the more unfortunate that our investigation stops with the year 1160. The reign of Alexander III saw the frustration of the progress achieved by the rapprochement between the two heads of Latin and Greek Christendom. No reconciliation was achieved between the claims of Rome and the imperial prerogative. In the West, the imperial ambition was checked once and for all. In the East, the relations between the Emperor and the crusader cooled. Further, Manuel's military power was broken forever at Myriokephalon. After his death, his pro-Latin policies were rejected when palace sedition raised Andronicus Comnenus to the throne. The dream of restoring the empire of Justinian came to an end.

The failure of the entente between Latin and Greek to bear fruit is directly connected with the collapse of the Latin power in Syria-Palestine. It is all the more tragic that the papal-imperial entente perished not only through the fortunes of war but through the conflict of human ambitions and mutually exclusive ideologies.

We have taken some pains to show that the papal attitude towards the crusaders in the East is a growingly integral part of papal policies in the West. The papal-Norman alliance figures in the relations between the Papacy and the Greek rulers. The hostility of the Papacy to the Norman monarchs and the growing hostility between the Papacy and the German emperors plays its role in the relationship of Latin and Greek. Yet despite these political vicissitudes, the Papacy tried to keep before the conscience of Europe the necessity for continued support of the crusade movement to the East. The pilgrimage to Jerusalem and also to Spain was indulged. Pilgrims were protected by the authority of the Church as was their property during their absence on pilgrimage.



Yet in the preaching of the Second Crusade, we noted the political consideration which had made Eugene turn first to the French and then to the Italians, wishing the Germans to stay at home and thus assist the Papacy in her difficulties with the Romans and the Normans. Here, however, the inspiration of Bernard operated against the papal desire. Papal influence also was lessened in the control of the Second Crusade. We remember that the papal legates were almost completely ineffective. Further, the result of the Second Crusade was that it brought bitterness in great measure against the Latin Orient and even against the Roman Church. The Papacy learned caution. The difficulties of Paschal with Bohemund, the disaster of the Second Crusade, the slanders directed against the Latin Orient, St. Bernard and the Papacy after the Second Crusade, and the craft of Roger II had been a school of troubles from which the Papacy emerged with a chastened and more sober attitude towards the Crusade. More and more the Popes turned to the military Orders, then at the height of their popularity. The faithful were encouraged in every way to support these Orders and through them to support the crusade in the East. Anxious to foster the progress of these Orders, the Papacy granted them extraordinary privileges and took them under the special protection of the Apostolic See.

The Papacy was wiser than it knew in this. Early in his reign, Alexander III was to issue a general crusade appeal to which Europe would turn a deaf ear. In a way, Europe never recovered from the Second Crusade. Only the capture of Jerusalem by Saladin would enkindle the ancient enthusiasm for the defence of the Holy Places. But then it would be too late.













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